area handbook series 

Israel 

a country study 




? 



Israel 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
December 1988 




On the cover: Shield of David — the menorah surrounded by 
olive branches, the official symbol of Israel 



Third Edition; First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Israel: A Country Study. 

Area handbook series, DA Pam 550-25 
Research completed December 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 361-386. 
Includes index. 

1. Israel I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress. III. Area Handbook for Israel. IV. 
Series: DA Pam 550-25. 

DS126.5.I772 1990 90-6119 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-25 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals who wrote the 1978 edition of Israel: A Country 
Study, which was edited by Richard F. Nyrop: Richard F. Nyrop, 
Laraine N. Carter, Darrell R. Eglin, Rinn Sup Shinn, and James 
D. Rudolph. Their work provided the organization and structure 
of the present volume, as well as portions of the text. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research 
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. The authors 
also wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division staff 
who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These 
people include Thomas Collelo, the substantive reviewer of all the 
textual material and maps; Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all 
drafts and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; and 
Martha E. Hopkins, who managed book editing and production. 
Noelle B. Beatty, Sharon Costello, Deanna D'Errico, and Evan 
Raynes edited the chapters. Also involved in preparing the text 
were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson. 
Catherine Schwartzstein performed final prepublication review. 
Shirley Kessel compiled the index. Malinda B. Neale of the Library 
of Congress Composing Unit set the type, under the direction of 
Peggy Pixley. 

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto, 
assisted by Sandra K. Ferrell. Carolina E. Forrester reviewed the 
map drafts and prepared the final maps. Special thanks are owed 
to Kimberly A. Lord, who designed the cover artwork and the illus- 
trations on the title page of each chapter. 

The authors would like to thank Arvies J. Staton, who supplied 
information on ranks and insignia. Joshua Sinai provided invalu- 
able assistance in the transliteration and translation of Hebrew 
terms. Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the many 
individuals and public agencies who allowed their photographs to 
be used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Mark A. Lewis 

ANCIENT ISRAEL 6 

HELLENISM AND THE ROMAN CONQUEST 11 

PALESTINE BETWEEN THE ROMANS AND 

MODERN TIMES 15 

ORIGINS OF ZIONISM 17 

Political Zionism 24 

Cultural Zionism 26 

Labor Zionism 28 

Revisionist Zionism 29 

EVENTS IN PALESTINE, 1908-48 30 

Arab Nationalism 30 

World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue 32 

The Arab Community During the Mandate 38 

The Jewish Community under the Mandate 40 

The Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39 44 

World War II and Zionism 47 

The Holocaust 48 

Prelude to Statehood 49 

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE, 1948-67 52 

Etatism 52 

Ingathering of the Exiles 53 

Israeli Arabs, Arab Land, and Arab Refugees 54 

The Emergence of the IDF 57 

1967 AND AFTERWARD 59 

The War of Attrition 62 

The October 1973 War 64 

The Decline of the Labor Party 68 

Oriental Jews 69 



vii 



THE BEGIN ERA 70 

The Peace Process 70 

The Occupied Territories 73 

Israeli Action in Lebanon, 1978-82 76 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment . 8i 

Kevin Avruch 

GEOGRAPHY 85 

Topography 85 

Climate 87 

POPULATION 88 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 93 

Varieties of Israeli Judaism 95 

The Role of Judaism 97 

Jewish Ethnic Groups 112 

Minority Groups 120 

Distinctive Social Institutions 127 

EDUCATION 130 

Higher Education 133 

Youth Movements and Organizations 134 

HEALTH 134 

WELFARE 136 

Chapter 3. Economy 139 

Joseph Pelzman 

OVERVIEW OF THE 1948-72 PERIOD 141 

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE . . 143 

Slowdown of Economic Growth 144 

Changes in Investment Patterns 146 

Changes in Industrial Structure 147 

Changes in Labor Force 148 

THE PUBLIC SECTOR 150 

Government Budget 150 

Provision of Civilian Services 151 

Provision of Defense Services 152 

Taxation 153 

INDUSTRY 154 

Electronics 155 

Biotechnology 155 

Diamonds 156 

Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 156 

Clothing and Textiles 157 

Construction 158 

Tourism 158 



vin 



Energy 159 

AGRICULTURE 161 

FINANCIAL SERVICES 162 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 166 

FOREIGN TRADE 169 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 173 

THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM OF 

JULY 1985 173 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 177 

Joshua Sinai 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 181 

GOVERNMENT 184 

The President 184 

The Cabinet 185 

The Civil Service 189 

The Knesset 190 

The State Comptroller 192 

The Judicial System 193 

Local Government 198 

Civilian Administration in the West Bank and the 

Gaza Strip 199 

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 200 

World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency . . 200 

Histadrut 202 

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK: ELITE, VALUES, AND 

ORIENTATIONS 203 

MULTIPARTY SYSTEM 210 

Alignment Parties 213 

The Likud Bloc 217 

Religious Parties 220 

Right-Wing Ultranationalist Parties 224 

Extraparliamentary Religio-Nationalist Movements . . 225 

Arab Parties 226 

Interest Groups 227 

PROSPECTS FOR ELECTORAL REFORM 228 

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 229 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 230 

Relations with Middle Eastern States 231 

Relations with the United States 234 

Relations with the Soviet Union 239 

Relations with Eastern Europe 240 

Relations with Western Europe 241 

Relations with African States 242 



ix 



Relations with Asian States 244 

Relations with Latin America 244 

COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA 244 

Chapter 5. National Security 249 

Jean R. Tartter and Robert Scott Mason 

SECURITY: A PERSISTENT NATIONAL CONCERN 252 

Historical Background 252 

War of Independence 255 

1956 War 256 

June 1967 War 259 

October 1973 War 260 

1982 Invasion of Lebanon 262 

The Siege of Beirut and Its Aftermath 264 

ISRAELI CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 266 

Dormant War 267 

Extensive Threat 267 

Strategic Depth 268 

Potential Causes of War 269 

Nuclear and Conventional Deterrents 270 

Autonomy 271 

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY 

CONCERNS 272 

The Arab Military Threat 272 

Palestinian Terrorist Groups 275 

Jewish Terrorist Organizations 279 

THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES 280 

Command Structure 280 

Ground Forces 281 

Navy 283 

Air Force 285 

Nahal 287 

Gadna 287 

Conscription 288 

Women in the IDF 289 

Reserve Duty 290 

Training 290 

Minorities in the IDF 294 

Pay and Benefits 294 

Rank, Insignia, and Uniforms 296 

Awards and Decorations 297 

Discipline and Military Justice 297 

THE IDF IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 300 

Military Government 301 



x 



Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- 303 

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 306 

Economic Impact 306 

The IDF as a Socializing Factor 308 

The Military in Political Life 310 

DEFENSE PRODUCTION AND SALES 314 

Defense Industries 315 

Nuclear Weapons Potential 317 

Foreign Military Sales and Assistance 318 

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED 

STATES 320 

THE ISRAEL POLICE 323 

Subordinate Forces 324 

Police Reform 326 

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 327 

Mossad 327 

Aman 328 

Shin Bet 329 

Lekem 330 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331 

Judicial System 331 

Criminal Justice in the Occupied Territories 333 

Penal System 334 

Appendix A. Tables 339 

Appendix B. Political Parties and 

Organizations 355 

Bibliography 36i 

Glossary 387 

Index 393 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Israel, 1988 xxii 

2 Land of Israel During the Reigns of David and Solomon . . 12 

3 Palestine During the Mandate and Two of the Partition 

Proposals 46 

4 Topography and Drainage 86 

5 Jewish Population Distribution by Age, Sex, and Origin, 

1986 90 

6 Non-Jewish Population Distribution by Age, Sex, and 

Religion, 1986 92 

7 Analysis of Jewish Population Distribution by Origin, 

1948, 1972, and 1986 94 



8 Economic Activity, 1988 160 

9 Transportation System, 1988 168 

10 Government System, 1988 186 

11 Evolution of Political Parties, 1948-88 (Simplified) 215 

12 Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon 266 

13 Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring 

Countries, 1987 274 

14 Organization of National Defense, 1988 282 

15 Ranks and Insignia of the Israeli Defense Forces, 1988 .... 298 

16 Israeli Settlements in the Golan Heights, 1985 302 

17 Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, October 1986 304 

18 Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip, January 1988 306 



xii 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, 
and military aspects of contemporary Israeli society. Sources of in- 
formation included scholarly journals and monographs, official 
reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and 
domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliog- 
raphies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some 
of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the 
metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those read- 
ers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Ap- 
pendix A). 

An effort has been made to limit the use of foreign — mostly 
Hebrew and Arabic — words and phrases, but a fairly large num- 
ber were deemed necessary to an understanding of the society. 
These terms have been defined the first time they appear in a chap- 
ter or defined in a Glossary entry. To help readers identify the 
numerous political groups, Appendix B, Political Parties and 
Organizations, is provided. 

The transliteration of Hebrew words and phrases follows a modi- 
fied version of the system adopted by the United States Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic 
Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN sys- 
tem. The names of people and places of ancient Israel are gen- 
erally presented as they appear in the Revised Standard Version 
of the Bible. 

A modified version of the BGN/PCGN system for transliterat- 
ing Arabic was employed. The modification is a significant one, 
however, entailing as it does the omission of diacritical marks and 
most hyphens. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: State of Israel 

Short Form: Israel 

Term for Citizens: Israeli(s) 

Capital: Government located in Jerusalem, Israel's officially desig- 
nated capital. In 1988 United States and most other countries con- 
tinued to recognize Tel Aviv as capital and to maintain their 
chanceries there. 



xv 



Geography 

Size: About 20,700 square kilometers. Occupied territories com- 
prise additional 7,477 square kilometers: West Bank, 5,879; Gaza 
Strip, 378; East Jerusalem, annexed in 1967, annexation reaffirmed 
in July 1980, 70; and Golan Heights, annexed in December 1981, 
1,150. 

Topography: Four general areas: coastal plain — fertile, humid, 
and thickly populated — stretches along Mediterranean Sea; cen- 
tral highlands including Hills of Galilee in north with country's 
highest elevation at Mt. Meron (1,208 meters), and arid Judean 
Hills in south; Jordan Rift Valley with lowest point (399 meters 
below sea level) at Dead Sea; and Negev Desert, which accounts 
for about half Israel's area. 

Society 

Population: Officially estimated in October 1987 at 4,389,600, 
of whom about 82 percent Jews. Population increasing at annual 
rate of about 1.8 percent, although Arab segment of population 
increasing at annual rate of about 2.8 percent compared to Jewish 
population growth rate of 1.3 percent. 

Education: High level of education, literacy rate of Jewish popu- 
lation about 90 percent. State education either secular or religious, 
with independent (but substantially state-supported) religious 
schools in addition; ratio of secular to religious enrollments approxi- 
mately 70 to 30. Schools are free and compulsory for students 
through age fifteen, and are supplemented by scouting, youth move- 
ments, and vocational training. Seven universities. 

Health: High level of health and medical care, with one of highest 
physician-patient ratios in world. Average life expectancy of 73.9 
for Jewish males and 77.3 for females; 72.0 for non-Jewish males 
and 75.8 for females. Steadily declining infant mortality rates. 
Widespread system of public health and broad insurance cover- 
age contribute to eradication and prevention of disease. Many 
voluntary and charitable organizations, some funded substantially 
from abroad, involved in health care. 

Languages: Hebrew major official language and most widely used 
in daily life. Arabic, chief language of Arab minority, also official 
language and may be used in Knesset (parliament) and courts; also 
spoken by older Sephardim (Oriental Jews — see Glossary). English 
widely spoken and taught in state schools. Yiddish spoken by older 



xvi 



Ashkenazim (see Glossary) and by ultra-Orthodox. Numerous other 
languages and dialects spoken by smaller segments of population, 
reflecting diversity of cultural origins. 

Religion: Judaism dominant faith. Substantial Sunni (see Glos- 
sary) Muslim (about 77 percent of non-Jewish population) and 
smaller Christian and Druze (see Glossary) communities also 
present. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Approximately US$33 billion 
(US$7,576 per capita) in 1987. Between 1973 and 1983 real 
GNP growth rate was approximately 2.0 percent per year. Real 
GNP increased 2.4 percent in 1984, increased 3.7 percent in 
1985, increased 3.3 percent in 1986, and increased 5.2 percent in 
1987. 

Agriculture: Efficient and modern. Irrigation extensive, but all 
available water resources currently being used. Main products in- 
cluded cereals, fruits, vegetables, poultry, and dairy products. 
Specialization in high-value produce, partly for export. Imports 
of grains and meat. Agriculture's share of GNP 5 percent in 1986. 

Industry: Contributed 23 percent of GNP and employed 23 per- 
cent of labor force in 1986. Major industries included electronics, 
biotechnology, diamond cutting and polishing, energy, chemicals, 
rubber, plastics, clothing and textiles, and defense. 

Imports: US$9.2 billion in 1986, excluding US$1.1 billion of direct 
defense imports. Materials for processsing accounted for more than 
75 percent of nondefense imports. Bulk of imports from industri- 
alized countries. 

Exports: US$6.9 billion in 1986. Metals, machinery, and electron- 
ics represented main exports (US$2.2 billion in 1986). Diamonds 
were next largest export (US$1 .9 billion). Main markets in indus- 
trial countries. 

Balance of Payments: During 1986 Israel had current account 
surplus of US$1 .4 billion. Situation resulted from Economic Stabili- 
zation Program adopted in July 1985. 

Currency and Exchange Rates: New Israeli shekel introduced Sep- 
tember 1985, worth 1,000 of former shekels; 100 agorot (sing., 
agora — see Glossary) = 1 new Israeli shekel. Average exchange 
rate 1988 1.6 NIS per US$. 



xvn 



Transportation and Communications 



Roads: 13,410 kilometers of roads in 1985, providing relatively 
dense network. 

Railroads: 528 kilometers of state-owned railroads in 1988 link- 
ing major centers of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba, and 
Ashdod. 

Ports: Haifa most important, handling about 55 percent of for- 
eign trade in 1985, excluding bulk oil transport. Ashdod and Elat 
(Red Sea) other major cargo ports. Oil terminals at Elat and near 
Ashqelon; coal terminal at Hadera. 

Airports: International airport at Lod; smaller airport at Elat. 

Pipelines: Elat to near Ashqelon for crude oil for ongoing ship- 
ment; branch leads to Ashdod and Haifa refineries and to consump- 
tion centers, including Elat, for petroleum products. 

Communications: Modern, developed system with good connec- 
tions via cable and three ground satellite stations to rest of world. 
In FY 1986 about 1 .9 million telephones. In late 1980s, Israel faced 
a demand for more telecommunications services than it was able 
to provide. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Republic and parliamentary democracy headed by 
president, titular head of state. Executive power wielded by prime 
minister and cabinet ministers representing dominant political blocs 
in Knesset, to which they are collectively responsible. Knesset is 
unicameral parliament of 120 members elected at-large every four 
years as a rule by direct secret ballot and under system of propor- 
tional representation; voting for party lists rather than individual 
candidates. Electoral system remains object of political reform. 
Government system based on no comprehensive written constitu- 
tion but nine Basic Laws enacted by Knesset. Efforts to introduce 
constitution delineating principle of separation of powers and estab- 
lishing supremacy of civil law and secular bill of rights have so far 
met resistance. Judiciary independent and comprises secular, re- 
ligious, and military courts. Integrity and performance of govern- 
mental system checked by independent and influential ombudsman, 
Office of the State Comptroller. 

Politics: Multiparty system divided into four main categories: left- 
of-center parties, right-of-center parties, right-wing religious parties, 



xvm 



and Arab parties. Inconclusive twelfth Knesset election held in 
November 1988 repeated pattern of 1984 Knesset elections with 
neither major party able to form cohesive coalition government 
without other's equal participation. This resulted in formation of 
National Unity Government. Long-term electoral trends, however, 
indicated upswing in support for right-of-center parties. 

Administrative Divisions: Divided into six administrative districts 
and fourteen subdistricts under ultimate jurisdiction of Ministry 
of Interior. Occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
annexed Golan Heights administered by Israel Defense Forces. 

Foreign Affairs: Foreign policy chiefly influenced by Israel's stra- 
tegic situation, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and rejection of Israel 
by most Arab states. Diplomatic relations established with Egypt 
following 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and Israel maintained 
de facto peaceful relationship with Jordan. General consensus in 
Israel over terms of 1978 Camp David Accords, but disagreement 
over principle of exchanging land for peace, particularly over West 
Bank, and direct negotiations with Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: As of 1987, army 104,000 on active duty, includ- 
ing 88,000 conscripts; navy 8,000, including 3,200 conscripts; air 
force 39,000, including 7,000 conscripts. Reservists: army 494,000, 
navy 1,000, air force 50,000. Male conscripts served three years 
active duty and female conscripts twenty months; annual reserve 
duty for males thirty to sixty days following active service. Paramili- 
tary groups included Nahal, combining military service with work 
in agricultural settlements, and Gadna, providing military train- 
ing at high school level. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment: As of 1987, on mobiliza- 
tion, army had eleven divisions composed of thirty- three armored 
brigades; also nine independent mechanized brigades, three infantry 
brigades, five paratroop brigades, fifteen artillery brigades. 
Equipped with 3,900 tanks and 8,000 other armored vehicles. Navy 
had 100 combat vessels, including 3 submarines, 19 missile attack 
craft, 40 coastal patrol boats. Three missile corvettes and two sub- 
marines on order. Air force had 655 combat aircraft organized into 
twelve fighter-interceptor squadrons, six fighter squadrons, one 
reconnaissance squadron. First-line fighters were F-15s, F-16s, and 
Kfirs. 



xix 



Equipment Sources: Large domestic defense industry of state- 
owned and privately owned firms produced aircraft, missiles, small 
arms, munitions, electronics, and communications gear. Export 
sales of US$1 .2 billion annually exceeded production for domestic 
use. United States military aid running at US$1 .8 billion annually, 
including fighter aircraft, helicopters, missile boats, and funding 
for Israeli-manufactured weapons. 

Military Budget: US$5.6 billion in Israeli fiscal year 1987; ap- 
proximately 14 percent of GNP and 25 percent of total govern- 
ment budget. 

Police and Intelligence Agencies: As of 1986, Israel 
Police — 20,874, including Border Police of approximately 5,000 
and Palestinian Police (1,000). Auxiliary forces included Civil 
Defense Corps of army reservists (strength unknown) and Civil 
Guard (approximately 100,000 volunteers). Separate intelligence 
organizations included Mossad (external), Shin Bet (domestic), and 
Aman (military). 



xx 



International 
boundary 

District 
boundary 

National capital 

District center 

Armistice 
1949 

Armistice line 
1950 

40 Kilometers 



The 1 950 Israeli proclamation 
that Jerusalem be the national 
capital is not recognized by the 
United Slates government. 




United Nations 
Disengagement 
Observer Force Zone 



GOLAN HEIGHTS 

(fsr&eb occupied} 33 



SYRIA 



Cease-ire line, 198? 



Amman 



Mediterranean Sea 



\ SOUTHERN 

\ 

\ 



EGYPT 



-30 



; ) 



34 



guff of Kqaba 



5 Boundary, 
i not necesi 



32- 



JORDAN 



31 



30 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions, Israel, 1988 



xxn 



Introduction 



ISRAEL OBSERVED THE fortieth anniversary of its founding 
as a state in 1988. Although a young nation in the world commu- 
nity, Israel has been profoundly influenced by Jewish history that 
dates back to biblical times as well as by the Zionist movement 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. These two strands, 
frequently in conflict with one another, helped to explain the ten- 
sions in Israeli society that existed in the late 1980s. Whereas Ortho- 
dox Judaism emphasized the return to the land promised by God 
to Abraham, secular Zionism stressed the creation of a Jewish na- 
tion state. 

Zionism historically has taken different forms, and these varia- 
tions were reflected in twentieth-century Israeli society. The lead- 
ing type of early Zionism, political Zionism, came out of Western 
Europe in large measure as a response to the failure of the eman- 
cipation of Jews in France in 1791 to produce in the succeeding 
century the degree of the anticipated reduction in anti-Semitism. 
Jewish assimilation into West European society was inhibited by 
the anti-Jewish prejudice resulting from the 1894 trial of Alfred 
Dreyfus, a French Jewish officer. Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, 
in 1896 published a book advocating the creation of a Jewish state 
to which West European Jews would immigrate, thus solving the 
Jewish problem. Rather than emphasizing creation of a political 
entity, cultural Zionism, a product of oppressed East European 
Jewry, advocated the establishment in Palestine of self-reliant Jewish 
settiements to create a Hebrew cultural renaissance. Herzl was will- 
ing to have the Jewish state located in Uganda but East European 
Jews insisted on the state's being in Palestine, and after Herzl' s 
death in 1904, the cultural Zionists prevailed. Meanwhile, the need 
arose for practical implementation of the Zionist dream and Labor 
Zionism came to the fore, appealing particularly to young Jews 
who were influenced by socialist movements in Russia and who 
sought to flee the pogroms in Eastern Europe. Labor Zionism 
advocated socialism to create an equitable Jewish society and 
stressed the integration of class and nation. David Ben-Gurion, 
who came to Palestine in 1906, became a leader of this group, which 
favored a strong economic basis for achieving political power. Labor 
Zionism in turn was challenged by the Revisionist Zionism of 
Vladimir Jabotinsky, a Russian Jew who glorified nationalism and 
sought to promote Jewish immigration to Palestine and the im- 
mediate declaration of Jewish statehood. 



xxm 



The Zionist cause was furthered during World War I by Chaim 
Weizmann, a British Jewish scientist, skilled in diplomacy, who 
recognized that Britain would play a major role in the postwar set- 
tlement of the Middle East. At that time Britain was seeking the 
wartime support of the Arabs, and in the October 1915 correspon- 
dence between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, 
British high commissioner in Egypt, Britain endorsed Arab post- 
war independence in an imprecisely defined area that apparently 
included Palestine. In November 1917, however, Britain commit- 
ted itself to the Zionist cause by the issuance of the Balfour Decla- 
ration, which stated that the British government viewed with favor 
"the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jew- 
ish People," while the "civil and religious rights of existing non- 
Jewish communities in Palestine" were not to suffer. These two 
concurrent commitments ultimately proved irreconcilable. 

During the succeeding decades until the Holocaust conducted 
by Nazi Germany during World War II, Jewish immigration to 
Palestine continued at a fairly steady pace. The Holocaust, in which 
nearly 6 million Jews lost their lives, gave an impetus to the crea- 
tion of the state of Israel: thousands of Jews sought to enter Pales- 
tine while Britain, as the mandatory power, imposed limits on 
Jewish immigration to safeguard the indigenous Arab inhabitants. 
An untenable situation developed, and in 1947 Britain referred the 
Palestine problem to the United Nations General Assembly. The 
latter body approved a resolution on November 29, 1947, calling 
for a complex partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. 
The Arab Higher Committee rejected the resolution, and violence 
increased. The establishment of the State of Israel was declared 
on May 14, 1948, and Arab military forces began invading the 
territory the following day. By January 1949, Israel had gained 
more territory than had been allotted by the partition; East Jerusa- 
lem and the West Bank of the Jordan River remained in Jordanian 
hands as a result of fighting by the Arab Legion of Transjordan, 
and the Gaza area remained in Egyptian hands (see fig. 1). Israel 
held armistice talks with the Arab states concerned in the first half 
of 1949 and armistice lines were agreed upon, but no formal peace 
treaties ensued. 

Having achieved statehood, the new government faced numer- 
ous problems. These included the continued ingathering of Jews 
from abroad, the provision of housing, education, health and wel- 
fare facilities, and employment for the new immigrants; the estab- 
lishment of all requisite government services as well as expanding 
the country's infrastructure; the expropriation of Arab lands — 
including lands left by Arabs who had fled during the 1948 war 



xxiv 



as well as by Arabs obliged by the government to relocate — so as 
to provide a livelihood for new immigrants; the establishment of 
a military government to administer Arab population areas; and 
the growth of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to safeguard national 
security. 

Tensions continued to exist between Israel and its neighbors, 
and as a result a series of wars occurred: in 1956 in the Suez Canal 
area; in June 1967, during which Israel captured the Golan Heights, 
the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West 
Bank, adding about 800,000 Palestinian Arabs to its population; 
and in October 1973, a war that destroyed Israel's image of its in- 
vincibility. Israel's poor showing in the early days of the 1973 war 
led to considerable popular disenchantment with the ruling Labor 
Party; this declining popularity, combined with the growing number 
of Oriental Jews who identified more readily with the religious ex- 
pressions of Menachem Begin than with Labor's socialist policies, 
contributed to the coming to power of the conservative Likud Bloc 
in the May 1977 elections. 

The rise of Oriental Jews illustrated the changing pattern of eth- 
nicity in the course of Jewish history. In the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, the majority of the Jewish population in Palestine was of 
Sephardic (Spanish or Portuguese) origin, but by the time the State 
of Israel was created Ashkenazim (Jews of Central or East Euro- 
pean origin) constituted 77 percent of the population. By the 
mid-1970s, however, as a result of the influx of Oriental Jews from 
North Africa and the Middle East, the Ashkenazi majority had been 
reversed, although Ashkenazim still dominated Israel's political, 
economic, and social structures. Oriental immigrants tended to 
resent the treatment they had received in transition camps and de- 
velopment towns at the hands of the Labor government that ruled 
Israel for almost thirty years. Furthermore, Orientals experienced 
discrimination in housing, education, and employment; they recog- 
nized that they constituted a less privileged group in society that 
came to be known as the ''Second Israel." 

In addition to the Ashkenazi-Oriental division, Israel has faced 
a cleavage between religiously observant Orthodox Jews and secular 
Jews, who constituted a majority of the population. In broad terms, 
most secular Jews were Zionists who sought in various ways, de- 
pending on their conservative, liberal, or socialist political views, 
to support governmental programs to strengthen Israel economi- 
cally, politically, and militarily. Jews belonging to religious politi- 
cal parties, however, tended to be concerned with strict observance 
of religious law, or halakah, and with preserving the purity of Juda- 
ism. The latter was reflected in the views of religiously observant 



xxv 



Jews who accepted as Jews only persons born of a Jewish mother 
and the ultra-Orthodox who considered conversions by Reform or 
Conservative rabbis as invalid. 

A further divisive element in Israeli society concerned the role 
of minorities: Arab Muslims, Christians, and Druzes. These sec- 
tors together constituted approximately 18 percent of Israel's popu- 
lation in late 1989, with a birth rate in each case higher than that 
of Jews. Israelis in the late 1980s frequently expressed concern over 
government statistics that indicated that the high birthrate among 
Arabs in Israel proper (quite apart from the West Bank) had resulted 
in an Arab population majority in Galilee. They were concerned 
as well over the comparative youth of the Arab population in com- 
parison with the Jewish population. In general, members of the 
ethnic minorities were less well off in terms of employment, hous- 
ing, and education than the average for the Jewish population. 

The role of the Arab minority in Israel's economy has histori- 
cally been controversial. Labor Zionism advocated that all man- 
ual labor on kibbutzim and moshavim (see Glossary) be performed 
by Jewish immigrants themselves. As immigration increased, 
however, and immigrants had skills needed by the new state in areas 
other than agriculture, cheap Arab labor came to be used for agricul- 
tural and construction purposes. After the occupation of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Arab day laborers became an 
even more important factor in the Israeli economy, providing as 
much as 30 percent of the work force in some spheres, and in many 
instances replacing Oriental Jews who had performed the more 
menial tasks in Israeli society. 

Despite its historical importance in Israel, agriculture has not 
had major economic significance. For example, in 1985 agricul- 
ture provided just over 5 percent of Israel's gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) whereas industry contributed almost five 
times as much. Israel's skilled work force excelled in the industrial 
sphere, particularly in high-technology areas such as electronics, 
biotechnology, chemicals, and defense-related industries or in such 
highly skilled occupations as diamond cutting. 

Although Israel had human resources, the lack of capital on the 
part of many new immigrants after 1948 obliged the government 
to provide funds for developing the country's infrastructure and 
for many enterprises. This policy resulted in a quasi-socialist econ- 
omy in which ownership fell into three broad categories: private, 
public, and HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael 
(General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel) known as 
Histadrut (see Glossary), the overall trade union organization. Israel 
depended to a large degree on funds contributed by Jews in the 



xxvi 



Diaspora (see Glossary) to provide government services necessary 
to settle new immigrants and to establish economic ventures that 
would ensure jobs as well as to maintain the defense establishment 
at a high level of readiness, in view of Israel's position as a "garri- 
son democracy" surrounded by potential enemies. Despite the in- 
flow of money from Jews in the Diaspora, as a result of large 
government spending for defense and domestic purposes, Israel 
has generally been a debtor nation and has relied heavily on grants 
and loans from the United States. Israel in the early 1980s also 
had to deal with runaway inflation that reached about 450 percent 
in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1984. To curb such inflation, the 
government instituted the Economic Stabilization Program in July 
1985 that reduced inflation in 1986 to 20 percent. 

By 1987, the Economic Stabilization Program had led to a sig- 
nificant increase in economic activity in Israel. Increased certainty 
brought about by the Economic Stabilization Program stimulated 
improved growth in income and productivity. Between July 1985 
and May 1988, a cumulative increase in productivity of 10 per- 
cent occurred. The 1987 cuts in personal, corporate, and employer 
tax rates and in employer national insurance contributions stimu- 
lated net investment during the same period. 

The freezing of public sector employment occasioned by the Eco- 
nomic Stabilization Program began lessening the role of govern- 
ment in the economy and increased the supply of labor available 
to the business community. However, the outbreak of the intifadah 
(uprising) in December 1987 had an adverse impact on these trends. 

The government has played a major role in social and economic 
life. Even prior to the achievement of statehood in 1948, the coun- 
try's political leaders belonged primarily to the Labor Party's 
predecessor, Mapai, which sought to inculcate socialist principles 
into various aspects of society. Creating effective government under 
the circumstances prevailing in 1948, however, entailed com- 
promises between the Labor Zionist leadership and the Orthodox 
religious establishment. These compromises were achieved by creat- 
ing a framework that lacked a written constitution but relied in- 
stead on a number of Basic Laws governing such aspects as the 
organization of the government, the presidency, the parliament 
or Knesset, the judiciary, and the army. An uneasy tension con- 
tinued, however, between religiously observant and secular Jews. 
For example, in protest against the proposed new Basic Law: 
Human Rights (and a possible change in the electoral system), 
which Agudat Israel, a small ultra-Orthodox religious party, be- 
lieved would have an adverse effect on Orthodox Jews, in early 



xxvn 



November 1989 the party left the National Unity Government for 
two months. 

Until 1977 the government operated under a political power sys- 
tem with two dominant parties, Labor and Likud. As a result of 
the 1977 elections, in which Labor lost control of the government, 
a multiparty system evolved in which it became necessary for each 
major party to obtain the support of minor parties in order to 
govern, or for the two major parties to form a coalition or govern- 
ment of national unity, as occurred in 1984 and 1988. The result 
of Israel's proportional electoral system, in which voters endorsed 
national party lists rather than candidates in a given geographic 
area, has been a stalemate in which the smaller parties, especially 
the growing right-wing religious parties, have been able to exert 
disproportionate influence in the formation of governments and 
on government policies. This situation has led to numerous 
proposals for electoral reform, which were still being studied in early 
1990, but which had a marginal chance of enactment because of 
the vested interests of the parties involved. 

A major factor in Israel's political alignment has been its rela- 
tions with other countries, particularly those of the West, because 
of its dependence on financial support from abroad. Although 
Israel's relations with the United States and Western Europe have 
generally been good, since late 1987 criticism has grown in the West 
of Israel's handling of the uprising in the occupied territories of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The agreement by the United 
States in December 1988 to initiate discussions with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) has indicated that United States 
and Israeli interests may not necessarily be identical. Furthermore, 
the feeling has increased that the United States should exert greater 
pressure on Israel to engage in negotiations with the Palestinians 
and to abandon its "greater Israel" stance, as expressed by Secre- 
tary of State James A. Baker on May 22, 1989. In October 1989, 
Baker proposed a five-point "framework" that involved Israel, the 
United States, and Egypt to try to advance Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir's plan for elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Israel agreed in principle in November but attached two reserva- 
tions: that the PLO not be involved in the naming of Palestinian 
delegates and that the discussions be limited to preparations for 
the elections. 

In addition to relations with the West, Israel has sought to ex- 
pand its economic relations, particularly, with both Third World 
countries and with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to 
influence the latter to allow increased emigration of Jews. The sharp 
upswing in Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel— approximately 



xxvm 



2,000 persons in November 1989 and 3,700 in December, with 
a continued influx in mid-January 1990 at the rate of more than 
1,000 persons per week — led to an announcement that Israel would 
resettle 100,000 Soviet Jews over the following three years. The 
cost was estimated at US$2 billion, much of which Israel hoped 
to raise in the United States. This influx aroused considerable con- 
cern on the part of Palestinian Arabs, who feared many Soviet Jews 
would settle in the West Bank. 

Israel's relations with neighboring states have been uneven. Egyp- 
tian president Anwar as Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 
November 1977 led to the Camp David Accords in September 1978 
and ultimately to the signing of a peace treaty and the return of 
the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. In 1989 Egypt began to play an in- 
creasingly prominent role as mediator between Israel and the Pales- 
tinians, particularly as reflected in President Husni Mubarak's 
ten-point peace proposals in July. The PLO accepted the points 
in principle, and the Israel Labor Party considered them a viable 
basis for negotiations. 

Tensions continued along Israel's northern border with Leba- 
non because of incursions into Israel by Palestinian guerrillas based 
in Lebanon. These raids led to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (known 
in Israel as Operation Peace for Galilee) in June 1982, the siege 
of Beirut, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, and with- 
drawal to the armistice line in June 1985. As a result, relations 
with factions in Lebanon and relations with Syria remained tense 
in early 1990, whereas Israeli relations with Jordan had ended in 
cooperation agreements concerning the West Bank; such agree- 
ments were canceled by King Hussein's disclaimer on July 31 , 1989, 
of Jordanian involvement in the West Bank. 

Israel's relationship with its neighbors must be understood in 
the context of its overriding concern for preserving its national secu- 
rity. Israel saw itself as existing alone, beleaguered in a sea of Arabs. 
Accordingly, it has developed various security principles: such as 
anticipating a potential extensive threat from every Arab state, need- 
ing strategic depth of terrain for defensive purposes, or, lacking 
that, needing an Israeli deterrent that could take a conventional 
or nuclear form, and the necessity to make clear to neighboring 
states, particularly Syria, actions that Israel would consider potential 
causes for war. Another security principle was Israeli autonomy 
in decision making concerning military actions while the country 
concurrently relied on the United States for military materiel. 
(United States military aid to Israel averaged US$1.8 billion an- 
nually in the mid- and late 1980s; other United States government 

xxix 



aid from 1985 onward brought the total to more than US$3 billion 
annually). 

Because of its national security concerns, the IDF, primarily a 
citizen army, has played a leading role in Israeli society. With ex- 
ceptions granted to Orthodox individuals for religious reasons, men 
and women have an obligation to perform military service, a fac- 
tor that has acted to equalize and educate Israel's heterogeneous 
Jewish population. Although Israel operates on the principle of 
civilian control of defense matters, a number of the country's leaders 
have risen to political prominence on retiring from the military, 
such as Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Ezer Weizman, and Ariel 
Sharon. The key national role of the IDF and its pursuit of the 
most up-to-date military materiel, although costly, have benefited 
the economy. Defense- related industries are a significant employer, 
and, through military equipment sales, also serve as a leading source 
of foreign currency. Israel has excelled in arms production and has 
developed weapons used by the United States and other countries. 

The IDF has not only served in a traditional military capacity 
in the wars in which Israel has been engaged since 1948. Since 1967 
it also has exercised military government functions in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. This role has proved particularly onerous for 
Israeli citizen soldiers once the intifadah began in December 1987. 

The intifadah has probably had a greater impact on the lives of 
both Palestinians and Israelis than any other event in recent years. 
For Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the upris- 
ing has created a new younger generation of leadership, a sense 
of self-reliance, and an ability to transcend religious, political, eco- 
nomic, and social differences in forming a common front against 
the Israeli occupation. In so doing, Palestinians have organized 
themselves into local popular committees (coordinated at the top 
by the Unified National Command of the Uprising) to handle such 
matters as education, food cultivation and distribution, medical 
care, and communications. Committee membership remained 
secret, as such membership was declared a prison offense in August 
1988. Observers have commented that the committees were relia- 
bly considered to include representatives of various political fac- 
tions within the PLO and some of its more radical offshoots, as 
well as communists and members of the Muslim fundamentalist 
Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas. Israeli authori- 
ties initially endorsed Hamas in the hope that it would draw Arabs 
from the PLO (Hamas was given time on Israeli television in the 
November 1988 elections), but as it became more powerful, espe- 
cially in the Gaza Strip, Israel outlawed Hamas, Islamic Jihad (Holy 
War), and Hizballah (Party of God), which were radical Muslim 



xxx 



groups, in June 1989, setting jail terms of ten years for members. 
The PLO itself had been banned earlier in the occupied territories. 

Various restrictions and punishments have been imposed from 
time to time and in different locations on West Bank and Gaza 
Strip residents since the intifadah began. Among actions taken 
against Palestinians in the West Bank was the outlawing of profes- 
sional unions of doctors, lawyers, and engineers in August 1988. 
Universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been closed 
since October 1987. Schools in the West Bank were closed for more 
than six months in 1988 and, after reopening in December 1988, 
were again closed one month later; schools were open for only three 
months in 1989. Instruction in homes or elsewhere was punish- 
able by imprisonment. Extended curfews have been instituted, often 
requiring people's confinement to their houses. (For example, the 
approximately 130,000 Palestinian inhabitants of Nabulus ex- 
perienced an eleven-day curfew in February 1989, during which 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East trucks bearing food were forbidden to enter the 
city). Water, electricity, and telephone service have been cut, and 
periodically Palestinian workers have been refused permission to 
enter Israel to work. By the end of 1989, at least 244 houses had 
been destroyed, affecting almost 2,000 persons. Beatings and shoot- 
ings had resulted in 795 deaths and more than 45,000 injuries by 
the end of 1989. Approximately 48,000 Palestinians had been ar- 
rested and imprisoned since the uprising began through Decem- 
ber 1989. Administrative detention without charge, originally for 
a period of six months and increased in August 1989 to twelve 
months, was imposed on about 7,900 Palestinians, and 61 Pales- 
tinians had been deported from Israel by the end of 1989. These 
restrictions were documented in detail in the United States Depart- 
ment of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and 
the statistics of Al Haq (Law in the Service of Man), a Ram Allah- 
based human rights organization. Countermeasures instituted by 
Palestinians have included demonstrations, boycotts of Israeli 
products, refusal to pay taxes (resulting in the case of Bayt Sahur, 
near Bethlehem, in September 1989 of extended twenty-four-hour 
curfews and the seizure of property in lieu of taxes), strikes and 
intermittent closings of shops, stonethrowing, and some terrorist 
acts including the use of fire bombs, and the killing of about 150 
Palestinians considered Israeli collaborators. 

Both Palestinians and foreign observers saw the intifadah as having 
had a profound effect on the PLO. In the opinion of many observ- 
ers, the PLO had previously sought to minimize the role of Pales- 
tinians in the occupied territories so as to maintain its own control 



xxxi 



of the Palestinian movement. The coordinated activities of the 
young Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
since the uprising have obliged the PLO to relinquish its sole leader- 
ship. The PLO has been compelled to support solutions for the 
Palestinian problem that it had previously opposed but which were 
favored by residents of the occupied territories, namely an inter- 
national conference to resolve the Palestine issue and a two-state 
solution. The uprising brought pressure on the Palestine National 
Council, which included representatives of Palestinians through- 
out the world, to bury its differences and to provide psychological 
support to Palestinians within the occupied territories by announc- 
ing the creation of a Palestinian state in mid-November 1988. 

The intifadah has also had a substantial impact on Israelis be- 
cause of the escalation of violence. Israeli settlers in the West Bank 
have taken the law into their own hands on numerous occasions, 
shooting and killing Palestinians. In the course of the intifadah, 44 
Israelis had been killed by the end of 1989, and, according to Israeli 
government statistics, more than 2,000 Israelis had been injured. 
The uprising has also affected Israeli Arabs, many of whom have 
experienced a greater sense of identity with their Palestinian brothers 
and sisters. Evidence is lacking, however, of acts of violence by 
Israeli Arabs against Israeli authorities, something that many 
Israelis had anticipated. 

The cost to Israel of quelling the uprising has been calculated 
by the United States government at US$132 million per month, 
not counting the loss in revenues from production and from 
tourism — the latter dropped 40 percent but were beginning to rise 
again in late 1989. The violence has not occurred without protest 
by Israelis. Many of the soldiers of the IDF, for example, have 
found particularly distasteful the use of force on civilians, espe- 
cially on young children, women, and the elderly, and have com- 
plained to government leaders such as Prime Minister Shamir. The 
liberal Israeli movement Peace Now organized a large-scale peace 
demonstration that involved Israelis and Palestinians as well as 
about 1 ,400 foreign peace activists on December 30, 1989, in Jerusa- 
lem; more than 15,000 persons formed a human chain around the 
city. 

Many Israelis have expressed concern about the effects of the 
violence on Israel's democratic institutions as well as on Israel's 
image in the world community. A number of Israeli leaders have 
publicly advocated a political rather than a military settlement of 
the uprising. As early as the spring of 1988, a group of retired gen- 
erals, primarily members of the Labor Party, organized the Council 
for Peace and Security, maintaining that continued occupation of 



xxxn 



the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was actually harmful to Israel's 
security, and that Israel should rely on the IDF rather than the 
occupied territories for its security. The Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies of Tel Aviv University, a think tank composed of high- 
level political and military figures, in a study conducted by Aryeh 
Shalev, retired former military governor of the West Bank, con- 
cluded in December 1989 that Israel's repressive measures had ac- 
tually fueled the uprising. Among individuals who have spoken out 
are former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who endorsed chief of 
staff Lieutenant General Dan Shomron's view that the intifadah can- 
not be solved "because it is a matter of nationalism." To this Eban 
added, "You cannot fight a people with an army." Eban main- 
tained that the PLO could not endanger Israel because Israel had 
"540,000 soldiers, 3,800 tanks, 682 fighter-bombers, thousands 
of artillery units, and a remarkable electronic capacity." Observ- 
ers have pointed out that Israel's launching on September 19, 1988, 
of the Ofeq-1 experimental satellite provided it with a military in- 
telligence potential that reduced the need for territorial holdings. 
In September 1989, Israel launched Ofeq-2, a ballistic missile that 
further demonstrated Israel's military response capabilities. 

Both Eban and Ezer Weizman, minister of science and technol- 
ogy in the 1988 National Unity Government, favored talking with 
the PLO, as did General Mordechai Gur, also a Labor cabinet 
member, former military intelligence chief General Yehoshafat 
Harkabi, and several other generals. The Jaffee Center for Stra- 
tegic Studies, in its early March 1989 report, Israel's Options for Peace, 
supported talks with the PLO. In fact, informal contacts between 
Israelis and PLO members had already occurred, although such 
meetings were a criminal offense for Israelis. On February 23, 1989, 
PLO chief Yasir Arafat met in Cairo with fifteen Israeli journalists. 
In early March, several Knesset members met PLO officials in New 
York at a conference sponsored by Columbia University. In other 
instances, Egyptians, Americans, and West Bank Palestinians have 
served as intermediaries in bringing Israelis and PLO officials 
together. In October 1989, however, Abie Nathan, a leading Israeli 
peace activist, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for meet- 
ing PLO members, and in early January 1990, Ezer Weizman was 
forced out of the inner cabinet for meeting with PLO figures. The 
families of Israeli prisoners of war, however, were authorized in 
December 1989 to contact the PLO to seek the prisoners' release. 

In addition to the pressures exerted by the intifadah, the reason 
for the greater willingness to talk to the PLO has been a percep- 
tion that the PLO has followed a more moderate policy than in 
the past. For example, in December 1988, Arafat explicitly met 



xxxm 



United States conditions for discussions with the PLO by announc- 
ing the acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338, which indicated recognition of the State of Israel, 
and by renouncing the use of terrorism. 

The majority of the government of Israel in January 1990, 
however, continued to oppose talks with the PLO. For example, 
on January 19, 1989, Minister of Defense Rabin proposed that 
Palestinians end the intifadah in exchange for an opportunity to elect 
local leaders who would negotiate with the Israeli government. The 
plan, which made no mention of the PLO, was presented to Faisal 
Husayni, head of the Arab Studies Center in Jerusalem and a West 
Bank Palestinian leader, just after his release from prison on Janu- 
ary 28. Minister of Industry and Trade Sharon in February 1989 
sharply denounced any talks with the PLO. In mid- April, Prime 
Minister Shamir stated that he would not withdraw Israeli troops 
from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to facilitate free Palestin- 
ian elections in those areas, nor would he allow international ob- 
servers of such elections. In late April, Rabin asserted that any 
PLO candidate in Palestinian elections would be imprisoned. 

Despite such indications of an apparent negative attitude toward 
facilitating peace negotiations, on May 14, 1989, Shamir announced 
a twenty-point cabinet-approved peace plan, which he had aired 
privately with President George Bush during his May visit to 
Washington. The basic principles of the plan stated that Israel 
wished to continue the Camp David peace process; it opposed the 
creation of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip or the 
West Bank (by implication Jordan was considered already to be 
a Palestinian state); it would not negotiate with the PLO; and there 
would be "no change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza 
district, unless in accord with the basic program of the govern- 
ment." Israel proposed free elections in the occupied territories, 
which were to be preceded by a "calming of the violence" (the 
plan did not specifically set forth an end to the uprising as a precon- 
dition for elections, as Sharon had wished); elections were to choose 
representatives to negotiate the interim stage of self-rule, which 
was set at five years to test coexistence and cooperation. No later 
than three years after the interim period began, negotiations were 
to start for a final solution; negotiations for the first stage were to 
be between Israelis and Palestinians, with Jordan and Egypt par- 
ticipating if they wished; for the second stage, Jordan would also 
participate and Egypt if it desired. In the interim period, Israel 
would be responsible for security, foreign affairs, and matters relat- 
ing to Israeli citizens in the occupied territories. The plan made 
no mention of voting rights for the approximately 140,000 Arab 



xxxiv 



residents of East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied in 1967. In coun- 
tering Israeli criticism of the plan, Shamir restated his commit- 
ment not to yield "an inch of territory." 

Such an intransigent position also characterized those Israeli West 
Bank settlers whose vigilante tactics have created problems not only 
for Palestinians but also for the IDF in the occupied territories. 
In late May 1989, West Bank military commander Major Gen- 
eral Amran Mitzna begged a visiting Knesset committee to help 
"stop the settlers' incitement against the Israel Defense Forces." 
The settlers were provoked by the army's interference with their 
"reprisal raids" on Palestinians. The substantial reduction in IDF 
forces in the West Bank, following a January 1989 reduction in 
the defense appropriation (variously reported as US$67 or US$165 
million) was followed by increased settler violence. Concurrently, 
the IDF has reduced the number of days of annual service to be 
performed by reservists from sixty (the number set after the upris- 
ing began — it was thirty before the intifadah) to forty-five, as a direct 
economy measure and to minimize the impact on the Israeli econ- 
omy of lengthy reserve service. 

The serious problems facing the Israeli economy have fallen to 
Minister of Finance Shimon Peres, who, as Labor Party head, 
served as prime minister in the previous National Unity Govern- 
ment. The need to remedy the serious deficits incurred by the kib- 
butzim and the industries operated by the Histadrut, both areas 
of the economy associated with the Labor Party, were considered 
a major reason for Peres' s having been named minister of finance 
in the new 1988 government. Observers have commented that Peres 
made a slow start in addressing the rising inflation rate, which was 
nearing 23 percent in 1989; the growing unemployment, which 
amounted to more than 9 percent; and the budget deficits. In late 
December, Peres announced a 5 percent devaluation of the new 
Israeli shekel (for value of the shekel — see Glossary) and a week 
later, when unveiling the new budget on January 1, a further 
8 percent devaluation. Budget cuts of US$550 million were made 
in addition to government savings of US$220 million by reducing 
food and gasoline subsidies. The government also announced plans 
to dismiss thousands of civil servants and to cut cost-of-living 
increases for all workers. These components were collectively 
designed to revive the economy and to stimulate exports. The Israeli 
public, however, was understandably critical of these harsh mea- 
sures, which made Peres personally unpopular and decreased the 
possibility of his being able to force an early election to overturn 
the Likud-led National Unity Government. 



xxxv 



Israel in January 1990, therefore, faced a difficult future. Eco- 
nomically, the country was undergoing stringent budgetary limi- 
tations that affected all Israelis. Politically and militarily, it 
confronted the ongoing intifadah and the question of its willingness 
to talk to the PLO and to consider giving up land for peace, or 
its continued use of the IDF to repress the Palestinian uprising in 
the occupied territories. Militarily, it faced a possible threat from 
its enemy Syria as well as from the battle-tested army of Iraq. Po- 
litically, Israel was challenged by the growing strength of right- 
wing religious and religio-nationalist parties and the need for elec- 
toral reform to create a more effective system of government. So- 
cially and religiously, the country faced the issue of reconciling the 
views of Orthodox Jews with those of secular Jews, considered by 
most observers as a more serious problem than differences between 
Oriental Jews and Ashkenazim. Any Israeli government confronting 
such challenges was indeed called upon to exercise the proverbial 
wisdom of Solomon. 

January 25, 1990 

* * * 

The major event since the above was written was the fall on 
March 15 of the government of Likud prime minister Yitzhak 
Shamir on a no-confidence vote over his refusal to accept the United 
States proposal for discussions between Israelis and Palestinians 
to initiate steps toward an Israeli- Arab peace plan. (Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Ariel Sharon had resigned from the coa- 
lition government on February 18 after the Likud central committee 
moved toward approving such a dialogue). The fall of the govern- 
ment, which was the first time that the Knesset had dissolved a 
government, was preceded by Shamir's firing of Deputy Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres on March 13, leading to the resignation 
of all other Labor Party ministers in the National Unity Govern- 
ment. The no-confidence vote resulted from a last-minute deci- 
sion by Shas, a small ultra-Orthodox Sephardic party, to abstain 
from voting, giving Labor and its allies a sixty to fifty-five major- 
ity in the Knesset. On March 20, President Chaim Herzog asked 
Peres to form a government; despite five-week efforts to achieve 
a coalition, Peres notified Herzog on April 26 that he was unable 
to do so. This process again was a first — the first time in forty-two 
years that a prime minister candidate designated by a president 
had failed to put together a government. On April 27 the man- 
date for forming a government was given to Shamir, who as of 



xxxvi 



early May was still negotiating. Should this attempt fail, new elec- 
tions will be required, but the composition of the Knesset will prob- 
ably not change significantly in such an election. 

Meanwhile, the negotiations conducted by both major parties 
involved bargaining and significant material and policy commit- 
ments to tiny fringe parties, particularly the religious parties, that 
were out of proportion to their strength. As a result, Israelis have 
become increasingly disenchanted with their electoral system. On 
April 7 a demonstration for electoral reform drew approximately 
100,000 Israelis, the largest number since the 1982 demonstration 
protesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon. More than 70,000 people 
signed a petition, endorsed by President Herzog, calling for the 
direct election of the prime minister and members of the Knesset 
so as to eliminate the disproportionate influence of small parties. 
Moreover, on April 9 an Israeli public opinion poll revealed that 
80 percent of Israelis favored changing the electoral system. 

The situation was further complicated by the Israeli response 
to Secretary of State Baker's statement on March 1 that the United 
States would back Israel's request for a US$400 million loan to 
construct housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants only if Israel stopped 
establishing settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
Israeli government stated that this condition was the first time that 
the United States government had linked American aid to the way 
that Israel spent its own money. In a March 3 news conference, 
President Bush included East Jerusalem in the category of terri- 
tory occupied by Israel, saying that the United States government 
opposed new Jewish immigrants being setded there (an estimated 
115,000 Jews and 140,000 Palestinian Arabs lived in East Jerusa- 
lem as of March). Prime Minister Shamir announced on March 5 
that new Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would be ex- 
panded as rapidly as possible to settle Soviet Jews — 7,300 Soviet 
Jews arrived in March and 10,500 in April. 

On April 18, Shamir appointed Michael Dekel, a Likud advo- 
cate of settlements, to oversee the groundbreaking for four new 
settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip and to try to buy residential property in the Armenian 
Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem for Jewish occupancy. This 
action was made possible by the absence from the government of 
Labor Party ministers, who had been opposing various settlement 
activities. Government sponsorship of Jewish settlement in Jerusa- 
lem, although initially denied, included a grant of US$1.8 million 
to a group of 150 persons, consisting of Jewish religious students 
and their families, to rent through a third party St. John's Hospice 
in the Christian Quarter of the Old City, which they occupied on 



xxxvn 



April 12, the eve of Good Friday. This incident caused an uproar 
among Christian Palestinians and led to the protest closing of Chris- 
tian churches in Jerusalem for one day on April 27 — the first time 
in 800 years that the Church of the Holy Sepulcher had been closed. 
Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek testified in court opposing the set- 
tlement on the grounds that it would damage Israel's international 
reputation, harm public order in the Christian Quarter, and dis- 
rupt the delicate and established ethnic balance of Jerusalem. The 
Supreme Court announced on April 26 that it upheld the eviction 
of the settlers by May 1. 

In other developments, the European Community threatened 
sanctions against Israel unless the government allowed the reopen- 
ing of Palestinian institutions of higher education in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, which had been closed since October 1987. In 
reply, Israel stated on February 26 that it would allow sixteen com- 
munity colleges and vocational institutions, serving approximately 
18,000 Palestinian students, to reopen in stages on unspecified dates. 

Iraq's president Saddam Husayn, who was extremely fearful of 
an Israeli strike against Iraq, on April 2 threatened that Iraq would 
use chemical weapons against Israel if it attacked. This threat out- 
raged the world community and was followed on April 3 by Israel's 
launch of a new three-stage rocket earth satellite into a surveillance 
orbit. 

Meanwhile, the intifadah continued. The Palestine Center for 
Human Rights reported on March 19 that 878 Palestinian fatali- 
ties had occurred up to that date. The Israeli human rights body 
stated on April 3 that thirty Palestinians had been killed by Israeli 
army gunfire in the first quarter of 1990, whereas Palestinians had 
killed thirty-five of their number as suspected Israeli collaborators 
over the same period. Israel announced on February 18 a 15 per- 
cent reduction in the defense budget for 1990-91, together with 
a reduced number of service days for reservists, caused by the finan- 
cial costs of the uprising. No end to the intifadah appeared in sight, 
with well-informed Israeli sources suggesting that the uprising had 
strengthened the convictions of Israelis on both sides: those favor- 
ing territorial maximalism and those advocating compromise. The 
difference was thought to be a greater realism, with maximalists 
feeling that the territories could be retained only by removing a 
number of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
and compromisers recognizing that negotiations with the PLO 
would require significant concessions. 



May 2, 1990 Helen Chapin Metz 



xxxvm 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



A Jew wearing a tasseled cap or simlah, 

shown on the Black Obelisk of Shalmaneser III (r. 859-825 B.C.) 



ON MAY 14, 1948, in the city of Tel Aviv, David Ben-Gurion 
proclaimed the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel. The introductory paragraph affirmed that "Eretz Yisrael 
(the Land of Israel) was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here 
they first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and 
universal significance, and gave the world the eternal Book of 
Books. " The issuance of the proclamation was signaled by the ritual 
blowing of the shofar (ram's-horn trumpet) and was followed by 
the recitation of the biblical verse (Lev. 25:10): "Proclaim liberty 
throughout the land and to all the inhabitants thereof. ' ' The same 
verse is inscribed on the American Liberty Bell in Independence 
Hall in Philadelphia. 

The reestablishment of the Jewish nation-state in Palestine has 
been the pivotal event in contemporary Jewish history. After nearly 
two millennia of exile, the Jewish people were brought together 
in their ancient homeland. Despite the ancient attachments of Jews 
to biblical Israel, the modern state of Israel is more deeply rooted 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history than it is 
in the Bible. Thus, although Zionism — the movement to establish 
a national Jewish entity — is rooted in the messianic impulse of tradi- 
tional Judaism and claims a right to Palestine based on God's 
promise to Abraham, the vast majority of Zionists are secularists. 

For nearly 2,000 years following the destruction of the Second 
Temple in A.D. 70, the attachment of the Jewish Diaspora (see 
Glossary) to the Holy Land was more spiritual then physical. The 
idea of an ingathering of the exiles and a wholesale return to the 
Holy Land, although frequently expressed in the liturgy, was never 
seriously considered or acted upon. Throughout most of the exilic 
experience, the Jewish nation connoted the world Jewish commu- 
nity that was bound by the powerful moral and ethical ethos of 
the Jewish religion. The lack of a state was seen by many as a vir- 
tue, for it ensured that Judaism would not be corrupted by the 
exigencies of statehood. Despite frequent outbreaks of anti- 
Semitism, Jewish communities survived and in many cases thrived 
as enclosed communities managed by a clerical elite in strict 
accordance with Jewish law. 

Zionism called for a revolt against the old established order of 
religious orthodoxy (see Origins of Zionism, this ch.). It repudiated 
nearly 2,000 years of Diaspora existence, claiming that the Judaism 
of the Exile, devoid of its national component, had rendered the 



3 



Israel: A Country Study 



Jews a defenseless pariah people. As such, Zionism is the most radi- 
cal attempt in Jewish history to escape the confines of traditional 
Judaism. The new order from which Zionism sprang and to which 
the movement aspired was nineteenth-century liberalism: the age 
of reason, emancipation, and rising nationalism. 

Before Napoleon emancipated French Jewry in 1791, continen- 
tal and Central European Jews had been forced to reside in desig- 
nated Jewish "ghettos" apart from the non-Jewish community. 
Emancipation enabled many Jews to leave the confines of the ghetto 
and to attain unprecedented success in business, banking, the arts, 
medicine, and other professions. This led to the assimilation of many 
Jews into non -Jewish European society. The concomitant rise of 
ethnically based nationalisms, however, precluded Jewish partici- 
pation in the political leadership of most of the states where they 
had settled. Political Zionism was born out of the frustrated hopes 
of emancipated European Jewry. Political Zionists aspired to estab- 
lish a Jewish state far from Europe but modeled after the posteman- 
cipation European state. 

In Eastern Europe, where the bulk of world Jewry lived, any 
hope of emancipation ended with the assassination of the reform- 
minded Tsar Alexander II in 1881. The pogroms that ensued led 
many Russian Jews to emigrate to the United States, while others 
joined the communist and socialist movements seeking to overthrow 
the tsarist regime and a much smaller number sought to establish 
a Jewish state in Palestine. Zionism in its East European context 
evolved out of a Jewish identity crisis; Jews were rapidly abandoning 
religious orthodoxy, but were unable to participate as equal citizens 
in the countries where they lived. This was the beginning of cul- 
tural Zionism, which more than political Zionism attached great 
importance to the economic and cultural content of the new state. 

The most important Zionist movement in Palestine was Labor 
Zionism, which developed after 1903. Influenced by the Bolsheviks, 
the Labor movement led by David Ben-Gurion created a highly 
centralized Jewish economic infrastructure that enabled the Jewish 
population of Palestine (the Yishuv — see Glossary) to absorb waves 
of new immigrants and to confront successfully the growing Arab 
and British opposition during the period of the British Mandate 
(1920-48). Following independence in May 1948, Ben-Gurion 's 
Labor Zionism would guide Israel through the first thirty years 
of statehood. 

The advent of Zionism and the eventual establishment of the 
State of Israel posed anew a dilemma that has confronted Jews and 
Judaism since ancient times: how to reconcile the moral impera- 
tives of the Jewish religion with the power politics and military force 



4 



Historical Setting 



necessary to maintain a nation-state. The military and political 
exigencies of statehood frequently compromised Judaism's tran- 
scendent moral code. In the period before the Exile, abuses of state 
power set in rapidly after the conquests of Joshua, in the reign of 
Solomon in both the northern and southern kingdoms, under the 
Hasmoneans, and under Herod the Great. 

In the twentieth century, the Holocaust transformed Zionism 
from an ideal to an urgent necessity for which the Yishuv and world 
Jewry were willing to sacrifice much. From that time on, the bulk 
of world Jewry would view Jewish survival in terms of a Jewish 
state in Palestine, a goal finally achieved by the creation of the state 
of Israel in 1948. The Nazi annihilation of 6 million Jews, on whose 
behalf the West proved unwilling to intervene, and the hostility 
of Israel's Arab neighbors, some of which systematically evicted 
their Jewish communities, later combined to create a sense of siege 
among many Israelis. As a result, the modern State of Israel 
throughout its brief history has given security priority over the coun- 
try 's other needs and has considerably expanded over time its con- 
cept of its legitimate security needs. Thus, for reasons of security 
Israel has justified the dispossession of hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian Arabs, the limited rights granted its Arab citizens, and 
harsh raids against bordering Arab states that harbored Palestinian 
guerrillas who had repeatedly threatened Israel. 

The June 1967 War was an important turning point in the his- 
tory of Israel (see 1967 and Afterward, this ch.). The ease of vic- 
tory and the reunification of Jerusalem spurred a growing 
religio-nationalist movement. Whereas Labor Zionism was a secular 
movement that sought to sow the land within the Green Line (see 
Glossary), the new Israeli nationalists, led by Gush Emunim and 
Rabbi Moshe Levinger, called for Jewish settlement in all of Eretz 
Yisrael. The June 1967 War also brought under Israel's control 
the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights (see Glossary), the West 
Bank (see Glossary), the Gaza Strip (see Glossary), and East Jerusa- 
lem. From the beginning, control of Jerusalem was a nonnegotia- 
ble item for Israel. The Gaza Strip and especially the West Bank, 
however, posed a serious demographic problem that continued to 
fester in the late 1980s. 

In contrast to the euphoria that erupted in June 1967, the heavy 
losses suffered in the October 1973 War ushered in a period of 
uncertainty. Israel's unpreparedness in the early stages of the war 
discredited the ruling Labor Party, which also suffered from a rash 
of corruption charges. Moreover, the demographic growth of Orien- 
tal Jews (Jews of African or Asian origin), a large number of whom 
felt alienated from Labor's blend of socialist Zionism, tilted the 



5 



Israel: A Country Study 

electoral balance for the first time in Israel's history away from 
the Labor Party (see Jewish Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). In the May 
1977 elections Menachem Begin's Likud Bloc unseated Labor. 

The early years of the Begin era were dominated by the historic 
peace initiative of President Anwar as Sadat of Egypt. His trip to 
Jerusalem in November 1977 and the subsequent signing of the 
Camp David Accords and the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and 
Israel ended hostilities between Israel and the largest and militarily 
strongest Arab country. The proposed Palestinian autonomy laid 
out in the Camp David Accords never came to fruition because 
of a combination of Begin's limited view of autonomy — he viewed 
the West Bank as an integral part of the State of Israel — and be- 
cause of the refusal of the other Arab states and the Palestinians 
to participate in the peace process. As a result, violence in the oc- 
cupied territories increased dramatically in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 

Following Likud's victory in the 1981 elections, Begin and his 
new minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, pursued a harder line toward 
the Arabs in the territories. After numerous attempts to quell the 
rising tide of Palestinian nationalism failed, Begin, on the advice 
of Sharon and Chief of Staff General Rafael Eitan, decided to de- 
stroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) major base of 
operations in Lebanon. On June 6, 1982, Israeli troops crossed 
the border into Lebanon initiating Operation Peace for Galilee. 
This was the first war in Israel's history that lacked wide public 
support. 

Ancient Israel 

The history of the evolving relationship between God and the 
Jewish people set forth in the the Hebrew Bible — the five books 
of the Torah (see Glossary), neviim (prophets), and ketuvim (writ- 
ings) — known to Christians as the Old Testament, begins with 
myths. The stories of creation, the temptation and sin of the first 
humans, their expulsion from an idyllic sanctuary, the flood, and 
other folkloric events have analogies with other early societies. With 
the appearance of Abraham, however, the biblical stories introduce 
a new idea — that of a single tribal God. Over the course of several 
centuries, this notion evolved into humanity's first complete 
monotheism. Abraham looms large in the traditions of the Jewish 
people and the foundation of their religion. Whether Jews by birth 
or by conversion, each male Jew is viewed as "a son of Abraham." 

It was with Abraham that God, known as Yahweh, made a 
covenant, promising to protect Abraham and his descendants, to 
wage wars on their behalf, and to obtain for them the land of 



6 



Muslim mosque above the Cave of Machpela, the traditional 
burial place of the Jewish patriarchs, in Hebron, occupied West Bank 

Courtesy Palestine Perspectives 

Canaan, an area roughly approximate to modern Israel and the 
occupied West Bank (in another part of the Torah, God pledges 
to Abraham's descendants "the land from the river of Egypt to 
the great river, the river Euphrates," an area much larger than 
historic Canaan). In exchange, the ancient Hebrews were bound 
individually and collectively to follow the ethical precepts and rituals 
laid down by God. 

Canaan, the land promised to Abraham and his descendants, 
was a narrow strip, 130 kilometers wide, bounded by the Mediter- 
ranean Sea to the west, the Arabian Desert to the east, Egypt to 
the south, and Mesopotamia to the north. Situated between the 
great Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures, Canaan served as a 
burgeoning trading center for caravans between the Nile Valley 
and the Euphrates and as a cultural entrepot. The clash of cul- 
tures and the diverse commercial activities gave Canaan a dynamic 
spiritual and material creativity. Prior to the emergence of Abra- 
ham, however, Egyptian and Mesopotamian hostility, continuous 
invasions of hostile peoples, and Canaan's varied topography had 
resulted in frequent fighting and general instability. 

In the last quarter of the second millennium B.C., the collapse 
of the Hittite Empire to the north, and the decline of Egyptian power 



7 



Israel: A Country Study 



to the south at a time when the Assyrians had not yet become a 
major force set the stage for the emergence of the Hebrews. As 
early as the latter part of the third millennium B.C., invasions from 
the east significantly disrupted Middle Eastern society. The peo- 
ple who moved from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean spoke 
western Semitic languages of which Hebrew is one. The term Hebrew 
apparently came from the word habiru (also hapiru or apiru), a term 
that was common to the Canaanites and many of their neighbors. 
The word was used to designate a social class of wanderers and 
seminomads who lived on the margins of, and remained separate 
from, sedentary setdements. Abraham was the leader of one of these 
immigrant habiru groups. He is depicted as a wealthy seminomad 
who possessed large flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle, and enough 
retainers to mount small military expeditions. 

The Canaanite chieftains urged Abraham to settle and join with 
them. Abraham remained in the land, but when it came time to 
select a wife for his and Sarah's son Isaac, the wife was obtained 
from their relatives living in Haran, near Urfa in modern Turkey. 
This endogamous practice was repeated by Isaac's son Jacob, who 
became known as Israel because he had wrestled with God (Gen. 
32:28). 

During Jacob-Israel's lifetime the Hebrews completely severed 
their links with the peoples of the north and east and his followers 
began to think of themselves as permanently linked to Canaan. 
By his two wives, Leah and Rachel, and their two serving maids, 
Bilhah and Zilpah, Israel fathered twelve sons, the progenitors of 
the twelve tribes of Israel, the "children of Israel." The term Jew 
derives from the name of one of the tribes, Judah, which was not 
only one of the largest and most powerful of the tribes but also 
the tribe that produced David and from which, according to bibli- 
cal prophecy and postbiblical legend, a messiah will emerge. 

Some time late in the sixteenth or early in the fifteenth century 
B.C., Jacob's family — numbering about 150 people — migrated to 
Egypt to escape the drought and famine in Canaan. Beginning in 
the third millennium B.C. large numbers of western Semites had 
migrated to Egypt, usually drawn by the richness of the Nile Valley. 
They came seeking trade, work, or escape from hunger, and some- 
times they came as slaves. The period of Egyptian oppression that 
drove the Israelites to revolt and escape probably occurred during 
the reign of Ramses II (1304-1237 B.C.). Most scholars believe 
that the Exodus itself took place under his successor Merneptah. 
A victory stela dated 1220 B.C. relates a battle fought with the 
Israelites beyond Sinai in Canaan. Taken together with other 



8 



Historical Setting 



evidence, it is believed that the Exodus occurred in the thirteenth 
century B.C. and had been completed by about 1225 B.C. 

The Book of Exodus describes in detail the conditions of slavery 
of the Jews in Egypt and their escape from bondage. The Exodus 
episode is a pivotal event in Jewish history. The liberation of a slave 
people from a powerful pharaoh — the first such successful revolt 
in recorded antiquity — through divine intervention tied successive 
generations of Hebrews (Jews) to Yahweh. The scale of the revolt 
and the subsequent sojourn in Sinai created a self- awareness among 
the Hebrews that they were a separate people sharing a common 
destiny. Moreover, the giving of the Law to Moses at Mount Sinai 
set down a moral framework that has guided the Jewish people 
throughout their history. The Mosaic Code, which includes the 
Ten Commandments and a wide body of other laws derived from 
the Torah, not only proclaimed the unity of God but also set forth 
the revolutionary idea that all men, because they were created in 
God's image, were equal. Thus, the Hebrews believed that they 
were to be a people guided by a moral order that transcended the 
temporal power and wealth of the day. 

The conquest of Canaan under the generalship of Joshua took 
place over several decades. The biblical account depicts a primi- 
tive, outnumbered confederation of tribes slowly conquering pieces 
of territory from a sedentary, relatively advanced people who lived 
in walled cities and towns. For a long time the various tribes of 
Israel controlled the higher, less desirable lands, and only with the 
advent of David did the kingdoms of Israel and Judah come into 
being with a capital in Jerusalem. 

Prior to the emergence of David, the Hebrew tribes, as portrayed 
in the last three chapters of the Book of Judges, were fighting among 
themselves when the Philistines (whence the term Palestine) appeared 
on the coast and pushed eastward. The Philistines were a warlike 
people possessing iron weapons and organized with great discipline 
under a feudal-military aristocracy. Around 1050 B.C., having ex- 
terminated the coastal Canaanites, they began a large-scale move- 
ment against the interior hill country, now mainly occupied by the 
Israelites. To unify the people in the face of the Philistine threat, 
the prophet Samuel anointed the guerrilla captain Saul as the first 
king of the Israelites. Only one year after his coronation, however, 
the Philistines destroyed the new royal army at Mount Gilboa, near 
Bet Shean, southeast of the Plain of Yizreel (also known as the Plain 
of Jezreel and the Plain of Esdraelon), killing Saul and his son 
Jonathan. 

Facing imminent peril, the leadership of the Israelites passed to 
David, a shepherd turned mercenary who had served Saul but also 



9 



Israel: A Country Study 

trained under the Philistines. Although David was destined to be 
the most successful king in Jewish history, his kingdom initially 
was not a unified nation but two separate national entities, each 
of which had a separate contract with him personally. King David, 
a military and political genius, successfully united the north and 
south under his rule, soundly defeated the Philistines, and expanded 
the borders of his kingdom, conquering Ammon, Moab, Edom, 
Zobah (also seen as Aram-Zobah), and even Damascus (also seen 
as Aram-Damascus) in the far northeast (see fig. 2). His success 
was caused by many factors: the establishment of a powerful profes- 
sional army that quelled tribal unrest, a regional power vacuum 
(Egyptian power was on the wane and Assyria and Babylon to the 
east had not yet matured), his control over the great regional trade 
routes, and his establishment of economic and cultural contacts 
with the rich Phoenician city of Tyre. Of major significance, David 
conquered from the Jebusites the city of Jerusalem, which controlled 
the main interior north-south route. He then brought the Ark of 
the Covenant, the most holy relic the Israelites possessed and the 
symbol of their unity, into the newly constituted "City of David," 
which would serve as the center of his united kingdom. 

Despite reigning over an impressive kingdom, David was not 
an absolute monarch in the manner of other rulers of his day. He 
believed that ultimate authority rested not with any king but with 
God. Throughout his thirty- three-year reign, he never built a gran- 
diose temple associated with his royal line, thus avoiding the crea- 
tion of a royal temple-state. His successor and son Solomon, 
however, was of a different ilk. He was less attached to the spiri- 
tual aspects of Judaism and more interested in creating sumptuous 
palaces and monuments. To carry out his large-scale construction 
projects, Solomon introduced corvees, or forced labor; these were 
applied to Canaanite areas and to the northern part of the king- 
dom but not to Judah in the south. He also imposed a burden- 
some tax system. Finally, and most egregious to the northern tribes 
of Israel, Solomon ensured that the Temple in Jerusalem and its 
priestly caste, both of which were under his authority, established 
religious belief and practice for the entire nation. Thus, Solomon 
moved away from the austere spirituality founded by Moses in the 
desert toward the pagan cultures of the Mediterranean Coast and 
Nile Valley. 

When Solomon died in 925 or 926 B.C., the northerners refused 
to recognize his successor Rehoboam. Subsequentiy the north broke 
away and was ruled by the House of Omri. The northern king- 
dom of Israel, more populous than the south, possessing more fer- 
tile land and closer to the trading centers of the time, flourished 



10 



Historical Setting 



until it was completely destroyed and its ten tribes sent into per- 
manent exile by the Assyrians between 740 and 721 B.C. The de- 
struction of the north had a sobering effect on the south. The 
prophet Isaiah eloquently proclaimed that rather than power and 
wealth, social justice and adherence to the will of God should be 
the focus of the Israelites. 

At the end of the sixth century B.C., the Assyrian Empire col- 
lapsed and the Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar besieged the 
city of Jerusalem, captured the king, and ended the first common- 
wealth. Even before the first Exile, the prophet Jeremiah had stated 
that the Israelites did not need a state to carry out the mission given 
to them by God. After the Exile, Ezekiel voiced a similar belief: 
what mattered was not states and empires, for they would perish 
through God's power, but man. 

From the time of the destruction of the First Temple in 586 B.C. , 
the majority of Jews have lived outside the Holy Land. Lacking 
a state and scattered among the peoples of the Near East, the Jews 
needed to find alternative methods to preserve their special iden- 
tity. They turned to the laws and rituals of their faith, which be- 
came unifying elements holding the community together. Thus, 
circumcision, sabbath observance, festivals, dietary laws, and laws 
of cleanliness became especially important. 

In the middle of the sixth century B.C., the Persian emperor 
Cyrus the Great defeated the Babylonians and permitted the Jews 
to return to their homeland "to rebuild the house of the Lord." 
The majority of Jews, however, preferred to remain in the Diaspora, 
especially in Babylon, which would become a great center of Jewish 
culture for 1,500 years. During this period Ezra, the great codi- 
fier of the laws, compiled the Torah from the vast literature of his- 
tory, politics, and religion that the Jews had accumulated. The 
written record depicting the relationship between God and the 
Jewish people contained in the Torah became the focal point of 
Judaism. 

Hellenism and the Roman Conquest 

In 332 B.C. , Alexander the Great of Macedon destroyed the Per- 
sian Empire but largely ignored Judah. After Alexander's death, 
his generals divided — and subsequently fought over — his empire. 
In 301 B.C., Ptolemy I took direct control of the Jewish homeland, 
but he made no serious effort to interfere in its religious affairs. 
Ptolemy's successors were in turn supplanted by the Seleucids, and 
in 175 B.C. Antiochus IV seized power. He launched a campaign 
to crush Judaism, and in 167 B.C. he sacked the Temple. 



11 



Israel: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



The violation of the Second Temple, which had been built about 
520-515 B.C., provoked a successful Jewish rebellion under the 
generalship of Judas (Judah) Maccabaeus. In 140 B.C. the Has- 
monean Dynasty began under the leadership of Simon Maccabaeus, 
who served as ruler, high priest, and commander in chief. Simon, 
who was assassinated a few years later, formalized what Judas had 
begun, the establishment of a theocracy, something not found in 
any biblical text. 

Despite priestly rule, Jewish society became Hellenized except 
in its generally staunch adherence to monotheism. Although rural 
life was relatively unchanged, cities such as Jerusalem rapidly 
adopted the Greek language, sponsored games and sports, and in 
more subtie ways adopted and absorbed the culture of the Hellenes. 
Even the high priests bore such names as Jason and Menelaus. 
Biblical scholars have identified extensive Greek influence in the 
drafting of commentaries and interpolations of ancient texts dur- 
ing and after the Greek period. The most obvious influence of the 
Hellenistic period can be discerned in the early literature of the 
new faith, Christianity. 

Under the Hasmonean Dynasty, Judah became comparable in 
extent and power to the ancient Davidic dominion. Internal polit- 
ical and religious discord ran high, however, especially between 
the Pharisees, who interpreted the written law by adding a wealth 
of oral law, and the Sadducees, an aristocratic priestly class who 
called for strict adherence to the written law. In 64 B.C., dynastic 
contenders for the throne appealed for support to Pompey, who 
was then establishing Roman power in Asia. The next year Roman 
legions seized Jerusalem, and Pompey installed one of the con- 
tenders for the throne as high priest, but without the title of king. 
Eighty years of independent Jewish sovereignty ended, and the 
period of Roman dominion began. 

In the subsequent period of Roman wars, Herod was confirmed 
by the Roman Senate as king of Judah in 37 B.C. and reigned 
until his death in 4 B.C. Nominally independent, Judah was actu- 
ally in bondage to Rome, and the land was formally annexed in 
6 B.C. as part of the province of Syria Palestina. Rome did, 
however, grant the Jews religious autonomy and some judicial and 
legislative rights through the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin, which 
traces its origins to a council of elders established under Persian 
rule (333 B.C. to 165 B.C.) was the highest Jewish legal and 
religious body under Rome. The Great Sanhedrin, located on the 
Temple Mount in Jerusalem, supervised smaller local Sanhedrins 
and was the final authority on many important religious, politi- 
cal, and legal issues, such as declaring war, trying a high priest, 



13 



Israel: A Country Study 

and supervising certain rituals. Scholars have sharply debated the 
structure and composition of the Sanhedrin. The Jewish historian 
Josephus and the New Testament present the Sanhedrin as a 
political and judicial council whereas the Talmud (see Glossary) 
describes it as a religious, legislative body headed by a court of 
seventy-one sages. Another view holds that there were two separate 
Sanhedrins. The political Sanhedrin was composed primarily of 
the priestly Sadducee aristocracy and was charged by the Roman 
procurator with responsibility for civil order, specifically in mat- 
ters involving imperial directives. The religious Sanhedrin of the 
Pharisees was concerned with religious law and doctrine, which 
the Romans disregarded as long as civil order was not threatened. 
Foremost among the Pharisee leaders of the time were the noted 
teachers, Hillel and Shammai. 

Chafing under foreign rule, a Jewish nationalist movement of 
the fanatical sect known as the Zealots challenged Roman control 
in A.D. 66. After a protracted siege begun by Vespasian, the 
Roman commander in Judah, but completed under his son Titus 
in A.D. 70, Jerusalem and the Second Temple were seized and 
destroyed by the Roman legions. The last Zealot survivors perished 
in A.D. 73 at the mountain fortress of Massada, about fifty-six 
kilometers southwest of Jerusalem above the western shore of the 
Dead Sea. 

During the siege of Jerusalem, Rabbi Yohanan Ben-Zakki 
received Vespasian's permission to withdraw to the town of Yibna 
(also seen as Jabneh) on the coastal plain, about twenty-four kilo- 
meters southwest of present-day Tel Aviv. There an academic center 
or academy was set up and became the central religious authority; 
its jurisdiction was recognized by Jews in Palestine and beyond. 
Roman rule, nevertheless, continued. Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 
117-38) endeavored to establish cultural uniformity and issued 
several repressive edicts, including one against circumcision. 

The edicts sparked the Bar-Kochba Rebellion of 132-35, which 
was crushed by the Romans. Hadrian then closed the Academy 
at Yibna, and prohibited both the study of the Torah and the ob- 
servance of the Jewish way of life derived from it. Judah was in- 
cluded in Syria Palestina, Jerusalem was renamed Aelia Capitolina, 
and Jews were forbidden to come within sight of the city. Once 
a year on the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple, con- 
trolled entry was permitted, allowing Jews to mourn at a remain- 
ing fragment on the Temple site, the Western Wall, which became 
known as the Wailing Wall. The Diaspora, which had begun with 
the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century B.C., and which had 
resumed early in the Hellenistic period, now involved most Jews 



14 



Historical Setting 



in an exodus from what they continued to view as the land promised 
to them as the descendants of Abraham. 

Following the destruction of the Temple in 70 A.D., and espe- 
cially after the suppression of the Bar-Kochba Rebellion in 135 
A.D., religio-nationalist aspects of Judaism were supplanted by a 
growing intellectual- spiritual trend. Lacking a state, the survival 
of the Jewish people was dependent on study and observance of 
the written law, the Torah. To maintain the integrity and cohe- 
siveness of the community, the Torah was enlarged into a coher- 
ent system of moral theology and community law. The rabbi and 
the synagogue became the normative institutions of Judaism, which 
thereafter was essentially a congregationalist faith. 

The focus on study led to the compilation of the Talmud, an 
immense commentary on the Torah that thoroughly analyzed the 
application of Jewish law to the day-to-day life of the Jewish com- 
munity. The complexity of argument and analysis contained in the 
Palestinian Talmud (100-425 A.D.) and the more authoritative 
Babylonian Talmud (completed around 500) reflected the high level 
of intellectual maturity attained by the various schools of Jewish 
learning. This inward-looking intellectualism, along with a rigid 
adherence to the laws and rituals of Judaism, maintained the 
separateness of the Jewish people, enabling them to survive the 
exilic experience despite the lure of conversion and frequent out- 
breaks of anti-Semitism. 

Palestine Between the Romans and Modern Times 

As a geographic unit, Palestine extended from the Mediterra- 
nean on the west to the Arabian Desert on the east and from the 
lower Litani River in the north to the Gaza Valley in the south. 
It was named after the Philistines, who occupied the southern coastal 
region in the twelfth century B.C. The name Philistia was used 
in the second century A.D. to designate Syria Palestina, which 
formed the southern third of the Roman province of Syria. 

Emperor Constantine (ca. 280-337) shifted his capital from Rome 
to Constantinople in 330 and made Christianity the official religion. 
With Constantine's conversion to Christianity, a new era of 
prosperity came to Palestine, which attracted a flood of pilgrims 
from all over the empire. Upon partition of the Roman Empire 
in 395, Palestine passed under eastern control. The scholarly Jew- 
ish communities in Galilee continued with varying fortunes under 
Byzantine rule and dominant Christian influence until the Arab- 
Muslim conquest of A.D. 638. The period included, however, 
strong Jewish support of the briefly successful Persian invasion of 
610-14. 



15 



Israel: A Country Study 

The Arab caliph, Umar, designated Jerusalem as the third holiest 
place in Islam, second only to Mecca and Medina. Under the 
Umayyads, based in Damascus, the Dome of the Rock was erected 
in 691 on the site of the Temple of Solomon, which was also the 
alleged nocturnal resting place of the Prophet Muhammad on his 
journey to heaven. It is the earliest Muslim monument still extant. 
Close to the shrine, to the south, the Al Aqsa Mosque was built. 
The Umayyad caliph, Umar II (717-720), imposed humiliating 
restrictions on his non-Muslim subjects that led many to convert 
to Islam. These conversions, in addition to a steady tribal flow from 
the desert, changed the religious character of the inhabitants of 
Palestine from Christian to Muslim. Under the Abbasids the process 
of Islamization gained added momentum as a result of further 
restrictions imposed on non-Muslims by Harun ar Rashid (786- 
809) and more particularly by Al Mutawakkil (847-61). 

The Abbasids were followed by the Fatimids who faced frequent 
attacks from Qarmatians, Seljuks, and Byzantines, and periodic 
beduin opposition. Palestine was reduced to a battlefield. In 1071 
the Seljuks captured Jerusalem. The Fatimids recaptured the city 
in 1098, only to deliver it a year later to a new enemy, the Crusaders 
of Western Europe. In 1100 the Crusaders established the Latin 
Kingdom of Jerusalem, which remained until the famous Muslim 
general Salah ad Din (Saladin) defeated them at the decisive Bat- 
tle of Hattin in 1 187. The Crusaders were not completely evicted 
from Palestine, however, until 1291 when they were driven out 
of Acre. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were a "dark age" 
for Palestine as a result of Mamluk misrule and the spread of several 
epidemics. The Mamluks were slave-soldiers who established a 
dynasty that ruled Egypt and Syria, which included Palestine, from 
1250 to 1516. 

In 1516 the Ottoman Turks, led by Sultan Selim I, routed the 
Mamluks, and Palestine began four centuries under Ottoman domi- 
nation. Under the Ottomans, Palestine continued to be linked 
administratively to Damascus until 1830, when it was placed under 
Sidon, then under Acre, then once again under Damascus. In 1887- 
88 the local governmental units of the Ottoman Empire were finally 
settled, and Palestine was divided into the administrative divisions 
(sing., mutasarrifiyah) of Nabulus and Acre, both of which were 
linked with the vilayet (largest Ottoman administrative division, simi- 
lar to a province) of Beirut and the autonomous mutasarrifiyah of 
Jerusalem, which dealt directly with Constantinople. 

For the first three centuries of Ottoman rule, Palestine was rela- 
tively insulated from outside influences. At the end of the eigh- 
teenth century, Napoleon's abortive attempt to establish a Middle 



16 



Historical Setting 



East empire led to increased Western involvement in Palestine. The 
trend toward Western influence accelerated during the nine years 
(1831 -40) that the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Ali and his son 
Ibrahim ruled Palestine. The Ottomans returned to power in 1840 
with the help of the British, Austrians, and Russians. For the re- 
mainder of the nineteenth century, Palestine, despite the growth 
of Christian missionary schools and the establishment of European 
consulates, remained a mainly rural, poor but self-sufficient, intro- 
verted society. Demographically its population was overwhelmingly 
Arab, mainly Muslim, but with an important Christian merchant 
and professional class residing in the cities. The Jewish popula- 
tion of Palestine before 1880 consisted of fewer than 25,000 peo- 
ple, two-thirds of whom lived in Jerusalem where they made up 
half the population (and from 1 890 on more than half the popula- 
tion). These were Orthodox Jews (see Glossary), many of whom 
had immigrated to Palestine simply to be buried in the Holy Land, 
and who had no real political interest in establishing a Jewish entity. 
They were supported by alms given by world Jewry. 

Origins of Zionism 

The major event that led to the growth of the Zionist movement 
was the emancipation of Jews in France (1791), followed shortly 
thereafter by their emancipation in the rest of continental and Cen- 
tral Europe. After having lived for centuries in the confines of Jewish 
ghettos, Jews living in Western and Central Europe now had a 
powerful incentive to enter mainstream European society. Jews, 
who had previously been confined to petty trade and to banking, 
rapidly rose in academia, medicine, the arts, journalism, and other 
professions. The accelerated assimilation of Jews into European 
society radically altered the nature of relations between Jews and 
non-Jews. On the one hand, Jews had to reconcile traditional Juda- 
ism, which for nearly 2,000 years prior to emancipation had devel- 
oped structures designed to maintain the integrity and separateness 
of Jewish community life, with a powerful secular culture in which 
they were now able to participate. On the other hand, many non- 
Jews, who prior to the emancipation had had little or no contact 
with Jews, increasingly saw the Jew as an economic threat. The 
rapid success of many Jews fueled this resentment. 

The rise of ethnically based nationalism in the mid-nineteenth 
century gave birth to yet another form of anti-Semitism. Before 
the mid-nineteenth century, European anti-Semitism was based 
mainly on Christian antipathies toward Jews because of their refusal 
to convert to Christianity. As a result, an individual Jew could 
usually avoid persecution by converting, as many did over the 



17 




18 



Temple Mount in Jerusalem with the Dome of the Rock, 
a Muslim holy place, as seen from Mount Scopus 

Courtesy Les Vogel 



19 



Israel: A Country Study 

centuries. The emergence of ethnically based nationalism, however, 
radically changed the status of the Jew in European society. The 
majority gentile population saw Jews as a separate people who could 
never be full participants in the nation's history. 

The vast majority of Jews in Western and Central Europe 
responded by seeking even deeper assimilation into European cul- 
ture and a secularization of Judaism. A minority, who believed 
that greater assimilation would not alter the hostility of non-Jews, 
adopted Zionism. According to this view, the Jew would remain 
an outsider in European society regardless of the liberalism of the 
age because Jews lacked a state of their own. Jewish statelessness, 
then, was the root cause of anti-Semitism. The Zionists sought to 
solve the Jewish problem by creating a Jewish entity outside Europe 
but modeled after the European nation-state. After more then half 
a century of emancipation, West European Jewry had become dis- 
tanced from both the ritual and culture of traditional Judaism. 
Thus, Zionism in its West European Jewish context envisioned a 
purely political solution to the Jewish problem: a state of Jews rather 
than a Jewish state. 

For the bulk of European Jewry, however, who resided in Eastern 
Europe's Pale of Settlement (see Glossary) — on the western fringe 
of the Russian Empire, between the Baltic and the Black seas — 
there was no emancipation. East European Jewry had lived for cen- 
turies in kehilot (sing., kehilah), semiautonomous Jewish municipal 
corporations that were supported by wealthy Jews. Life in the kehilot 
was governed by a powerful caste of learned religious scholars who 
strictly enforced adherence to the Jewish legal code. Many Jews 
found the parochial conformity enforced by the kehilot leadership 
onerous. As a result, liberal stirring unleashed by the emancipa- 
tion in the West had an unsettling effect upon the kehilot in the East. 

By the early nineteenth century, not only was kehilot life resented 
but the tsarist regimes were becoming increasingly absolute. In 1825 
Tsar Nicholas I, attempting to centralize control of the empire and 
Russify its peoples, enacted oppressive measures against the Jews; 
he drafted a large number of under-age Jews for military service, 
forced Jews out of their traditional occupations, such as the liquor 
trade, and generally repressed the kehilot. Facing severe economic 
hardship and social upheaval, tens of thousands of Jews migrated 
to the cities, especially Odessa on the Russian coast. In their new 
urban environments, the restless and highly literate Jews clamored 
for the liberalization of tsarist rule. 

In 1855 the prospects for Russian Jewry appeared to improve 
significantly when the relatively liberal-minded Tsar Alexander II 
ascended the throne. Alexander II ended the practice of drafting 



20 



Historical Setting 



Jewish youth into the military and granted Jews access, albeit lim- 
ited, to Russian education institutions and various professions previ- 
ously closed to them. Consequently, a thriving class of Jewish 
intellectuals, the maskalim (enlightened), emerged in cities like 
Odessa, just as they had in Western Europe and Central Europe 
after emancipation. The maskalim believed that Tsar Alexander II 
was ushering in a new age of Russian liberalism which, as in the 
West, would eventually lead to the emancipation of Russian Jewry. 

The hopes of the maskalim and of Russian Jewry in general, 
however, were misplaced. Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, 
and a severe pogrom ensued that devastated Jewish communities 
throughout the Pale of Settlement. The new Tsar, Alexander III, 
enacted oppressive policies against the Jews and denied police pro- 
tection to those Jews who remained in the countryside. As a result, 
a floodtide of impoverished Jews entered the cities where they joined 
various movements that sought to overthrow the tsar. 

The openly anti-Semitic policies pursued by the new tsar and 
the popularity of these policies among large segments of the non- 
Jewish population posed serious political, economic, and spiritual 
dilemmas for Russian Jewry. On the economic level, the tsar's 
anti-Semitic policies severely limited Jewish economic opportuni- 
ties and undermined the livelihood of the Jewish masses. Many 
impoverished East European Jews, therefore, emigrated from the 
Russian Empire. Between 1881 and 1914, an estimated 2.5 mil- 
lion Jews left the empire, 2 million of whom settled in the United 
States. 

For many Jews, especially the maskalim, however, the pogroms 
and the anti-Semitism of the new tsar not only meant economic 
hardship and physical suffering but also a deep spiritual malaise . 
Before 1881, they had been abandoning the strict confines of the 
kehilot en masse and rebelling against religious orthodoxy, anxiously 
waiting for the expected emancipation to reach Russia. The 1881 
pogroms and their aftermath shattered not only the faith of the 
maskalim in the inevitable liberalization of tsarist Russia but also 
their belief that the non-Jewish Russian intellectual would take an 
active role in opposing anti-Semitism. Most of the Russian intel- 
ligentsia were either silent during the pogroms or actually supported 
them. Having lost their faith in God and in the inevitable spread 
of liberalism, large numbers of Russian Jews were forced to seek 
new solutions. Many flocked to the revolutionary socialist and com- 
munist movements opposing the tsar, while others became involved 
with the Bund (see Glossary), a cultural society that sought to 
establish a Yiddish (see Glossary) cultural renaissance within Russia. 



21 



Israel: A Country Study 

A smaller but growing number of Jews were attracted to the 
ancient but newly formulated notion of reconstituting a Jewish 
nation- state in Palestine. Zionism as it evolved in Eastern Europe, 
unlike Zionism in the West, dealt not only with the plight of Jews 
but with the crisis of Judaism. Thus, despite its secularism, East 
European Zionism remained attached to the Jewish biblical home 
in Palestine. It also was imbued with the radical socialist fervor 
challenging the tsarist regime. 

Zionism's reformulation of traditional Judaism was deeply re- 
sented by Orthodox Jews, especially the Hasidim (sing., Hasid — see 
Glossary). Most Orthodox Jews rejected the notion of a return to 
the promised land before the appearance of the Messiah. They 
viewed Zionism as a secular European creation that aspired to 
change the focus of Judaism from devotion to Jewish law and reli- 
gious ritual to the establishment of a Jewish nation-state. 

Zionist Precursors 

The impulse and development of Zionism was almost exclusively 
the work of Ashkenazim — Jews of European origin; few Sephardim 
(see Glossary) were directly engaged in the movement in its for- 
mative years. (In 1900 about 9.5 million of the world's 10.5 mil- 
lion Jews were Ashkenazim, and about 5.2 million of the 
Ashkenazim lived in the Pale of Settlement.) 

The first writings in what later came to be known as Zionism 
appeared in the mid- 1800s. In 1840 the Jews of Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans had been aroused by rumors that the messianic 
era was at hand. Various writers, most prominently Rabbi Judah 
Alkalai and Rabbi Zevi Hirsch Kalisher but including many others, 
were impressed by the nationalist fervor of Europe that was creat- 
ing new nation-states and by the resurgence of messianic expecta- 
tions among Jews. Kalisher wrote that Jewish nationalism was 
directly akin to other nationalist movements and was the logical 
continuation of the Jewish enlightenment that had begun in France 
in 1791 when Jews were granted civil liberties. Alkalai consciously 
altered his expectations from a miraculous messianic salvation to 
a redemption by human effort that would pave the way for the 
arrival of the Messiah. Both authors urged the development of Jew- 
ish national unity, and Kalisher in particular foresaw the ingathering 
to Palestine of many of the world's Jews as part of the process of 
emancipation. 

Another important early Zionist was Moses Hess, a German Jew 
and socialist comrade of Karl Marx. In his book Rome and Jerusa- 
lem, published in 1862, Hess called for the establishment of a Jew- 
ish socialist commonwealth in Palestine. He was one of the first 



22 




Desert west of the Dead Sea in the occupied West Bank 

Courtesy Les Vogel 
The Jordan River in northern Israel, east of Bet Shean 

Courtesy Les Vogel 



23 



Israel: A Country Study 

Jewish thinkers to see that emancipation would ultimately exacer- 
bate anti-Semitism in Europe. He concluded that the only solu- 
tion to the Jewish problem was the establishment of a national 
Jewish society managed by a Jewish proletariat. Although his syn- 
thesis of socialism and Jewish nationalism would later become an 
integral part of the Labor Zionist movement, during his lifetime 
the prosperity of European Jewry lessened the appeal of his work. 

Political Zionism 

Political Zionism was emancipated West European Jewry's 
response to the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism and to the failure 
of the enlightenment to alter the status of the Jew. Its objective 
was the establishment of a Jewish homeland in any available 
territory — not necessarily in Palestine — through cooperation with 
the Great Powers. Political Zionists viewed the "Jewish problem" 
through the eyes of enlightenment rationalism and believed that 
European powers would support a Jewish national existence 
outside Europe because it would rid them of the Jewish problem. 
These Zionists believed that Jews would come en masse to the new 
entity, which would be a secular nation modeled after the post- 
emancipation European state. 

The first Jew to articulate a political Zionist platform was not 
a West European but a Russian physician residing in Odessa. A 
year after the 1881 pogroms, Leo Pinsker, reflecting the disappoint- 
ment of other Jewish maskalim, wrote in a pamphlet entitled Auto- 
Emancipation that anti-Semitism was a modern phenomenon, beyond 
the reach of any future triumphs of ' 'humanity and enlightenment. ' ' 
Therefore Jews must organize themselves to find their own national 
home wherever possible, not necessarily in their ancestral home 
in the Holy Land. Pinsker' s work attracted the attention of Hib- 
bat Tziyyon (Lovers of Zion), an organization devoted to Hebrew 
education and national revival. Ignoring Pinsker' s indifference 
toward the Holy Land, members of Hibbat Tziyyon took up his 
call for a territorial solution to the Jewish problem. Pinsker, who 
became leader of the movement, obtained funds from the wealthy 
Jewish philanthropist, Baron Edmond de Rothschild — who was not 
a Zionist — to support Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine 
at Rishon LeZiyyon, south of Tel Aviv, and Zikhron Yaaqov, south 
of Haifa. Although the numbers were meager — only 10,000 set- 
tlers by 1891 — especially when compared to the large number of 
Jews who emigrated to the United States, the First Aliyah 
(1882-1903), or immigration, was important because it established 
a Jewish bridgehead in Palestine espousing political objectives. 



24 



Historical Setting 



The impetus to the founding of a Zionist organization with spe- 
cific goals was provided by Theodor Herzl. Born in Budapest on 
May 2, 1860, Herzl grew up in an environment of assimilation. 
He was educated in Vienna as a lawyer but instead became a jour- 
nalist and playwright. By the early 1890s, he had achieved some 
recognition in Vienna and other major European cities. Until that 
time, he had only been identified peripherally with Jewish culture 
and politics. He was unfamiliar with earlier Zionist writings, and 
he noted in his diary that he would not have written his book had 
he known the contents of Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation. 

While working as Paris correspondent for a Viennese newspaper, 
Herzl became aware of the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in French 
society. He saw that emancipation rather than dissipating anti- 
Semitism had exacerbated popular animosity toward the Jews. The 
tearing down of the ghetto walls placed Jews in competition with 
non-Jews. Moreover, the newly liberated Jew was blamed by much 
of non-Jewish French society for the socioeconomic upheaval caused 
by both emancipation and accelerated industrialization. 

The turning point in Herzl' s thinking on the Jewish question 
occurred during the 1894 Paris trial of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish 
officer in the French army, on charges of treason (the sale of mili- 
tary secrets to Germany). Dreyfus was convicted, and although 
he was eventually cleared, his career was ruined. The trial and later 
exoneration sharply divided French society and unleashed wide- 
spread anti-Semitic demonstrations and riots throughout France. 
To Herzl' s shock and dismay, many members of the French in- 
tellectual, social, and political elites — precisely those elements of 
society into which the upwardly mobile emancipated Jews wished 
to be assimilated — were the most vitriolic in their anti-Semitic 
stance. 

The Dreyfus affair proved for Herzl, as the 1881 pogroms had 
for Pinsker, that Jews would always be an alien element in the so- 
cieties in which they resided as long as they remained stateless. 
He believed that even if Jewish separateness in religion and social 
custom were to disappear, the Jews would continue to be treated 
as outsiders. 

Herzl put forth his solution to the Jewish problem in Der Juden- 
staat (The Jewish State) published in 1896. He called for the estab- 
lishment of a Jewish state in any available territory to which the 
majority of European Jewry would immigrate. The new state would 
be modeled after the postemancipation European state. Thus, it 
would be secular in nature, granting no special place to the Hebrew 
language, Judaism, or to the ancient Jewish homeland in Palestine. 



25 



Israel: A Country Study 

Another important element contained in Herzl's concept of a 
Jewish state was the enlightenment faith that all men — including 
anti-Semites — are basically rational and will work for goals that 
they perceive to be in their best interest. He was convinced, there- 
fore, that the enlightened nations of Europe would support the 
Zionist cause to rid their domains of the problem-creating Jews. 
Consequently, Herzl actively sought international recognition and 
the cooperation of the Great Powers in creating a Jewish state. 

Herzl's ideas were not original, his belief that the Great Powers 
would cooperate in the Zionist enterprise was naive, and his in- 
difference to the final location of the Jewish state was far removed 
from the desires of the bulk of the Jewish people residing in the 
Pale of Settlement. What he accomplished, however, was to culti- 
vate the first seeds of the Zionist movement and to bestow upon 
the movement a mantle of legitimacy. His stature as a respected 
Western journalist and his meetings with the pope, princes of 
Europe, the German kaiser, and other world figures, although not 
successful, propelled the movement into the international arena. 
Herzl sparked the hopes and aspirations of the mass of East Euro- 
pean Jewry living under Russian oppression. It was the oppressed 
Jewish masses of the Pale, however — with whom Herzl, the as- 
similated bourgeois of the West, had so little in common — who ab- 
sorbed his message most deeply. 

In 1897 Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Swit- 
zerland. The first congress adopted the goal: "To create for the 
Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by Public Law." The 
World Zionist Organization (WZO — see Glossary) was founded 
to work toward this goal, and arrangements were made for future 
congresses. The WZO established a general council, a central ex- 
ecutive, and a congress, which was held every year or two. It de- 
veloped member societies worldwide, continued to encourage 
settlement in Palestine, registered a bank in London, and estab- 
lished the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet) to buy land in 
Palestine. The First Zionist Congress was vital to the future de- 
velopment of Zionism, not only because it established an institu- 
tional framework for Zionism but also because it came to symbolize 
for many Jews a new national identity, the first such identity since 
the destruction of the Second Temple in A.D. 70. 

Cultural Zionism 

The counterpoint to Herzl's political Zionism was provided by 
Asher Ginsberg, better known by his pen name Ahad HaAm (One 
of the People). Ahad HaAm, who was the son of a Hasidic rabbi, 
was typical of the Russian maskalim. In 1886, at the age of thirty, 



26 



Historical Setting 



he moved to Odessa with the vague hope of modernizing Juda- 
ism. His views on Zionism were rooted in the changing nature of 
Jewish communal life in Eastern Europe. Ahad HaAm realized 
that a new meaning to Jewish life would have to be found for the 
younger generation of East European Jews who were revolting 
against traditional Jewish practice. Whereas Jews in the West could 
participate in and benefit from a secular culture, Jews in the East 
were oppressed. While Herzl focused on the plight of Jews alone, 
Ahad HaAm was also interested in the plight of Judaism, which 
could no longer be contained within the limits of traditional religion. 

Ahad HaAm's solution was cultural Zionism: the establishment 
in Palestine of small settlements aimed at reviving the Jewish spirit 
and culture in the modern world. In the cultural Zionist vision, 
a small number of Jewish cadres well versed in Jewish culture and 
speaking Hebrew would settle in Palestine. Ahad HaAm believed 
that by settling in that ancient land, religious Jews would replace 
their metaphysical attachment to the Holy Land with a new Hebrew 
cultural renaissance. Palestine and the Hebrew language were im- 
portant not because of their religious significance but because they 
had been an integral part of the Jewish people's history and cul- 
tural heritage. 

Inherent in the cultural Zionism espoused by Ahad HaAm was 
a deep mistrust of the gentile world. Ahad HaAm rejected Herzl' s 
notion that the nations of the world would encourage Jews to move 
and establish a Jewish state. He believed that only through Jewish 
self-reliance and careful preparation would the Zionist enterprise 
succeed. Although Ahad HaAm's concept of a vanguard cultural 
elite establishing a foothold in Palestine was quixotic, his idea of 
piecemeal settlement in Palestine and the establishment of a Zionist 
infrastructure became an integral part of the Zionist movement. 

The ascendancy of Ahad HaAm's cultural Zionism and its em- 
phasis on practical settlement in Eretz Yisrael climaxed at the Sixth 
Zionist Congress in 1903. After an initial discussion of settlement 
in the Sinai Peninsula, which was opposed by Egypt, Herzl came 
to the congress apparently willing to consider, as a temporary 
shelter, a British proposal for an autonomous Jewish entity in East 
Africa. The Uganda Plan, as it was called, was vehemently rejected 
by East European Zionists who, as before, insisted on the ancient 
political identity with Palestine. Exhausted, Herzl died of pneu- 
monia in 1904, and from that time on the mantle of Zionism was 
carried by the cultural Zionists led by Ahad HaAm and his close 
colleague, Chaim Weizmann. They took over the WZO, increased 
support for Hibbat Tziyyon, and sought Jewish settiement in Pales- 
tine as a prerequisite to international support for a Jewish state. 



27 



Israel: A Country Study 
Labor Zionism 

The defeat of Herzl's Uganda Plan ensured that the fate of the 
Zionist project would ultimately be determined in Palestine. In 
Palestine the Zionist movement had to devise a practical settlement 
plan that would ensure its economic viability in the face of extremely 
harsh conditions. Neither Herzl's political Zionism nor Ahad 
HaAm's cultural Zionism articulated a practical plan for settiement 
in Palestine. Another major challenge facing the fledgling move- 
ment was how to appeal to the increasing number of young Jews 
who were joining the growing socialist and communist movements 
in Russia. To meet these challenges, Labor Zionism emerged as 
the dominant force in the Zionist movement. 

The intellectual founders of Labor Zionism were Nachman 
Syrkin and Ber Borochov. They inspired the founding of Poalei 
Tziyyon (Workers of Zion, see Appendix B) — the first Labor Zionist 
party, which grew quickly from 1906 until the start of World War I. 
The concepts of Labor Zionism first emerged as criticisms of the 
Rothschild-supported settiements of the First Aliyah. Both Borochov 
and Syrkin believed that the Rothschild settlements, organized on 
purely capitalist terms and therefore hiring Arab labor, would 
undermine the Jewish enterprise. Syrkin called for Jewish settle- 
ment based on socialist modes of organization: the accumulation 
of capital managed by a central Jewish organization and employ- 
ment of Jewish laborers only. He believed that "anti-Semitism was 
the result of unequal distribution of power in society. As long as 
society is based on might, and as long as the Jew is weak, anti- 
Semitism will exist." Thus, he reasoned, the Jews needed a material 
base for their social existence — a state and political power. 

Ber Borochov' s contribution to Labor Zionism was his synthe- 
sis of the concepts of class and nation. In his most famous essay, 
entitled Nationalism and Class Struggle, Borochov showed how the 
nation, in this case the Jewish nation, was the best institution 
through which to conduct the class struggle. According to Borochov, 
only through the establishment of a Jewish society controlling its 
own economic infrastructure could Jews be integrated into the 
revolutionary process. His synthesis of Marxism and Zionism 
attracted many Russian Jews caught up in the revolutionary fer- 
vor of the Bolshevik movement. 

Another important Labor Zionist and the first actually to reside 
in Palestine was Aaron David Gordon. Gordon believed that only 
by physical labor and by returning to the land could the Jewish 
people achieve national salvation in Palestine. Gordon became a 
folk hero to the early Zionists by coming to Palestine in 1905 at 



28 



Historical Setting 



a relatively advanced age — forty-seven — and assiduously working 
the land. He and his political party, HaPoel HaTzair (The Young 
Worker), were a major force behind the movement to collectivize 
Jewish settlements in Palestine. The first kibbutz was begun by 
Gordon and his followers at Deganya in eastern Galilee. 

Before Gordon's arrival, the major theorists of Labor Zionism 
had never set foot in Palestine. Zionism in its theoretical formula- 
tions only took practical effect with the coming to Palestine of the 
Second Aliyah. Between 1904 and 1914, approximately 40,000 Jews 
immigrated to Palestine in response to the pogroms that followed 
the attempted Russian revolution of 1905. By the end of the Sec- 
ond Aliyah, the Jewish population of Palestine stood at about 
85,000, or 12 percent of the total population. The members of the 
Second Aliyah, unlike the settlers of the first, were dedicated 
socialists set on establishing Jewish settlement in Palestine along 
socialist lines. They undertook a number of measures aimed at 
establishing an autonomous Jewish presence in Palestine, such as 
employing only Jewish labor, encouraging the widespread use of 
Hebrew, and forming the first Jewish self-defense organization, 
HaShomer (The Watchmen). 

The future leadership cadre of the state of Israel emerged out 
of the Second Aliyah. The most important leader of this group and 
the first prime minister of Israel was David Ben-Gurion {ben, son 
of — see Glossary). Ben-Gurion, who arrived in Palestine in 1906, 
believed that economic power was a prerequisite of political power. 
He foresaw that the fate of Zionist settlement in Palestine depended 
on the creation of a strong Jewish economy. This aim, he believed, 
could only be accomplished through the creation of a Hebrew- 
speaking working class and a highly centralized Jewish economic 
structure. Beginning in the 1920s, he set out to create the immense 
institutional framework for a Jewish workers' state in Palestine. 

Revisionist Zionism 

Labor Zionism, although by far the largest organization in the 
Yishuv (the p restate Jewish community in Palestine), did not go 
unchallenged. The largest and most vocal opposition came from 
a Russian-born Jewish intellectual residing in Odessa, Vladimir 
Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky was both a renowned writer and the first 
military hero of the Zionist revival; he was commander of the Jewish 
Legion. While residing in Italy, Jabotinsky became attached to the 
notions of romantic nationalism espoused by the great Italian 
nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi. Like Garibaldi, Jabotinsky viewed 
nationalism as the highest value to which humans can aspire. He 
called for massive Jewish immigration to Palestine and the 



29 



Israel: A Country Study 

immediate declaration of Jewish statehood in all of biblical Pales- 
tine. He viewed the world in Machiavellian terms: military and 
political power ultimately determine the fate of peoples and nations. 
Therefore, he called for the establishment of a well-armed Jewish 
self-defense organization. 

Jabotinsky sharply criticized Ben-Gurion's single-minded focus 
on creating a Jewish working-class movement, which he felt dis- 
tracted the Zionist movement from the real issue at hand, Jewish 
statehood. He gained wide popularity in Poland, where his criti- 
cisms of socialism and his calls for Jewish self-defense appealed to 
a Jewish community of small entrepreneurs hounded as a result 
of anti-Semitism. 

Events in Palestine, 1908-48 
Arab Nationalism 

Before the Second Aliyah, the indigenous Arab population of 
Palestine had worked for and generally cooperated with the small 
number of Jewish settlements. The increased Jewish presence and 
the different policies of the new settlers of the Second Aliyah aroused 
Arab hostility. The increasing tension between Jewish settler and 
Arab peasant did not, however, lead to the establishment of Arab 
nationalist organizations. In the Ottoman-controlled Arab lands 
the Arab masses were bound by family, tribal, and Islamic ties; 
the concepts of nationalism and nation-state were viewed as alien 
Western categories. Thus, an imbalance evolved between the highly 
organized and nationalistic settlers of the Second Aliyah and the 
indigenous Arab population, who lacked the organizational sophisti- 
cation of the Zionists. 

There were, however, small groups of Western-educated Arab 
intellectuals and military officers who formed nationalist organi- 
zations demanding greater local autonomy. The primary moving 
force behind this nascent Arab nationalist movement was the Com- 
mittee of Union and Progress, a loose umbrella organization of 
officers and officials within the Ottoman Empire in opposition to 
the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid. The removal of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908 was widely 
supported by both Arab nationalists and Zionists. The commit- 
tee's program of constitutional reform and promised autonomy 
aroused hope of independence on the part of various nationalities 
throughout the Ottoman Empire. 

After 1908, however, it quickly became clear to Zionists and 
Arabs alike that the nationalism of Abdul Hamid 's successors was 
Turkish nationalism, bent on Turkification of the Ottoman domain 



30 




31 



Israel: A Country Study 

rather than granting local autonomy. In response, Arab intellec- 
tuals in Beirut and Damascus formed clandestine political societies, 
such as the Ottoman Decentralization Party, based in Cairo; Al 
Ahd (The Covenant Society), formed primarily by army officers 
in 1914; and Al Fatat (The Young Arabs), formed by students in 
1911. The Arab nationalism espoused by these groups lacked sup- 
port, however, among the Arab masses. 

World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue 

On the eve of World War I, the anticipated break-up of the en- 
feebled Ottoman Empire raised hopes among both Zionists and 
Arab nationalists. The Zionists hoped to attain support from one 
of the Great Powers for increased Jewish immigration and even- 
tual sovereignty in Palestine, whereas the Arab nationalists wanted 
an independent Arab state covering all the Ottoman Arab domains. 
From a purely demographic standpoint, the Zionist argument was 
not very strong — in 1914 they comprised only 12 percent of the 
total population of Palestine. The nationalist ideal, however, was 
weak among the Arabs, and even among articulate Arabs compet- 
ing visions of Arab nationalism — Islamic, pan- Arab, and statism — 
inhibited coordinated efforts to achieve independence. 

A major asset to Zionism was that its chief spokesman, Chaim 
Weizmann, was an astute statesman and a scientist widely respected 
in Britain and he was well versed in European diplomacy. Weiz- 
mann understood better than the Arab leaders at the time that the 
future map of the Middle East would be determined less by the 
desires of its inhabitants than by Great Power rivalries, European 
strategic thinking, and domestic British politics. Britain, in pos- 
session of the Suez Canal and playing a dominant role in India 
and Egypt, attached great strategic importance to the region. British 
Middle East policy, however, espoused conflicting objectives, and 
as a result London became involved in three distinct and contradic- 
tory negotiations concerning the fate of the region. 

The earliest British discussions of the Middle East question 
revolved around Sharif Husayn ibn Ali, scion of the Hashimite 
(also seen as Hashemite) family that claimed descent from the 
Prophet and acted as the traditional guardians of Islam's most holy 
sites of Mecca and Medina in the Arabian province of Hijaz. In 
February 1914, Amir Abdullah, son of Sharif Husayn, went to 
Cairo to visit Lord Kitchener, British agent and consul general in 
Egypt, where he inquired about the possibility of British support 
should his father stage a revolt against Turkey. Turkey and Ger- 
many were not yet formally allied, and Germany and Britain were 
not yet at war; Kitchener's reply was, therefore, noncommittal. 



32 



Historical Setting 



Shortly after the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, 
Kitchener was recalled to London as secretary of state for war. By 
1915, as British military fortunes in the Middle East deteriorated, 
Kitchener saw the usefulness of transferring the Islamic caliphate — 
the caliph, or successor to the Prophet Muhammad, was the tradi- 
tional leader of the Islamic world — to an Arab candidate indebted 
to Britain, and he energetically sought Arab support for the war 
against Turkey. In Cairo Sir Henry McMahon, the first British 
high commissioner in Egypt, conducted an extensive correspon- 
dence from July 1915 to January 1916 with Husayn, two of whose 
sons — Abdullah, later king of Jordan, and Fay sal, later king of Syria 
(ejected by the French in 1920) and of Iraq (1921-33)— were to 
figure prominently in subsequent events. 

In a letter to McMahon enclosed with a letter dated July 14, 
1915, from Abdullah, Husayn specified an area for Arab indepen- 
dence under the "Sharifian Arab Government" consisting of the 
Arabian Peninsula (except Aden) and the Fertile Crescent of Pales- 
tine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In his letter of October 24, 1915, 
to Husayn, McMahon, on behalf of the British government, 
declared British support for postwar Arab independence, subject 
to certain reservations and exclusions of territory not entirely Arab 
or concerning which Britain was not free "to act without detri- 
ment to the interests of her ally, France." The territories assessed 
by the British as not purely Arab included: 4 'The districts of Mersin 
and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the 
districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo." As with the 
later Balfour Declaration, the exact meaning was not clear, although 
Arab spokesmen since then have usually maintained that Pales- 
tine was within the pledged area of independence. Although the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence was not legally binding on 
either side, on June 5, 1916, Husayn launched the Arab Revolt 
against Turkey and in October declared himself "King of the 
Arabs." 

While Husayn and McMahon corresponded over the fate of the 
Middle East, the British were conducting negotiations with the 
French over the same territory. Following the British military defeat 
at the Dardanelles in 1915, the Foreign Office sought a new offen- 
sive in the Middle East, which it thought could only be carried 
out by reassuring the French of Britain's intentions in the region. 
In February 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially the "Asia 
Minor Agreement") was signed, which, contrary to the contents 
of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, proposed to partition 
the Middle East into French and British zones of control and in- 
terest. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine was to be 



33 



Israel: A Country Study 

administered by an international "condominium" of the British, 
French, and Russians (also signatories to the agreement). 

The final British pledge, and the one that formally committed 
the British to the Zionist cause, was the Balfour Declaration of 
November 1917. Before the emergence of David Lloyd George as 
prime minister and Arthur James Balfour as foreign secretary in 
December 1916, the Liberal Herbert Asquith government had 
viewed a Jewish entity in Palestine as detrimental to British stra- 
tegic aims in the Middle East. Lloyd George and his Tory sup- 
porters, however, saw British control over Palestine as much more 
attractive than the proposed British-French condominium. Since 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine had taken on increased stra- 
tegic importance because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, where 
the British garrison had reached 300,000 men, and because of a 
planned British attack on Ottoman Syria originating from Egypt. 
Lloyd George was determined, as early as March 1917, that Pales- 
tine should become British and that he would rely on its conquest 
by British troops to obtain the abrogation of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. 

In the new British strategic thinking, the Zionists appeared as 
a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests 
in the region. Furthermore, as British war prospects dimmed 
throughout 1917, the War Cabinet calculated that supporting a 
Jewish entity in Palestine would mobilize America's influential Jew- 
ish community to support United States intervention in the war 
and sway the large number of Jewish Bolsheviks who participated 
in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to keep Russia in the war. Fears 
were also voiced in the Foreign Office that if Britain did not come 
out in favor of a Jewish entity in Palestine the Germans would 
preempt them. Finally, both Lloyd George and Balfour were devout 
churchgoers who attached great religious significance to the pro- 
posed reinstatement of the Jews in their ancient homeland. 

The negotiations for a Jewish entity were carried out by Weiz- 
mann, who greatly impressed Balfour and maintained important 
links with the British media. In support of the Zionist cause, his 
protracted and skillful negotiations with the Foreign Office were 
climaxed on November 2, 1917, by the letter from the foreign secre- 
tary to Lord Rothschild, which became known as the Balfour Decla- 
ration. This document declared the British government's 
"sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations," viewed with favor 
"the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jew- 
ish People," and announced an intent to facilitate the achievement 
of this objective. The letter added the provision of "it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 



34 



Historical Setting 



civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country." 

The Balfour Declaration radically changed the status of the 
Zionist movement. It promised support from a major world power 
and gave the Zionists international recognition. Zionism was trans- 
formed by the British pledge from a quixotic dream into a legiti- 
mate and achievable undertaking. For these reasons, the Balfour 
Declaration was widely criticized throughout the Arab world, and 
especially in Palestine, as contrary to the spirit of British pledges 
contained in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The word- 
ing of the document itself, although painstakingly devised, was inter- 
preted differently by different people, according to their interests. 
Ultimately, it was found to contain two incompatible undertak- 
ings: establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews 
and preservation of the rights of existing non-Jewish communities, 
i.e., the Arabs. The incompatibility sharpened over the succeed- 
ing years and became irreconcilable. 

On December 9, 1917, five weeks after the Balfour Declaration, 
British troops led by General Sir Edmund Allenby took Jerusalem 
from the Turks; Turkish forces in Syria were subsequendy defeated; 
an armistice was concluded with Turkey on October 31 , 1918; and 
all of Palestine came under British military rule. British policy in 
the Arab lands of the now moribund Ottoman Empire was guided 
by a need to reduce military commitments, hold down expendi- 
tures, prevent a renewal of Turkish hegemony in the region, and 
safeguard Britain's strategic interest in the Suez Canal. The con- 
flicting promises issued between 1915 and 1918 complicated the 
attainment of these objectives. 

Between January 1919 and January 1920, the Allied Powers met 
in Paris to negotiate peace treaties with the Central Powers. At 
the conference, Amir Fay sal, representing the Arabs, and Weiz- 
mann, representing the Zionists, presented their cases. Although 
Weizmann and Fay sal reached a separate agreement on January 3, 
1919, pledging the two parties to cordial cooperation, the latter 
wrote a proviso on the document in Arabic that his signature was 
tied to Allied war pledges regarding Arab independence. Since these 
pledges were not fulfilled to Arab satisfaction after the war, most 
Arab leaders and spokesmen have not considered the Faysal- 
Weizmann agreement as binding. 

The conferees faced the nearly impossible task of finding a com- 
promise between the generally accepted idea of self-determination, 
wartime promises, and plans for a division of the spoils. They 
ultimately decided upon a mandate system whose details were laid 



35 



Israel: A Country Study 

out at the San Remo Conference of April 1920. The terms of the 
British Mandate were approved by the League of Nations Coun- 
cil on July 24, 1922, although they were technically not official until 
September 29, 1923. The United States was not a member of the 
League of Nations, but a joint resolution of the United States Con- 
gress on June 30, 1922, endorsed the concept of the Jewish national 
home. 

The Mandate's terms recognized the "historical connection of 
the Jewish people with Palestine," called upon the mandatory power 
to "secure establishment of the Jewish National Home," and recog- 
nized "an appropriate Jewish agency" for advice and cooperation 
to that end. The WZO, which was specifically recognized as the 
appropriate vehicle, formally established the Jewish Agency (see 
Glossary) in 1929. Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, while 
ensuring that the "rights and position of other sections of the popu- 
lation are not prejudiced." English, Arabic, and Hebrew were all 
to be official languages. At the San Remo Conference, the French 
also were assured of a mandate over Syria. They drove Fay sal out 
of Damascus in the summer; the British provided him with a throne 
in Iraq a year later. In March 1921 , Winston Churchill, then colo- 
nial secretary, established Abdullah as ruler of Transjordan under 
a separate British mandate. 

To the WZO, which by 1921 had a worldwide membership of 
about 770,000, the recognition in the Mandate was seen as a wel- 
come first step. Although not all Zionists and not all Jews were 
committed at that time to conversion of the Jewish national home 
into a separate political state, this conversion became firm Zionist 
policy during the next twenty-five years. The patterns developed 
during these years strongly influenced the State of Israel proclaimed 
in 1948. 

Arab spokesmen, such as Husayn and his sons, opposed the Man- 
date's terms because the Covenant of the League of Nations had 
endorsed popular determination and thereby, they maintained, sup- 
ported the cause of the Arab majority in Palestine. Further, the 
covenant specifically declared that all other obligations and under- 
standings inconsistent with it were abrogated. Therefore, Arab 
argument held that both the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes- 
Picot Agreement were null and void. Arab leaders particularly 
objected to the Mandate's numerous references to the "Jewish com- 
munity," whereas the Arab people, then constituting about 88 per- 
cent of the Palestinian population, were acknowledged only as "the 
other sections." 

Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Palestinian Arab nation- 
alists had worked for a Greater Syria (see Glossary) under Faysal. 



36 



Historical Setting 



The British military- occupation authority in Palestine, fearing an 
Arab rebellion, published an Anglo-French Joint Declaration, issued 
after the armistice with Turkey in November 1918, which called 
for self-determination for the indigenous people of the region. By 
the end of 1919, the British had withdrawn from Syria (exclusive 
of Palestine), but the French had not yet entered (except in Leba- 
non) and Fay sal had not been explicitly repudiated by Britain. In 
March 1920, a General Syrian Congress meeting in Damascus 
elected Faysal king of a united Syria, which included Palestine. 
This raised the hope of the Palestinian Arab population that the 
Balfour Declaration would be rescinded, setting off a feverish series 
of demonstrations in Palestine in the spring of 1920. From April 
4 to 8, Arab rioters attacked the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem. 
Faysal 's ouster by the French in the summer of 1920 led to further 
rioting in Jaffa (contemporary Yafo) as a large number of Pales- 
tinian Arabs who had been with Faysal returned to Palestine to 
fight against the establishment of a Jewish nation. 

The end of Faysal' s Greater Syria experiment and the applica- 
tion of the mandate system, which artificially carved up the Arab 
East into new nation-states, had a profound effect on the history 
of the region in general and Palestine in particular. The mandate 
system created an identity crisis among Arab nationalists that led 
to the growth of competing nationalisms: Arab versus Islamic versus 
the more parochial nationalisms of the newly created states. It also 
created a serious legitimacy problem for the new Arab elites, whose 
authority ultimately rested with their European benefactors. The 
combination of narrowly based leadership and the emergence of 
competing nationalisms stymied the Arab response to the Zionist 
challenge in Palestine. 

To British authorities, burdened with heavy responsibilities and 
commitments after World War I, the objective of the Mandate ad- 
ministration was peaceful accommodation and development of 
Palestine by Arabs and Jews under British control. Sir Herbert 
Samuels, the first high commissioner of Palestine, was responsi- 
ble for keeping some semblance of order between the two antagonis- 
tic communities. In pursuit of this goal, Samuels, a Jew, was guided 
by two contradictory principles: liberalism and Zionism. He called 
for open Jewish immigration and land acquisition, which enabled 
thousands of highly committed and well-trained socialist Zionists 
to enter Palestine between 1919 and 1923. The Third Aliyah, as 
it was called, made important contributions to the development 
of Jewish agriculture, especially collective farming. Samuels, 
however, also promised representative institutions, which, if they 
had emerged in the 1920s, would have had as their first objective 



37 



Israel: A Country Study 

the curtailment of Jewish immigration. According to the census 
of 1922, the Jews numbered only 84,000, or 1 1 percent of the popu- 
lation of Palestine. The Zionists, moreover, could not openly op- 
pose the establishment of democratic structures, which was clearly 
in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
mandatory system. 

The Arabs of Palestine, however, believing that participation 
in Mandate-sanctioned institutions would signify their acquiescence 
to the Mandate and thus to the Balfour Declaration, refused to par- 
ticipate. As a result, Samuels 's proposals for a legislative council, 
an advisory council, and an Arab agency envisioned as similar to 
the Jewish Agency, were all rejected by the Arabs. After the col- 
lapse of the bid for representative institutions, any possibility of 
joint consultation between the two communities ended. 

The Arab Community During the Mandate 

The British Mandate and the intensification of Jewish settlement 
in Palestine significantly altered Palestinian leadership structures 
and transformed the socioeconomic base of Palestinian Arab soci- 
ety. First, British policy in Palestine, as elsewhere in the Middle 
East, was based on patronage. This policy entailed granting wide 
powers to a small group of competing traditional elites whose 
authority would depend upon the British high commissioner. In 
Palestine, Samuels granted the most important posts to two com- 
peting families, the Husaynis (also seen as Husseinis) and the 
Nashashibis. Of the two clans, the Husaynis were given the most 
powerful posts, many of which had no precedent under Ottoman 
rule. In 1921 Samuels appointed Hajj Amin al Husayni, an ardent 
anti-Zionist and a major figure behind the April 1920 riots, as mufti 
(chief Muslim religious jurist) of Jerusalem. In 1922 he augmented 
Hajj Amin's power by appointing him president of the newly con- 
stituted Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), which was given wide 
powers over the disbursement of funds from religious endowments, 
fees, and the like. 

By heading the SMC, Hajj Amin controlled a vast patronage 
network, giving him power over a large constituency. This new 
patronage system competed with and threatened the traditional 
family-clan and Islamic ties that existed under the Ottoman Em- 
pire. Traditional Arab elites hailing from other locales, such as 
Hebron and Haifa, resented the monopoly of power of the British- 
supported Jerusalem-based elite. Furthermore, as an agricultural 
depression pushed many Arabs westward into the coastal cities, 
a new urban-based elite emerged that challenged the Nashashibis 
and Husaynis. 



38 



II 



A building on Jaffa Road 
in the New City of Jerusalem 
Courtesy Les Vogel 




Tension between members of Arab elites was exacerbated because 
Hajj Amin, who was not an elected official, increasingly attempted 
to dictate Palestinian politics. The competition between the major 
families and the increased use of the Zionist threat as a political 
tool in interelite struggles placed a premium on extremism. Hajj 
Amin frequently incited his followers against the Nashashibis by 
referring to the latter as Zionist collaborators. As a result, Pales- 
tinian leadership during the Mandate was fragmented and unable 
to develop a coherent policy to deal with the growing Zionist 
movement. 

The other major transformation in Palestinian Arab society dur- 
ing the Mandate concerned the issue of land ownership. During 
the years of Ottoman rule, the question of private property rights 
was never fully articulated. The tenuous nature of private property 
rights enabled the Zionist movement to acquire large tracts of land 
that had been Arab owned. The sale of land to Jewish setders, which 
occurred even during the most intense phases of the Palestinian 
Revolt, reflected the lack of national cohesion and institutional struc- 
ture that might have enabled the Palestinian Arabs to withstand 
the lure of quick profits. Instead, when increased Jewish land pur- 
chases caused property prices to spiral, both the Arab landowning 
class and absentee landlords, many of whom resided outside Pales- 
tine, were quick to sell for unprecedented profits. In the 1930s, 
when Palestine was beset by a severe economic depression, large 



39 



Israel: A Country Study 

numbers of Arab peasants, unable to pay either their Arab land- 
lords or taxes to the government, sold their land. The British did 
not intervene in the land purchases mainly because they needed 
the influx of Jewish capital to pay for Jewish social services and 
to maintain the Jewish economy. 

The Jewish Community under the Mandate 

The greatest asset brought by the Zionists settling Palestine was 
their organizational acumen, which allowed for the institutionali- 
zation of the movement despite deep ideological cleavages. The 
WZO established an executive office in Palestine, thus implement- 
ing the language of the Mandate prescribing such an agency. In 
August 1929, the formalized Jewish Agency was established with 
a council, administrative committee, and executive. Each of these 
bodies consisted of an equal number of Zionist and nominally non- 
Zionist Jews. The president of the WZO was, however, ex officio 
president of the agency. Thereafter, the WZO continued to con- 
duct external diplomatic, informational, and cultural activities, and 
the operational Jewish Agency took over fundraising, activities in 
Palestine, and local relations with the British Mandate Authority 
(administered by the colonial secretary). In time, the World Zionist 
Organization and the Jewish Agency became two different names 
for virtually the same organization. 

Other landmark developments by the WZO and the Jewish 
Agency under the Mandate included creation of the Asefat Haniv- 
harim (Elected Assembly — see Glossary) and the Vaad Leumi 
(National Council) in 1920 to promote religious, educational, and 
welfare services; establishment of the chief rabbinate in 1921; cen- 
tralized Zionist control of the Hebrew school system in 1919, open- 
ing of the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) in Haifa in 
1924, and dedication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 
1925; and continued acquisition of land — largely via purchases by 
the Jewish National Fund — increasing from 60,120 hectares in 1922 
to about 155,140 hectares in 1939, and the concurrent growth of 
Jewish urban and village centers. 

The architect of the centralized organizational structure that 
dominated the Yishuv throughout the Mandate and afterward was 
Ben-Gurion. To achieve a centralized Jewish economic infrastruc- 
ture in Palestine, he set out to form a large-scale organized Jewish 
labor movement including both urban and agricultural laborers. 
In 1919 he founded the first united Labor Zionist party, Ahdut 
HaAvodah (Unity of Labor), which included Poalei Tziyyon and 
affiliated socialist groups. This achievement was followed in 
1920 by the formation of the Histadrut, or HaHistadrut HaKlalit 



40 



Historical Setting 



shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael (General Federation of Laborers 
in the Land of Israel). 

The Histadrut was the linchpin of Ben-Gurion's reorganization 
of the Yishuv. He designed the Histadrut to form a tightly con- 
trolled autonomous Jewish economic state within the Palestinian 
economy. It functioned as much more than a traditional labor 
union, providing the Yishuv with social services and security, set- 
ting up training centers, helping absorb new immigrants, and in- 
structing them in Hebrew. Its membership was all-inclusive: any 
Jewish laborer was entitled to belong and to obtain shares in the 
organization's assets. It established a general fund supported by 
workers' dues that provided all members with social services previ- 
ously provided by individual political parties. The Histadrut also 
set up Hevrat HaOvdim (Society of Workers) to fund and manage 
large-scale agricultural and industrial enterprises. Within a year 
of its establishment in 1921 , Hevrat HaOvdim had set up Tenuvah, 
the agriculture marketing cooperative; Bank HaPoalim, the work- 
ers' bank; and Soleh Boneh, the construction firm. Originally es- 
tablished by Ahdut HaAvodah after the Arab riots in 1920, the 
Haganah under the Histadrut rapidly became the major Jewish 
defense force (see Historical Background, ch. 5). 

From the beginning, Ben-Gurion and Ahdut HaAvodah domi- 
nated the Histadrut and through it the Yishuv. As secretary general 
of the Histadrut, Ben-Gurion oversaw the development of the Jew- 
ish economy and defense forces in the Yishuv. This centralized con- 
trol enabled the Yishuv to endure both severe economic hardship 
and frequent skirmishes with the Arabs and British in the late 1920s. 
The resilience of the Histadrut in the face of economic depression 
enabled Ben-Gurion to consolidate his control over the Yishuv. In 
1929 many private entrepreneurs were forced to look to Ahdut 
HaAvodah to pull them through hard economic times. In 1930 
Ahdut HaAvodah was powerful enough to absorb its old ideologi- 
cal rival, HaPoel HaTzair. They merged to form Mifleget Poalei 
Eretz Yisrael (better known by its acronym Mapai), which would 
dominate political life of the State of Israel for the next two gener- 
ations (see Multiparty System, ch. 4). 

The hegemony of Ben-Gurion's Labor Zionism in the Yishuv 
did not go unchallenged. The other major contenders for power 
were the Revisionist Zionists led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, who 
espoused a more liberal economic structure and a more zealous 
defense policy than the Labor movement. Jabotinsky, who had be- 
come a hero to the Yishuv because of his role in the defense of the 
Jews of Jerusalem during the riots of April 1920, believed that 
there was an inherent conflict between Zionist objectives and the 



41 



Israel: A Country Study 

aspirations of Palestinian Arabs. He called for the establishment 
of a strong Jewish military force capable of compelling the Arabs 
to accept Zionist claims to Palestine. Jabotinsky also thought that 
Ben-Gurion's focus on building a socialist Jewish economy in Pales- 
tine needlessly diverted the Zionist movement from its true goal: 
the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 

The appeal of Revisionist Zionism grew between 1924 and 1930 
as a result of an influx of Polish immigrants and the escalating con- 
flict with the Arabs. In the mid- 1920s, a political and economic 
crisis in Poland and the Johnson-Lodge Immigration Act passed 
by the United States Congress, which curtailed mass immigration 
to America, spurred Polish-Jewish immigration to Israel. Between 
1924 and 1931, approximately 80,000 Jews arrived in Palestine 
from Central Europe. The Fourth Aliyah, as it was called, differed 
from previous waves of Jewish immigration. The new Polish im- 
migrants, unlike the Bolshevik-minded immigrants of the Second 
Aliyah, were primarily petty merchants and small-time industri- 
alists with their own capital to invest. Not attracted to the Labor 
Party's collective settlements, they migrated to the cities where they 
established the first semblance of an industrialized urban Jewish 
economy in Palestine. Within five years, the Jewish populations 
of Jerusalem and Haifa doubled, and the city of Tel Aviv emerged. 
These new immigrants disdained the socialism of the Histadrut and 
increasingly identified with the laissez-faire economics espoused by 
Jabotinsky. 

Another reason for Jabotinsky 's increasing appeal was the escala- 
tion of Jewish- Arab violence. Jabotinsky's belief in the inevitable 
conflict between Jews and Arabs and his call for the establishment 
of an "iron wall" that would force the Arabs to accept Zionism 
were vindicated in the minds of many Jews after a confrontation 
over Jewish access to the Wailing Wall in August 1929 turned into 
a violent Arab attack on Jews in Hebron and Jerusalem. By the 
time the fighting ended, 133 Jews had been killed and 339 wounded. 
The causes of the disturbances were varied: an inter-Palestinian 
power struggle, a significant cutback in British military presence 
in Palestine, and a more conciliatory posture by the new British 
authorities toward the Arab position. 

The inability of the Haganah to protect Jewish civilians during 
the 1929 riots led Jewish Polish immigrants who supported 
Jabotinsky to break away from the Labor-dominated Haganah. 
They were members of Betar, an activist Zionist movement founded 
in 1923 in Riga, Latvia, under the influence of Jabotinsky. The 
first Betar congress met at Danzig in 1931 and elected Jabotinsky 
as its leader. In 1937, a group of Haganah members left the 



42 



Historical Setting 



organization in protest against its "defensive" orientation and 
joined forces with Betar to set up a new and more militant armed 
underground organization, known as the Irgun. The formal name 
of the Irgun was the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organi- 
zation), sometimes also called by the acronym, Etzel, from the initial 
letters of the Hebrew name. The more extreme terrorist group, 
known to the British as the Stern Gang, split off from the Irgun 
in 1939. The Stern Gang was formally known as the Lohamei Herut 
Israel (Fighters for Israel's Freedom), sometimes identified by the 
acronym Lehi (see Glossary). Betar (which later formed a nucleus 
for Herut — see Appendix B) and Irgun rejected the Histadrut/ 
Haganah doctrine of havlaga (self-restraint) and favored retaliation. 

Although the 1929 riots intensified the Labor- Revisionist split 
over the tactics necessary to attain Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, 
their respective visions of the indigenous Arab population coalesced. 
Ben-Gurion, like Jabotinsky, came to realize that the conflict be- 
tween Arab and Jewish nationalisms was irreconcilable and there- 
fore that the Yishuv needed to prepare for an eventual military 
confrontation with the Arabs. He differed with Jabotinsky, however, 
on the need to make tactical compromises in the short term to at- 
tain Jewish statehood at a more propitious time. Whereas Jabotinsky 
adamantly put forth maximalist demands, such as the immediate 
proclamation of statehood in all of historic Palestine — on both banks 
of the Jordan River — Ben-Gurion operated within the confines of 
the Mandate. He understood better than Jabotinsky that timing 
was the key to the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. The Yishuv in 
the 1930s lacked the necessary military or economic power to carry 
out Jabotinsky' s vision in the face of Arab and British opposition. 

Another development resulting from the 1929 riots was the grow- 
ing animosity between the British Mandate Authority and the 
Yishuv. The inactivity of the British while Arab bands were at- 
tacking Jewish settlers strengthened Zionist anti-British forces. Fol- 
lowing the riots, the British set up the Shaw Commission to 
determine the cause of the disturbances. The commission report, 
dated March 30, 1930, refrained from blaming either community 
but focused on Arab apprehensions about Jewish labor practices 
and land purchases. The commission's allegations were investigated 
by an agrarian expert, Sir John Hope Simpson, who concluded 
that about 30 percent of the Arab population was already landless 
and that the amount of land remaining in Arab hands would 
be insufficient to divide among their offspring. This led to the 
Passfield White Paper (October 1930), which recommended that 
Jewish immigration be stopped if it prevented Arabs from obtain- 
ing employment and that Jewish land purchases be curtailed. 



43 



Israel: A Country Study 

Although the Passfield White Paper was publicly repudiated by 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in 1931, it served to alienate 
further the Yishuv from the British. 

The year 1929 also saw the beginning of a severe economic cri- 
sis in Germany that launched the rise of Adolf Hitler. Although 
both Germany and Austria had long histories of anti-Semitism, 
the genocide policies preached by Hitier were unprecedented. When 
in January 1930 he became chancellor of the Reich, a massive wave 
of mostly German Jewish immigration to Palestine ensued. 
Recorded Jewish immigration was 37,000 in 1933, 45,000 in 1934, 
and an all-time record for the Yishuv of 61,000 in 1935. In addi- 
tion, the British estimated that a total of 40,000 Jews had entered 
Palestine without legal certificates during the period from 1920 to 
1939. Between 1929, the year of the Wailing Wall disturbances, 
and 1936, the year the Palestinian Revolt began, the Jewish popu- 
lation of Palestine increased from 170,000 or 17 percent of the popu- 
lation, to 400,000, or approximately 31 percent of the total. The 
immigration of thousands of German Jews accelerated the pace of 
industrialization and made the concept of a Jewish state in Pales- 
tine a more formidable reality. 

The Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39 

By 1936 the increase in Jewish immigration and land acquisi- 
tion, the growing power of Hajj Amin al Husayni, and general 
Arab frustration at the continuation of European rule, radicalized 
increasing numbers of Palestinian Arabs. Thus, in April 1936 an 
Arab attack on a Jewish bus led to a series of incidents that esca- 
lated into a major Palestinian rebellion. An Arab Higher Com- 
mittee (AHC), a loose coalition of recently formed Arab political 
parties, was created. It declared a national strike in support of three 
basic demands: cessation of Jewish immigration, an end to all fur- 
ther land sales to the Jews, and the establishment of an Arab 
national government. 

The intensity of the Palestinian Revolt, at a time when Britain 
was preparing for the possibility of another world war, led the British 
to reorient their policy in Palestine. As war with Germany became 
imminent, Britain's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and there- 
fore the need for Arab goodwill, loomed increasingly large in its 
strategic thinking. Jewish leverage in the Foreign Office, on the 
other hand, had waned; the pro-Zionists, Balfour and Samuels, 
had left the Foreign Office and the new administration was not 
inclined toward the Zionist position. Furthermore, the Jews had 
little choice but to support Britain against Nazi Germany. Thus, 
Britain's commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine dissipated, 



44 



Historical Setting 



and the Mandate authorities pursued a policy of appeasement with 
respect to the Arabs. 

Britain's policy change in Palestine was not, however, easily im- 
plemented. Since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, successive British 
governments had supported (or at least not rejected) a Jewish na- 
tional home in Palestine. The Mandate itself was premised on that 
pledge. By the mid- 1930s, the Yishuv had grown to about 400,000, 
and the Jewish economic and political structures in Palestine were 
well ensconced. The extent of the Jewish presence and the rapidly 
deteriorating fate of European Jewry meant that the British would 
have an extremely difficult time extricating themselves from the 
Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, the existing Palestinian leader- 
ship, dominated by Hajj Amin al Husayni, was unwilling to grant 
members of the Jewish community citizenship or to guarantee their 
safety if a new Arab entity were to emerge. Thus, for the British 
the real options were to impose partition, to pull out and leave the 
Jews and Arabs to fight it out, or to stay and improvise. 

In 1937 the British, working with their regional Arab allies, Amir 
Abdullah of Transjordan, King Ghazi of Iraq, and King Abdul 
Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, mediated an end to the revolt with 
the AHC. A Royal Commission on Palestine (known as the Peel 
Commission) was immediately dispatched to Palestine. Its report, 
issued in July 1937, described the Arab and Zionist positions and 
the British obligation to each as irreconcilable and the existing 
Mandate as unworkable. It recommended partition of Palestine 
into Jewish and Arab states, with a retained British Mandate over 
Nazareth, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem and a corridor from Jerusa- 
lem to the coast (see fig. 3). 

In 1937 the Twentieth Zionist Congress rejected the proposed 
boundaries but agreed in principle to partition. Palestinian Arab 
nationalists rejected any kind of partition. The British government 
approved the idea of partition and sent a technical team to make 
a detailed plan. This group, the Woodhead Commission, reversed 
the Peel Commission's findings and reported in November 1937 
that partition was impracticable; this view in its turn was accepted. 
The Palestinian Revolt broke out again in the autumn of 1937. 
The British put down the revolt using harsh measures, shutting 
down the AHC and deporting many Palestinian Arab leaders. 

With their leadership residing outside Palestine, the Arabs were 
unable to match the Zionists' highly sophisticated organization. 
Another outcome of the Palestinian Revolt was the involvement 
of the Arab states as advocates of the Palestinian Arabs. Whereas 
Britain had previously tended to deal with its commitments in 



45 



Israel: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



Palestine as separate from its commitments elsewhere in the Mid- 
dle East, by 1939 pan-Arab pressure carried increasing weight in 
London. 

In the Yishuv, the Palestinian Revolt reinforced the already firm 
belief in the need for a strong Jewish defense network. Finally, the 
Arab agricultural boycott that began in 1936 forced the Jewish econ- 
omy into even greater self-sufficiency. 

World War II and Zionism 

In May 1939, the British published a White Paper that marked 
the end of its commitment to the Jews under the Balfour Declara- 
tion. It provided for the establishment of a Palestinian (Arab) state 
within ten years and the appointment of Palestinian ministers to 
begin taking over the government as soon as "peace and order" 
were restored to Palestine; 75,000 Jews would be allowed into Pales- 
tine over the next five years, after which all immigration would 
be subject to Arab consent; all further land sales would be severely 
restricted. The 1939 White Paper met a mixed Arab reception and 
was rejected by the AHC. The Jewish Agency rejected it emphati- 
cally, branding it as a total repudiation of Balfour and Mandate 
obligations. In September 1939, at the outset of World War II, 
Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, declared: "We 
shall fight the war against Hitler as if there were no White Paper, 
and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war." 

Ben-Gurion 's statement of 1939 set the tone for Jewish Agency 
policy and operations during World War II. In May 1940, however, 
when Winston Churchill, a longtime Zionist sympathizer, became 
prime minister, it appeared that the 1939 White Paper might be 
rescinded. A brief period of close British-Jewish military coopera- 
tion ensued, and there was talk (which never came to fruition) of 
establishing a Jewish division within the British Army. The Brit- 
ish trained Jewish commando units, the first elements of the fa- 
mous Palmach (Pelugot Mahatz — Shock Forces — see Glossary) — 
the strategic reserve of the Haganah — and they also gave Jewish 
volunteers intensive training in sabotage, demolition, and parti- 
san warfare. Ironically, this training proved indispensable in the 
Yishuv' s efforts after the war to force the British to withdraw from 
Palestine. 

The entry of Italy into the war in May 1940, which brought the 
war closer to the Middle East, convinced Churchill and his mili- 
tary advisers that the immigration provisions of the White Paper 
needed to be enforced so as not to antagonize the Arabs. Thus, 
the British strictly enforced the immigration limits at a time when 
European Jewry sought desperately to reach the shores of Palestine. 



47 



Israel: A Country Study 



Despite rising British-Jewish tensions, thousands of Jewish volun- 
teers served in the British army, and on September 14. 1944, the 
Jewish Brigade was established. 

The event that did the most to turn the Zionist movement against 
Churchill's Britain was the Struma affair. The Struma, a ship carry- 
ing Jewish refugees from Romania, was denied entry into Pales- 
tine, after which the ship sank in the Black Sea leaving all but two 
of its passengers dead. In the aftermath of the loss of the Struma 
in April 1942, young Menachem Begin, then a soldier in the Polish 
army-in-exile, first came to Palestine. Begin was a disciple of 
Jabotinsky, but he rejected Jabotinsky's pro-British sympathies. 
Upon entering Palestine. Begin immediately set out to draw together 
the whole underground, including Lehi, in preparation for a Jew- 
ish war of liberation against the British. 

By 1943 as news regarding Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe 
increased, the Irgun and Stern Gang stepped up harassment of Brit- 
ish forces in an attempt to obtain unrestricted Jewish immigration. 
In November 1944, Lord Moyne, the British minister-resident in 
Cairo and a close personal friend of Churchill, was assassinated 
by Lehi. Lord Moyne 's assassination alienated the British prime 
minister, who until then had supported a Jewish national home 
in Palestine. Subsequently, no British government considered set- 
ting up a Jewish state in Palestine. The assassination also led the 
Jewish Agency's clandestine military arm, Haganah, to cooperate 
with the British against the Irgun. 

Another result of the anti-Zionist trend in British policy was the 
Yishuv's increasing reliance on the United States. In May 1942. 
Zionist policy and objectives were clarified at a conference of Zionist 
parties held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. This confer- 
ence was called at the initiative of Ben-Gurion. who had come to 
solicit the support of American Jews. Ben-Gurion was determined 
to seek a resolution that Jewish immigration to Palestine and the 
establishment of a Jewish state would proceed despite British op- 
position. Weizmann, who objected to the idea of severing ties with 
Britain, was outflanked at the conference. The Biltmore Program 
adopted at the conference and approved by the Zionist General 
Council in November 1942 called for unlimited Jewish immigra- 
tion to Palestine and control of immigration by the Jewish com- 
monwealth, the word commonwealth thus replacing homeland. 

The Holocaust 

The impact of the Holocaust on world Jewry, either on contem- 
poraries of the horror or on succeeding generations, cannot be 
exaggerated. The scope of Hitler's genocidal efforts can be quickly 



48 



Historical Setting 



summarized. In 1939 about 10 million of the estimated 16 million 
Jews in the world lived in Europe. By 1945 almost 6 million had 
been killed, most of them in the nineteen main concentration camps. 
Of prewar Czechoslovakia's 281,000 Jews, about 4,000 survived. 
Before the German conquest and occupation, the Jewish popula- 
tion of Greece was estimated to be between 65,000 and 72,000; 
about 2,000 survived. Only 5,000 of Austria's prewar Jewish com- 
munity of 70,000 escaped. In addition, an estimated 4.6 million 
Jews were killed in Poland and in those areas of the Soviet Union 
seized and occupied by the Germans. 

The magnitude of the Holocaust cast a deep gloom over the Jew- 
ish people and tormented the spirit of Judaism. The faith of ob- 
servant Jews was shaken, and the hope of the assimilationists 
smashed. Not only had 6 million Jews perished, but the Allies, who 
by 1944 could have easily disrupted the operation of the death 
camps, did nothing. In this spiritual vacuum, Zionism alone 
emerged as a viable Jewish response to this demonic anti-Semitism. 
Zionist thinkers since the days of Pinsker had made dire predic- 
tions concerning the fate of European Jewry. For much of world 
Jewry that had suffered centuries of persecution, Zionism and its 
call for a Jewish national home and for the radical transformation 
of the Jew from passive victim to self-sufficient citizen residing in 
his own homeland became the only possible positive response to 
the Holocaust. Zionism unified the Jewish people, entered deeply 
into the Jewish spirit, and became an integral part of Jewish iden- 
tity and religious experience. 

Prelude to Statehood 

The British position in Palestine at the end of World War II was 
becoming increasingly untenable. Hundreds of thousands of Jew- 
ish Holocaust survivors temporarily housed in displaced persons 
camps in Europe were clamoring to be settled in Palestine. The 
fate of these refugees aroused international public opinion against 
British policy. Moreover, the administration of President Harry 
S Truman, feeling morally bound to help the Jewish refugees and 
exhorted by a large and vocal Jewish community, pressured Brit- 
ain to change its course in Palestine. Postwar Britain depended 
on American economic aid to reconstruct its war- torn economy. 
Furthermore, Britain's staying power in its old colonial holdings 
was waning; in 1947 British rule in India came to an end and Brit- 
ain informed Washington that London could no longer carry the 
military burden of strengthening Greece and Turkey against com- 
munist encroachment. 



49 



Israel: A Country Study 

In May 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry unani- 
mously declared its opposition to the White Paper of 1939 and pro- 
posed, among other recommendations, that the immigration to 
Palestine of 100,000 European Jews be authorized at once. The 
British Mandate Authority rejected the proposal, stating that such 
immigration was impossible while armed organizations in 
Palestine — both Arab and Jewish — were fighting the authority and 
disrupting public order. 

Despite American, Jewish, and international pressure and the 
recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
the new Labour Party government of Prime Minister Clement Atlee 
and his foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, continued to enforce the 
policy articulated in the White Paper. British adamancy on im- 
migration radicalized the Yishuv. Under Ben-Gurion's direction, 
the Jewish Agency decided in October 1945 to unite with Jewish 
dissident groups in a combined rebellion against the British ad- 
ministration in Palestine. The combined Jewish resistance move- 
ment organized illegal immigration and kidnapping of British 
officials in Palestine and sabotaged the British infrastructure in 
Palestine. In response Bevin ordered a crackdown on the Haganah 
and arrested many of its leaders. While the British concentrated 
their efforts on the Haganah, the Irgun and Lehi carried out ter- 
rorist attacks against British forces, the most spectacular of which 
was the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in July 
1946. The latter event led Ben-Gurion to sever his relationship with 
the Irgun and Lehi. 

By 1947 Palestine was a major trouble spot in the British Em- 
pire, requiring some 100,000 troops and a huge maintenance bud- 
get. On February 18, 1947, Bevin informed the House of Commons 
of the government's decision to present the Palestine problem to 
the United Nations (UN). On May 15, 1947, a special session of 
the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), consisting of eleven mem- 
bers. The UNSCOP reported on August 31 that a majority of its 
members supported a geographically complex system of partition 
into separate Arab and Jewish states, a special international status 
for Jerusalem, and an economic union linking the three members. 
Backed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the plan 
was adopted after two months of intense deliberations as the UN 
General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. Although 
considering the plan defective in terms of their expectations from 
the League of Nations Mandate twenty-five years earlier, the Zionist 
General Council stated willingness in principle to accept partition. 
The League of Arab States (Arab League) Council, meeting in 



50 



Historical Setting 



December 1947, said it would take whatever measures were re- 
quired to prevent implementation of the resolution. 

Despite the passage of the UN partition plan, the situation in 
Palestine in early 1948 did not look auspicious for the Yishuv. When 
the AHC rejected the plan immediately after its passage and called 
for a general strike, violence between Arabs and Jews mounted. 
Many Jewish centers, including Jerusalem, were besieged by the 
Arabs. In January 1948, President Truman, warned by the United 
States Department of State that a Jewish state was not viable, 
reversed himself on the issue of Palestine, agreeing to postpone 
partition and to transfer the Mandate to a trusteeship council. 
Moreover, the British forces in Palestine sided with the Arabs and 
attempted to thwart the Yishuv 's attempts to arm itself. 

In mid-March the Yishuv 's military prospects changed dramat- 
ically after receiving the first clandestine shipment of heavy arms 
from Czechoslovakia. The Haganah went on the offensive and, 
in a series of operations carried out from early April until mid- 
May, successfully consolidated and created communications links 
with those Jewish setdements designated by the UN to become the 
Jewish state. In the meantime, Weizmann convinced Truman to 
reverse himself and pledge his support for the proposed Jewish state. 
In April 1948, the Palestinian Arab community panicked after 
Begin' s Irgun killed 250 Arab civilians at the village of Dayr Yasin 
near Jerusalem. The news of Dayr Yasin precipitated a flight of 
the Arab population from areas with large Jewish populations. 

On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establish- 
ment of the State of Israel. On the following day Britain relinquished 
the Mandate at 6:00 P.M. and the United States announced de 
facto recognition of Israel. Soviet recognition was accorded on 
May 18; by April 1949, fifty-three nations, including Britain, had 
extended recognition. In May 1949, the UN General Assembly, 
on recommendation of the Security Council, admitted Israel to the 
UN. 

Meanwhile, Arab military forces began their invasion of Israel 
on May 15. Initially these forces consisted of approximately 8,000 
to 10,000 Egyptians, 2,000 to 4,000 Iraqis, 4,000 to 5,000 Trans- 
jordanians, 3,000 to 4,000 Syrians, 1,000 to 2,000 Lebanese, and 
smaller numbers of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni troops, about 
25,000 in all. Israeli forces composed of the Haganah, such irreg- 
ular units as the Irgun and the Stern Gang, and women's aux- 
iliaries numbered 35,000 or more. By October 14, Arab forces 
deployed in the war zones had increased to about 55,000, includ- 
ing not more than 5,000 irregulars of Hajj Amin al Husayni's Pales- 
tine Liberation Force. The Israeli military forces had increased to 



51 



Israel: A Country Study 

approximately 100,000. Except for the British- trained Arab Legion 
of Transjordan, Arab units were largely ill- trained and inex- 
perienced. Israeli forces, usually operating with interior lines of 
communication, included an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 European 
World War II veterans. 

By January 1949, Jewish forces held the area that was to define 
Israel's territory until June 1967, an area that was significantly 
larger than the area designated by the UN partition plan. The part 
of Palestine remaining in Arab hands was limited to that held by 
the Arab Legion of Transjordan and the Gaza area held by Egypt 
at the cessation of hostilities. The area held by the Arab Legion 
was subsequently annexed by Jordan and is commonly referred 
to as the West Bank (see Glossary). Jerusalem was divided. The 
Old City, the Western Wall and the site of Solomon's Temple, 
upon which stands the Muslim mosque called the Dome of the 
Rock, remained in Jordanian hands; the New City lay on the Is- 
raeli side of the line. Although the West Bank remained under 
Jordanian suzerainty until 1967, only two countries — Britain and 
Pakistan — granted de jure recognition of the annexation. 

Early in the conflict, on May 29, 1948, the UN Security Coun- 
cil established the Truce Commission headed by a UN mediator, 
Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte, who was assassinated in Jerusa- 
lem on September 17, 1948. He was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, 
an American, as acting mediator. The commission, which later 
evolved into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization- 
Palestine (UNTSOP), attempted to devise new settlement plans 
and arranged the truces of June 11 -July 8 and July 19-October 
14, 1948. Armistice talks were initiated with Egypt in January 1949, 
and an armistice agreement was concluded with Egypt on Febru- 
ary 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Transjordan on April 3, 
and with Syria on July 20. Iraq did not enter into an armistice 
agreement but withdrew its forces after turning over its positions 
to Transjordanian units. 

Problems of the New State, 1948-67 
Etatism 

The War of Independence was the most costly war Israel has 
fought; more than 6,000 Jewish fighters and civilians died. At the 
war's end in 1949, the fledgling state was burdened with a num- 
ber of difficult problems. These included reacting to the absorp- 
tion of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants and to a festering 
refugee problem on its borders, maintaining a defense against a 
hostile and numerically superior Arab world, keeping a war- torn 



52 



Historical Setting 



economy afloat, and managing foreign policy alignments. Faced 
with such intractable problems, Ben-Gurion sought to ensure a fluid 
transition from existing prestate institutions to the new state 
apparatus. He announced the formation of a Provisional Council 
of State, actually a transformed executive committee of the Jewish 
Agency with himself as prime minister. Weizmann became presi- 
dent of the council, although Ben-Gurion was careful to make the 
presidency a distinctly ceremonial position. The provisional govern- 
ment would hold elections no later than October 1948 for the Con- 
stituent Assembly to draw up a formal constitution. The proposed 
constitution was never ratified, however, and on February 16, 1949 
the Constituent Assembly became Israel's first parliament or 
Knesset (see Glossary). 

A key element of Ben-Gurion 's etatism was the integration of 
Israel's independent military forces into a unified military struc- 
ture. On May 28, 1948, Ben-Gurion 's provisional government 
created the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Hebrew name of which, 
Zvah Haganah Le Yisrael, is commonly abbreviated to Zahal, and 
prohibited maintenance of any other armed force. This proclama- 
tion was challenged by the Irgun, which sailed the Altalena, a ship 
carrying arms, into Tel Aviv harbor. Ben-Gurion ordered Haganah 
troops to fire on the ship, which was set aflame on the beach in 
Tel Aviv. With the two camps on the verge of civil war, Begin, 
the leader of the Irgun, ordered his troops not to fire on the 
Haganah. Although the Altalena affair unified the IDF, it remained 
a bitter memory for Begin and the Irgun. Begin subsequently con- 
verted his armed movement into a political party, the Herut (or 
Freedom Movement). By January 1949, Ben-Gurion had also dis- 
solved the Palmach, the strike force of the Haganah. 

Ingathering of the Exiles 

The first legislative act of the Provisional Council of State was 
the Law and Administrative Ordinance of 1948 that declared null 
and void the restrictions on Jewish immigration imposed by Brit- 
ish authorities. In July 1950, the Knesset passed the Law of Return 
(see Glossary), which stated that "Every Jew has the right to come 
to this country as an olah (new immigrant)." 

In 1939 the British Mandate Authority had estimated that about 
445,000 out of 1.5 million residents of the Mandate were Jews. 
Israeli officials estimated that as of May 15, 1948, about 650,000 
Jews lived in the area scheduled to become Israel under the Novem- 
ber 1947 UN partition proposal. Between May 1948 and Decem- 
ber 31, 1951, approximately 684,000 Jewish immigrants entered 
the new state, thus providing a Jewish majority in the region for 



53 



Israel: A Country Study 

the first time in the modern era. The largest single group of im- 
migrants consisted of Jews from Eastern Europe; more than 300,000 
people came from refugee and displaced persons camps. 

The highly organized state structure created by Ben-Gurion and 
the old guard Mapai leadership served the Yishuv well in the 
prestate era, but was ill prepared for the massive influx of non- 
European refugees that flooded into the new state in its first years 
of existence. Between 1948 and 1952 about 300,000 Sephardic 
immigrants came to Israel. Aside from 120,000 highly educated 
Iraqi Jews and 10,000 Egyptian Jews, the majority of new im- 
migrants (55,000 Turkish Jews, 40,000 Iranian Jews, 55,000 
Yemeni Jews, and thousands more from Jewish enclaves in Afghan- 
istan, the Caucasus, and Cochin in southwest India) were poorly 
educated, impoverished, and culturally very different from the coun- 
try's dominant European culture. They were religious Jews who 
had worked primarily in petty trade, while the ruling Ashkena- 
zim of the Labor Party were secular socialists. As a result, the 
Ashkenazim-dominated kibbutz movement spurned them, and 
Mapai leadership as a whole viewed the new immigrants as "raw 
material" for their socialist program (see Jewish Ethnic Groups, 
ch. 2). 

In the late 1950s, a new flood of 400,000 mainly undereducated 
Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, and Egyptian Jews immigrated to 
Israel following Israel's Sinai Campaign (see 1956 War, ch. 5). 
The total addition to Israel's population during the first twelve years 
of statehood was about 1.2 million, and at least two-thirds of the 
newcomers were of Sephardic extraction. By 1961 the Sephardic 
portion of the Jewish population was about 45 percent, or approx- 
imately 800,000 people. By the end of the first decade, about four- 
fifths of the Sephardic population lived in the large towns, mostly 
development towns, and cities where they became workers in an 
economy dominated by Ashkenazim. 

Israeli Arabs, Arab Land, and Arab Refugees 

Events immediately before and during the War of Independence 
and during the first years of independence remain, so far as those 
events involved the Arab residents of Palestine, matters of bitter 
and emotional dispute. Palestinian Arab refugees insist that they 
were driven out of their homeland by Jewish terrorists and regu- 
lar Jewish military forces; the government of Israel asserts that the 
invading Arab forces urged the Palestinian Arabs to leave their 
houses temporarily to avoid the perils of the war that would 
end the Jewish intrusion into Arab lands. Forty years after the 



54 



Historical Setting 



event, advocates of Arabs or Jews continue to present and believe 
diametrically opposed descriptions of those events. 

According to British Mandate Authority population figures in 
1947, there were about 1.3 million Arabs in all of Palestine. Be- 
tween 700,000 and 900,000 of the Arabs lived in the region even- 
tually bounded by the 1949 Armistice line, the so-called Green Line. 
By the time the fighting stopped, there were only about 170,000 
Arabs left in the new State of Israel. By the summer of 1949, about 
750,000 Palestinian Arabs were living in squalid refugee camps, 
set up virtually overnight in territories adjacent to Israel's borders. 
About 300,000 lived in the Gaza Strip, which was occupied by the 
Egyptian army. Another 450,000 became unwelcome residents of 
the West Bank of the Jordan, recently occupied by the Arab Legion 
of Transjordan. 

The Arabs who remained inside post- 1948 Israel became citizens 
of the Jewish state. They had voting rights equal to the state's Jewish 
community, and according to Israel's Declaration of Independence 
were guaranteed social and political equality. Because Israel's parlia- 
ment has never passed a constitution, however, Arab rights in the 
Jewish state have remained precarious (see Minority Groups, ch. 2; 
Arab Parties, ch. 4). Israel's Arab residents were seen both by Jew- 
ish Israelis and by themselves as aliens in a foreign country. They 
had been waging war since the 1920s against Zionism and could 
not be expected to accept enthusiastically residence in the Jewish 
state. The institutions of the new state were designed to facilitate 
the growth of the Jewish nation, which in many instances entailed 
a perceived infringement upon Arab rights. Thus, Arab land was 
confiscated to make way for Jewish immigrants, the Hebrew lan- 
guage and Judaism predominated over Arabic and Islam, foreign 
economic aid poured into the Jewish economy while Arab agricul- 
ture and business received only meager assistance, and Israeli secu- 
rity concerns severely restricted the Arabs' freedom of movement. 

After independence the areas in which 90 percent of the Arabs 
lived were placed under military government. This system and the 
assignment of almost unfettered powers to military governors were 
based on the Defense (Emergency) Regulations promulgated by 
the British Mandate Authority in 1945. Using the 1945 regulations 
as a legal base, the government created three areas or zones to be 
ruled by the Ministry of Defense. The most important was the 
Northern Area, also known as the Galilee Area, the locale of about 
two-thirds of the Arab population. The second critical area was 
the so-called Little Triangle, located between the villages of Et Tira 
and Et Taiyiba near the border with Jordan (then Transjordan). 



55 



Israel: A Country Study 

The third area included much of the Negev Desert, the region 
traversed by the previously apolitical nomadic beduins. 

The most salient feature of military government was restriction 
of movement. Article 125 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 
empowered military governors to declare any specified area "off- 
limits" to those having no written authorization. The area was then 
declared a security zone and thus closed to Israeli Arabs who lacked 
written permission either from the army chief of staff or the minister 
of defense. Under these provisions, 93 out of 104 Arab villages in 
Israel were constituted as closed areas out of which no one could 
move without a military permit. In these areas, official acts of mili- 
tary governors were, with rare exceptions, not subject to review 
by the civil courts. Individuals could be arrested and imprisoned 
on unspecified charges, and private property was subject to search 
and seizure without warrant. Furthermore, the physical expulsion 
of individuals or groups from the state was not subject to review 
by the civil courts. 

Another land expropriation measure evolved from the Defense 
(Emergency) Regulations, which were passed in 1949 and renewed 
annually until 1972 when the legislation was allowed to lapse. Under 
this law, the Ministry of Defense could, subject to approval by an 
appropriate committee of the Knesset, create security zones in all 
or part of what was designated as the "protected zone," an area 
that included lands adjacent to Israel's borders and other speci- 
fied areas. According to Sabri Jiryis, an Arab political economist 
who based his work exclusively on Israeli government sources, the 
defense minister used this law to categorize "almost half of Galilee, 
all of the Triangle, an area near the Gaza Strip, and another along 
the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway line near Batir as security zones." A 
clause of the law provided that permanent as well as temporary 
residents could be required to leave the zone and that the individual 
expelled had four days within which to appeal the eviction notice 
to an appeals committee. The decisions of these committees were 
not subject to review or appeal by a civil court. 

Yet another measure enacted by the Knesset in 1949 was the 
Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance. 
One use of this law was to transfer to kibbutzim or other Jewish 
settlements land in the security zones that was lying fallow because 
the owner of the land or other property was not allowed to enter 
the zone as a result of national security legislation. The 1949 law 
provided that such land transfers were valid only for a period of 
two years and eleven months, but subsequent amending legisla- 
tion extended the validity of the transfers for the duration of the 
state of emergency. 



56 



Historical Setting 



Another common procedure was for the military government 
to seize up to 40 percent of the land in a given region — the maxi- 
mum allowed for national security reasons — and to transfer the land 
to a new kibbutz or moshav (see Glossary). Between 1948 and 1953, 
about 370 new Jewish settlements were built, and an estimated 350 
of the settlements were established on what was termed abandoned 
Arab property. 

The property of the Arabs who were refugees outside the state 
and the property expropriated from the Arabs who remained in 
Israel became a major asset to the new state. According to Don 
Peretz, an American scholar, by 1954 "more than one-third of 
Israel's Jewish population lived on absentee property, and nearly 
a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settied in the urban 
areas abandoned by Arabs." The fleeing Arabs emptied thriving 
cities such as Jaffa, Acre (Akko), Lydda (Lod), and Ramla, plus 
"338 towns and villages and large parts of 94 other cities and towns, 
containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel." 

To the Israeli Arabs, one of the more devastating aspects of the 
loss of their property was their knowledge that the loss was legally 
irreversible. The early Zionist settlers — particularly those of the 
Second Aliyah — adopted a rigid policy that land purchased or in 
any way acquired by a Jewish organization or individual could never 
again be sold, leased, or rented to a non-Jew. The policy went so 
far as to preclude the use of non -Jewish labor on the land. This 
policy was carried over into the new state. At independence the 
State of Israel succeeded to the "state lands" of the British Man- 
date Authority, which had "inherited" the lands held by the govern- 
ment of the Ottoman Empire. The Jewish National Fund was the 
operating and controlling agency of the Land Development Author- 
ity and ensured that land once held by Jews — either individually 
or by the "sovereign state of the Jewish people" — did not revert 
to non-Jews. This denied Israel's non-Jewish, mostly Arab, popu- 
lation access to about 95 percent of the land. 

The Emergence of the IDF 

In February 1950, the Israeli government had discreetly nego- 
tiated a draft treaty with King Abdullah of Transjordan, includ- 
ing a five-year nonaggression pact, open borders, and free access 
to the port of Haifa. In April Abdullah annexed the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem, thus creating the united Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan. Ben-Gurion acquiesced because he thought this would 
mean an end to independent claims on Israeli territory and material 
claims on confiscated Arab territory. Abdullah, however, was assas- 
sinated in July 1951 . Moreover, Israel was boycotted by all its Arab 



57 



Israel: A Country Study 

neighbors, and from the end of 1951 the Suez Canal and the Strait 
of Tiran (at the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba, where it opens 
into the Red Sea) were closed to Israeli shipping. 

Surrounded by enemies and having to integrate thousands of 
immigrants into the new state, Ben-Gurion attempted to make the 
IDF the new unifying symbol of the fledgling state. He realized 
that the socialism of the Histadrut was ill suited to solving the 
problems facing the new state. Above all, Israel needed a unity 
of purpose, which in Ben-Gurion 's thinking could only be provided 
by a strong army that would defend the country against its ene- 
mies and help assimilate its culturally diverse immigrants. Thus, 
Ben-Gurion added to the socialist ethos of the Histadrut and kib- 
butz movements an aggressive Israeli nationalism spearheaded by 
the IDF. To carry out this new orientation, he cultivated a "new 
guard" Mapai leadership headed by dynamic young General 
Moshe Dayan and technocrat Shimon Peres. Throughout the 1950s 
and early 1960s the Dayan-Peres supporters in Mapai and the "old 
guard" Labor establishment would compete for power (see Multi- 
party System, ch. 4). 

In November 1953, Ben-Gurion tendered his resignation, and 
the less militaristic Moshe Sharett took over as prime minister. 
Under Sharett 's weaker leadership, the conflict between the old- 
guard Mapai leadership and Ben-Gurion' s new technocratic elite 
festered openly. This led to a major scandal in the Labor Party 
called the Lavon affair. Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon, an im- 
portant figure in the old guard, had authorized intelligence chief 
Benjamin Gibly to launch Israeli spy rings in Cairo and Alexan- 
dria in an attempt to embarrass Egyptian president Gamal Abdul 
Nasser. The Egyptians, however, caught and later executed the 
spies, and the affair proved to be a major embarrassment to the 
Israeli government. The commission authorized to investigate the 
affair became embroiled in a test of strength between the young 
military establishment — including Dayan and Peres — and the 
Mapai old guard, whose support Lavon solicited. 

In February 1955, Ben-Gurion returned to the Ministry of 
Defense, and with the malleable Sharett still as prime minister was 
able to promote his hard-line defense policy. This position resulted 
in a number of raids against the Egyptians in response to attacks 
on Israeli settlements originating from Egyptian-held territory. Sub- 
sequently, Ben-Gurion was restored to leadership of the Mapai 
government. At this time, his biggest concern was the rising power 
of Nasser. By October 1955, Nasser had signed an agreement to 
buy arms from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, while Presi- 
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to supply Israel with weapons. 



58 



Old city gate of Jaffa, 
outside Tel Aviv 
Courtesy Les Vogel 



Ben-Gurion sought to inflict a mortal blow on the Egyptian re- 
gime. Because Nasser threatened Western interests in the Suez 
Canal, Ben-Gurion entered into secret talks with Britain and France 
about the possibility of Israel striking at the Sinai Peninsula, while 
Britain and France moved in on the Suez Canal, ostensibly to help 
protect Western shipping from combat. In late October, the IDF 
routed the Egyptian army at Gaza and after a week pushed to the 
Gidi and Mitla passes. On November 5, 1956, the French and Brit- 
ish took over the Suez Canal area. After intense pressure from the 
Eisenhower administration, which was worried about the threat 
of Soviet military involvement, the European powers acceded to 
a cease-fire. 

In March 1957, Israeli troops were forced to withdraw. The war 
served to spur Ben-Gurion 's drive toward greater militarization. 
Although Israel was forced to withdraw from Sinai, Ben-Gurion 
deemed the war a success: the raids from Gaza ceased, UN peace- 
keeping forces separated Egypt and Israel, greater cooperation with 
France led to more arms sales to Israel and the building of a nuclear 
reactor, and, most important, the army's near-perfect performance 
vindicated his view on the centrality of the IDF. 

1967 and Afterward 

By the spring of 1967, Nasser's waning prestige, escalating 
Syrian-Israeli tensions, and the emergence of Levi Eshkol as prime 



59 



Israel: A Country Study 

minister set the stage for the third Arab-Israeli war. Throughout 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Nasser was the fulcrum of Arab poli- 
tics. Nasser's success, however, was shortlived; his union with Syria 
fell apart, a revolutionary government in Iraq proved to be a com- 
petitor for power, and Egypt became embroiled in a debilitating 
civil war in Yemen. After 1964, when Israel began diverting waters 
(of the Jordan River) originating in the Golan Heights for its new 
National Water Carrier, Syria built its own diverting facility, which 
the IDF frequently attacked. Finally, in 1963, Ben-Gurion stepped 
down and the more cautious Levi Eshkol became prime minister, 
giving the impression that Israel would be less willing to engage 
the Arab world in hostilities. 

On April 6, 1967, Israeli jet fighters shot down six Syrian planes 
over the Golan Heights, which led to a further escalation of Israeli- 
Syrian tensions. The Soviet Union, wanting to involve Egypt as 
a deterrent to an Israeli initiative against Syria, misinformed Nasser 
on May 13 that the Israelis were planning to attack Syria on May 17 
and that they had already concentrated eleven to thirteen brigades 
on the Syrian border for this purpose. In response Nasser put his 
armed forces in a state of maximum alert, sent combat troops into 
Sinai, notified UN Secretary General U Thant of his decision "to 
terminate the existence of the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) on United Arab Republic (UAR) soil and in the Gaza 
Strip," and announced the closure of the Strait of Tiran. 

The Eshkol government, to avoid the international pressure that 
forced Israel to retreat in 1956, sent Foreign Minister Abba Eban 
to Europe and the United States to convince Western leaders to 
pressure Nasser into reversing his course. In Israel, Eshkol's diplo- 
matic waiting game and Nasser's threatening rhetoric created a 
somber mood. To reassure the public, Moshe Dayan, the hero of 
the 1956 Sinai Campaign, was appointed minister of defense and 
a National Unity Government was formed, which for the first time 
included Begin' s Herut Party, the dominant element in Gahal. 

The actual fighting was over almost before it began; the Israeli 
Air Corps on June 5 destroyed nearly the entire Egyptian Air Force 
on the ground. King Hussein of Jordan, misinformed by Nasser 
about Egyptian losses, authorized Jordanian artillery to fire on 
Jerusalem. Subsequently, both the Jordanians in the east and the 
Syrians in the north were quickly defeated. 

The June 1967 War was a watershed event in the history of Israel 
and the Middle East. After only six days of fighting, Israel had 
radically altered the political map of the region. By June 13, Israeli 
forces had captured the Golan Heights from Syria, Sinai and the 
Gaza Strip from Egypt, and all of Jerusalem and the West Bank 



60 



Historical Setting 



from Jordan. The new territories more than doubled the size of 
pre- 1967 Israel, placing under Israel's control more than 1 mil- 
lion Palestinian Arabs. In Israel, the ease of the victory, the ex- 
pansion of the state's territory, and the reuniting of Jerusalem, the 
holiest place in Judaism, permanently altered political discourse. 
In the Arab camp, the war significantly weakened Nasserism, and 
led to the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as the leading representative of the Palestinian people and 
effective player in Arab politics. 

The heroic performance of the IDF and especially the capture 
of Jerusalem unleashed a wave of religious nationalism through- 
out Israel. The war was widely viewed in Israel as a vindication 
of political Zionism; the defenseless Jew of the shtetl (the typical 
Jewish town or village of the Pale of Settlement), oppressed by the 
tsar and slaughtered by the Nazis, had become the courageous sol- 
dier of the IDF, who in the face of Arab hostility and superpower 
apathy had won a miraculous victory. After 2,000 years of exile, 
the Jews now possessed all of historic Palestine, including a united 
Jerusalem. The secular messianism that had been Zionism's creed 
since its formation in the late 1800s was now supplanted by a 
religious-territorial messianism whose major objective was secur- 
ing the unity of Eretz Yisrael. In the process, the ethos of Labor 
Zionism, which had been on the decline throughout the 1960s, was 
overshadowed. 

In the midst of the nationalist euphoria that followed the war, 
talk of exchanging newly captured territories for peace had little 
public appeal. The Eshkol government followed a two-track pol- 
icy with respect to the territories, which would be continued under 
future Labor governments: on the one hand, it stated a willing- 
ness to negotiate, while on the other, it laid plans to create Jewish 
settlements in the disputed territories. Thus, immediately follow- 
ing the war, Eshkol issued a statement that he was willing to negoti- 
ate "everything" for a full peace, which would include free passage 
through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran and a solution to 
the refugee problem in the context of regional cooperation. This 
was followed in November 1967 by his acceptance of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242, which called for "withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in 
exchange for Arab acceptance of Israel. Concurrently, on Septem- 
ber 24, Eshkol' s government announced plans for the resettlement 
of the Old City of Jerusalem, of the Etzion Bloc — kibbutzim on 
the Bethlehem-Hebron road wiped out by Palestinians in the war 
of 1948 — and for kibbutzim in the northern sector of the Golan 
Heights. Plans were also unveiled for new neighborhoods around 



61 



Israel: A Country Study 

Jerusalem, near the old buildings of Hebrew University, and near 
the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus. 

The Arab states, however, rejected outright any negotiations with 
the Jewish state. At Khartoum, Sudan, in the summer of 1967, 
the Arab states unanimously adopted their famous "three nos": 
no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiation with 
Israel concerning any Palestinian territory. The stridency of the 
Khartoum resolution, however, masked important changes that the 
June 1967 War caused in inter- Arab politics. At Khartoum, Nasser 
pledged to stop destabilizing the region and launching acerbic 
propaganda attacks against the Persian Gulf monarchies in ex- 
change for badly needed economic assistance. This meant that 
Egypt, along with the other Arab states, would focus on consolidat- 
ing power at home and on pressing economic problems rather than 
on revolutionary unity schemes. After 1967 Arab regimes increas- 
ingly viewed Israel and the Palestinian problem not as the key to 
revolutionary change of the Arab state system, but in terms of how 
they affected domestic political stability. The Palestinians, who since 
the late 1940s had looked to the Arab countries to defeat Israel and 
regain their homeland, were radicalized by the 1967 defeat. The 
PLO — an umbrella organization of Palestinian resistance groups 
led by Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah — moved to the forefront of Arab 
resistance against Israel. Recruits and money poured in, and 
throughout 1968 Palestinian guerrillas launched a number of border 
raids on Israel that added to the organization's popularity. The 
fedayeen (Arab guerrillas) attacks brought large-scale Israeli retali- 
ation, which the Arab states were not capable of counteracting. 
The tension between Arab states' interests and the more revolu- 
tionary aspirations of the Palestinian resistance foreshadowed a 
major inter- Arab political conflict. 

The War of Attrition 

The tarnished legitimacy of the Arab states following the June 
1967 War was especially poignant in Egypt. Israeli troops were 
situated on the east bank of the Suez Canal, the canal was closed 
to shipping, and Israel was occupying a large piece of Egyptian 
territory. Nasser responded by maintaining a constant state of mili- 
tary activity along the canal — the so-called War of Attrition — 
between February 1969 and August 1970. Given the wide disparity 
in the populations of Israel and Egypt, Israel could not long toler- 
ate trading casualties with the Egyptians. The Israeli government, 
now led by Golda Meir, pursued a policy of "asymmetrical 
response" — retaliation on a scale far exceeding any individual 
attack. 



62 



Historical Setting 



As the tension along the Egyptian border continued to heat, 
United States secretary of state William Rogers proposed a new 
peace plan. In effect, the Rogers Plan was an interpretation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 242; it called for the international fron- 
tier between Egypt and Israel to be the secure and recognized border 
between the two countries. There would be "a formal state of peace 
between the two, negotiations on Gaza and Sharm ash Shaykh, 
and demilitarized zones." In November Israel rejected the offer, 
and in January 1970 Israeli fighter planes made their first deep 
penetration into Egypt. 

Following the Israeli attack, Nasser went to Moscow request- 
ing advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other military 
equipment. After some wavering, the Kremlin committed itself to 
modernizing and retraining the Egyptian military. Egypt's new 
Soviet-made arsenal threatened to alter the regional military balance 
with Israel. The tension in Israeli-Soviet relations escalated in July 
1970, when Israeli fighter planes shot down four Egyptian planes 
flown by Soviet pilots about thirty kilometers west of the canal. 
Fearing Soviet retaliation, and uncertain of American support, 
Israel in August accepted a cease-fire and the application of Reso- 
lution 242. 

Following the June 1967 War, the PLO established in Jordan 
its major base of operations for the war against Israel. Through- 
out the late 1960s, a cycle of Palestinian guerrilla attacks followed 
by Israeli retaliatory raids against Jordan caused much damage 
to Jordan. In September 1970, after militant factions of the PLO 
(who previously had stated that "the road to Tel Aviv lies through 
Amman") hijacked four foreign planes and forced them to land 
in Jordan, King Hussein decided it was time to act. Throughout 
September the Jordanian military launched an attack to push the 
PLO out of Jordan. Jordan's attack on the PLO led to an escala- 
tion of Syrian-Israeli tensions. It was widely believed in Washing- 
ton that deployment of Israeli troops along the Jordan River had 
deterred a large-scale Syrian invasion of Jordan. As a result, Presi- 
dent Richard M. Nixon increasingly viewed Israel as an impor- 
tant strategic asset, and the Rogers Plan was allowed to die. 

While negotiating a cease-fire to the conflict in Jordan, Nasser 
died of a heart attack. The new Egyptian president, Anwar as Sadat, 
quickly realized, just as Nasser had toward the end of his life, that 
Egypt's acute economic and social problems were more pressing 
than the conflict with Israel. Sadat believed that by making peace 
with Israel Egypt could reduce its huge defense burden and obtain 
desperately needed American financial assistance. He realized, 
however, that before some type of arrangement with Israel could 



63 



Israel: A Country Study 

be reached, Egypt would have to regain the territory lost to Israel 
in the June 1967 War. To achieve these ends, Sadat launched a 
diplomatic initiative as early as 1971, aimed at exchanging territory 
for peace. On February 4, 1971, he told the Egyptian parliament: 

that if Israel withdrew her forces in Sinai to the passes I would 
be willing to reopen the Suez Canal; to have my forces cross 
to the east bank ... to make a solemn declaration of a cease- 
fire; to restore diplomatic relations with the United States and 
to sign a peace agreement with Israel through the efforts of 
Dr. Jarring, the representative of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations. 

Sadat's peace initiative, similar to the Rogers Plan, was not 
warmly received in Israel. Prime Minister Golda Meir stated un- 
equivocally that Israel would never return to the prewar borders. 
She also commissioned the establishment of a settlement on occupied 
Egyptian territory at Yamit, near the Gaza Strip. Her rejection 
of the Egyptian offer reflected the hawkish but also complacent 
politico-military strategy that had guided Israeli policy after the 
June 1967 War. Advised by Minister of Defense General Moshe 
Day an and ambassador to Washington General Yitzhak Rabin, 
the Meir government held that the IDF's preponderance of power, 
the disarray of the Arab world, and the large buffer provided by 
Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights would deter the Arab 
states from launching an attack against Israel. Therefore, the Israeli 
government perceived no compelling reason to trade territory for 
peace. This view had wide Israeli public support as a result of a 
growing settler movement in the occupied territories, a spate of 
Arab terrorist attacks that hardened public opinion against com- 
promise with the Arabs, and the widespread feeling that the Arab 
states were incapable of launching a successful attack on Israel. 
Israel's complacency concerning an Arab attack was bolstered in 
July 1972 by Sadat's surprise announcement that he was expel- 
ling most Soviet military advisers. 

The October 1973 War 

The Meir government's rejection of Sadat's peace overtures con- 
vinced the Egyptian president that to alter the status quo and gain 
needed legitimacy at home he must initiate a war with limited ob- 
jectives. On Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, Octo- 
ber 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack against 
Israel. In the south, waves of Egyptian infantrymen crossed the 
Suez Canal and overran the defense of the much touted Bar-Lev 
Line. In the north, Syrian forces outnumbering the Israeli defenders 



64 




Palestinian women in traditional dress selling produce 
at an outdoor market in the occupied West Bank 
Courtesy Palestine Perspectives 

(1,100 Syrian tanks against 157 Israeli tanks) reached the outer 
perimeter of the Golan Heights overlooking the Hula Basin. In 
the first few days of the war, Israeli counterattacks failed, Israel 
suffered hundreds of casualties, and lost nearly 150 planes. Finally, 
on October 10 the tide of the war turned; the Syrians were driven 
out of all territories conquered by them at the beginning of the war 
and on the following day Israeli forces advanced into Syria proper, 
about twenty kilometers from the outskirts of Damascus. The Soviet 
Union responded by making massive airlifts to Damascus and 
Cairo, which were matched by equally large United States airlifts 
to Israel. In the south, an Egyptian offensive into Sinai was repelled, 
and Israeli forces led by General Ariel Sharon crossed the canal 
to surround the Egyptian Third Army. At the urgent request of 
the Soviet Union, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
went to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire arrangement. This ar- 
rangement found expression in UN Security Council Resolu- 
tion 338, which called for a cease-fire to be in place within twelve 
hours, for the implementation of Resolution 242, and for "negoti- 
ations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices 
aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." 
Following Kissinger's return to Washington, the Soviets announced 
that Israel had broken the terms of the cease-fire and was threatening 



65 



Israel: A Country Study 



to destroy the besieged Egyptian Third Army. Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev informed Nixon that if the siege were not lifted the Soviet 
Union would take unilateral steps. The United States pressured 
Israel, and the final cease-fire took effect on October 25. 

The October 1973 War had a devastating effect on Israel. More 
than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of 
fighting. The loss of equipment and the decline of production and 
exports as a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US$7 bil- 
lion, the equivalent of Israel's gross national product (GNP — see 
Glossary) for an entire year. Most important, the image of an in- 
vincible Israel that had prevailed since the June 1967 War was de- 
stroyed forever. Whereas the June 1967 War had given Israel in 
general and the declining Labor Party in particular a badly needed 
morale booster, the events of October 1973 shook the country's 
self-confidence and cast a shadow over the competence of the Labor 
elite. A war- weary public was especially critical of Minister of 
Defense Dayan, who nonetheless escaped criticism in the report 
of the Agranat Commission, a body established after the war to 
determine responsibility for Israel's military unpreparedness. 

Israel's vulnerability during the war led to another important 
development: its increasing dependence on United States military, 
economic, and diplomatic aid. The war set off a spiraling regional 
arms race in which Israel was hard pressed to match the Arab states, 
which were enriched by skyrocketing world oil prices. The vastly 
improved Arab arsenals forced Israel to spend increasingly on 
defense, straining its already strapped economy. The emergence 
of Arab oil as a political weapon further isolated Israel in the world 
community. The Arab oil boycott that accompanied the war and 
the subsequent quadrupling of world oil prices dramatized the 
West's dependence on Arab oil production. Evidence of this de- 
pendence was reflected, for example, in the denial of permission 
during the fighting for United States transport planes carrying 
weapons to Israel to land anywhere in Europe except Portugal. 

The dominant personality in the postwar settlement period was 
Kissinger. Kissinger believed that the combination of Israel's in- 
creased dependence on the United States and Sadat's desire to por- 
tray the war as an Egyptian victory and regain Sinai allowed for 
an American-brokered settlement. The key to this diplomatic stra- 
tegy was that only Washington could induce a vulnerable Israel 
to exchange territories for peace in the south. 

The first direct Israeli-Egyptian talks following the war were held 
at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo- Suez road. They dealt with stabilizing 
the cease-fire and supplying Egypt's surrounded Third Army. Fol- 
lowing these talks, Kissinger began his highly publicized "shuttle 



66 



Historical Setting 



diplomacy," moving between Jerusalem and the Arab capitals try- 
ing to work out an agreement. In January 1974, Kissinger, along 
with Sadat and Dayan, devised the First Sinai Disengagement 
Agreement, which called for thinning out forces in the Suez Canal 
zone and restoring the UN buffer zone. The published plan was 
accompanied by private (but leaked) assurances from the United 
States to Israel that Egypt would not interfere with Israeli freedom 
of navigation in the Red Sea and that UN forces would not be with- 
drawn without the consent of both sides. Following the signing of 
this agreement, Kissinger shuttled between Damascus and Jerusa- 
lem, finally attaining an agreement that called for Israel to with- 
draw from its forward positions in the Golan Heights, including 
the return of the Syrian town of Al Qunaytirah. The evacuated 
zone was to be demilitarized and monitored by a UN Disengage- 
ment Observer Force (UNDOF). 

After the signing of the Israeli- Syrian Disengagement Agreement 
in June 1974, the public mood in Israel shifted against concessions. 
In part, Israel's hardened stance was a reaction to the 1974 Arab 
summit in Rabat, Morocco. At that summit, both Syria and Egypt 
supported a resolution recognizing the PLO as the sole repre- 
sentative of the Palestinian people. The Israeli public viewed the 
PLO as a terrorist organization bent on destroying the Jewish 
state. Throughout 1974 Palestinian terrorism increased; in the sum- 
mer alone there were attacks in Qiryat Shemona, Maalot, and 
Jerusalem. 

Another important factor underlying Israel's firmer stance was 
an internal political struggle in the newly elected government of 
Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin had narrowly defeated his chief rival Shimon 
Peres in bitterly fought internal Labor Party elections in late De- 
cember 1973. Peres, who was appointed minister of defense, forced 
Israel into a less flexible posture by blocking any concessions pro- 
posed by Rabin. In addition, the issuing of the Agranat Commis- 
sion report and the return from the front of reservists mobilized 
for the war further fueled public clamor for a stronger defense 
posture. 

In Washington, President Gerald R. Ford, facing a recalcitrant 
Israel and under pressure from the pro-Israel lobby, decided to 
sweeten the offer to Israel. The United States pledged to provide 
Israel US$2 billion in financial aid, to drop the idea of an interim 
withdrawal in the West Bank, and to accept that only cosmetic 
changes could be expected in the Second Syrian-Israeli Disengage- 
ment Agreement. In addition, in a special secret memorandum 
Israel received a pledge that the United States would not deal with 
the PLO as long as the PLO failed to recognize Israel's right to 



67 



Israel: A Country Study 

exist and failed to accept Security Council Resolution 242. In Sep- 
tember 1975, Israel signed the Second Sinai Disengagement Agree- 
ment, which called for Israel to withdraw from the Sinai passes, 
leaving them as a demilitarized zone monitored by American tech- 
nicians and the UNEF. 

The Decline of the Labor Party 

Even before the October 1973 War, the Labor Party was ham- 
pered by internal dissension, persistent allegations of corruption, 
ambiguities and contradictions in its political platform, and by the 
disaffection of Oriental Jews (see Oriental Jews, this ch.). Labor's 
failure to prepare the country for the war further alienated a large 
segment of the electorate. 

Despite Labor's commitment to exchange occupied territories 
for peace, successive Labor governments beginning soon after the 
June 1967 War established settlements in the territories and re- 
frained from dismanding illegal settlements, such as those estab- 
lished in 1968 at Qiryat Arba in Hebron by Rabbi Moshe Levinger 
and others set up by the extremist settier movement Gush Emunim. 
By 1976 more than thirty settlements had been established on the 
West Bank. 

Another contradiction in Labor's political platform concerned 
Jerusalem. All Labor governments have proclaimed that Jerusa- 
lem will always remain the undivided capital of Israel. In effect, 
this stance precludes the peace for territories formula contained 
in Resolution 242 because neither Jordan nor the Palestinians would 
be likely to accept any agreement by which Jerusalem remained 
in Israeli hands. 

The post- 1973 Labor Party estrangement from the Israeli pub- 
lic intensified throughout 1976 as the party was hit with a barrage 
of corruption charges that struck at the highest echelons. Rabin's 
minister of housing, who was under investigation for alleged abuses 
during his time as director general of the Histadrut Housing 
Authority, committed suicide in January 1977. At the same time, 
the governor of the Bank of Israel, who had been nominated by 
Rabin, was sentenced to jail for taking bribes and evading taxes, 
and the director general of the Ministry of Housing was appre- 
hended in various extortion schemes. Finally, and most egregious, 
Rabin himself was caught lying about money illegally kept in a 
bank account in the United States. 

Israel's growing defense budget (about 35 to 40 percent of GNP), 
along with rising world oil prices, also created chaos in the Israeli 
economy. Inflation was running at 40 to 50 percent annually, wages 
were falling, and citizen accumulation of so-called black money 



68 



Historical Setting 



(unreported income) was rampant. The worsening economic situ- 
ation led to greater income disparities between the Ashkenazim, 
who dominated the higher echelons of government, the military, 
and business, and the majority Oriental population, which was 
primarily employed in low paying blue-collar jobs. 

Oriental Jews 

By the mid-1970s, economic grievances, corruption, and the per- 
ceived haughtiness of the Labor elite led to a major shift in the 
voting patterns of Oriental Jews (those of African or Asian origin). 
During the first twenty years of Israel's existence, Oriental Jews 
voted for the Labor Party mainly because the Histadrut, the Jew- 
ish Agency, and other state institutions on which they as new im- 
migrants depended were dominated by Labor. But even during 
the early years of the state, Labor's ideological blend of secular- 
socialist Zionism conflicted sharply with the Oriental Jews' cul- 
tural heritage, which tended to be more religious and oriented 
toward a free market economy. As Oriental Jews became more 
integrated into Israeli society, especially after the June 1967 War, 
resentment of Labor's cultural, political, and economic hegemony 
increased. Most unacceptable to the Oriental Jews was the hypocrisy 
of Labor slogans that continued to espouse egalitarianism while 
Ashkenazim monopolized the political and economic reins of power. 

Despite Labor's frequent references to closing the Ashkenazi- 
Oriental socioeconomic gap, the disparity of incomes between the 
two groups actually widened. Between 1968 and 1971, Minister 
of Finance Pinchas Sapir's program of encouraging foreign invest- 
ment and subsidizing private investment led to an economic boom; 
GNP grew at 7 percent per year. Given the persistent dominance 
of Labor institutions in the economy, however, this economic 
growth was not evenly distributed. The kibbutzim, moshavim, and 
Histadrut enterprises, along with private defense and housing con- 
tractors, enriched themselves, while the majority of Oriental Jews, 
lacking connections with the ruling Labor elite, saw their position 
deteriorate. Furthermore, while Oriental Jews remained for the 
most part in the urban slums, the government provided new 
European immigrants with generous loans and new housing. This 
dissatisfaction led to the growth of the first Oriental protest 
movement — the Black Panthers — based in the Jerusalem slums in 
early 1971. 

Oriental Jews, many of whom were forced to leave their homes 
in the Arab states, also supported tougher measures against Israeli 
Arabs and neighboring Arab states than the policies pursued 
by Labor. Their ill feelings were buttressed by the widely held 



69 



Israel: A Country Study 



perception that the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
entity would oblige Oriental Jews to accept the menial jobs per- 
formed by Arab laborers, as they had in the early years of the state. 

The Begin Era 

In the May 1977 elections, the Labor Party's dominance of Israeli 
politics ended. The Likud Bloc — an alliance of Begin's Herut Party, 
the Liberal Party, and other smaller parties formed in the after- 
math of the October 1973 War — formed a ruling coalition govern- 
ment for the first time in Israel's history. Likud gained forty-three 
seats, Labor dropped to thirty-two seats, down by nineteen from 
the 1973 figure. Likud's supporters consisted of disaffected middle- 
class elements alienated by the series of scandals, many new im- 
migrants from the Soviet Union, and large numbers of defecting 
Oriental Jews. Begin appealed to many because he was viewed as 
incorruptible and untarnished by scandal. He was a strong leader 
who did not equivocate about his plans for a strong Israel (which 
he believed included the occupied territories), or about his will- 
ingness to stand up to the Arabs or even the superpowers if Israel's 
needs demanded. Begin also attracted some veteran Labor Zionists 
for whom his focus on Jewish settlement and self-reliance was 
reminiscent of an earlier unadulterated Labor Zionism. 

Begin's vision of Israel and its role in the region was deeply rooted 
in the Revisionist platform with which he had been associated since 
the days of Jabotinsky. He strongly advocated Israeli sovereignty 
over all of Eretz Yisrael, which in his view included Jerusalem and 
the West Bank, but not Sinai. 

The Peace Process 

The international climate at the time of Begin's rise to power 
in May 1977 leaned strongly toward some type of superpower- 
sanctioned settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. New United States 
president Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev both advo- 
cated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement that would include 
autonomy for the Palestinians. On October 1, 1977, in prepara- 
tion for a reconvened Geneva conference, the United States and 
the Soviet Union issued a joint statement committing themselves 
to a comprehensive settlement incorporating all parties concerned 
and all questions. 

Nevertheless, the idea of a Geneva conference on the Middle 
East was actively opposed and eventually defeated by a constella- 
tion of Israeli, Egyptian, and powerful private American interests. 
Begin proclaimed that he would never accept the authority of an 
international forum to dictate how Israel should deal with its 



70 




Arrival of Egyptian President Anwar as Sadat 
at Ben-Gurion Airport, Lod, near Tel Aviv, November 21, 1977 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 



territory, especially because, aside from Washington, the Israelis 
would lack allies at such a meeting. Inside the United States, the 
Jewish lobby and anti-Soviet political groups vehemently opposed 
the Geneva conference idea. Sadat also opposed a Geneva confer- 
ence, seeing it as a way for Syria, supported by the Soviet Union, 
to gain leverage in an Arab-Israeli settlement. Sadat realized that 
if an international conference were held, Egypt's recovery of Sinai, 
which was his primary objective in dealing with Israel, would be 
secondary to the Palestinian issue and the return of the Golan 
Heights to Syria. 

To stave off an international conference and to save Egypt's 
rapidly collapsing economy, Sadat made the boldest of diplomatic 
moves: he offered to address the Knesset. Begin consented, and 
in November 1977 Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem, 
opening a new era in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Although Sadat 
expressed his commitment to the settlement of the Palestinian issue 
and to that issue's centrality in Arab-Israeli relations, his main 
interest remained Israel's return of Egyptian territory. Begin's 
acceptance of the Egyptian initiative was based on the premise that 
Sinai, but not the West Bank, was negotiable. He foresaw that 
exchanging Sinai for a peace treaty with Egypt would remove Egypt 
from the Arab-Israeli military balance and relieve pressure on Israel 



71 



Israel: A Country Study 

to make territorial concessions on the West Bank. President Carter, 
who had been a major advocate of a Geneva conference, was forced 
by the momentum of Sadat's initiative to drop the international 
conference idea. Subsequendy, he played a crucial role in facilitating 
an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. 

Following nearly a year of stalled negotiations, Begin, Sadat, 
and Carter met at Camp David near Washington, D.C., for two 
weeks in September 1978. The crux of the problem at Camp David 
was that Begin, the old-time Revisionist who had opposed territorial 
concessions to the Arabs for so many years, was reluctant to dis- 
mantle existing Sinai settlements. Finally, on September 17 he con- 
sented, and the Camp David Accords were signed. On the following 
day, Begin obtained Knesset approval of the accords. 

The Camp David Accords consisted of two agreements: one dealt 
with the future of the West Bank and the other with the return 
of Sinai. The sections on the West Bank were vague and open to 
various interpretations. They called for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
"the representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate about 
the future of the West Bank and Gaza. ' ' A five-year period of "tran- 
sitional autonomy" was called for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority." The agreement also called for peace talks 
between Israel and its other Arab neighbors, namely Syria. The 
other part of the accords was more specific. It provided for "the 
full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recog- 
nized border," as well as for the Israeli right of free passage through 
the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal. The agreements were 
accompanied by letters. A letter from Begin to Carter promised 
that the removal of settlers from Sinai would be put to Knesset 
vote. A letter from Sadat to Carter stated that if the settlers were 
not withdrawn from Sinai, there would be no peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. It was also understood that to make the agree- 
ment more palatable the United States would significantly increase 
aid to both countries. 

Begin 's limited view of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank 
became apparent almost immediately after the agreement known 
as the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel was signed in 
March 1979. The following month his government approved two 
new settlements between Ram Allah and Nabulus. The military 
government established civilian regional councils for the Jewish set- 
tlements. Finally, and most provocative, autonomy plans were pre- 
pared in which Israel would keep exclusive control over the West 
Bank's water, communications, roads, public order, and immi- 
gration. 



72 



Historical Setting 



In effect, the acceleration of settlements, the growth of an increas- 
ingly militaristic Jewish settler movement, and Israel's stated desire 
to retain complete control over resources in the territories precluded 
the participation in the peace process of either moderate Pales- 
tinians, such as the newly formed National Guidance Committee 
composed of West Bank mayors (the PLO refused from the begin- 
ning to participate in the peace process) or King Hussein of Jordan. 
No Arab leader could accept Begin' s truncated version of auton- 
omy. Hussein, who had initially withheld judgment on the accords, 
joined hands with the Arab radicals in a meeting in Baghdad that 
denounced the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty and 
ostracized Egypt. Sadat protested Israeli actions in the occupied 
territories, but he was unwilling to change his course for fear that 
doing so would leave Sinai permanently in Israeli hands. Presi- 
dent Carter objected to the new settlements but was unable to force 
the Begin government to change its settlement policy. Although 
ambassadors were exchanged; commercial, trade, and cultural ties 
were established; and Sinai was returned in May 1982, relations 
between Israel and Egypt remained chilly. 

The Occupied Territories 

During the June 1967 War, about 1 . 1 million Palestinian Arabs 
living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem came 
under Israeli rule. Immediately after the war, East Jerusalem was 
occupied and reunited with the rest of Israel's capital. Its Arab 
inhabitants — about 67,000 after the war — became citizens of Israel 
with the same rights as other Israeli Arabs. The West Bank, ruled 
by Jordan since 1948, was economically underdeveloped but pos- 
sessed a relatively efficient administrative infrastructure. Its 750,000 
people consisted of a settled population and refugees from Israel 
who had fled during the 1948 War. Both the refugees and the set- 
tled population were Jordanian citizens, free to work in Jordan. 
Most of the leading urban families and virtually all the rural clans 
had cooperated with Hussein. The Gaza Strip, on the other hand, 
was seething with discontent when Israeli forces arrived in 1967. 
Its 1967 population of 350,000 — the highest population density in 
the world at the time — had been under Egyptian rule, but the 
inhabitants were not accepted as Egyptian citizens or allowed to 
travel to Egypt proper. As a result they were unable to find work 
outside the camps and were almost completely dependent on the 
UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East. In the Gaza Strip, Israel implemented harsh secu- 
rity measures to quell widespread unrest and root out the growing 
resistance movement. 



73 



Israel: A Country Study 

Labor's settlement policy in the occupied territories was based 
on a plan formulated during the summer of 1965 by Yigal Allon, 
deputy prime minister of the Eshkol government. The plan, primar- 
ily dictated by security concerns, called for rural and urban settle- 
ments to be erected in a sparsely Arab-populated strip twelve to 
fifteen kilometers wide along the western bank of the Jordan River 
and the western shores of the Dead Sea. Labor governments sought 
to interfere as little as possible in the day-to-day lives of the Arab 
inhabitants. Political and social arrangements were, as much as 
possible, kept under Jordanian or pro-Jordanian control, the cur- 
rency remained the Jordanian dinar, the application of Jordanian 
law continued, and a revised Jordanian curriculum was used in 
the schools. 

Another aspect of Labor's occupation policies was the integra- 
tion of the territories into the Israeli economy. By the mid-1970s, 
Arabs from Israel and the territories provided nearly one-quarter 
of Israel's factory labor and half the workers in construction and 
service industries. Moreover, the territories became an important 
market for Israeli domestic production; by 1975 about 16 percent 
of all Israeli exports were sold in the territories. 

The final element of Labor's occupation policies was economic 
and social modernization. This included the mechanization of 
agriculture, the spread of television, and vast improvements in edu- 
cation and health care. This led to a marked increase in GNP, which 
grew by 14.5 percent annually between 1968 and 1973 in the West 
Bank and 19.4 percent annually in Gaza. As a result, the tradi- 
tional elites, who had cooperated with Hussein during the years 
of Jordanian rule, were challenged by a younger, better educated, 
and more radical elite that was growing increasingly impatient with 
the Israeli occupation and the older generation's complacency. In 
the spring of 1976, Minister of Defense Shimon Peres held West 
Bank municipal elections, hoping to bolster the declining power 
of the old guard Palestinian leadership. Peres wrongly calculated 
that the PLO would boycott the elections. Instead, pro-PLO can- 
didates won in every major town except Bethlehem. 

Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories changed in 
1977 with the coming to power of Begin. Whereas Labor's poli- 
cies had been guided primarily by security concerns, Begin es- 
poused a deep ideological attachment to the territories. He viewed 
the Jewish right of settlement in the occupied territories as fulfill- 
ing biblical prophecy and therefore not a matter for either the 
Arabs or the international community to accept or reject. Begin' s 
messianic designs on the territories were supported by the rapid 



74 



Historical Setting 



growth of religio-nationalist groups, such as Gush Emunim, which 
established settlements in heavily populated Arab areas. 

The increase in Jewish settlements and the radicalization of the 
settlers created an explosive situation. When in May 1980 six stu- 
dents of a Hebron yeshiva, a Jewish religious school, were killed 
by Arab gunfire, a chain of violence was set off that included a 
government crackdown on Hebron and the expulsion of three 
leaders of the Hebron Arab community. West Bank Jewish set- 
tiers increasingly took the law into their own hands; they were widely 
believed to be responsible for car-bomb attacks on the mayors of 
Ram Allah and Nabulus. 

Begin 's policies toward the occupied territories became in- 
creasingly annexationist following the Likud victory in the 1981 
parliamentary elections. He viewed the Likud's victory, which sur- 
prised many observers, as a mandate to pursue a more aggressive 
policy in the territories. After the election, he appointed the hawkish 
Ariel Sharon as minister of defense, replacing the more moderate 
Ezer Weizman, who had resigned in protest against Begin 's set- 
tlement policy. In November 1981, Sharon installed a civilian ad- 
ministration in the West Bank headed by Menachem Milson. 
Milson immediately set out to stifle rapidly growing Palestinian 
nationalist sentiments; he deposed pro-PLO mayors, dissolved the 
mayors' National Guidance Committee, and shut two Arab 
newspapers and Bir Zeit University. 

While Milson was working to quell Palestinian nationalism in 
the territories, the Begin regime accelerated the pace of settlements 
by providing low-interest mortgages and other economic benefits 
to prospective settlers. This action induced a number of secular 
Jews, who were not part of Gush Emunim, to settle in the territo- 
ries, further consolidating Israel's hold on the area. Moreover, Israel 
established large military bases and extensive road, electricity, and 
water networks in the occupied territories. 

In November 1981 , Milson established village leagues in the West 
Bank consisting of pro-Jordanian Palestinians to counter the PLO's 
growing strength there. The leadership of the village leagues had 
a limited base of support, however, especially because the growth 
of Jewish settlements had adversely affected Arab villagers. The 
failure of the Village League Plan, the escalating violence in the 
occupied territories, in addition to increased PLO attacks against 
northern Israeli settlements, and Syria's unwillingness to respond 
when the Knesset extended Israeli law to the occupied Golan 
Heights in December 1981 convinced Begin and Sharon of the need 
to intervene militarily in southern Lebanon. 



75 



Israel: A Country Study 



Israeli Action in Lebanon, 1978-82 

The precarious sectarian balance prevailing in Lebanon has 
presented Israeli policy makers with opportunities and risks. 
Lebanon's Christian Maronites, who under French tutelage oc- 
cupied the most important political and economic posts in the coun- 
try, were, like Israeli Jews, a minority among the region's Muslim 
majority. As early as 1954, Ben-Gurion had proposed that Israel 
support the establishment in part of Lebanon of a Maronite- 
dominated Christian ministate that would ally itself with Israel. 
During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-76), then Prime Minister 
Rabin reportedly invested US$150 million in equipping and train- 
ing the Maronite Phalange Party's militia. 

The instability of Lebanon's sectarian balance, however, ena- 
bled hostile states or groups to use Lebanon as a staging ground 
for attacks against Israel. The PLO, following its expulsion from 
Jordan in September 1970, set up its major base of operations in 
southern Lebanon from which it attacked northern Israel. The num- 
ber and size of PLO operations in the south accelerated through- 
out the late 1970s as central authority deteriorated and Lebanon 
became a battleground of warring militias. In March 1978, fol- 
lowing a fedayeen attack, originating in Lebanon, on the Tel Aviv- 
Haifa road that killed thirty-seven people, Israel launched Opera- 
tion Litani, a massive military offensive that resulted in Israeli 
occupation of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. By June 
Prime Minister Begin, under intense American pressure, withdrew 
Israeli forces, which were replaced by a UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL). The withdrawal of Israeli troops without hav- 
ing removed the PLO from its bases in southern Lebanon became 
a major embarrassment to the Begin government. 

By the spring of 1981, Bashir Jumayyil (also cited as Gemayel) 
emerged as the Maronite strong man and major Israeli ally in 
Lebanon. Having ruthlessly eliminated his Maronite rivals, he was 
attempting to extend his authority to other Lebanese Christian sects. 
In late 1980 and early 1981, he extended the protection of his 
Maronite militia to the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Zahlah, in 
eastern Lebanon. Syrian president Hafiz al Assad considered 
Zahlah, which was located near the Beirut-Damascus road, a strong- 
hold that was strategically important to Syria. In April 1981 , Syrian 
forces bombed and besieged Zahlah, ousting the Phalangists, the 
Maronite group loyal to Jumayyil, from the city. In response to 
the defeat of its major Lebanese ally, Israeli aircraft destroyed 
two Syrian helicopters over Lebanon, prompting Assad to move 
Soviet-made SAMs into Lebanon. Israel threatened to destroy the 



76 



Historical Setting 



missiles but was dissuaded from doing so by the administration 
of President Ronald Reagan. In the end, the Zahlah crisis, like 
the Litani Operation, badly tarnished the image of the Begin 
government, which had come to power in 1977 espousing a hard- 
line security policy. 

In June 1981, Israel held Knesset elections that focused on the 
Likud's failure to stop the PLO buildup in southern Lebanon or 
to remove Syrian missile batteries from the Biqa (Bekaa) Valley 
in eastern Lebanon. To remove a potential nuclear threat and also 
to bolster its public image, the IDF launched a successful attack 
on the French-built Iraqi Osiraq (acronym for Osiris-Iraq) nuclear 
reactor three weeks before the elections. Begin interpreted 
widespread public approval of the attack as a mandate for a more 
aggressive policy in Lebanon. The Likud also rallied a large num- 
ber of undecided voters by reducing import duties on luxury goods, 
enabling Israeli consumers to go on an unprecedented buying spree 
that would later result in spiraling inflation. Although Labor 
regained an additional fifteen seats over its poor showing in 1977 
when it won only thirty-two seats, it was unable to prevail over 
Likud. 

Begin' s perception that the Israeli public supported a more ac- 
tive defense posture influenced the composition of his 1981 postelec- 
tion cabinet. His new minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, was 
unquestionably an Israeli war hero of longstanding; he had played 
an important role in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars and was wide- 
ly respected as a brilliant military tactician. Sharon, however, was 
also feared as a military man with political ambitions, one who 
was ignorant of political protocol and who was known to make 
precipitous moves. Aligned with Sharon was chief of staff General 
Rafael Eitan who also advocated an aggressive Israeli defense 
posture. Because Begin was not a military man, Israel's defense 
policy was increasingly decided by the minister of defense and the 
chief of staff. The combination of wide discretionary powers granted 
Sharon and Eitan over Israeli military strategy, the PLO's menacing 
growth in southern Lebanon, and the existence of Syrian SAMs 
in the Biqa Valley pointed to imminent Syrian-PLO-Israeli 
hostilities. 

In July 1981, Israel responded to PLO rocket attacks on north- 
ern Israeli settlements by bombing PLO encampments in southern 
Lebanon. United States envoy Philip Habib eventually negotiated 
a shaky cease-fire that was monitored by UNIFIL. 

Another factor that influenced Israel's decision to take action 
in Lebanon was the disarray of the Arab world throughout the early 
1980s. The unanimity shown by the Arab states in Baghdad in 



77 



Israel: A Country Study 

condemning Sadat's separate peace with Israel soon dissipated. The 
1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War 
in September 1980, and the December 1980 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan badly divided the Arab world. The hard-line countries, 
Syria and Libya, supported Iran, and the moderate countries, Jor- 
dan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, supported Iraq. Moreover, 
Syrian president Assad's regime, dominated by the minority Alawi 
Muslim sect, was confronted with growing domestic opposition from 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which Assad violently quelled in Febru- 
ary 1982 by besieging the city of Hamah. Finally, early United States 
opposition to an invasion of Lebanon appeared to have weakened, 
following Israel's final withdrawal from Sinai in May 1982. 

Israel's incursion into Lebanon, called Operation Peace for 
Galilee, was launched in early June 1982. After an attack on Israel's 
ambassador in London carried out by the Abu Nidal group but 
blamed on the PLO, Israeli troops marched into southern Leba- 
non. On the afternoon of June 4 the Israeli air force bombed a 
sports stadium in Beirut, said to be used for ammunition storage 
by the PLO. The PLO responded by shelling Israeli towns in 
Galilee. On June 5, the government of Israel formally accused the 
PLO of breaking the cease-fire. At 11 A.M. on June 6, Israeli 
ground forces crossed the border into Lebanon. The stated goals 
of the operation were to free northern Israel from PLO rocket 
attacks by creating a forty-kilometer-wide security zone in southern 
Lebanon and by signing a peace treaty with Lebanon (see 1982 
Invasion of Lebanon, ch. 5). 

The June 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the first war fought by 
the IDF without a domestic consensus. Unlike the 1948, 1967, and 
1973 wars, the Israeli public did not view Operation Peace for 
Galilee as essential to the survival of the Jewish state. By the early 
1980s — less than forty years after its establishment — Israel had at- 
tained a military prowess unmatched in the region. The architects 
of the 1982 invasion, Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan, sought to use 
Israel's military strength to create a more favorable regional politi- 
cal setting. This strategy included weakening the PLO and sup- 
porting the rise to power in Lebanon of Israel's Christian allies. 
The attempt to impose a military solution to the intractable Pales- 
tinian problem and to force political change in Lebanon failed. The 
PLO, although defeated militarily, remained an important politi- 
cal force, and Bashir Jumayyil, Israel's major ally in Lebanon, was 
killed shortly after becoming president. Inside Israel, a mounting 
death toll caused sharp criticism by a war-weary public of the war 
and of the Likud government. 

* * * 



78 



Historical Setting 



The literature on the cultural, political, and religious history of 
Israel is immense. The works noted here and those listed in the 
bibliography include easily available English-language materials 
that are valuable hither reading not only for the serious student 
but also for the interested layperson. 

For a comprehensive and very detailed view of Jewish history 
see the eighteen- volume work by Salo W. Baron and A History of 
the Jewish People, edited by H.H. Ben Sasson. Another valuable 
source covering all aspects of Jewish history is the Encyclopaedia 
Judaica; a condensed history of the Jews is contained in the sixteen 
volumes of the Israel Pocket Library. Paul Johnson's A History of 
the Jews provides a more recent overview. 

A, valuable summary of the origins of Zionism is set forth in 
Arthur Hertzberg's introduction to The Zionist Idea: A Historical Anal- 
ysis and Reader. David Vital' s books, The Origins of Zionism and 
Zionism: The Formative Years, offer scholarly accounts of the history 
of Zionism. More recent works on Zionism include Shlomo 
Avineri's The Making of Modern Zionism and Bernard Avishai's The 
Tragedy of Zionism. 

The most comprehensive history of the modern State of Israel 
is Howard Morley Sachar's two-volume A History of Israel. Two 
other reliable general histories of Israel are Noah Lucas's The Modern 
History of Israel and The Siege by Connor Cruise O'Brien. A solid 
account of Israel's wars is provided by Chaim Herzog's The Arab - 
Israeli Wars. 

Five classics covering the pre-state era are Neville Mandel's The 
Arabs and Zionism Before World War I, J.C. Hurewitz's The Struggle 
for Palestine, Christopher Sykes's Crossroads to Israel, George 
Antonius's The Arab Awakening, and Michael J. Cohen's Palestine: 
Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945. New 
Revisionist accounts of the crucial years 1948-49 are contained in 
Tom Segev's 1949: The First Israelis, Simha Flapan's The Birth of 
Israel: Myths and Realities, and Benny Morris's The Birth of the Pales- 
tinian Refugee Problem. 

The most authoritative source on Israel's settlement policy in 
the occupied territories is Meron Benvenisti's The West Bank and 
Gaza Data Project. Two seminal works on Arabs in Israel are Sammy 
Smooha's Israel: Pluralism and Conflict and Sabri Jiryis's The Arabs 
in Israel. The best accounts of Israel's incursion into Lebanon are 
Itamar Rabinovich's The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 and Zeev 
Schiff and Ehud Yaari's Israel's War in Lebanon. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



79 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Moroccan Jewish immigrant and Sephardic rabbi 



THE SOCIETY OF MODERN ISRAEL has diverse sources, 
but the majority of these sources stem ultimately from Judaism and 
the modern political movement called Zionism. Crystallizing in the 
late nineteenth century as a response to both the repression of Jews 
in Eastern Europe and the non-Jewish European nationalist move- 
ments of the time, Zionism called for the reversal of the Jewish 
dispersion (Diaspora) and the "ingathering of the exiles" to their 
biblical homeland. Although only small numbers of Jews had resid- 
ed in Palestine since the destruction of the Second Temple by the 
Romans in A.D. 70, the "new Yishuv" (as opposed to the "old 
Yishuv" consisting of traditional Orthodox Jewish residents), or 
prestate Jewish community in Palestine, dates from 1882 and the 
arrival from Russia of a group called Hibbat Tziyyon (Lovers of 
Zion), intent on settling the land as part of its fulfillment of the 
Zionist ideal. 

As a nationalist movement, Zionism largely succeeded: much 
of the Jewish Diaspora was dissolved, and the people were integrated 
into the population of the State of Israel — a self-consciously modern 
Jewish state. Along with this political achievement, a cultural 
achievement of equal, if not greater, importance took place. 
Hebrew, the ancient biblical language, was revived and became 
the modern spoken and written vernacular. The revival of Hebrew 
linked the new Jewish state to its Middle Eastern past and helped 
to unify the people of the new state by providing them with a com- 
mon tongue that transcended the diversity of languages the im- 
migrants brought with them. 

Despite these political and cultural achievements — achievements 
that Israeli sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt sees as comprising "the Jew- 
ish re-entry into history" — modern Israeli society is still beset by 
problems, some of them profound. Among these are problems found 
in all industrial and economically differentiated social systems, in- 
cluding stratification by socioeconomic class, differential prestige 
attached to various occupations or professions, barriers to social 
mobility, and different qualities of life in urban centers, towns, and 
rural localities. For example, there are significant differences be- 
tween the quality of life in the so-called development towns and 
the rural localities known as kibbutzim (sing., kibbutz — see Glos- 
sary) and moshavim (sing., moshav), respectively collective and 
cooperative settlements that are strongly socialist and Zionist in 
history and character. 



83 



Israel: A Country Study 



Other social problems that Israel faces are unique to its own 
society and culture. The role that traditional Judaism should play 
in the modern state is a major source of controversy. The tension 
between religious and secular influences pervades all aspects of 
society. For example, religious practices influence the education 
system, the way ethnic groups are dealt with, how political debate 
is conducted, and there is no civil marriage in Israel. 

The division between the Ashkenazim (Jews of European or 
American origin) and Oriental Jews (Jews of African or Asian ori- 
gin) is another serious problem. This divisiveness results from the 
extreme cultural diversity in the migratory streams that brought 
Jewish immigrants to Israel between the late nineteenth century 
and the late 1980s. Already- settled members of the receiving soci- 
ety have had difficulty absorbing immigrants whose cultures differ 
so greatly from their own and from each other. Adding further to 
cultural disharmony is the problem of the place of non-Jews in the 
Jewish state. In Israel non-Jews are primarily Arabs (who are mostly 
Muslims, but also Christians and Druzes); a small number are non- 
Arab Muslims (such as the Circassians) or Christians (such as the 
Armenian residents of Jerusalem). Jewish Israelis also distinguish 
between Arabs who reside within the pre-June 1967 War bound- 
aries of Israel and Arabs who live in the West Bank, the Golan 
Heights, and the Gaza Strip — the latter group is perceived as hav- 
ing no loyalty to the state. 

The rift between Arabs and Jews in Israel is, of course, related 
to Israel's position in the contemporary Middle East. By Israeli 
count, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the fifth major Arab-Israeli 
war since 1948. This does not count smaller military actions or 
larger, more celebrated military actions, such as the Entebbe raid 
of July 1976. American political scientist Bernard Reich has writ- 
ten that "Israel is perhaps unique among states in having hostile 
neighbors on all of its borders, with the exception, since 1979, of 
Egypt. ' ' He adds that this fact has dominated all aspects of Israeli 
life since 1948, when the state was established and was invaded 
by Arab armies. It might be noted that security concerns were a 
striking feature of life (especially after 1929 and Arab violence 
against Jews) in the Yishuv as well. To the tension caused by 
cleavages between Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews, between the reli- 
gious and the secularists, and between Jews and non-Jews must 
be added the profound social and psychological stress of living in 
a society at war with, and feeling itself to be under siege by, its 
neighbors. Many Israelis would also cite the special stress of hav- 
ing to serve as soldiers in areas regarded by Arab inhabitants as 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



"occupied territories," a situation characterized, especially since 
December 1987, by increasing civil disobedience and violence. 

Geography 

Israel is located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. 
It is bounded on the north by Lebanon, on the northeast by Syria, 
on the east and southeast by Jordan, on the southwest by Egypt, 
and on the west by the Mediterranean Sea (see fig. 1). Before June 
1967, the area composing Israel (resulting from the armistice lines 
of 1949 and 1950) was about 20,700 square kilometers, which in- 
cluded 445 square kilometers of inland water. Thus Israel was 
roughly the size of the state of New Jersey, stretching 424 kilo- 
meters from north to south. Its width ranged from 114 kilometers 
to, at its narrowest point, 10 kilometers. The area added to Israel 
after the June 1967 War, consisting of occupied territories (the West 
Bank — see Glossary — and the Gaza Strip) and annexed territories 
(East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) totaled an additional 7,477 
square kilometers. The areas comprised the West Bank, 5,879 
kilometers; the Gaza Strip, 378; East Jerusalem, 70; and the Golan 
Heights, 1,150. 

Topography 

The country is divided into four regions: the coastal plain, the 
central hills, the Jordan Rift Valley, and the Negev Desert (see 
fig. 4). The Mediterranean coastal plain stretches from the Lebanese 
border in the north to Gaza in the south, interrupted only by Cape 
Carmel at Haifa Bay. It is about forty kilometers wide at Gaza 
and narrows toward the north to about five kilometers at the 
Lebanese border. The region is fertile and humid (historically 
malarial) and is known for its citrus and viniculture. The plain is 
traversed by several short streams, of which only two, the Yarqon 
and Qishon, have permanent water flows. 

East of the coastal plain lies the central highland region. In the 
north of this region lie the mountains and hills of Upper Galilee 
and Lower Galilee; farther to the south are the Samarian Hills with 
numerous small, fertile valleys; and south of Jerusalem are the 
mainly barren hills of Judea. The central highlands average 610 
meters in height and reach their highest elevation at Mount Meron, 
at 1,208 meters, in Galilee near Zefat (Safad). Several valleys cut 
across the highlands roughly from east to west; the largest is the 
Yizreel or Jezreel Valley (also known as the Plain of Esdraelon), 
which stretches forty-eight kilometers from Haifa southeast to the 
valley of the Jordan River, and is nineteen kilometers across at 
its widest point. 



85 



Israel: A Country Study 




Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



East of the central highlands lies the Jordan Rift Valley, which 
is a small part of the 6,500-kilometer-long Syrian-East African Rift. 
In Israel the Rift Valley is dominated by the Jordan River, Lake 
Tiberias (known also as the Sea of Galilee and to Israelis as Lake 
Kinneret), and the Dead Sea. The Jordan, Israel's largest river 
(322 kilometers long), originates in the Dan, Baniyas, and Has- 
bani rivers near Mount Hermon in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains 
and flows south through the drained Hula Basin into the fresh- 
water Lake Tiberias. Lake Tiberias is 165 square kilometers in size 
and, depending on the season and rainfall, is at about 213 meters 
below sea level. With a capacity estimated at 3 billion cubic meters, 
it serves as the principal reservoir of the National Water Carrier 
(also known as the Kinneret-Negev Conduit). The Jordan River 
continues its course from the southern end of Lake Tiberias (forming 
the boundary between the West Bank and Jordan) to its terminus 
in the highly saline Dead Sea. The Dead Sea is 1 ,020 square kilo- 
meters in size and, at 399 meters below sea level, is the lowest point 
in the world. South of the Dead Sea, the Rift Valley continues in 
the Nahal HaArava (Wadi al Arabah in Arabic), which has no per- 
manent water flow, for 170 kilometers to the Gulf of Aqaba. 

The Negev Desert comprises approximately 12,000 square kilo- 
meters, more than half of Israel's total land area. Geographically 
it is an extension of the Sinai Desert, forming a rough triangle with 
its base in the north near Beersheba (also seen as Beersheva), the 
Dead Sea, and the southern Judean Hills, and it has its apex in 
the southern tip of the country at Elat. Topographically, it parallels 
the other regions of the country, with lowlands in the west, hills 
in the central portion, and the Nahal HaArava as its eastern border. 

Climate 

Israel has a Mediterranean climate characterized by long, hot, 
dry summers and short, cool, rainy winters, as modified locally 
by altitude and latitude. The climate is determined by Israel's 
location between the subtropical aridity characteristic of Egypt and 
the subtropical humidity of the Levant or eastern Mediterranean. 
January is the coldest month, with temperatures from 5°C to 10°C, 
and August is the hottest month at 18°C to 38°C. About 70 per- 
cent of the average rainfall in the country falls between November 
and March; June through August are often rainless. Rainfall is 
unevenly distributed, decreasing sharply as one moves southward. 
In the extreme south, rainfall averages less than 100 millimeters 
annually; in the north, average annual rainfall is 1 , 128 millimeters. 
Rainfall varies from season to season and from year to year, par- 
ticularly in the Negev Desert. Precipitation is often concentrated 



87 



Israel: A Country Study 



in violent storms, causing erosion and flooding. During January 
and February, it may take the form of snow at the higher eleva- 
tions of the central highlands, including Jerusalem. The areas of 
the country most cultivated are those that receive more than 300 
millimeters of rainfall annually; about one- third of the country is 
cultivable. 

Population 

At the end of October 1987, according to the Central Bureau 
of Statistics, the population of Israel was 4,389,600, of which 
3,601,200 (82 percent) were Jews. About 27 percent of the world's 
Jews lived in Israel. About 605,765 (13.8 percent) of the popula- 
tion of Israel were Muslims, 100,960 (2.3 percent) were Christians, 
and about 74,623 (1.7 percent) were Druzes and others. At the 
end of 1986 the population was growing at a rate of 1.3 percent 
for Jews, 3.0 percent for Muslims, 1.5 percent for Christians, and 
2.8 percent for Druzes and others. 

In 1986 the median age of the Israeli population was 25.4. Differ- 
ences among segments of the population, among Jews and Mus- 
lim Arabs in particular, were striking. The non-Jewish population 
was much younger; in 1986 its median age was 16.8, that of Jews 
was 27.6. The Jewish population was skewed toward the upper and 
lower extremes of age, as compared with the non-Jewish age dis- 
tribution. This skewing resulted from large-scale Jewish immigra- 
tion, especially the immigration that accompanied the formation 
of the state in 1948. Many of these immigrants were older individ- 
uals; moreover, most of the younger immigrants were single and 
did not marry and raise families until after their settlement. This 
circumstance accounts in part for the relatively small percentage 
of the Jewish population in the twenty to thirty-five-year-old age- 
group (see fig. 5). 

With regard to minorities, Muslim Arabs clearly predominated 
over Christians, Druzes, and others. In 1986 Muslims accounted 
for 77 percent of the non-Jewish Israeli population. Together with 
the Druzes, who resembled them closely in demographic terms, 
they had the highest rate of growth, with all the associated indica- 
tors (family size, fertility rate, etc.). Christian Arabs in 1986 were 
demographically more similar to Israeli Jews than to Muslims or 
Druzes (see fig. 6). 

The Jewish Israeli population differed also in country of origin; 
the population included African-Asian and European-American 
Jews, and native-born Israelis, or sabras (see Glossary). In the ol- 
dest age-groups, those of European-American provenance, called 
"Ashkenazim," predominated, reflecting the population of the 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



pre-1948 era. By the early 1970s, the number of Israelis of African- 
Asian origin outnumbered European or American Jews. In Israel, 
immigrants from African and Asian countries were called either 
Orientals, from the Hebrew Edot Mizrah (communities of the East), 
or Sephardim (see Jewish Ethnic Groups, this ch.), from an older 
and different usage. It was not until 1975 that the sabras outnum- 
bered immigrants (see fig. 7). 

Understanding the importance of aliyah (pi., aliyot — see Glos- 
sary), as immigration to Israel is called in Hebrew, is crucial to 
understanding much about Israeli society, from its demography 
to its ethnic composition. Aliyah has historical, ideological, and 
political ramifications. Ideologically, aliyah was one of the central 
constituents of the Zionist goal of ingathering of the exiles. Histor- 
ically and politically, aliyah accounted for most of the growth in 
the Jewish population before and just after the advent of the state. 
For example, between 1922 and 1948 the Jewish population in 
Palestine grew at an annual average rate of 9 percent. Of this 
growth, 75 percent was due to immigration. By contrast, in the 
same period, the Arab population grew at an average annual rate 
of 2.75 percent — almost all as a result of natural increase. Between 
1948 and 1960, immigration still accounted for 69 percent of the 
annual average growth rate of 8.6 percent. A significant group en- 
tering Israel since 1965 has been Soviet Jews, of whom approxi- 
mately 174,000 immigrated between 1965 and 1986. In the most 
recent period for which data existed in 1988, the period from 1983 
through 1986, immigration contributed only a little more than 6 
percent to a much diminished average annual growth rate of 1.5 
percent (see table 2, Appendix A). 

The practical political aspects of declining aliyot are important 
in comparing the Jewish and non-Jewish population growth rates; 
one must also consider emigration of Jews from Israel, caHed yerida, 
a term with pejorative connotations in Hebrew. It is estimated that 
from 400,000 to 500,000 Israelis emigrated between 1948 and 1986. 
Emigration is a politically sensitive topic, and statistical estimates 
of its magnitude vary greatly. To take one possible index, the Cen- 
tral Bureau of Statistics noted that of the more than 466,000 Israeli 
residents who went abroad for any period of time in 1980, about 
19,200 had not returned by the end of 1986. Continued emigra- 
tion combined with falling immigration, together with unequal 
natural population growth rates of Jews and Arabs, mean that by 
the year 2010, assuming medium projections of Arab and Jewish 
fertility, the proportion of the Jewish population within Israel's 
pre- 1967 borders would decrease to 75 percent. If the occupied ter- 
ritories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be annexed, by 



89 



Israel: A Country Study 




90 



The Society and Its Environment 



2010 Jews would become a clear minority in the state, comprising 
approximately 45 percent of the total population. 

These demographic facts have affected population and family 
planning policies in Israel, but as of 1988 no consistent course of 
action had emerged. Until the mid-1960s, Israel followed a policy 
favoring large families, and family planning was not a priority. 
In the early 1970s, as a result of unrest among Oriental Jews, the 
Labor government under Golda Meir decided to support family 
planning as a way of reducing the size of Oriental Jewish fami- 
lies and narrowing the socioeconomic gap between them and 
Ashkenazim. Nevertheless, most family planning consisted, unsatis- 
factorily to most people concerned with the issue, of abortions per- 
formed under a liberal abortion law that was opposed bitterly by 
Orthodox Jews for religious reasons. (Orthodox Jews managed to 
restrict the criteria for performing abortions after Menachem Begin 
came to power in 1977.) Thus, because Jews feared being demo- 
graphically overtaken by Arabs and because of potent opposition 
by Orthodox Jews, the development of a coherent family-planning 
policy was stymied. In the late 1980s, Israel's policies on family 
planning remained largely contradictory. 

The dispersal of the population has been a matter of concern 
throughout the existence of the state. In 1986 the average popula- 
tion density in Israel was 199 persons per square kilometer, with 
densities much higher in the cities (close to 6,000 persons per square 
kilometer in the Tel Aviv District in 1986) and considerably lower 
in the very arid regions of the south. The population continues to 
be overwhelmingly urban. Almost 90 percent resides in urban lo- 
calities, more than one-third of the total in the three largest cities 
(in order of population), Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. Since 
1948, despite calls throughout the 1960s to "Judaize" Galilee, the 
population has been shifting southward. Still, as of 1988, almost 
two-thirds of the population was concentrated on the Mediterra- 
nean coast between Haifa and Ashdod. 

In the mid-1950s, in an effort both to disperse the population 
from the coast and settle the large numbers of immigrants coming 
from Middle Eastern and North African countries, so-called de- 
velopment towns were planned and built over the next fifteen years. 
They were settled primarily by Oriental Jews, or Sephardim (see 
Glossary) and through the years they have often been arenas of 
unrest and protest among ethnic groups. In 1986, about 77 per- 
cent of rural Jews lived in kibbutzim and moshavim; still, these 
two rather striking Israeli social institutions attracted a very small 
percentage (3.5 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively) of the total 
Jewish population. 



91 



Israel: A Country Study 




92 



The Society and Its Environment 

The changing distribution of population was more pronounced 
among Arabs. Whereas 75 percent of the Arabs lived in rural 
localities in 1948, less than 30 percent did by 1983. This pattern 
was not entirely because of internal migration to urban areas, but 
rather resulted from the urbanization of larger Arab villages. For 
example, in 1950 the Arab locality of Et Taiyiba near Nabulus had 
5,100 residents; by 1986 its population had risen to 19,000. Israeli 
Arabs were concentrated in central and western Galilee, around 
the city of Nazareth, and in the city of Jaffa (Yafo in Hebrew), 
northeast of Tel Aviv. Arabs resided also in Acre (Akko in Hebrew), 
Lydda (Lod in Hebrew), Ramla, Haifa, and near Beersheba. They 
constituted the majority in East Jerusalem, annexed after the June 
1967 War. 

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 1986 
about 51,200 Jews resided in the the West Bank occupied territo- 
ries (called Judea and Samaria by Jewish Israelis), and an addi- 
tional 2,100 resided in the Gaza Strip (these figures represented 
1.4 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively, of the 1986 Jewish popu- 
lation of Israel). They lived in 122 localities in both areas, includ- 
ing 4 cities, 10 kibbutzim, 31 moshavim, and 77 "other rural 
localities." This last category included more than fifty localities 
of a kind called yishuv kehilati, a nonagricultural cooperative settle- 
ment, a form new to Israel. Such settlements were associated es- 
pecially with Amana, the settlement arm of Gush Emunim, and 
developed in the mid-1970s especially to enhance Jewish presence 
in the West Bank. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
in 1985 about 7,094, and in 1986 approximately 5,160, Jews set- 
tled in the occupied territories. Some did so for religious and na- 
tionalistic reasons, but many more were motivated by the high costs 
of housing inside Israel, combined with economic incentives offered 
by the Likud governments of the late 1970s and early 1980s to those 
who settled in the West Bank. 

The Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the 1986 Arab popu- 
lation of the West Bank to be 836,000, and that of Gaza to be 
545,000, for a total population of close to 1.4 million. In 1986 the 
population increased at a rate of 2.5 percent for the West Bank 
and 3.4 percent for Gaza — among the highest annual rates attained 
during the Israeli occupation. 

Social Structure 

The social structure of contemporary Israel has been shaped by 
a variety of forces and circumstances. Israel inherited some insti- 
tutions and customs from the Ottomans and some from the Brit- 
ish mandatory rule over Palestine. Zionists who strove to build the 



93 



Israel: A Country Study 



1948 Total population - 716.7 (in thousands) 



European-American 
393 
(54.8%) 

African 

12.2 
(1.7%) 




Israeli 
253.7 
(35.4%) 

Asian 
57.8 
(8.1%) 



1972 Total population - 2,686.7 (in thousands) 



European-American 
749.7 
(27.9%) 



African 
348.6 
(13%) 




Israeli 
1,272.3 
(47.3%) 



Asian 
316.1 
(11.8%) 



1 986 Total population - 3,561 .4 (in thousands) 



European-American 
761.4 
(21.4%) 



African 
327.1 
(9.2%) 



Asian 
284.2 

(8%) 




Israeli 
2,188.7 
(61 .4%) 



European- 
American 



African 



ID As 



lan 



Israeli 



Source: Based on information from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel, 1987, No. 38, Jerusalem, 1987, 73. 



Figure 7. Anal} sis of 'Jewish Population Distribution by Origin, 1948, 1972, 
and 1986 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Yishuv under Ottoman and British rule (see Origins of Zionism, 
ch. 1) also wielded influence. Immigration patterns have altered 
the social structure radically at different times. From 1882 to 1948, 
Israel received many immigrants from Eastern Europe and Cen- 
tral Europe. Following independence, huge numbers of Middle 
Eastern, North African, and Asian Jews came to the new state and 
altered its dominant Ashkenazi cast. Another shaping force was 
the presence of non-Jews in the Jewish state — a growing Arab 
minority within the pre- 1967 borders of Israel and an absolute 
majority in the territories held under military occupation since the 
June 1967 War. Finally, among the most important forces shap- 
ing contemporary Israeli society is religion. 

Varieties of Israeli Judaism 

As the references to ''Orthodox Zionists," "Orthodox non- 
Zionists," and "Orthodox anti-Zionists" indicate, Judaism is not 
a monolithic cultural entity in contemporary Israel. Furthermore, 
an understanding of religious categories in American Judaism is 
not sufficient for understanding Israeli Judaism. Israelis religiously 
categorize themselves first as dati, that is, "religiously" observant 
Jews or lo dati, "not religiously" observant Jews. One who is reli- 
gious strictiy follows halakah, that is, adheres to the totality of rab- 
binic law. One who is not religious is not a strict follower of rabbinic 
law; however, the category can be further subdivided into agnos- 
tic or atheistic secularists, on the one hand, and individuals who 
are committed to Judaism in principle, on the other. The latter 
group calls itself "traditionalist" (mesoratim) . 

Many Oriental Jews, especially in the second generation since 
immigration, are traditionalists, expressing this commitment in ob- 
servance of folk customs such as ethnic festivals and pilgrimages. 
This group is important because, although members may not vote 
directly for religious political parties, they respond positively to re- 
ligious symbols used politically by a number of parties; for exam- 
ple, the idea of the Jewish people's right to a greater, biblical land 
of Israel as divinely ordained. 

Orthodox Judaism 

Within the Orthodox or dati category one can distinguish be- 
tween the ultra-Orthodox or haredi, and the "modern" or "neo- 
Orthodox." At the very extreme, the ultra-Orthodox consists of 
groups such as the Neturei Karta, a small fringe group of anti- 
Zionist extremists, who reject Israel and view it as a heretical entity. 
They want nothing to do with the state and live in enclaves (Mea 
Shearim in Jerusalem and towns such as Bene Beraq), where they 



95 



Israel: A Country Study 

shut out the secular modern world as much as possible. Neverthe- 
less, among the ultra-Orthodox one can also count some of the ad- 
herents of the Agudat Israel Party, who accept the state, although 
not its messianic pretensions, and work within many of its institu- 
tions. These adherents are exempt from compulsory military service 
and do not volunteer for police work, yet they demand that the 
state protect their way of life, a political arrangement known as 
the "preservation of the status quo" (see The Role of Judaism, 
this ch.). In practice, they live in the same neighborhoods as the 
more extreme haredi and maintain their own schools, rabbinical 
courts, charitable institutions, and so on. The state has not only 
committed itself to protecting the separate institutions of different 
Orthodox Jewish groups but also, especially since 1977, to their 
financial subvention. 

The modern or neo-Orthodox are those who, while scrupulously 
adhering to halakah, have not cut themselves off from society at 
large. They are oriented to the same ideological goals as many of 
the secularists, and they share the basic commitment to Israel as 
a Zionist state. Furthermore, they participate fully in all the major 
institutions of the state, including the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). 
This group is also referred to as "Orthodox Zionists." They have 
been represented historically by a number of political parties or 
coalitions, and have been the driving force behind many of the 
extraparliamentary social, political, and Jewish terrorist move- 
ments that have characterized Israeli society since the June 1967 
War (see Extraparliamentary Religio-nationalist Movements, 
ch. 4). Most Orthodox Zionists have been "ultra-hawkish" and 
irredentist in orientation; Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful, 
is the most prominent of these groups. A minority of other Zionist 
groups, for example, Oz Veshalom, an Orthodox Zionist move- 
ment that is the religious counterpart to Peace Now, has been more 
moderate. 

Relations between the ultra-Orthodox and the neo-Orthodox 
have been complicated and not always cordial. Nevertheless, the 
neo-Orthodox have tended to look to the ultra-Orthodox for 
legitimacy on religious matters, and the ultra-Orthodox have 
managed to maintain their virtual monopoly on the training and 
certification of rabbis (including neo-Orthodox ones) in Israel. (The 
neo-Orthodox university, Bar-Ilan, as part of the parliamentary 
legislation that enabled it, was prohibited from ordaining rabbis.) 
Thus ultra-Orthodoxy has an aura of ultimate authenticity, a spe- 
cial connection to tradition that has been difficult for others to over- 
come. Even a staunch secularist such as David Ben-Gurion 
lamented during a confrontation that the ultra-Orthodox "look like 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



our grandfathers. How can you slap your grandfather into jail, even 
if he throws stones at you?" 

Non-Orthodox Judaism 

The American denominations of Conservative Jews (see Glos- 
sary) and Reform Jews (see Glossary), although they have enrolled 
between them the vast majority of affiliated American Jews, have 
achieved a very modest presence in Israel. Neither Reform nor Con- 
servative rabbinical ordination is recognized by the Israeli Chief 
Rabbinate; thus, these rabbis are generally forbidden to perform 
weddings or authorize divorces. (In the mid-1980s a few Conser- 
vative rabbis were granted the right, on an ad hoc basis, to per- 
form weddings.) In the early 1980s, there were twelve Reform 
congregations in Israel and about 900 members — almost 90 per- 
cent of whom were born outside the country. During the same 
period there were more than twenty Conservative congregations 
with more than 1 ,500 members; only about 14 percent were native- 
born Israelis (and, as in the case of Reform, the great majority 
of these were of Ashkenazi descent). 

Although both Reform and Conservative movements dated their 
presence in Israel to the 1930s, they experienced real growth, the 
Conservative movement in particular, only in the late 1960s to 
mid-1970s. During this period, relatively large numbers of Ameri- 
can Jews immigrated — more than 36,000 between 1968 and 1975. 
Nevertheless, the opposition of the Israeli Orthodox establishment 
to recognizing Conservative and (particularly) Reform Judaism as 
legitimate was strong, and it continued to be unwilling to share 
power and patronage with these movements. Neither of the newer 
movements has attracted native-born Israelis in significant num- 
bers. The importance of the non-Orthodox movements in Israel 
in the late 1980s mainly reflects the influence they have wielded 
in the American and West European Diaspora. 

The Role of Judaism 

In 1988 two-thirds to three-quarters of Jewish Israelis were not 
religious or Orthodox in observance or practice. Among the minor- 
ity of the religious who were the most extreme in their adherence 
to Judaism — the haredi — the very existence of Israel as a self- 
proclaimed Jewish state was anathema because Israel is for them 
(ironically, as it is for many Arabs) a wholly illegitimate entity. 
Given these facts — the large number of secular Israelis, and the 
sometimes fierce denunciation of the state by a small number of 
the most religious extremists — one might expect Judaism to play 
a modest role in Israeli society and culture. But the opposite 



97 



Israel: A Country Study 



is true; traditional Judaism has been playing a more dominant role 
since the late 1960s and affecting more of the political and eco- 
nomic dimensions of everyday life (see Prospects for Electoral Re- 
form, ch. 4). 

The relation between Judaism and the Jewish state has always 
been ambivalent and fraught with paradox. In the nineteenth cen- 
tury, Zionism often competed with Orthodox Judaism for the hearts 
and minds of young Jews, and enmity existed between Orthodox 
Jews of Eastern Europe and the Zionists (and those residing in Pales- 
tine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Ortho- 
dox Jews resented the dominantly secular nature of Jewish 
nationalism (for example, the desire to turn the holy tongue of 
Hebrew into an instrument of everyday discourse), whereas the 
Zionists derogated the other-worldly passivity of Orthodox Jews. 
Among the most extreme Orthodox Jews, the Zionist movement 
was deemed heretical because it sought to * 'force the End of Days" 
and preempt the hand of God in restoring the Jewish people to 
their Holy Land before the Messiah's advent. 

Nevertheless, for all its secular trappings, Zionism as an ideology 
was also profoundly tied to Jewish tradition — as its commitment 
to the revival of the Jews' biblical language, and, indeed, its com- 
mitment to settle for nothing less than a Jewish home in biblical 
Palestine indicate. Thus, secular Zionism and religious Judaism 
are inextricably linked, and hence the conceptual ambivalence and 
paradoxes of enmity and attraction. 

In any case, conceptual difficulties have been suspended by world 
events: the violence of the pogroms in Eastern Europe throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the Holocaust 
carried out by Nazi Germany, in which approximately 6 million 
Jews were killed, nearly destroying Central and East European 
Jewry in the 1930s and 1940s. In the face of such suffering — and 
especially after the magnitude of the Holocaust became known — 
Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews devised ways to work together 
in Palestine despite their fundamental differences. When the ad- 
vent of the state was followed immediately by invasion and lasting 
Arab hostility, this cooperative modus vivendi in the face of a com- 
mon enemy continued. 

The spearheads of cooperation on the Orthodox side were the 
so-called religious Zionists, who were able to reconcile their na- 
tionalism with their piety. Following Rabbi A.I. Kook (1865-1935), 
the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Palestine, many believed that 
Zionism and Zionists, however secular, were nonetheless instru- 
ments of God who were engaged in divinely inspired work. On 
a more pragmatic level, under leadership such as that of Rabbi 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



I.J. Reines (1839-1915), the religious, like the secularists, organized 
in political parties, such as the Mizrahi Party (see Religious Par- 
ties, ch. 4). They were joined in the political arena by the non- 
Zionist Orthodox, organized as the Agudat Israel Party. Although 
Agudat Israel was originally opposed to the idea of a Jewish state, 
it came to accept the rationale for it in a hostile gentile world (es- 
pecially after the Central and East European centers of Orthodoxy 
were destroyed in the Holocaust). Because Orthodox Jews, like 
secularists, were organized in political parties, from an early date 
they participated — the religious Zionists more directly than the re- 
ligious non-Zionists — in the central institutions of the Yishuv and, 
later, the State of Israel. Indeed, since 1977 and the coming to power 
of Menachem Begin 's Likud, Orthodox Jews have been increas- 
ingly vocal in their desire not just to participate in but also to 
shape — reshape, if need be — the central institutions of Israeli 
society. 

Judaism, Civil Religion, and the "New Zionism" 

All varieties of Judaism — ultra-Orthodoxy, neo-Orthodoxy, the 
Reform and Conservative forms — together counted as their for- 
mal adherents only a minority of Jewish Israelis. Yet religion was 
a potent force, and increasingly so, in Israeli society. Traditional 
Judaism has exerted its influence in Israel in three important ways. 
First, traditional Judaism has influenced political and judicial legis- 
lation and state institutions, which have been championed by the 
various Orthodox political parties and enshrined in the "preser- 
vation of the status quo" arrangements through the years. Second, 
religion has exerted influence through the symbols and practices 
of traditional Judaism that literally pervade everyday life. Satur- 
day is the sabbath (Shabbat — see Glossary), the official day of rest 
for Jews (although the majority do not attend synagogue), and most 
enterprises are closed. Jewish holidays also affect school curricula, 
programming on radio and television, features in the newspapers, 
and so on. Traditionalists, who extol halakah even if they do not 
observe all rabbinic law, also observe many folk customs. Through 
the years, much of the folk religion has taken on an Oriental- 
Jewish flavor, reflecting in part the demographic preponderance 
of Oriental Jews since the 1970s. Such customs include ethnic 
festivals such as the Moroccan mimouna (an annual festival of 
Moroccan Jews, originally a minor holiday in Morocco, which has 
become in Israel a major celebration of Moroccan Jewish ethnic 
identity) and family pilgrimages to the tombs of Jewish holy 
men. The latter have become country- wide events. Traditional 
Judaism has influenced Israeli society in yet a third way: Israel's 



99 



Israel: A Country Study 

political elite has selectively co-opted symbols and practices of tradi- 
tional Judaism in an attempt to promote nationalism and social 
integration. In this way traditional Judaism, or some aspects of 
it, becomes part of the political culture of the Jewish state, and 
aspects of traditional Judaism are then enlisted in what some 
analysts have called the "civil religion" of Jewish society. Thus, 
Judaism speaks to Israelis who may themselves be nonreligious, 
indeed even secularist. 

Of all the manifestations of religion in Israel, civil religion has 
undergone the most profound changes through the years, specifi- 
cally becoming more religious — in the sense of incorporating more 
traditional, Orthodox-like Judaism. In the prestate period, the civil 
religion of Jewish society was generally socialist, that is, Labor 
Zionism. Labor Zionists were hostile to much of traditional Jew- 
ish life, to the concept of exile, and to what they viewed as the cul- 
tural obscurantism of traditional Jews. They actively rejected 
Orthodoxy in religion and considered it to be a key reason for the 
inertia and lack of modernity of exiled Jews. Labor Zionists sought 
to reconstitute a revolutionary new form of Jewish person in a radi- 
cally new kind of society. 

After 1948, however, new problems faced Israeli society — not 
only military and economic problems, but also the massive immigra- 
tion of Jews and their assimilation. First came the remnants of East 
and Central European Jewry from the detention and displaced- 
persons camps; then came Jews from Africa and Asia (see Ingather- 
ing of the Exiles, ch. 1). Social integration and solidarity were 
essential to successful assimilation, yet Labor Zionism neither ap- 
pealed to nor united many sectors of the new society. Throughout 
the 1950s and early 1960s — roughly the period of Ben-Gurion's 
preeminence — a civil religion was fashioned by some factions of 
the political elite (led by Ben-Gurion himself), which sought to stress 
the new Israeli state as the object of ultimate value. 

Israelis have called this the period of mamlakhtiyut or statism. The 
Jewish Bible was the key text and symbol, and secular youths 
studied parts of it as the Jewish nation's history and cultural 
heritage. Religious holidays, such as Hanukkah and Passover, or 
Pesach, were reinterpreted to emphasize nationalist and liberation 
themes, and Independence Day was promoted as a holiday of stat- 
ure equal to the old religious holidays. The archaeology of the Holy 
Land, particularly during the Israelite (post-Joshua) period, be- 
came a national obsession, first because of the discovery of the Dead 
Sea Scrolls and later because of Yigal Yadin's excavations at Mas- 
sada (a site of fierce Jewish resistance to the Romans after the fall 
of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.). At the same time, the two thousand years 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



of Jewish history that followed the Roman destruction of Jerusa- 
lem, Jewish cultural life in the various diasporas (Ashkenazi as well 
as Sephardi), and Jewish religion of the postbiblical eras (rabbinic 
Judaism, exemplified in the Talmud — see Glossary) were rejected 
or ignored. 

For many reasons, the statist focus of Israeli civil religion did 
not continue after the June 1967 War. These reasons ranged from 
the greater traditionalism and piety of the Oriental immigrants, 
who were never satisfactorily engaged by the more limited scope 
of statism; to the exhaustion of the Labor Alignment, which, after 
the October 1973 War, had sought to embody socialist Zionism 
and Israeli modern statism as a manifestation of its own identity 
and agenda; to the rise of Begin's Likud Bloc with its populist ap- 
peals to ethnic traditionalism and an irredentist territorial program 
as a challenge to Labor Zionism's fading hegemony. Begin and 
his Likud championed a new civil religion to embody its identity 
and agenda. This new right-wing civil religion affirmed traditional 
Judaism and denigrated modernistic secularism — the reverse of the 
earlier civil religion. Unlike the statist version of Ben-Gurion's time, 
which focused on the Bible and pre-exilic Jewish history, the new 
civil religion was permeated by symbols from the whole of Jewish 
history. It gave special emphasis, however, to the Holocaust as a 
sign of the ultimate isolation of the Jewish people and the endur- 
ing hostility of the gentile world. 

The new civil religion (which in its more political guise some 
have called the New Zionism) has brought traditional Judaism back 
to a position in the Jewish state very different from that which it 
occupied twenty, forty, or eighty years ago. After the June 1967 
War, the New Zionists linked up with the revitalized and trans- 
formed neo-Orthodox — young, self-assured religious Jews who have 
self-consciously connected retention and Jewish settlement of the 
West Bank, the biblical Judea and Samaria, with the Messiah's 
advent. The rise of messianic right-wing politics gave birth in the 
mid-1970s to the irredentist, extraparliamentary movement Gush 
Emunim, which in turn led to the Jewish terrorist underground 
of the 1980s (see Jewish Terrorist Organizations, ch. 5). When the 
underground was uncovered and broken by Israeli security in April 
1984, it had already carried out several attacks on Arabs, includ- 
ing, it was thought, Arab mayors, in the West Bank and was plan- 
ning to destroy the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem. Even 
before the June 1967 War, however, Orthodox Judaism had been 
able to exert influence on Israeli society simply because its reli- 
gious institutions were so historically entrenched in the society. 



101 



Israel: A Country Study 

Religious Institutions 

The basis of all religious institutions in Israel dates back to the 
Ottoman Empire (1402-1921) and its system of confessional group 
autonomy called the millet system. Under the millet, each religious 
group was allowed limited independence in running its own com- 
munity under a recognized (usually religious) leader who repre- 
sented the community politically to the imperial authorities. Matters 
of law relating to personal status — marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
legitimacy of children — were also left to community control, so long 
as they did not involve a Muslim, in which case the sharia (Islamic 
law) courts took precedence. 

The Jewish community in Ottoman Palestine was represented 
by its chief rabbi, called the Hakham Rashi or Rishon Le Tziyyon 
(the First in Zion), who was a Sephardi. The Orthodox Ashkena- 
zim in Ottoman Palestine, who never formed a unified commun- 
ity, resented Sephardi preeminence. The secular European Jews 
who began to arrive in large numbers after 1882 ignored the con- 
straints of the millet system and the standing of the chief rabbi and 
his council as best they could. 

Under their League of Nations Mandate over Palestine, the Brit- 
ish retained this system of religious courts (the Jewish Agency be- 
came the political representative of the Yishuv as a whole). In 
recognition of the growing numerical preponderance of Ashkena- 
zim, however, the British recommended the formation of a joint 
chief rabbinate, one Sephardi and one Ashkenazi, and a joint chief 
rabbinical council. This system was implemented in 1921, together 
with a hierarchical court structure composed of local courts, regional 
appellate courts, and the joint Supreme Rabbinical Court in Jerusa- 
lem. After Israel's independence — even with the establishment of 
autonomous secular and military judiciaries — this system of rab- 
binical courts prevailed. An addition to the system was a Ministry 
of Religious Affairs under the control of the religious political party 
that sat in coalition to form the government, originally Mizrahi 
and later the National Religious Party (see The Judicial System; 
Multiparty System, ch. 4). 

In 1988, in addition to the two chief rabbis and their Chief Rab- 
binical Council, local chief rabbis were based in the larger cities 
(again, generally two, one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi) and on 
local religious councils. These councils (under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs) functioned as administrative bodies and provided 
religious services. They supervised dietary laws (kashrut) in pub- 
lic institutions, inspected slaughterhouses, maintained ritual 
baths, and supported synagogues — about 5,000 of them — and their 



102 



A Druze elder 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, 
Washington 




Samaritan priest and 
followers on a 
holy day of sacrifice 
Courtesy Les Vogel 




Israel: A Country Study 



officials. They also registered marriages and divorces, that is, legal 
matters of personal status that came under their jurisdiction. 

Israel's Proclamation of Independence guarantees freedom of 
religion for all groups within the society. Thus, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs also supervised and supported the local religious 
councils and religious courts of the non-Jewish population: Chris- 
tian, Druze, and Muslim. As in Ottoman times, the autonomy of 
the confessional groups is maintained in matters of religion and 
personal status, although all courts are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the (secular) Supreme Court. (This was true technically even 
of Jewish rabbinical courts, but outright confrontation or imposi- 
tion of secular appellate review was, in fact, avoided.) Among Chris- 
tians, the Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Latin, Maronite, and 
Arab Anglican groups operated their own courts. In 1962 a separate 
system of Druze courts was established. Sunni Muslim (see Glos- 
sary) judges (qadis) presided over courts that followed sharia. 

The Ministry of Religious Affairs also exerted control over Mus- 
lim religious endowments (waqfs), and for this reason has been a 
political presence in Muslim communities. The ministry tradition- 
ally was a portfolio held by the National Religious Party, which 
at times also controlled the Arab departments in the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Social Welfare. This helped to account 
for the otherwise paradoxical fact that some Arabs — 8.2 percent 
of voters in 1973 — supported the neo-Orthodox, Zionist, Nation- 
alist Religious Party in elections. 

Besides Christian, Muslim, and Druze courts, there was yet 
another system of Orthodox Jewish courts that ran parallel to, and 
independently of, the rabbinate courts. These courts served the 
ultra-Orthodox (non-Zionist Agudat Israel as well as anti-Zionist 
Neturei Karta and other groups) because the ultra-Orthodox had 
never accepted the authority or even the legitimacy of the official, 
state-sponsored (pro-Zionist, neo-Orthodox) rabbinate and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. In place of the rabbinate and rab- 
binical council, Agudat Israel and the community it represented 
were guided by a Council of Torah Sages, which functioned also 
as the highest rabbinical court for the ultra-Orthodox. The mem- 
bers of this council represent the pinnacle of religious learning 
(rather than political connections, as was alleged for the rabbinate) 
in the ultra-Orthodox community. The council also oversaw for 
its community inspectors of kashrut, ritual slaughterers, ritual baths, 
and schools — all independent of the rabbinate and the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs. 

In 1983 this state of affairs was even further complicated when 
the former Sephardi chief rabbi, Ovadia Yoseph, angry at not being 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



reelected to this post, withdrew from the rabbinate to set up his 
own Sephardic ultra-Orthodox council and political party, called 
Shas (an acronym for Sephardic Torah Guardians). Shas ran suc- 
cessfully in the 1983 Jerusalem municipal elections, winning three 
of twenty-one seats, and later in the national Knesset (parliament) 
elections in 1984, where it cut deeply into Agudat Israel's hold on 
ultra-Orthodox Oriental voters. Shas won four seats in 1984, 
Agudat Israel only two (see Religious Parties, ch. 4). In this con- 
text, Shas's importance lay in the fact that it split the Oriental ultra- 
Orthodox from Ashkenazi domination under Agudat Israel, adding 
yet another institutionalized variety of Israeli traditional Judaism 
to an already complicated mix. 

The practical result of all these separate and semiautonomous 
judiciaries based on religious grounds was that, for a large area 
of law dealing with matters of personal status, there was no civil 
code or judiciary that applied to all Israeli citizens. Marriages, 
divorces, adoptions, wills, and inheritance were all matters for ad- 
judication by Christian clerics, Muslim qadis, or dayanim (sing., 
dayan; Jewish religious judge). An essential practical difficulty was 
that, in strictly legal terms, marriages across confessional lines were 
problematic. Another result was that citizens found themselves 
under the jurisdiction of religious authorities even if they were them- 
selves secular. This situation has posed the greatest problem for 
the Jewish majority, not only because most Jewish Israelis are 
neither religiously observant nor Orthodox, but also because the 
hegemony of Orthodox halakah has from time to time forced the 
raising of issues of fundamental concern to modern Israel. Fore- 
most among these has been the issue of "Who is a Jew?" in the 
Jewish state. 

The "Who Is a Jew?" Controversy 

The predominance of halakah and religious courts in adjudicat- 
ing matters of personal status — and for that matter, the privileged 
position of the Orthodox minority in Israeli society — date back to 
arrangements worked out between the Orthodox and Labor Zionists 
on the eve of statehood. In June 1947, the executive committee 
of Agudat Israel received a letter from Ben-Gurion, then chair- 
man of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency, who was 
the predominant political leader of the Yishuv. Ben-Gurion, wishing 
to have the support of all sectors of the Yishuv in the dire struggle 
he knew was soon to come, asked Agudat Israel to join the coali- 
tion that would constitute the first government of the State of Is- 
rael. In return for Agudat Israel's support, Ben-Gurion offered a 
set of guarantees relating to traditional Judaism's place in the new 



105 



Israel: A Country Study 

society. These guarantees formalized the customary arrangements 
that had developed in Ottoman times and continued through the 
British Mandate; hence they came to be known as agreements for 
the "preservation of the status quo." 

The core of the status quo agreements focused on the following 
areas: the Jewish Shabbat, Saturday, would be the official day of 
rest for all Jews; public transportation would not operate nation- 
wide on Shabbat and religious holidays, although localities would 
remain free to run local transportation systems; kashrut would be 
maintained in all public institutions; the existing religious school 
system would remain separate from the secular one but would 
receive funding from the state; and rabbinical courts applying 
halakah would decide matters of personal status (see Education, 
this ch.). Both Agudat Israel and the Zionist Orthodox party, 
Mizrahi (later the National Religious Party), accepted the agree- 
ments and joined the first elected government of Israel in 1949. 

Ben-Gurion's concern that a more-or-less united Israel confront 
its enemies was answered by the status quo arrangement. But this 
arrangement — particularly the educational and judicial aspects — 
also set the stage for conflict between Orthodox and secular Jew- 
ish Israelis. This conflict became quickly apparent in the wake of 
the first flood of Jewish immigration to the new state and as a direct 
result of one of the first laws passed by the new Knesset, the Law 
of Return. 

The Law of Return, passed in 1950, guaranteed to all Jews the 
right to immigrate to Israel. Along with the Nationality Law (1952), 
which granted Israeli citizenship to people (including non-Jews) 
who lived in the country prior to 1948, the Law of Return also 
extended to Jewish immigrants (unless they specifically deferred 
citizenship or renounced it) immediate Israeli citizenship. Non- 
Jewish immigrants could acquire citizenship through a slower 
process of naturalization. 

The problem of what constitutes Jewish "nationality" {leorri) was 
essentially new. Before the modern era, one was a Jew (in the eyes 
of Jews and gentiles alike) by religious criteria; to renounce the 
religion meant renouncing one's membership in the community. 
In modern nation- states membership (citizenship) and religion were 
formally and, it was hoped, conceptually independent: one could 
be a British, French, or American citizen of the "Jewish persua- 
sion." But the modern State of Israel presented special opportu- 
nities to Jews — the right to settle in the country and claim Israeli 
citizenship as a right, in Ben-Gurion's words, "inherent in being 
a Jew." With these opportunities have come problems, both for- 
mal and conceptual, about the definition of "a Jew." 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



A halakic definition is available: a Jew is one who is born of a 
Jewish mother or who converts according to the halakah. The tradi- 
tional criteria thus consist of biology (descent) and religion. In a 
sense, biology dominates religion, because, according to halakah, 
someone remains a Jew if born of a Jewish mother, even if he or 
she converts to another religion, although such a person is referred 
to as "one who has destroyed himself." 

Another problem is that of defining "nationality. ' ' Such an issue 
is of concern to a modern state and its minister of interior. 
Moreover, a modern state is interested in the nationality question 
as part of the determination of citizenship, with all its associated 
rights and duties. The Orthodox, however, are less concerned with 
nationality as a guide to citizenship and more concerned with 
nationality as it determines proper marriage partners, with the 
attendant legitimacy of children. In Orthodox Judaism an illegiti- 
mate child (mamzer; pi., mamzerim) is severely limited in the range 
of permissible marriage partners; the children of mamzerim are 
("even to the tenth generation," according to Deuteronomy 23:2) 
themselves illegitimate. Furthermore, a woman who has not been 
divorced according to halakah will have mamzerim as the children 
of subsequent marriages. Rabbis would never knowingly sanctify 
the marriage of improper or forbidden partners, nor would such 
improper unions hold up in rabbinical courts. For the Orthodox, 
therefore, to know, as assuredly as one can, the status of a poten- 
tial marriage partner as a "full and proper" Jew is crucial. Any 
doubts, even in principle, would have the effect of dividing the Jew- 
ish community into endogamous groups, that is, groups that would 
marry only within the confines of assurance against bastardy 
(mamzerut). This threat of sundering the "whole Jewish commun- 
ity" into mutually nonintermarrying segments has been used by 
the Orthodox to great effect. 

Against this background one can understand much of the "Who 
is a Jew?" question and the vehemence with which positions have 
been taken. In 1958 the Bureau of the Registration of Inhabitants, 
under the minister of interior (from a left-of-center party), was 
directed to register individuals and issue identity cards that had 
separate categories under nationality and religion, according to the 
"good faith" declaration of the individual. Thus a non-Jewish 
mother could declare herself or her children to be Jewish and would 
be so registered. The rabbinate and the religious political parties 
were incensed, especially after they were told that population regis- 
try and identity cards were civil matters and need never affect mar- 
riages and divorces, which, under the status quo arrangements, 
would continue to fall under the jurisdiction of rabbinical courts. 



107 



Israel: A Country Study 

Orthodox Jews reasoned that if they had to deal with questions 
of Jewish nationality in a modern society, they could not allow 
nationality to be separated from religion in the Jewish state. The 
National Religious Party precipitated a cabinet crisis, and Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion responded by forming a committee of Jew- 
ish "sages" (including non-Orthodox Diaspora scholars) to study 
the question. 

The response of the scholars — even the non-Orthodox ones — 
was that it was premature to define who was a Jew in such a way 
that religion and nationality were separate. If not born of a Jewish 
mother, then a person must undergo a conversion to the Jewish 
faith to become a Jew. On the basis of this agreement, as well as 
Ben-Gurion 's own political considerations, a new minister of in- 
terior from the National Religious Party, which rejoined the govern- 
ment, was appointed. In 1960 the new minister redirected the 
Bureau of the Registration of Inhabitants to define a Jew by ad- 
ministrative fiat as "a person born of a Jewish mother who does 
not belong to another religion, or one who has converted in accor- 
dance with religious law." This definition, advanced by an Ortho- 
dox minister, is not strictly halakic, since an apostate is still a Jew 
according to halakah but not according to this definition. Such was 
the criterion used to deny automatic Israeli citizenship to Brother 
Daniel, a Carmelite monk who was born Oswald Rufeisen, a Jew, 
but who converted to Christianity and then tried to claim citizen- 
ship under the Law of Return. The Supreme Court in 1962 upheld 
the ministry's definition, since according to the "commonsense" 
definition of who is a Jew of the "average" Israeli, "a Christian 
cannot be a Jew." (Brother Daniel later acquired Israeli citizen- 
ship through naturalization.) 

The "Who is a Jew?" question still vexes the Knesset and the 
Supreme Court, and it has brought Orthodox and secular Israelis 
into sharp conflict. Sometimes, as in the Brother Daniel case, the 
issue has arisen as individuals tested the directives in terms of their 
own predicament. In 1968 Benjamin Shalit, an officer in the Israeli 
navy who was married to a non-Jewish naturalized Israeli citizen, 
sought to register his children as "Jewish" under the nationality 
category, but to leave the category under religion blank. This would 
have the effect of separating religion from nationality but not vio- 
late the "commonsense" notion that one cannot be an adherent 
of another religion (as was Brother Daniel) and still be Jewish. Shalit 
was claiming no religion for his children. The citizenship of the chil- 
dren was never in question: they were Israelis. What was at stake 
was their nationality. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



The court's first response was to ask the government to drop 
the nationality category from registration lists; the government 
declined, ostensibly for security reasons. Finally, after the 1969 na- 
tional elections, the court ruled by a five-to-four majority in 1970 
that Shalit could register his children as ' 'Jews' ' by nationality with 
no religion — invalidating the directives of 1960. Orthodox Jews 
rose up in defiance; Prime Minister Golda Meir backed down, and 
in 1970, after fierce debate, the Knesset passed an amendment to 
the Law of Return that revalidated and legalized the 1960 adminis- 
trative directive; thus: a Jew is one "born to a Jewish mother, or 
who has become converted to Judaism, and who is not a member 
of another religion. ' ' What the Orthodox did not win, at this time, 
was the proviso that the conversion to Judaism must have been 
carried out in conformance with halakah. Thus the status of con- 
versions carried out by Reform or Conservative rabbis in the 
Diaspora remained in question in the eyes of the religious minor- 
ity in Israel. 

Another way in which the "Who is a Jew?" issue arose involved 
the status of entire communities. Among these were the Karaites 
(a schismatic Jewish sect of the eighth century that rejected the 
legitimacy of rabbinic law), the Bene Yisrael (Jews from near Bom- 
bay, India, who immigrated in large numbers in the 1950s), and 
from the 1970s onward, Jews from Ethiopia — Falashas. The con- 
troversy arose over the fitness of these Jews, according to halakic 
criteria, for intermarriage with other Jews — not over whether they 
were Jews. The question was whether, because of their isolation 
(Bene Israel or Falashas) or schismatic deviance (the Karaites), their 
ignorance or improper observance of halakic rules had not ren- 
dered them essentially communities of mamzerim, fit only to marry 
each other or (according to halakah) Jewish proselytes. 

These community-level disputes have had different outcomes: 
the Orthodox Jewish authorities have not relented on the Karaites, 
who were doctrinal opponents of rabbinic law, despite pleas to bring 
them fully into the fold. The Karaites thus remained, according 
to halakah, a separate community for purposes of marriage. Young 
Karaites sometimes concealed their affiliation to "pass" in the larger 
Jewish Israeli society, where they were in all ways indistinguish- 
able. In the mid-1960s, the Orthodox backed down on the Bene 
Yisrael, changing the rabbinate's special caution against them in 
the registration of marriages between Jewish ethnic groups to a 
general caution. The Ethiopian Falashas, among the newest addi- 
tions to the Israeli Jewish mix, still faced some uncertainty in the 
1980s — again, not so much in terms of their Jewishness, which was 
accepted, but with respect to marriage to other Jews. 



109 



Israel: A Country Study 



Halakah provides many other stipulations and constraints on 
proper marriages and divorces. Among others these include the 
biblical levirate, whereby a childless widow must first obtain the 
ritual release of her brother-in-law before she may remarry; laws 
restricting the marriage of Cohens, the priestly caste of Israelites, 
who today have few corporate functions but whose putative in- 
dividual members are recognized; and laws governing the status 
of agunot (sing., aguna), married women "abandoned" by their hus- 
bands whose remarriage is disallowed until the man files a proper 
bill of divorce or until his death can be halakically established. This 
last law has made it difficult for women married to soldiers listed 
as "missing in action" to remarry within halakah, because the 
requisite two witnesses to their husband's death (or other admissi- 
ble evidence) are not always forthcoming. People involved in such 
hardship cases can get married outside Israel, but then the status 
of their children, in the eyes of halakah, is tainted. Although such 
cases arouse the sympathy of Orthodox Jews, the principle followed 
is that halakah, being divine and eternal, cannot be modified. 

It is in regard to the principles of the divinity and immutability 
of halakah that Orthodoxy opposes Conservative and Reform Juda- 
ism. Conservative Judaism affirms the divinity of halakah, but ques- 
tions its immutability. Reform Judaism denies the authority of both 
principles. Because of these views and their control over the reli- 
gious establishment, Orthodox Jews have been able to keep rab- 
bis of either persuasion from establishing full legitimacy in Israel. 
But because the majority of Jews in the Western democracies, if 
they are affiliated at all, are affiliated with Reform or Conserva- 
tive congregations, and because of the high intermarriage rates, 
as of 1988 Orthodox Jews have been unable publicly to invalidate 
Reform or Conservative conversions to Judaism under the Law 
of Return by amending the law again to stipulate specific confor- 
mance with halakah as the sole mode of conversion. Yet many new 
immigrants (and some long-time residents) whose status is in doubt 
have undergone Orthodox conversions — often added onto their 
previous Reform or Conservative ones — once resident in Israel. 

The Orthodox-Secular Cleavage 

As has been seen, Israeli Judaism in the late 1980s exerted its 
influence on society through a complex interplay of ethnicity, 
halakah, and political and ideological ferment — as well as through 
the notions of Israeli Jewish citizenship, nationality, security, and 
sovereignty. In part because of the institutionalization of the sta- 
tus quo arrangements of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in part 
because of the disproportionate power available to small (religious) 



110 





The Wailing Wall on the Temple Mount, Jerusalem 

Courtesy Jean E. Tucker 
Blowing of the Shofar during Rosh Hashanah, Jewish New Year 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 



111 



Israel: A Country Study 



political parties in the Israeli parliamentary system, traditional Juda- 
ism both pervades and structures much of everyday life (see Multi- 
party System, ch. 4). Because many of the Orthodox of various 
persuasions view the status quo as the baseline from which to 
advance, they are accused by many secular Israelis of trying to im- 
pose additional cultural controls and religious structures. As an 
example of Orthodox pressures, when Begin formed his first 
coalition government in 1977, the religious parties took advantage 
of this change in the political status quo to push for changes in the 
religious status quo as well. Thirty-five of the forty-three clauses 
in the 1977 multiparty coalition agreement submitted to the Knesset 
dealt with religious questions. 

Since the early 1970s, neo-Orthodox youths have been more as- 
sertive and less defensive in their religious observance — a charge 
leveled against their elders in the 1950s and 1960s. The "knitted 
skullcap generation" of the post-June 1967 War era has in some 
ways replaced the Labor Zionist kibbutzniks of a former era as the 
pioneering vanguard of Israeli society. Meanwhile, the ultra- 
Orthodox in 1988 were as willing as ever to challenge secular 
authorities, on the streets and with violence if need be, to protect 
their prerogatives and to preserve the special character of their 
enclave communities. 

The results of these trends have been twofold: a growing tradi- 
tionalization of Israeli society in terms of religion, and the sharp- 
ening of conflict between the extremist Orthodox and their 
sympathizers and the secularists who oppose the Orthodox Jews 
and their agendas. Despite the sharp rift, a sort of modus vivendi 
has emerged, which is what the status quo agreements intended. 
But the status quo itself has not been stable or stagnant; on the 
contrary it has been dynamic, gradually shifting toward religion. 

Jewish Ethnic Groups 

The division of Jewish Israelis into ethnic groups is primarily 
a legacy of the cultural diversity and far-flung nature of the Jew- 
ish Diaspora: it is said that Jews have come to modern Israel from 
103 countries and speak more than 70 different languages. As in 
the United States, the immigrants of yesterday became the ethnic 
groups of today. But Jewish ethnicity troubles many Israelis, and 
since the late 1950s it has sometimes been viewed as Israel's major 
social problem. 

There are two principal sources of concern. First, in a rather 
Utopian way, Zionism was supposed to bring about the dissolu- 
tion of the Diaspora and the reconstitution of world Jewry into a 
single, unified Jewish people. The persistence of cultural diversity — 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



Jewish ethnicity in a Jewish state — was simply inconceivable. Sec- 
ond, the socialist Labor Zionists assumed that the Jewish society 
of Israel would be egalitarian, free of the class divisions that plagued 
Europe. Instead, along with the growing, industrializing economy 
came the usual divisions of class, stratification, and socioeconomic 
inequality. These class divisions seemed to coincide with ethnic divi- 
sions: certain kinds of ethnic groups were overrepresented in the 
lowest classes. For Utopian thinkers, the persistence of Jewish eth- 
nic groups was troubling enough; their stratification into a class 
structure was unthinkable. 

The Ashkenazi- Oriental Distinction 

The two dominant Jewish ethnic groups in Israel are the Ash- 
kenazim (the term comes from the old Hebrew word for Germany), 
which now includes Jews from northern and eastern Europe (and, 
later, their descendants from America); and Sephardim (the term 
comes from the old Hebrew word for Spain), which now includes 
Jews of Mediterranean, Balkan, Aegean, and Middle Eastern lands. 
There are differences in ritual and liturgy between these two groups, 
but both sides have always recognized the validity and authority 
of the other's rabbinical courts and rulings. Nor, throughout the 
centuries, were scholars or notables from either branch totally iso- 
lated from the other. In some countries, Italy for example, com- 
munities representing both groups lived together. Originally, 
Ashkenazi meant one who spoke Yiddish, a dialect of German, in 
everyday life and Sephardi meant one who spoke Ladino (see Glos- 
sary), a dialect of Castilian Spanish. Although this narrow under- 
standing of Sephardim is still retained at times, in Israeli colloquial 
usage, Sephardim include Jews who speak (or whose fathers or 
grandfathers spoke) dialects of Arabic, Berber, or Persian as well. 
In this extended sense of Sephardim, they are now also referred 
to as the Edot Mizrah, ''the communities of the East," or in Eng- 
lish as "Oriental Jews." 

Whereas the Ashkenazi-Sephardi division is a very old one, the 
Ashkenazi-Oriental division is new to Israel. The term "Orien- 
tal" refers specifically to Israelis of African or Asian origin. This 
geographical distinction has developed over the years into a eu- 
phemism for talking about the poor, underprivileged, or educa- 
tionally disadvantaged (those "in need of fostering," in the Hebrew 
phrase). Some social scientists as well as some Sephardi activists 
have seen a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy in this classification. Many 
Sephardim will not refer to themselves as Orientals. 

The heterogenous nature of the Oriental segment of Israeli 
Jewry is sometimes lost when someone speaks of "the" Oriental 



113 



Israel: A Country Study 

community, or collects census data (as does the Central Bureau 
of Statistics) on the basis of the "continent of origin" ("Europe- 
America versus Africa-Asia") of its citizens and residents. The 
category "Oriental" includes Jews from Moroccan and Yemeni 
backgrounds — to take only two examples that span the range of 
the Arabic-speaking world. These two communities see themselves, 
and are seen by other Israelis — particularly Ashkenazim — very 
differently. Yemenis enjoy a positive self-image, and they are like- 
wise viewed positively by other Israelis; the Moroccans' self-image 
has been more ambivalent, and they are often viewed by others 
as instigators of violence and crime. Although this image has be- 
come something of a stereotype, Moroccan Jews did instigate acts 
of violence against the Labor Party in the 1981 elections, and statisti- 
cally their communities have tended to have a high crime rate. In 
a similar way, Iraqi, Iranian, and Kurdish Jewish ethnic groups 
all differ from one another in matters of self-perception and per- 
ception by other Israelis. They differ also according to such indices 
as income (for example, Iraqis are more concentrated in the mid- 
dle class, Kurds in the lower classes), orientation to tradition 
(Yemenis are probably the most religious of all non-Ashkenazi 
groups, Iranians are relatively secular), and so on. These differ- 
ences are likely to continue, moreover, as marriage statistics in the 
1980s indicate a higher rate of endogamy among members of Orien- 
tal ethnic groups, as compared to the Ashkenazim. As an ethnic 
group in the 1980s, Ashkenazim have become much more cultur- 
ally homogeneous than the Orientals. 

The Second Israel 

Before 1882 Sephardim or Oriental Jews were the majority, about 
60 percent, of the Jewish population in Palestine. Although Oriental 
Jews did immigrate between this period and that of the British 
Mandate — more than 15,000 came from Yemen and Aden Pro- 
tectorate between 1919 and 1948 — they were a minority, about 10 
percent of all immigrants. Thus, by 1948 Ashkenazim accounted 
for 77 percent of the population of the new State of Israel. But this 
was to change quickly in the period of mass migration that followed 
the establishment of the state. Between 1948 and 1951 Oriental 
immigrants accounted for 49 percent of all immigrants; in the Jewish 
calendar year 1952-53 they comprised 70 percent, and from 1954 
to 1957 (following the Sinai Campaign and turbulence in North 
Africa), African-born Jews, the majority from Morocco, constituted 
63 percent of all immigrants. By 1958 almost the entire Jewish popu- 
lations of Yemen, Aden, Libya, and Iraq had immigrated. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



The new state was barely equipped, and had few of the resources 
needed, to handle this influx. The immigrants were housed in tented 
"transition camps" (maabarot; sing., maabara); and then directed, 
often without their approval, to some cooperative settlement (im- 
migrants' moshav) or one of the new development towns. In both 
cases, authorities wanted to disperse the Jewish population from 
the coast and place the immigrants in economically productive (es- 
pecially agricultural or light industrial) settings. The results were 
village or town settlements that were peripherally located, ethni- 
cally homogeneous or nearly homogeneous, and the poorest set- 
tlements in the nation. 

The lack of resources, however, was not the only obstacle to the 
successful integration of the Oriental immigrants. Although their 
intentions were noble, in practice the Ashkenazim viewed their 
Oriental brethren as primitive — if not quite savage — representatives 
of "stone age Judaism," according to one extreme phrase. Pater- 
nalism and arrogance went hand in hand; the socialist Labor 
Zionists, in particular, had little use for the Orientals' reverence 
for the traditional Jewish criteria of accomplishment and rectitude: 
learnedness and religious piety. In the transition camps and the 
new settlements, the old elite of the Oriental communities lost their 
status and with it, often, their self-respect. The wealthy among them 
had been obliged to leave most of their wealth behind; besides, more 
often than not, they had been merchants or engaged in some "bour- 
geois" profession held in low esteem by the Labor Zionists. The 
rabbis and learned men among them fared no better with the secular 
Zionists but they were often patronized as well by representatives 
of the Ashkenazi religious parties, who respected their piety but 
evinced little respect for the scholarly accomplishments of rabbini- 
cal authorities who did not discourse in Yiddish. The religious and 
secular political parties knew, however, that the immigrants 
represented votes, and so, despite their patronizing attitudes, at 
times they courted them for support. In the early years, the leftist 
predecessor parties to the Labor Party even tried adding religious 
education to their transition camp schools as a way of enrolling 
Orientals. 

The transition camps were largely eliminated within a decade; 
a few became development towns. But the stresses and strains of 
immigrant absorption had taken their toll, and in July 1959 riot- 
ing broke out in Wadi Salib, a slum area in Haifa inhabited mostly 
by Moroccan Jews. The rioters spread to Haifa's commercial area, 
damaging stores and automobiles. It was the first violence of its 
kind in Israel, and it led to disturbances in other towns as the sum- 
mer progressed. Israelis were now acutely aware of the ethnic 



115 



Israel: A Country Study 

problem, and soon afterward many began to speak of Israel Shniya, 
the "Second Israel," in discussing the socioeconomic gaps that sepa- 
rated the two segments of society. In the early 1970s, violent pro- 
tests again erupted, as second-generation Orientals (mostly 
Moroccans), organized as the "Black Panthers" (named to great 
effect after the American Black protest group of the same period) 
confronted the Ashkenazi "establishment," demanding equality 
of opportunity in housing, education, and employment. Prime 
Minister Meir infuriated them even more by calling them "not 
nice boys." 

This remark underscored the perception of many Orientals that 
when they protested against Israel's establishment they were largely 
protesting against the Labor Party and its leaders. Many Orien- 
tals came to see the Labor Party as being unresponsive to their 
needs, and many also blamed Labor for the indignities of the tran- 
sition camps. These were legacies that contributed to Labor's fall 
from power in 1977; but, in fact, Oriental voters were turning away 
from Labor and toward Herut, Menachem Begin 's party, as early 
as the 1965 national elections. 

The Oriental protest movements, however, were never separatist. 
On the contrary, they expressed the intense desire of the Oriental 
communities for integration — to be closer to the centers of power 
and to share in the rewards of centrality. For example, some of 
the Black Panthers were protesting against their exclusion from ser- 
vice in the IDF, the result in most cases of previous criminal con- 
victions. This desire was also reflected in the Orientals' turn to 
Labor's opposition, Herut and later Likud, as a means of penetrat- 
ing power centers from which they felt excluded — by supporting 
the establishment of new ones. 

Ethnicity and Social Class 

The Orientals' electoral rejection of Labor and embrace of Likud 
can thus be seen as the political part of a larger attempt to try to 
lessen the socioeconomic gaps that have separated these two broad 
segments of Israel's Jewry. The gaps are reflected in the close corre- 
lation between Israel's class structure and its ethnic divisions along 
several critical dimensions, among them educational achievement, 
occupational structure, housing, and income. 

In education, the proportion of Orientals in junior high schools 
and high schools has risen through the years, but in the late 1980s 
a gap remained. For example, in 1975 the median years of school- 
ing for Ashkenazim was 9.8, compared with 7.1 for Orientals. In 
1986, although both groups enjoyed increased schooling, the me- 
dian for Ashkenazim was 12.2 years, compared with 10.4 for 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



Oriental Jews. Despite the expansion of higher education in Israel 
after the June 1967 War, Orientals lagged considerably behind Ash- 
kenazim in their presence in institutions of higher education. In 
the 1984-85 school year, only 14 percent of university degree 
recipients were of Oriental heritage, up from 10.6 percent a de- 
cade earlier. 

In terms of occupational structures, Oriental Jews were still over- 
represented in the blue-collar occupations. In 1982, for example, 
36.6 percent of Oriental immigrants and 34.5 percent of second- 
generation Orientals were employed in the blue-collar sector. 
Among Ashkenazim, 25.2 percent of the immigrant generation, 
and 1 3 percent of the next (sabra or native-born) generation were 
employed in the blue-collar sector. Among professional and tech- 
nical workers, the proportion for Orientals rose from 9 percent in 
the immigrant generation to 12 percent in the sabra generation, 
clearly some improvement. Nevertheless, in the same occupations 
among Ashkenazim, professional and technical employment rose 
from 15.5 percent in the immigrant to 24.7 percent in the Ash- 
kenazi sabra generation. In the sciences and academia, the gap 
has remained much larger, in generational terms. 

As a result of differential income levels and larger families, Orien- 
tals have lagged behind Ashkenazim in housing. In 1984 Ashkenazi 
households averaged 3.1 persons per room, as compared with 4.5 
per room in Oriental households. In 1984 the income of the aver- 
age Oriental family was 78 percent of that of the average Ashkenazi 
family — the same proportion as it had been in 1946, and down 4 
percent from what it was in 1975. Studies of the regional distribu- 
tion of income indicated that development towns, most with large 
Oriental populations, ranked well below the national average in 
income. Data comparing the period 1975-76 with that of 1979-80, 
however, indicated a significant improvement in Oriental income 
status. In this period, there was a decrease in the proportion of 
Oriental Jews defined as "poor" (having incomes in the lowest 
10 percent of the population). These data on education, occupa- 
tion, and income indicate that although Oriental Jews have made 
progress over the years, the gaps separating them from Ashkena- 
zim have not been significantly reduced. Moreover, these gaps have 
not been closing under Likud governments any more quickly or 
substantively than they had been under Labor. 

The close correlation between ethnicity and socioeconomic class 
in Israel remains the main axis along which the Ashkenazi-Oriental 
cleavage is drawn. The "hardening" of ethnicity into social class — 
what some analysts have referred to as the formation of Israeli 
"ethnoclasses" — represents, with the Orthodox- secular division, 



117 



Israel: A Country Study 

the most serious cleavage that divides the Jewish society of Israel 
from within. In Israel's class structure in the late 1980s, the upper 
classes were predominantly Ashkenazi and the lower classes 
predominantly Oriental. Mobility has been most evident in the 
movement, even though gradual, by Orientals into the large mid- 
dle class. 

Those Sephardim, however, who do rise to the middle class are 
unlikely to think of themselves as Orientals. They identify more 
with Ashkenazi patterns — in family size, age at termination of child- 
bearing, nature of leisure activities, and the like. Upwardly mo- 
bile Orientals loosen their ties with their own ethnic groups, and 
for them the term "Oriental" is reserved for the poor or under- 
privileged. This phenomenon has been seen by some as a sort of 
co-optation of upwardly mobile Orientals by Ashkenazi Israelis. 
Oriental upward mobility has strengthened the correlation for those 
who do not rise in class between Oriental ethnicity and low class 
standing. This correlation has led some analysts to speak of Oriental 
cultural patterns as essentially the culture of a particular stratum 
of society, the "Israeli working class." To some extent, too, Oriental 
culture patterns mitigate the integrationist effect of Ashkenazi- 
Oriental "intermarriage," estimated at nearly 30 percent for 
women of Oriental heritage who have nine or more years of 
schooling. 

The social manifestations of this rift, however, have been more 
evident in the political arena than in the economic. Since the 
mid-1970s, Orientals have comprised a numerical majority of the 
Jewish population. Thus far, the beneficiaries of this majority have 
been political parties, often religious ones and typically right-of- 
center, that have ranged themselves in opposition to Labor. The 
height of Ashkenazi-Oriental ethnic tensions occurred in the 
national elections of the 1980s — especially 1981 — in which anti- 
Labor sentiment was expressed, sometimes with violence, as anti- 
Ashkenazi sentiment. That Orientals supported in those elections 
the Likud Bloc led by Menachem Begin, himself an Ashkenazi from 
Poland, whose ultranationalist oratory served to inflame the vio- 
lence, was a paradox that troubled few in Israel at the time. More 
troubling to many Israelis were the violence and anti-Ashkenazi 
overtones of the opposition to the peace demonstrations that were 
organized by Israeli doves in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon, and, from the doves' side, the imputation of "anti- 
democratic" tendencies, en masse, to the Orientals. 

Some commentators have referred to these recent crystallizations 
as the "new Oriental ethnicity." Unlike the Oriental ethnicity of 
the 1970s, it has been less concerned with promoting festivals, 



118 



An Arab village scene in the occupied West Bank 
Courtesy Palestine Perspectives 

pilgrimages, and other cultural events, and more explicitly focused 
on political power. In the 1980s, self-consciously Oriental minor 
political parties have reentered the political arena, the first seri- 
ous and successful ones since the Yishuv and early years of the 
state. 

To some extent, the new ethnicity dovetailed with the new civil 
religion, the new Zionism, in its positive orientation to traditional 
Judaism and its negative orientation to the modern secularism of 
Labor Zionism. In this sense, the new ethnicity has contributed 
to the traditionalization of Israeli society. But the two movements 
are not identical. As a group, for example, Oriental Jews — although 
they are hawkish on the question of the occupied territories — have 
been less committed than many ultranationalist Ashkenazim to the 
settlement of the West Bank. The primary reason has been that 
Orientals see such costly efforts as draining resources into new set- 
tlements at the expense of solving serious housing problems in the 
cities and development towns of pre- 1967 Israel. 

Around issues such as the Jewish settlement of the West Bank 
can be seen the complicated interplay of ethnicity, religion, poli- 
tics, and social class interests in contemporary Israeli society. In 
the late 1980s, the Ashkenazi-Oriental distinction continued to be 
colored by all these factors. Both Israeli and foreign observers be- 
lieved that the Ashkenazi-Oriental rift would remain salient for 



119 



Israel: A Country Study 

many years, partly because it was a source of social tensions in 
Israel and partly because it was a lightning rod for them. 

Minority Groups 

The non-Jewish — almost entirely Arab — population of Israel in 
the mid-1980s comprised 18 percent of the total population (these 
figures refer to Arabs resident within the pre- 1967 borders of Israel). 
More than three-fourths were Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. 
Among Muslim Arabs the beduins, concentrated in the Negev, 
were culturally and administratively distinctive. They numbered 
about 29,000, divided among about forty tribally based factions. 
There were approximately 2,500 (non-Arab) Sunni Muslim Cir- 
cassians, concentrated in two small villages in Galilee. Among non- 
Muslim Arabs were Christians of various affiliations: Greek Ortho- 
dox, Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Protes- 
tants of different sects; the Greek Orthodox community being the 
largest of the Christian groups. In addition, there were Armeni- 
ans who belonged to several Christian churches (see also Popula- 
tion, this ch.). 

Another tiny minority group was that of the Samaritans, of whom 
about 500 remained in Israel in the late 1980s. The Samaritans 
are thought to be descendants of the Jews who lived in the area 
at the time of the Exile in Babylon beginning in 722 B.C. and who 
intermarried with the local inhabitants. Their religion resembles 
the form of ancient Judaism. 

In addition, Israel contained a small number of adherents of 
Bahaism, an offshoot of Shia Islam. They are followers of Mirza 
Husayn Ali, known as Baha Ullah (the glory of God), who claimed 
leadership of a community founded by an Iranian spiritual leader 
known as the Bab (the way), in the 1850s, after the Bab was ex- 
ecuted as a heretic. Bahais have a syncretistic faith that incorporates 
elements of Islam, Christianity, and universal ethical principles. 
Their governing body, the Universal House of Justice, which con- 
sists of elected representatives from various national spiritual 
assemblies, acts as supreme administrative, legislative, and judi- 
cial body for Bahais, and is located in Haifa. 

As a result of a high birth rate and improved health and sanita- 
tion conditions, the total number of Israeli Arabs in 1988 (exclu- 
sive of those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) was about equal 
to (and was expected soon to surpass) what it was in 1947 Pales- 
tine under the British Mandate. During and immediately after 
Israel's War of Independence, approximately 600,000 Arabs left 
the country of their own volition or were expelled; most went to 
Jordan's West Bank or the Gaza Strip, and some to Lebanon and 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Persian Gulf states. In 1948 many had expected to return to 
their homes (or to take over abandoned Jewish property) in the 
wake of victorious Arab armies. Instead, they have come to con- 
stitute the Palestinian diaspora, whose disposition has proved fateful 
to the history of many states in the modern Middle East. 

Israel's Arabs are guaranteed equal religious and civil rights with 
Jews under the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel. They have voted in national elections and sent members 
to the Knesset since 1949; following the 1984 elections, seven Arabs 
sat in the Knesset. Nevertheless, until the end of 1966, Israel's Arabs 
lived under a military jurisdiction that severely limited their phys- 
ical mobility and ranges of permissible political expression. They 
have also lost much land to the Israeli government, a good deal 
of it expropriated by the army for "security purposes," but much 
more turned over to Jewish settlements in attempts to increase the 
Jewish presence in northern and western Galilee, the centers of 
Arab population. 

In social and economic terms, the state has sought to dominate 
its Arab minority by encouraging dependence. This aim has been 
achieved, for example, by providing funding for the separate Arab 
(Muslim, Christian, and Druze) school systems, as well as access 
to Jewish institutions of higher learning, and by providing fund- 
ing for health facilities, religious institutions, and courts. Many 
of these institutions have encouraged the maintenance of Arab 
spheres of interaction segregated from Jewish ones. But the real 
dependency has resulted from the integration of Arab labor into 
Israel's economy. This has entailed an acute deemphasis on agricul- 
ture (abetted by government expropriations of arable land) and 
a funneling of labor into industry, especially construction, and into 
services. Under the British Mandate, for example, about two-thirds 
of all Arabs worked in agriculture. By 1955, this figure dropped 
to 50 percent of Arab labor employed in the agricultural sector, 
36 percent in industry and construction, and almost 14 percent in 
services. By the early 1980s, less than 12 percent were engaged 
in agriculture, 45 percent in industry and construction, and close 
to 43 percent in the service sector. Along with this proletarianiza- 
tion of Arab labor — the loss of its agrarian base — has come the 
urbanization of its population. In 1948 less than one-fourth of the 
Arab population lived in cities or towns; by the 1980s more than 
two-thirds did. 

Yet another way in which the government has related to its Arab 
minorities has been by encouraging internal segmentation, primar- 
ily along religious lines, in the Arab communities. Thus Muslims, 
Christians, and Druzes have been differentially treated. (So have 



121 



Israel: A Country Study 

the beduins, who are Muslims but are culturally distinctive as 
pastoralists from Muslim Arab village and town dwellers; and so 
have the Circassians, who although Muslims are not Arabs. Like 
Christians, beduins may volunteer for service in the army, and 
some do; like the Druzes, Circassians are conscripted.) Differen- 
tial treatment almost always has favored Christians and Druzes 
over Muslims; at least this has been the semi-official "policy." Some 
ethnographic and sociological studies of Arab villages, however, 
indicate that other Israeli policies have had the effect of weaken- 
ing the Christian and Druze position and strengthening that of Arab 
Muslims. 

In the past, Christian dominance, for example, was based on 
the control of agrarian resources in villages. The dismantling of 
the agrarian bases of the Arab economy and the proletarianiza- 
tion of Arab labor led to Arab dependence on the Jewish economy. 
But it did so at the expense of the wealth, and thus the political 
standing, of Christians. Similarly, the building and support of vil- 
lage and town schools open to all created an educated (and un- 
deremployed) Muslim cadre whose intellectual energies have tended 
to flow into antiestablishment politics. 

The Druzes 

The case of the Druzes is a special one. The Druzes belong to 
an eleventh century offshoot of Shia (see Glossary) Islam, which 
originated in Egypt. They soon migrated northward, settling first 
along the western slopes of Mount Hermon, and thence westward 
into the Shuf Mountains of Lebanon, south to Galilee and Mount 
Carmel, and east into Syria. In 1988 there were approximately 
318,000 Druzes in Syria and 182,000 in Lebanon. Including the 
Druze population of the Golan Heights, annexed by Israel in De- 
cember 1981, there were about 72,000 Druzes in Israel. This num- 
ber represented a large increase from the 1948 population of about 
13,000. Besides the Golan Heights, in the late 1980s Druzes lived 
in seventeen villages in Galilee and around Mount Carmel. Of 
these, nine were all Druze and the rest mixed, mostly with Chris- 
tian Arabs. Less than 10 percent of Druzes in Israel lived in cities — 
compared to more than 60 percent of Christians. 

The Druze religion is known mainly for being shrouded in secre- 
cy, even from large groups of Druzes themselves, the juhhal, 
uninitiated or "ignorant ones." The uqqal, the "wise," or initiated, 
undergo periods of initiation, each signaling an increased mastery 
of the mysteries of the faith. Although there is a formal separation 
between religious and political leadership, the wise ones (particu- 
larly the ajawid, or excellent, among them) have traditionally 



122 



The Church of All Nations 
and a Russian Orthodox 
church, both near the Garden 
of Gethsemane, Jerusalem 
Courtesy Jean E. Tucker 



Haifa, with a view 
of the Bahai Temple 
Courtesy Les Vogel 




123 



Israel: A Country Study 

wielded considerable political influence. The religion is fiercely 
monotheistic and includes an elaborate doctrine of the reincarna- 
tion and transmigration of souls. It shares with Shia Islam the doc- 
trine of practicing taqiya, the art of dissimulation in hostile 
environments. In the past this practice meant seeming to worship 
in the manner of the conqueror or dominant group, without 
apostasy. In more recent times, some observers note, it has meant 
being loyal to the state in which they reside, including serving in 
its army. 

Because the Druze religion was considered schismatic to Islam, 
even to Shia Islam, Druzes occasionally suffered discrimination and 
persecution at the hands of Muslims and, like other Middle Eastern 
dissidents, inhabited marginal or easily defensible areas: moun- 
tain slopes and intermontane valleys. Because the Druzes have long 
enjoyed a reputation for military prowess and good soldiery, they 
have often not suffered discrimination or persecutions lightly or 
without responding in kind. Whether because of the desire to set- 
tle old scores, or because the doctrine of taqiya can be stretched in 
this direction, Druzes have been remarkable in being a non-Jewish, 
Arabic- speaking group that has supported the Jewish state, both 
in the late Mandate period and since Israel's independence through 
service of Druze young men in the IDF and the paramilitary Border 
Police. About 175 Druzes have been killed in action, including a 
large proportion of that number in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. 

Jewish Israelis have recognized this service and sought to reward 
it. Druze villages had military supervision and restrictions lifted 
from them about four years before other Arab areas. Since 1977 
there has been a Druze member of the Knesset from the right-of- 
center Likud, and under Labor they have served in highly visible 
positions such as that of presidential adviser on minority affairs 
and, at one time, the Israeli consul in New York City. In 1962 
Israeli authorities recognized "Druze" as a separate nationality 
on internal identification cards — previously Druzes were differen- 
tiated only under dat, religion; their nationality was Arab. Although 
authorities assured Druzes that recognition as a separate national- 
ity would enhance their most favored status, some analysts and 
younger Druzes have viewed the identification as an attempt to 
drive a wedge between them and other Arabs. 

Many among the younger generation of Druzes have been partly 
radicalized in their politics — for a number of reasons. First, the 
favored status accorded the Druzes has not significandy helped them 
materially. Druzes have been among the least affluent of all groups 
in Israel, the number receiving higher education has been low, and 
few Druzes could be found in top professional or technical positions. 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 

Even those who have made the army their career have complained 
of severe limitations in promotions. Second, Israeli actions against 
Druzes in the occupied and then annexed Golan Heights troubled 
their coreligionists in Israel. Particularly troublesome was the 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. During this invasion, Israeli soldiers, as allies 
of the Lebanese Christians, were opposed by Druzes of the Shuf 
Mountains. Pitched battles or military encounters between the IDF 
and the Lebanese Druzes were avoided. Nevertheless, the Lebanese 
Christian Maronites have been among the Druzes' most bitter 
enemies, and many Druzes serving in the IDF were killed or 
wounded in Lebanon. This was a particularly difficult time for 
Jewish-Druze relations, one from which they had not fully recov- 
ered in 1988. 

The Arab-Jewish Cleavage 

The case of the Druzes highlights the peculiar problem of non- 
Jews, even demonstrably loyal ones, in the Jewish state. Both con- 
ceptually and pragmatically, the cleavage between Arabs and Jews 
is much more profound and perhaps unbridgeable than the one 
between Orthodox and secular Jews, or that between Ashkenazim 
and Oriental Jews. There has been an inherent tension between 
evolving an authentic Israeli national identity centered on the age- 
old religious character of Judaism and forging an egalitarian socio- 
economic system open to all citizens. Reconciling the place of 
non-Jews within the Jewish state has been a particular problem. 
These problems have been characterized with special lucidity and 
frankness by the Israeli- American political scientist, Daniel Elazar: 

The views of Israeli Jews regarding the Arabs in their midst 
are hardly monolithic, but whatever their character, all flow 
out of a common wish and a general ambivalence. The com- 
mon wish of virtually all Jews is that the Arabs simply would 
go away (and vice versa, it may be added). It is possible to 
get many Israelis to articulate this wish when they are pushed 
to do so, but needless to say, its very unreality means that 
it is rarely articulated, and, if articulated by a few extremists, 
such as Meir Kahane, it is rapidly dismissed from considera- 
tion by the vast majority. Yet it should be noted at the out- 
set, because for Israeli Jews, every other option, no matter 
which they choose, is clearly a poor second. 

It is against this background that the Israeli settlement policies 
of the West Bank and Gaza must be understood. To annex these 
areas would be to add almost 1.5 million Arabs to the non-Jewish 
population of the Jewish state — hardly a way to make the problem 



125 



Israel: A Country Study 

"simply go away." Until late 1987, Israeli planners had proceeded 
to build infrastructure in the West Bank as though operating under 
the premise that two totally separate socioeconomic systems — one 
Arab, the other Jewish — would exist side by side. Alternatively, 
the Arab sector was hardly mentioned — as if it did not exist. Still, 
West Bank Arab labor has been significantly absorbed into the 
larger Israeli economy; the situation recalls the experience of Arabs 
in pre- 1967 Israel. 

The violent protests that began in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank in December 1987 may well change this sort of thinking (see 
Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- , ch. 5). For example, it 
has been argued by some analysts that the West Bank (as Judea 
and Samaria) had already become part of a "cognitive map" for 
a generation of Jewish Israelis born after the June 1967 War. In 
light of this analysis, some have noted that security efforts begun 
in April 1988 to close off the West Bank, thereby keeping jour- 
nalists (among others) out and, Israelis hope, violent Palestinians 
in, have already had the unintended effect of reviving the old Green 
Line (see Glossary). Israeli Arabs living within the old Green Line 
have also been affected by events on the West Bank and Gaza — 
events that might prove fateful for Israel. 

Between 1948 and 1967 Israeli Arabs were effectively isolated 
from the rest of the Arab world. They were viewed by other Arabs 
as, at worst, collaborators, and, at best, hostages. After the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the economic integra- 
tion of its Arab population into Israel, social intercourse between 
Israeli Arabs and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians increased. 
Among other things, this contact has done much to raise the poli- 
tical consciousness of Israeli Arabs and strengthen their sense of 
Palestinian identity. In this sense, in the minds of many Jewish 
Israelis the dismantling of the old Green Line and the movement 
of Jewish settlers to fulfill their religio-nationalistic aspirations in 
biblical Judea and Samaria has been a double-edged sword. Along 
the way, the nationalist aspirations of Israeli Arabs have been in- 
vigorated as well. 

Renewed political activity among Israeli Arabs was already evi- 
dent when, in 1976, March 30 was proclaimed Land Day as a pro- 
test against Israeli expropriations of Arab lands. Several Arabs were 
shot by authorities during a demonstration, and since then Land 
Day has become a major event for expressing Israeli Arab politi- 
cal discontent, and for testing its organizational potential. Since 
early 1988, the political energies of Israeli Arabs have also been 
focused on expressing solidarity with their West Bank and Gazan 
brothers and sisters, who themselves have pursued more violent 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



confrontations with Israeli authorities. It seems less and less likely 
that an unproblematic Israeli Arab identity will develop and that 
the Israeli Arabs will become, as Israeli Jews had once hoped, 
"proud Arabs and loyal Israelis." In the late 1980s, it was more 
relevant to speak of the Palestinization of Israel's Arab minorities. 

Distinctive Social Institutions 

Israeli society in the late 1980s continued to be characterized 
by a number of distinctive institutions. Some, like the Histadrut, 
were legacies of the socialist aspects of Labor Zionism, with its 
commitments to the socioeconomic reconfiguration of the Jewish 
people and the establishment of an egalitarian and industrial nation- 
state society. Others, like the kibbutz and moshav, stemmed from 
these values but combined them with the practical problems posed 
by the need to pioneer and settle the land. Still others — the ulpan 
(Hebrew school for immigrants) or the merkaz klita (absorption 
center) — arose from the need to settle and integrate large num- 
bers of Jewish immigrants from diverse lands and cultures. 

The Histadrut 

The Histadrut (short for HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim 
B'Eretz Yisrael — The General Federation of Laborers in the Land 
of Israel) was founded in December 1920 as the primary represen- 
tative of Jewish labor in Palestine; it has accepted Arabs as full 
members since 1969. When founded the Histadrut claimed 4,500 
members; in the 1985 Histadrut elections more than 1.5 million 
members were eligible to vote. 

Much more than a labor union, the Histadrut was also, next 
to the government itself, the second largest employer in Israel, 
through its many cooperative economic enterprises — in industry, 
building trades, banking, insurance, transportation, travel agen- 
cies, dairy cooperatives, and so on — organized under Hevrat 
HaOvdim, the Histadrut' s holding company (see Overview of the 
1948-72 Period, ch. 3). The Histadrut also operated pension and 
social service programs, the most important of which was Kupat 
Holim (the Sick Fund), the largest provider of health care to Israelis 
(see Health, this ch.). The Histadrut published Davar, a liberal 
Hebrew daily newspaper, and owned Am Oved, a major publish- 
ing house. In addition, the collective and cooperative agricultural 
settlements — kibbutzim and moshavim — founded by the Labor- 
Zionist parties belonged to Histadrut, which marketed their 
products through its various cooperatives. The dual character of 
the Histadrut, as both the largest trade union federation in the coun- 
try and the second largest employer, has sometimes led to difficulties 



127 



Israel: A Country Study 

with both the government and labor. A long doctors' strike in the 
summer of 1983, for example, caused much rancor. 

Kibbutz and Moshav 

The first kibbutz, Deganya, near the Sea of Galilee, was founded 
in 1910. In addition to the two largest kibbutz federations, HaKib- 
butz HaMeuhad (the United Kibbutz Movement) and HaKibbutz 
HaArtzi (the Kibbutz of the Land), there were in 1988 a number 
of small movements including the agricultural collective settlements 
of the religious HaKibbutz HaDati, affiliated with the labor wing 
of the National Religious Party. In 1986 there were 125,700 resi- 
dents of about 265 kibbutzim, divided among five kibbutz federa- 
tions. The kibbutz is a collective settlement, originally devoted solely 
to agriculture, but since the late 1960s, it has included industrial 
concerns, too. Founded by ardent socialists, kibbutzim are charac- 
terized by the collectivization of labor and capital: the means of 
production, consumption, and distribution are communally owned 
and controlled, with considerable emphasis on participatory 
democracy in the operation of kibbutzim. Education and, in some 
federations, the rearing of children in age-graded dormitories, are 
communal as well. 

Until the 1980s, the kibbutz and its residents played a larger- 
than-life role in Israeli society. Kibbutzim embodied the coura- 
geous and selfless pioneer who settled the most difficult and dan- 
gerous areas to claim them for the Jewish state. They sent the 
highest proportion of young men to elite units of the army and its 
officers' corps, and later to positions of responsibility in the 
Histadrut and the government. If there were a sociopolitical elite 
in Israel (not an economic one, because members of the kibbutz 
lived with simplicity), it came from the kibbutzim. 

This highly positive image no longer held in 1988 for a number 
of reasons. First, the kibbutz was to a large extent a victim of its 
own successes. Its economic success raised the standard of living 
of the average member into the solid middle or upper middle class. 
It is difficult to conceive of a rural village with air-conditioned hous- 
ing, a well-equipped clinic, a large auditorium, and an olympic- 
sized swimming-pool as a pioneer outpost. Second, the economic 
success and the expansion of the kibbutz economy has forced it 
to go outside the community to hire labor — a direct contradiction 
of its earliest canons. Third, the membership of kibbutzim has been 
overwhelmingly Ashkenazi. Often the labor hired, if not Arab, con- 
sisted of Oriental Jews who resided in development towns near the 
kibbutz. Oriental Jews complained that the only time they saw 
members of kibbutzim as near equals was when the members came 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 

to town just before national elections to lobby the Orientals for votes 
for the left-of-center parties aligned with the kibbutzim. The turn 
of the mass of the Israeli electorate to the right wing was both a 
reflection and a cause of the loss of social prestige for the kibbutz, 
which has suffered a relative loss of influence in the centers of 
power in Israel. Nevertheless, the kibbutzim still contributed to 
Israel's economy and sociopolitical elite out of proportion to their 
number. 

The first moshav was established in the Jezreel, or Yizreel, Valley 
(Emeq Yizreel is also seen as the Valley of Esdraelon in English) 
in 1921. In 1986 about 156,700 Israelis lived and worked on 448 
moshavim, the great majority divided among eight federations. 
There are two types of moshavim, the more numerous (405) mosha- 
vim ovdim, and the moshavim shitufim. The former relies on cooper- 
ative purchasing of supplies and marketing of produce; the family 
or household is, however, the basic unit of production and con- 
sumption. The moshav shitufi form is closer to the collectivity of 
the kibbutz: although consumption is family- or household-based, 
production and marketing are collective. Unlike the moshavim 
ovdim, land is not allotted to households or individuals, but is col- 
lectively worked. 

Because the moshav form retained the family as the center of 
social life and eschewed bold experiments with communal child- 
rearing or equality of the sexes, it was much more attractive to 
traditional Oriental immigrants in the 1950s and early 1960s than 
was the more communally radical kibbutz. For this reason, the kib- 
butz has remained basically an Ashkenazi institution, whereas the 
moshav has not. On the contrary, the so-called immigrants' moshav 
(moshav olim) was one of the most used and successful forms of 
absorption and integration of Oriental immigrants, and it allowed 
them a much steadier ascent into the middle class than did life in 
some development towns. 

Like the kibbutzim, moshavim since 1967 have relied increas- 
ingly on outside — particularly Arab — labor. Financial instabilities 
in the early 1980s have hit many moshavim hard, as has the problem 
of absorbing all the children who might wish to remain in the com- 
munity. By the late 1980s, more and more moshav members were 
employed in nonagricultural sectors outside the community, so that 
some moshavim were coming to resemble suburban or exurban 
villages whose residents commute to work. In general moshavim 
never enjoyed the elite status accorded to kibbutzim; correspond- 
ingly they have not suffered a decline in prestige in the 1970s and 
1980s. 



129 



Israel: A Country Study 

The Ulpan and Merkaz Klita 

Immigration has always been a serious Israeli concern, as evi- 
denced by the ministerial rank given to the chief official in charge 
of immigration and the absorption of immigrants. Various insti- 
tutions and programs have helped integrate immigrants into Israeli 
society. Perhaps the most ubiquitous is the ulpan (pi., ulpanim — 
see Glossary), or intensive Hebrew language school. Some ulpanim 
were funded by municipalities, others by the Ministry of Educa- 
tion and Culture, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, or the 
Jewish Agency. Because they were heavily subsidized, ulpanim were 
free or charged only nominal fees to new immigrants. Some were 
residential, offering dormitory-like accommodations with board. 
They were mainly intended for single immigrants and offered half- 
day instruction in a course that lasted six months. The municipal 
ulpanim offered less intensive night classes. Many kibbutzim also 
ran ulpanim, which combined half-day language instruction with 
a half day's labor on the kibbutz. In the late 1970s, when immigra- 
tion to Israel was high, about 23,000 individuals were enrolled in 
some sort of ulpan. 

The merkaz klita, or absorption center, was developed in the late 
1960s to accommodate the increased immigration that occurred 
between 1969 and 1975 of relatively well-off and educated Jews 
from the West, particularly from the United States. These centers 
combined the ulpan with long-term (often exceeding one year) ac- 
commodation for families. With representatives of all the major 
ministries ideally on hand or on call, these centers were supposed 
to cushion the entry of the new immigrant into Israeli society. They 
were a far cry from the often squalid transition camps of the 1950s, 
a fact that did not go unnoticed by many Oriental Jews. In the 
late 1970s, at the height of immigration from the United States, 
there were more than twenty-five absorption centers housing almost 
4,000 new immigrants. Taking all the forms of such immigrant- 
absorption institutions together — centers, hostels (for families 
without children) and residential ulpanim — almost 10,000 persons 
were living in some form of them in early 1976. As of 1988 the 
occupancy had declined, as had Western immigration to Israel. 

Education 

Education in Israel has been characterized historically by the same 
social and cultural cleavages separating the Orthodox from the secu- 
lar and Arabs from Jews. In addition, because of residential pat- 
terns and concentrations — of Orientals in development towns, for 
example — or because of "tracking" of one sort or another, critics 



130 



Campus of Hebrew University, Jerusalem 
Courtesy Les Vogel 

have charged that education has been functionally divided by an 
Ashkenazi-Oriental distinction, as well. 

Before 1948 there were in the Jewish sector alone four different, 
recognized educational systems or "trends," each supported and 
used by political parties and movements or interest groups. As part 
of the prestate status quo agreements between Ben-Gurion and the 
Orthodox, this educational segregation, favored by the Orthodox, 
was to be protected and supported by the state. This system proved 
unwieldy and was the source of intense conflict and competition, 
especially as large numbers of immigrants arrived between 1948 
and 1953. The different parties fought over the immigrants for their 
votes and over the immigrants' children for the chance to socialize 
them and thus secure their own political future. This conflict precipi- 
tated several parliamentary crises, and in 1953 resulted in reform 
legislation — the State Education Law — which reduced the num- 
ber of trends to two: a state-supported religious trend and a state- 
supported secular trend. In reality, however, there were still a few 
systems outside the two trends that nevertheless enjoyed state sub- 
sidies: schools run by the various kibbutz federations and tradi- 
tional religious schools, yeshivot (sing., yeshiva — see Glossary), 
devoted to the study of the Talmud, run by the ultra-Orthodox 
Agudat Israel and others. In the 1986-87 school year, about 6 per- 
cent of all Jewish primary school students were enrolled in yeshivot, 



131 



Israel: A Country Study 

about 22 percent in state religious primary schools, and about 72 
percent in state secular primary schools. These figures remained 
constant throughout secondary education as well. Throughout this 
period and in 1988, Arab education was separately administered 
by the Ministry of Education and Culture and was divided by 
emphases on Muslim, Christian, or Druze subjects (see table 3, 
Appendix A). 

Israeli youth were required to attend at least ten years of school, 
in addition to preschool. The education system was structured in 
four levels. Preschool was available to children between the ages 
of three and six; it was obligatory from age five. Primary educa- 
tion ran from grades one through six; grades seven, eight, and nine 
were handled in intermediate or junior high schools. Secondary 
education comprised grades ten through twelve. Secondary schools 
were of three main types: the general academic high school, which 
prepared students to take the national matriculation examination, 
passage of which was necessary tp enter university; vocational high 
schools; and agricultural high schools. The latter two schools offered 
diplomas that allowed holders to continue in technical or engineering 
fields at the postsecondary level but did not lead to the matricula- 
tion exam. The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture shared with the Ministry of Education and Culture some 
responsibilities for curriculum and support of vocational and agricul- 
tural schools. Education through the intermediate school level was 
free. Before 1978 tuition was charged in secondary schools, and 
many argued that this discriminated against the poor, especially 
Orientals. A January 1984 reform imposed a reduced monthly fee 
of approximately US$10 in secondary schools. 

Israeli education has often been at the center of social and ideo- 
logical controversy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, sociological 
surveys indicated that youth attending the state secular system were 
both ignorant of and insufficiently attached to "traditional Jewish 
values," which included a sense of kinship with Diaspora Jewry. 
A Jewish Consciousness Program was then hastily implemented, 
but results were considered mixed. Most observers of Israeli edu- 
cation believed that the events of the June 1967 War, and the sub- 
sequent trauma of the October 1973 War, from which followed 
the increasing political isolation of Israel, did more than any cur- 
riculum to reinstill a sense of Jewish national identity in Israeli 
youth. 

Meanwhile, in the 1960s the state religious system, particularly 
at the high school level, underwent its own transformation, which 
many analysts considered to have had far-reaching effects on Israeli 
society. The state religious system has always included a high 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



proportion of Oriental students from traditional homes. Middle 
class Ashkenazim began to complain of the "leveling effects" the 
Orientals were having, and more specifically of the teachers (who 
were accused of not being pious enough) and the curriculum (criti- 
cized for giving insufficient attention to the study of the Talmud). 

In response to this dissatisfaction, activists from the youth or- 
ganization of the National Religious Party, the Bene Akiva (Sons 
of Rabbi Akiva), in the 1960s fashioned an alternative religious 
high school system, in which academic and religious standards were 
much higher than in the usual state religious high school. This 
alternative form soon attracted many middle class, Ashkenazi youth 
from the older state religious high schools. In addition to having 
a more rigorous academic curriculum, the new system was also 
strongly ultranationalistic, as reflected in the form known as the 
yeshiva hesder, which combined the traditional values of the Euro- 
pean talmudic academy with a commitment, on the part of its stu- 
dents, to serve in the IDF. These institutions have turned out a 
generation of self-assured religious youth who are not apologetic 
about their piety — something they accused their elders of being. 
Israelis referred to them as the "knitted skullcap generation," after 
their characteristic headgear (as distinguished from the solid black 
cloth or silk skullcaps of the ultra-Orthodox). Over the years, they 
have been more aggressive than their elders in trying to extend 
Orthodox Judaism's political influence in the society at large as 
well as within the territorial boundaries of the Jewish state. Many 
of these graduates have been instrumental in shaping the New 
Zionism. 

Arab education in Israel followed the same pattern as Jewish edu- 
cation, with students learning about Jewish history, heroes, and 
the like, but education is in Arabic. Arab education in East Jerusa- 
lem and the West Bank followed the Jordanian curriculm and stu- 
dents sat for Jordanian examinations; the textbooks used, however, 
had to be approved by Israeli authorities. After the outbreak of 
the intifadah (uprising) in December 1987, frequent school closings 
occurred so that students attended school only infrequently (see 
The Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- , ch. 5). 

Higher Education 

In the late 1980s, seven universities existed in Israel: the Tech- 
nion (Israel Institute for Technology, founded in 1912); the Hebrew 
University (1925); Tel Aviv University (begun in 1935, function- 
ing fully since 1956); Bar-Ilan University (1955); Haifa University 
(1963); Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (1965); and the 
postgraduate Weizmann Institute of Technology (1934). Higher 



133 



Israel: A Country Study 

education in Israel has grown tremendously since independence: 
in the 1948-49 academic year a total of 1,635 students attended 
degree-granting institutions, whereas in 1986-87 the figure was 
67,160. In terms of enrollments, the largest institution was Tel Aviv 
University (19,400 students in 1986-87), followed by Hebrew 
University (16,870), Bar-Ilan (9,480), the Technion (9,090), Haifa 
(6,550), Ben-Gurion University (5,200), and the Weizmann In- 
stitute (570). 

Israeli universities have not been isolated from the larger 
problems of society. High inflation and budget cutbacks have hit 
them severely since the late 1970s; many observers have expressed 
fear of a potential "brain-drain" as talented academics, unable 
to find suitable employment in Israel, emigrate. There have been 
repeated calls to increase the number of Israelis of Oriental back- 
ground in colleges and universities, at the same time that charges 
of "compromised standards" have been advanced. The univer- 
sity campuses have also been centers of political activity among 
all shades of the political spectrum in Israel, including Arab 
students. 

Youth Movements and Organizations 

During the Yishuv period and in the early 1950s, youth move- 
ments associated with political parties were important institutions 
of political education and socialization. Affiliated branches even 
existed in the European and American diasporas. They were train- 
ing grounds for future members, and especially for the future elite, 
of the parties. Each party of any size had one: Mapam (the origi- 
nal Labor-oriented youth movement was HaShomer HaTzair — 
see Appendix B), Herut (Betar — see Appendix B), National Reli- 
gious Party (Bene Akiva), as well as the Histadrut and other or- 
ganizations. The fate of these youth movements over the years has 
reflected the broader changes that have occurred in Israeli soci- 
ety. The relatively apolitical and nonideological Boy Scout organi- 
zation has grown; left-of-center movements have not. The Bene 
Akiva, on the other hand, has also grown, more than threefold since 
1960. In the late 1980s, it enrolled more than 30,000 Israeli reli- 
gious youths, who make up a large part of the "knitted skullcaps." 
The Bene Akiva has acted as a training ground for many of the 
young extremist and right-wing Orthodox political activists who 
have gained prominence since the June 1967 War. 

Health 

In part as a legacy of the socialist thrusts of Labor Zionism, 
Israelis enjoy a widely available health care system. The major 



134 




Housing built in the 1950s and 1960s for immigrants 

Courtesy Les Vogel 
Geometric designs characterize housing 
in Ramot Allon, East Jerusalem 



135 



Israel: A Country Study 

complaints of the population have focused on the heavy bureaucrati- 
zation of health care. In general, the health of the population com- 
pares favorably with West European standards, and the decrease 
in rates of infectious diseases has been very marked. The highest 
incidences of disease in 1986 were bacillary dysentery, 162 per 
100,000, and viral hepatitis, 75 per 100,000. There were report- 
edly forty-three cases in Israel of acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome, or AIDS, by the end of September 1987. 

In both Arab and Jewish populations, control of sanitation also 
has improved markedly since the the mid-1950s. Still, health care 
delivery has been better developed for the Jewish sector than for 
the Arab sector. In 1985 the life expectancy of Jewish men and 
women was 73.9 and 77.3 years, respectively; for non-Jews the 
figures were 72.0 (men) and 75.8 (women). Among Jews, in 1986 
the live birth rate per 1,000 was 21.2, the death rate 7.5. Among 
Muslims the live birth rate per 1,000 was 33.8, the death rate 3.4. 
The average number of children a woman may have during her 
lifetime was 2.83 for Jews and 4.63 for Muslims. The infant mor- 
tality rate was 9.6 for Jews and 18.0 for Muslims (see table 4, 
Appendix A). 

The Ministry of Health, the principal public health agency in 
the country, functioned as the supreme body for licensing medi- 
cal, dental, nursing, pharmaceutical, and paramedical professions, 
as well as for implementing all health- related legislation passed by 
the Knesset. It also functioned when no other nongovernmental 
agency was present. This fact was important in Israel because in 
1985-86 the sick funds contributed almost 45 percent of the na- 
tional expenditure on health; in comparison, the government con- 
tributed only some 22 percent. Kupat Holim, the largest sick fund, 
was affiliated with the Histadrut and was supported by almost two- 
thirds of the Histadrut' s membership dues. As the largest medical 
insurance carrier in Israel, the Histadrut fund covered about 70 
percent of the population (Arabs included). Another 20 percent 
was covered by the sick funds of other organizations, which 
means that in general the Israeli population was well protected 
by health care coverage. Further evidence of the availability of 
health care was the ratio of physicians to the general population; 
in the 1970s it was more than 1 to 400, one of the highest in the 
world. 

Welfare 

The Ministry of Social Welfare began its work in June 1948, 
carrying on the mission of the Social Welfare Department estab- 
lished in 1931 under the Mandate. The National Insurance Act 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



of 1953 and the Social Welfare Service Law, passed by the Knes- 
set in 1958, authorized a broad range of welfare programs, including 
old age and survivors' pensions, maternity insurance, workers' com- 
pensation provisions, and special allowances for large families. 
Retirement age was seventy for men and sixty-five for women, but 
persons were eligible for some benefits five years before retirement 
age. The Histadrut was also a principal provider of pensions and 
a supplier of insurance. In addition, there were a number of volun- 
tary agencies, many funded by Diaspora Jewry, that contributed 
significantly to the social welfare of Israelis. 

Special subventionary programs, including low-interest loans, 
subsidized housing, and rent or mortgage relief, were available to 
new immigrants after 1967 through the Ministry of Immigrant 
Absorption and the World Zionist Organization. At times these 
programs have been criticized by native-born Israelis or long-time 
settlers in the lower income brackets, especially for benefiting rela- 
tively well-to-do immigrants from the West. Even more controver- 
sial have been benefit programs designed to aid returning Israeli 
emigrants readjust to life in Israel. 

* * * 

Of the numerous books on Israeli society, Michael Wolffsohn's 
Israel, Polity, Society and Economy, 1882-1986 is a veritable compen- 
dium of demographic information and social indicators. Israel: Build- 
ing a New Society, by Daniel Elazar is lucidly written and closely 
argued. Sammy Smooha's Israel: Pluralism and Conflict explains the 
major social rifts discussed in this chapter and contains useful 
statistical information in detailed appendices. More concise, and 
focused upon the post-Begin era, is Peter Grose's A Changing Israel. 
For two views of Israel by Israelis, see Amos Elon's The Israelis: 
Founders and Sons and Amos Oz's In the Land of Israel. Finally, the 
Political Dictionary of the State of Israel, edited by Susan Hattis Rolef, 
contains many valuable entries on aspects of Israeli society and 
politics. 

On religion in Israel, the most comprehensive treatment remains 
S.Z. Abramov's Perpetual Dilemma: Jewish Religion in the Jewish State. 
More analytical is Religion and Politics in Israel by Charles S. Lieb- 
man and Eliezer Don-Yehiya. Their civil religion thesis is deve- 
loped at greater length in Civil Religion in Israel. Also recommended 
is an article by Shlomo Deshen, "Israeli Judaism: Introduction 
to the Major Patterns," in the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. 



137 



Israel: A Country Study 

On the waves of Oriental immigration and the settlement of 
Oriental Jews, see Nation- Building and Community in Israel by Dorothy 
Willner. A series of anthropological studies covers this period 
especially well. These include Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers, by 
Harvey Goldberg; Immigrants from India in Israel, by Gilbert Kush- 
ner; and The Dual Heritage: Immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in 
an Israeli Village, by Moshe Shokeid. Myron J. Aronoff s Frontier- 
town: The Politics of Community Building in Israel is a study of a de- 
velopment town in the same period. Also recommended is The 
Predicament of Homecoming, by Shlomo Deshen and Moshe Shokeid. 
The best book on Oriental ethnicity is the collection edited by Alex 
Weingrod, Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. On more 
recent immigration, see American Immigrants in Israel: Social Identi- 
ties and Change, by Kevin Avruch; for a comparison of American 
with Soviet immigrants, see Zvi Gitelman's Becoming Israelis: Polit- 
ical Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants. 

A critical study of Israeli education in a development town may 
be found in Power, Poverty, and Education by Arnold Lewis. The classic 
study of a kibbutz is Melford E. Spiro's Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia. 
On Israeli Arabs, the most comprehensive and balanced study is 
Ian Lustick's Arabs in the Jewish State, although events in late 1987 
and early 1988 have overtaken its main theme, the explanation 
of Israeli Arab political quiescence. On the Druzes, see Gabriel 
Ben-Dor's The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study. On West Bank 
Arabs, the collection Palestinian Society and Politics, edited by Joel S. 
Migdal, is recommended, as is Meron Benvenisti's continuing West 
Bank Data Project. The Journal of Palestine Studies is an important 
resource as well, containing useful articles such as that by Elia 
Zureik. 

The Israel Pocket Library, which contains material originally 
published in the Encyclopedia Judaica, has several books in the series 
that address aspects of Israeli society. These include Society, Reli- 
gious Life, Jewish Values, and Education and Science. The material in 
these books is now dated but still valuable for the period before 
the October 1973 War. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



138 



A woman with a hat typical of headgear worn by kibbutz members 



SINCE THE FOUNDING of Israel in 1948, the Israeli economy 
has experienced two distinct periods: one spanning the years 1948 
through 1972, and another stretching from 1973 to 1988. The three 
prominent features of the Israeli economy during the first period 
were the ingathering of the exiles (resulting in a very high rate of 
population growth), considerable importing of capital, and rapid 
growth of total and per capita gross national product (GNP — see 
Glossary). During this period, the Israeli economy grew at a very 
rapid rate, averaging an annual GNP increase of 10.4 percent an- 
nually. 

Between 1973 and 1986, by contrast, GNP growth declined to 
about 2 percent per annum, with no increase in per capita output. 
At the same time, the rate of inflation — which from 1948 through 
1972 was in single digits — increased to a high of 445 percent in 
1984. In 1975, 1983, and 1984, the Israeli economy came close 
to exhausting its potential sources of short-term financing to cover 
its balance of payments deficits. 

In July 1985, the government instituted an emergency program 
to interrupt the hyperinflation that was threatening the survival 
of the economy. By the end of 1985, the rate of inflation had been 
reduced to 20 percent. Even more remarkable was the elimination 
of the government's budget deficit in fiscal year (FY — see Glos- 
sary) 1985. At the beginning of FY 1986, the budget deficit re- 
mained close to zero. The emergency program ended fourteen years 
of steadily worsening inflation and devaluations and reversed years 
of government overspending. The relative stability the program 
achieved was seen as the necessary precondition to an assault on 
the underlying structural shortcomings responsible for the slow 
growth of the economy since 1973. 

Overview of the 1948-72 Period 

The years immediately following the state's creation in 1948 were 
difficult for the Israeli economy. The new state possessed no natural 
or financial resources, no monetary reserves, little economic infra- 
structure, and few public services. A sizable portion of the exist- 
ing Arab population fled the new state, while impoverished and 
afflicted Jewish refugees poured in from the European displaced 
persons camps and, later, from the Arab countries. In contrast to 
the 1930s, when Jewish immigrants to the Yishuv (or prestate Israel) 



141 



Israel: A Country Study 

had arrived with ample financial and human capital, after 1948 
most immigrants lacked the wealth and skills needed by the new 
state . 

The new state had to supply food, clothing, shelter, and employ- 
ment for its new citizens; set up civil and community services; and 
establish an independent foreign exchange, monetary, and fiscal 
system. Given the shortage of private capital, the burden of deal- 
ing with these problems naturally fell upon the public sector. The 
financial capital needed to deal with the influx of immigrants was 
drawn either from the high level of domestic savings, or from cap- 
ital imports (such as foreign loans and grants), or foreign private 
sector investments (such as Israeli bonds). The government's so- 
lution to the capital shortage included an austerity program of strin- 
gent price controls and rationing. The government also decided 
to promote investment projects in agriculture and housing through 
the use of public funds rather than through private capital mar- 
kets. The public sector thus gained control over a large part of 
Israel's investment resources and hence over the country's future 
economic activity. 

The result of this long-term state intervention was the develop- 
ment of a quasi-socialist economy, which, in terms of ownership, 
was divided into three sectors: private, public, and Histadrut 
(see Glossary), the abbreviation of HaHistadrut HaKlalit Shel 
HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael (General Federation of Laborers in the 
Land of Israel). The Histadrut, the umbrella organization of trade 
unions, quickly became one of the most powerful institutions in 
Israel. Although Histadrut-owned enterprises generally behaved 
like privately owned firms, the collective nature of the labor 
organization precluded the timely demise of economically ineffi- 
cient enterprises. Public sector firms were owned by local authori- 
ties and quasi- governmental bodies such as the Jewish Agency (see 
Glossary). As in the case of the Histadrut-run corporations, criteria 
other than profit maximization dominated the economic operation 
of these firms. 

The Israeli service sector, therefore, became totally dominated 
by the government and the Histadrut. Histadrut-affiliated cooper- 
atives achieved a near monopoly in such areas as public transport 
and the production and marketing of many agricultural products. 
The Jewish Agency acquired Israel's two major banks, which 
together made up 70 percent of the banking system; and the two 
largest insurance companies were (and in 1988 continued to be) 
owned by the Histadrut (see Financial Services, this ch.). 

The importance of the government and the Histadrut was not 
limited to the service sector. They became increasingly involved 



142 



The Economy 



in the industrial sector as well. Whereas the percentage of plants 
owned by the public and Histadrut sectors in 1972 was less than 
2.5 percent, their share of total industrial employment was 27 per- 
cent. Similarly their share of total industrial output in 1972 was 
34 percent. This situation continued until 1988, when discussions 
were initiated to decrease government control of business activity. 

The major factor accounting for the increased role in industry 
of the public and Histadrut sectors was the development of Israel's 
defense industry. After the June 1967 War and the French arms 
embargo that followed, the Israeli government decided to build as 
many domestic weapons systems as it could. In the 1980s, compa- 
nies such as Israel Aircraft Industries and Israel Military Indus- 
tries continued to be state owned and among the largest firms in 
the country. The Histadrut-owned Tadiran Electronic Industries 
became a major defense contractor and the state's largest electronics 
firm. Similarly, the government-owned Israel Chemicals Limited 
and its subsidiaries held the sole rights to mine potash, bromine, 
and other raw materials in the Dead Sea area. The oil refineries, 
as well as the retail gas distributors, were also mostly government 
owned. 

Economic Growth and Structural Change 

Between 1948 and 1972, Israel's GNP rose by more than 10 per- 
cent per annum on average. Thereafter, Israel's growth rate slowed 
to an annual average of 2 percent. Not only was Israel's economic 
growth rate much lower after 1972, it was also far less stable. The 
reasons most often cited for this slowdown include a sharp increase 
in defense spending, the 1982-83 energy crisis, and increased ex- 
penditures on social welfare. 

A breakdown of Israel's GNP into categories of consumption, 
investment, government expenditures, and net exports for the years 
1960 through 1986, highlights some of the difficulties experienced 
by a small, open economy burdened with a massive defense ex- 
penditure. During this period, Israel experienced chronic current 
account deficits and increased government expenditures. The trade 
deficit, which accounted for an average of 20 percent of annual 
GNP from 1960 through 1964, reached a high of 35 percent in 1973. 
It declined to 16 percent in 1986, however, primarily because the 
real value of exports increased while the real value of imports re- 
mained unchanged. 

Until the June 1967 War, defense spending ranged from 10 to 
16 percent of GNP. Between 1970 and 1982, however, defense 
spending escalated to over 25 percent of GNP — a high ratio, even 
for the volatile Middle East. A significant share of defense spending 



143 



Israel: A Country Study 

originated from military imports. In the aftermath of the October 
1973 War, military imports equaled 17 percent of GNP. About 
one-quarter to one-third of this defense expenditure was paid for 
by United States aid. After 1984 the increase in United States aid 
reduced the defense burden in Israel virtually to pre- 1967 levels. 
In 1986, the defense burden declined to 10 percent of GNP. 

The sharp upturn in world oil prices in 1973 increased the cost 
of oil imports by more than 3 percent of GNP in that year. The 
oil price increases of 1979, which occurred at about the same time 
as the return to Egypt of the Sinai oil fields, are estimated to have 
had an even more devastating effect on the Israeli economy. The 
total direct losses to the Israeli economy caused by the increase in 
energy prices from 1973 to 1982 have been estimated at US$12 
billion — the equivalent of one year's GNP. 

In addition to these external shocks, the economy had to accom- 
modate substantial increases in spending on domestic welfare pro- 
grams in the early 1970s. In response to domestic social unrest, 
the government introduced large-scale social programs to improve 
education, housing, and welfare assistance for the urban poor. 
These programs were designed before 1973, but were implemented 
after the economy had begun to stagnate. 

Slowdown of Economic Growth 

The economy's behavior during the 1961-72 and 1973-88 periods 
was starkly different. The growth of capital stock declined modestly 
from an 8.9 percent annual increase during the first period to a 
6 percent annual increase during the second period. A major decline 
occurred, however, in gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary). From a 9.7 percent annual growth rate in the first period, 
GDP fell to a 3.4 percent annual growth rate in the second period. 
Furthermore, labor inputs (measured either as employed persons 
or total hours of work) declined from the first to the second period. 
The annual increase in employed persons from 1961 through 1972 
averaged 3.6 percent; employed persons increased only 1.5 per- 
cent annually from 1973 through 1981. Similarly, total hours 
worked increased by an annual rate of 3.9 percent during the first 
period as compared to 1 percent during the second period. If the 
growth of the economy is measured as GDP per employed person, 
then Israeli performance declined from 6.1 percent to 1.9 percent 
over the two periods. If GDP per hour of work is used, Israel's 
performance declined from 5.8 percent to 2.4 percent. Finally, if 
GDP growth is measured per unit of capital, it declined from 0.8 
percent a year between 1961 and 1972 to -2.6 percent a year from 
1973 through 1981. 



144 



View of the National Water Carrier 
that brings water from the north to foster agriculture in the Negev 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 

Until 1973 the rise in labor and capital productivity was the major 
growth- generating ingredient in the Israeli economy, accounting 
for about 43 percent of total output growth and for 72 percent of 
the increase in output per worker hour. By contrast, beginning in 
1973, increases in capital stock accounted for 64.7 percent of total 
growth. The contribution of labor and capital productivity to total 
output declined to 18 percent, and its contribution to the increase 
in output per worker hour declined to 25 percent. Between 1961 
and 1981 , the relative contributions of capital per unit of labor and 
of total labor and capital productivity to the increase in labor produc- 
tivity were reversed. In large part, this reversal explains the slow- 
down in Israel's growth after 1972. 

Three factors apparently led to a decline in the growth of busi- 
ness sector employment from 1973 through 1981. First, the growth 
rate of new people entering the labor force dropped, primarily be- 
cause net immigration declined from an annual increase of 3.8 per- 
cent in the 1961-72 period to 2.5 percent in the 1973-81 period. 
Second, because of the increase in the income tax rate at higher 
levels of income, the average rate of labor force participation among 
men declined from 73.6 to 64.9 percent, while the rate for women 
increased from 29.2 to 33.4 percent. Fewer families found it worth- 
while for the husbands to work at higher-taxed, high-paying jobs; 



145 



Israel: A Country Study 

instead, the wives worked at lower-paying, lower-taxed jobs. Finally, 
the influx of Arab employees from the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip declined in the 1973-81 period. In all, the share of business 
sector employment relative to the whole economy declined from 
77.2 percent in the 1961-72 period to 73.6 percent in the 1973-81 
period. 

By 1988 the potential sources of large-scale net immigration had 
almost run dry. Since 1979 (as of 1988, 1979 was the last year during 
which the Soviet Union had permitted large numbers of Soviet Jews 
to leave) the rate of net immigration had been low; during several 
years, it had been surpassed by emigration. In 1987 immigration 
increased slightly, although this addition to the labor pool was in- 
sufficient to increase Israel's growth rate. The immigration of 
Oriental Jews had also decreased significantly by the 1980s. Given 
the low probability of sizable immigration from the United States 
or the Soviet Union, observers concluded that a return to the rapid 
economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s depended on Israel's ability 
to substitute alternative sources of sustained growth. Possibilities 
in this area were the new, science-based and high technology in- 
dustries. 

Changes in Investment Patterns 

Gross investment reached an exceptionally high level of 30 per- 
cent of GNP in the period ending in the early 1970s, but subse- 
quently dropped to 20 percent of GNP in 1986. While this figure 
is substantially lower than that achieved by earlier Israeli perfor- 
mance, it is internationally an acceptable standard of investment 
and private savings. 

Nonetheless, concern existed in Israel about the extent of public- 
sector debt. Since 1973 the government has incurred a substantial 
domestic and foreign debt that has resulted in a significant reduc- 
tion in the proportion of private savings available for investment. 
From 1970 through 1983, private savings averaged slightly above 
10 percent of GNP. The success of the Economic Stabilization Pro- 
gram adopted in July 1985 in order to cut back on government 
spending led to an increase in private saving, however; by 1986, 
private savings stood at 21 percent of GNP. 

Unlike the unstable trend in private savings recorded in the bank- 
ing sector, investment in housing has taken a consistendy high share 
of GNP, hitting a 40 percent peak in 1980. This high level of in- 
vestment in housing, which many economists argue is not justi- 
fied economically, further constrained the rise of gross business 
investment. For example, despite the rise of the share in GNP of 
gross investment in manufacturing during the 1970s, Israel's 



146 



The Economy 



1982-86 average share of 4 percent clearly is below international 
norms. 

The lack of uniformity in government investment incentives and 
in the rate of return on capital within the manufacturing sector 
may be responsible for the mix of Israeli investments. Economists 
generally agree that inefficiencies have arisen as a result of exces- 
sive substitution of capital for labor, underused capacity, and in- 
appropriate project selection. Government policy has been identified 
as the primary factor causing capital market inefficiencies by crowd- 
ing out business investment, creating excessively high average in- 
vestment subsidies, and introducing capital market controls based 
on inefficient discretionary policy. 

The 1967 Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment 
provided for the following incentives to "approved-type" enter- 
prises: cash grants, unlinked long-term loans at 6.5 percent interest, 
and reduced taxes. The Treasury assumed full responsibility for 
any discrepancy between the linked rates paid to savers and the 
unlinked rates charged to investors. Because inflation in the 
mid-1970s reached levels close to 40 percent, the real interest rate 
paid on long-term loans was close to -30 percent per annum, with 
a total subsidy on long-term loans reaching a high of 35 percent 
in 1977. These extremely favorable interest rates and implied sub- 
sidies led to an excessive substitution of capital for labor. 

The investment system has been characterized by the following 
factors: private firms generally are not allowed to issue bonds, the 
government establishes the real interest paid to savers and the nomi- 
nal interest paid by investors, and the economy is plagued by high 
and unpredictable rates of inflation. These conditions have main- 
tained an excess demand for investment. The result has been a con- 
tinuous need to ration loans — and an implicit role for government 
discretion in project approval. Thus, since the late 1960s, as a result 
of capital market controls, the government has been making in- 
dustrial policy. 

Changes in Industrial Structure 

The industrial structure of the economy can be seen in terms 
of the allocation of GDP, employment, and foreign capital among 
the tradable, nontradable, semitradable, and service sectors. The 
tradable sector includes agriculture, manufacturing, and transpor- 
tation; nontradables include public services and construction; and 
semitradables include business and financial services, commerce, 
tourism, and personal services. Public services include the activi- 
ties of government, national institutions, and local authorities; 



147 



Israel: A Country Study 

education, research, and scientific organizations; health, religious, 
political, and trade-union groups; and defense. 

Up to 1981, the economy allocated approximately 40 percent 
of its GDP to the tradable sector and about 33 to 35 percent to 
the nontradable sector. This distribution was mirrored in the allo- 
cation of civilian employment across the two sectors. The size of 
the public service sector in 1981 was 21 percent of GDP and 28 
percent of civilian employment. Some economists argue that this 
latter figure is very high relative to the international norms for a 
developing country. It is not high, however, when compared to 
developed socialist countries in Europe. Some economists also argue 
that Israel's high level of nontradables can be explained by the high 
level of capital inflows from abroad, by a high demand for public 
services and construction as a result of immigration, and by defense 
needs. 

From 1955 through 1972, the real output of tradables increased 
relative to that of nontradables. Most of this increase was attributa- 
ble to the importance of physical capital in the form of machinery 
and increased productivity. After 1972 the importance of machinery 
declined, while that of labor increased. Educated workers were being 
absorbed into the public and financial services; simultaneously, 
manufacturing productivity was declining. Increased demand 
favored nontradables, and the share of tradables in both employ- 
ment and output further declined. The overriding factor remained 
the rapid increase in the educated labor force. 

Changes in Labor Force 

In the 1950s and 1960s, through a state effort to absorb the large 
number of immigrant children into the public school system, the 
government assured itself of a future supply of educated workers. 
The demand for more educated workers was provided by the rapid 
expansion of public services, which are inherently human-capital 
intensive. Growth in public services resulted from the rapid and 
sustained economic growth that lasted until the early 1970s, and 
from the high rate of population growth. 

In the 1970s, the education level of the labor force continued 
to rise markedly. Unlike the experience of other Western econo- 
mies, the increased supply of educated workers in Israel did not, 
on average, depress the relative wage level of those with more 
schooling; nor did it markedly worsen the employment condition 
of more educated workers as compared with workers with a secon- 
dary education. The continued increase in demand for education- 
intensive services and for more sophisticated goods and services 
generally have so far precluded the negative effects experienced 



148 



self-propelled irrigation machine in operation in the Negev Desert 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 
Growing tomatoes under plastic 
near the Sea of Galilee 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 



149 



Israel: A Country Study 

in other countries. The widespread high level of human capital is 
expected to continue into the twenty-first century as long as in- 
vestment in education continues to be profitable. 

The Public Sector 

The two most important tools of economic policy in Israel have 
been the budget and foreign exchange control. Through the budget, 
the government can deal with all financial activities of the public 
sector. Defined in its broadest terms, the public sector includes the 
central government, local authorities, and national institutions 
(where the central government clearly dominates). In 1986 govern- 
ment and private nonprofit institutions represented about 20 
percent of GDP, which was about a 20 percent increase over 
the public sector's importance in 1968. Similarly, the provision of 
government-owned housing and rental services increased by 28 per- 
cent, rising from 8.4 percent of GDP in 1968 to 1 1 percent in 1986. 
Overall, in 1986 the business sector represented 69 percent of GDP, 
whereas the public sector, in all of its dimensions, represented 31 
percent of GDP. 

Government Budget 

By 1988 the government had been operating under a deficit for 
more than a decade. Between 1982 and 1984, the deficit equaled 
between 12 and 15 percent of GNP. After the implementation of 
the July 1985 Economic Stabilization Program, the government 
succeeded in balancing its budget (see The Economic Stabiliza- 
tion Program of July 1985, this ch.). This balance was achieved 
not only because the government raised taxes and reduced spend- 
ing, but also because the reduced inflation increased the real value 
of tax revenues. During FY 1986, the expansion of the economy 
compensated for the reduction in direct and indirect taxes. The 
government also initiated plans to reduce further its public debt 
(see table 5; table 6, Appendix A). 

Before the July 1985 reforms, the tax system was considered to 
be very progressive on individual income but barely touched cor- 
porate income. After the reforms, which included a new corporate 
tax law, large sums of taxes were collected from business sectors 
that previously had been untaxed. Personal income tax ranged from 
a base rate of 20 percent (payable on incomes equivalent to about 
US$500 per month) to a top rate of 60 percent on a monthly income 
of about US$2, 100.- Corporate income tax generally was 45 per- 
cent. Few corporations, however, actually paid this rate once var- 
ious government subsidies were included in the calculation. 



150 



Moshav Margalit in Galilee 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 

Provision of Civilian Services 

Civilian public services have employed a high proportion of the 
labor force and consequently have absorbed a high share of Israel's 
GNP. Spending on health, education, and welfare services rose 
from 17 percent of GNP in 1968 to 20 percent in the early 1970s. 
The level of spending on civilian public services remained constant 
at about 20 percent through 1986. The share of the total civilian 
labor force employed in civilian public services rose from 22 per- 
cent in 1968 to 30 percent in 1986. 

The civilian services primarily responsible for these high out- 
lays were education and health services, whose share increased from 
50 percent of the total in 1969 to more than 60 percent in 1986. 
At the other end of the scale were economic and general services, 
whose expenditures declined from 33 percent of the total in 1969 
to 23 percent in 1986. The share of other welfare services (includ- 
ing immigrant absorption services) remained constant. The decline 
of general and economic services reflected a transfer of some of 
these functions from the public sector to the business community 
and a decline in direct government intervention in the economy. 

Unlike social welfare and economic services, which were directly 
funded by the government, until the early 1970s education and 
health services received substantial funding from foreign sources. 



151 



Israel: A Country Study 

In 1968, for example, the government financed only 70.5 percent 
of Israel's education services. By 1978 the government's share had 
increased to 84.5 percent. Whereas in 1968 the Jewish Agency 
financed about 20 percent of the total national expenditure on edu- 
cation from foreign aid funds, by 1978 only 7.6 percent came from 
foreign aid, and this percentage has decreased further since. The 
result was an added burden on the taxpayer, equal to approximately 
22 percent of the national expenditure on education. Direct pri- 
vate financing of education expenditures contracted from 9.5 
percent of the total in FY 1968 to 1.7 percent in FY 1978. The 
key element explaining this latter drop was the institution of free, 
compulsory secondary education in the late 1970s. 

Health services' funding followed a similar pattern. The govern- 
ment's share rose from 53 percent in 1968 to 62 percent in 1980. 
Here, however, the Jewish Agency's participation decreased even 
more sharply, from 20 percent of the total national expenditure 
on health in 1968 to nearly zero in 1980. The added burden of 
government financing from internal sources over the decade was 
almost 30 percent. 

In both health and education, the trend illustrated a transition 
from foreign financing to internal resources and a switch from direct 
private financing (and independent fundraising by nonprofit 
institutions) to the imposition of a greater burden on the central 
fiscal system. In the past, when these services were expanded, the 
cost often was carried by aid from abroad. As this source began 
to dwindle, the cost increasingly shifted to the government, which 
for political reasons could not reduce these public civil expenditures. 

Provision of Defense Services 

Throughout its existence, Israel has been obliged to devote a con- 
siderable part of its resources to national defense. Since 1973, 
Israel's annual defense expenditure has equaled that of the Nether- 
lands and exceeded that of Sweden. In per capita terms, Israel's 
expenditure has been two to three times as large as theirs. Defense 
expenditures in the Netherlands and Sweden each amounted to 
3 to 4 percent of GNP in FY 1976; in Israel, they amounted to 
more than 25 percent of GNP. The persistence of a high defense 
expenditure over a very long period makes Israel's situation unique. 

The simplest definition of the defense burden is the total bud- 
geted resources diverted to defense and thus precluded from other 
uses by citizens. Other resource costs include the opportunity cost 
of labor working for the defense sector and therefore unavailable 
to other sectors, thus reducing civilian output. Finally, foreign cur- 
rency spent on military imports is unavailable for civilian imports. 



152 



The Economy 



Although estimates of the defense burden suffer from inadequate 
data, the Central Bureau of Statistics publishes data on the non- 
civilian component of public consumption, which is used as a proxy 
for defense expenditures. Apart from the war years of 1967 and 
1973, the annual fluctuations have been dominated by long-term 
changes in defense costs (commonly referred to as "ratchets" or 
step functions). By 1986 defense expenditure had declined to a range 
from 10 to 16 percent of GNP, depending on the measure used. 

These official data do not include information on forfeited earn- 
ings of conscripted soldiers, forfeited earnings of persons on reserve 
duty, and costs of casualties, stockpiling, civil defense, land devoted 
for army training, and many other government and civilian ex- 
penditures ascribed to defense. Although it is impossible to assign 
a rough order of magnitude to the items mentioned, some econ- 
omists have speculated that they are not insignificant components 
of the civilian public sector. This becomes clear when one considers 
that the length of time devoted to conscription, reserve duty, and 
regular army duty has been lengthened (see Conscription; Reserve 
Duty, ch. 5). Government defense functions involved in operations 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip add a further cost to the 
defense burden. 

The cost of defense also includes direct defense imports and mili- 
tary aid from the United States. In FY 1986, Israel received United 
States military aid in the range of US$3 billion. A large share of 
these funds has regularly been spent in the United States (see 
table 7, Appendix A). 

On the other side of the defense-burden equation are the benefi- 
cial by-products associated with military activity. The most im- 
portant benefits are education, absorption of immigrants, 
agricultural settlement, and the development and manufacture of 
weapons and equipment. An example of these beneficial by-products 
was the development of the Kfir interceptor, which created jobs 
for technicians and laborers (see Defense Industries, ch. 5). In short, 
when estimating Israel's defense burden it is important to consider 
the cost reductions implicit from these beneficial by-products. 

Taxation 

From 1961 to 1983, government expenditures grew far more 
rapidly than Israel's GNP, primarily because of the sharp increase 
in defense outlays from the latter half of the 1960s through the 1970s. 
Taxation was insufficient to finance the increase in government 
spending. Although gross taxes increased, net taxes declined con- 
tinuously during the period. To meet the deficit, the government 
resorted to domestic and foreign borrowing. 



153 



Israel: A Country Study 

By the mid-1970s, the government increasingly relied on for- 
eign sources to finance the domestic deficit. These growing debts 
were equivalent to almost 14 percent of each year's GNP, during 
a time when GNP was growing at less than 2 percent a year. 

In the second half of the 1970s, the tax system collected approx- 
imately 47 percent of GNP, compared with 35 percent in the 1960s 
and 41 percent in the first half of the 1970s. This rise occurred 
mainly in direct taxes and taxation of domestically produced goods, 
while taxes on imports declined by a small margin. During FY 1981 , 
direct taxes represented 25.7 percent of GNP; they were 14.3 per- 
cent of GNP in FY 1961. Taxes on domestic production represented 
12 percent of GNP in FY 1981, a decline from the FY 1961 high 
of 13.9 percent. The introduction of the value-added tax on both 
domestic and foreign goods added a tax base of 8.7 percent of GNP 
in FY 1981. 

In FY 1986, income taxes collected represented 33 percent of 
GNP. Value-added taxes represented 20 percent of GNP and cus- 
toms duties represented 4 percent of GNP. In late 1987, the govern- 
ment announced plans to revamp the tax structure in the light of 
the 1985 Economic Stabilization Program (see The Economic 
Stabilization Program of July 1985, this ch.). 

Industry 

The Histadrut directly owns or controls a significant portion of 
Israeli industry. The separation of industries among the public, 
private, and Histadrut sectors of the economy, however, is not a 
simple one. Many important enterprises are partners with either 
or both the Histadrut and the government. Most big industrial con- 
cerns, such as the Nesher cement and Shemen vegetable oil plants, 
are owned either solely by Histadrut (through its industrial con- 
glomerate, Koor Industries) or in partnership with private inves- 
tors. About 10 percent of FY 1985 industrial output was produced 
by joint ventures of the private and Histadrut sectors. 

In FY 1985, private-sector industrial ownership was as follows: 
electronics, 51 percent; textiles, 92 percent; clothing, 97 percent; 
machinery, 61 percent; food and tobacco, 60 percent; leather goods, 
80 percent; wood products, 72 percent; paper products, 81 per- 
cent; and printing and publishing, 86 percent. 

Manufacturing, particularly for export, has been a major com- 
ponent of GDP. In FY 1985, manufacturing contributed 23.4 per- 
cent of GDP. Industrial production grew at a rate of 3.6 percent 
in 1986, compared with 3 percent in 1984. Most of this growth 
has been in export products. For many years, export growth was 
led by the electronics and metallurgic industries, especially in the 



154 



The Economy 



field of military equipment. In the 1980s, exports from the textile, 
clothing and fashion industries expanded, as did exports of food 
products of various sorts. Following a slump in the 1980s, diamond 
exports made a strong recovery after 1985 (see table 8, Appendix A). 

Electronics 

In the 1980s, high- technology industries received the greatest 
attention from the government. Israeli electronics companies com- 
peted worldwide and in some cases were leaders in their fields. 
Israel's Scitex was a leading image-processing firm, Laser Indus- 
tries led in laser surgery, Elbit led in defense electronics, and Fibron- 
ics led in fiberoptic communication. In 1985 the electric and 
electronic equipment industry represented 4.5 percent of indus- 
trial establishments, 12 percent of industrial employment, and 
almost 13 percent of industrial revenues. 

Despite the success of the electronics industry in the 1980s, ex- 
perts predicted that in the 1990s this sector will face a shortage of 
engineers and technicians. A major reason for this shortage is the 
lower net pay for engineers in Israel relative to the United States. 
An identical 1985 gross salary of US$30,000 in Israel and in Califor- 
nia would generate a net income of US$9,000 in Israel and 
US$20,000 in California. Although the Israeli would consume a 
higher amount of social services than his or her counterpart in 
California, a wide gap would remain between the two salaries. As 
long as this gap exists, Israel will have difficulty keeping skilled 
engineers. 

Biotechnology 

Israel's biotechnology industry is relatively new and an offspring 
of its American counterpart. Its creation in the late 1960s resulted 
from the establishment in Israel of subsidiaries of foreign phar- 
maceutical companies. The first of these was a subsidiary formed 
by Miles Laboratories with the Weizmann Institute of Technology, 
called Miles- Yeda. This was followed by the Hebrew University- 
Weizmann Institute subsidiary, Ames-Yissum. Over time, these 
firms became wholly Israeli-owned entities. Gradually, foreign ven- 
ture capitalists began to initiate other independent biotechnology 
entities in Israel. As of the early 1980s, Israeli venture capitalists 
had begun creating their own science-based entities. 

Many economists call biotechnology a "natural" Israeli indus- 
try. Its primary input has been data from research and university 
laboratories. The only other major ingredient has been American 
capital to support research and development activity. The main 
areas of research in the mid-1980s included genetic engineering, 



155 



Israel: A Country Study 

human and animal diagnostics, agricultural biofertilization, and 
aquatic biotechnology. 

Diamonds 

Israel's diamond industry in the 1980s differed considerably from 
its 1950s' version. Until the early 1980s, a handful of large firms 
dominated the Israeli diamond industry. The nucleus consisted of 
European Jewish cutters who had immigrated during the Yishuv. 
In the 1970s, Israel surpassed Antwerp as the largest wholesale dia- 
mond center, accounting for more than 50 percent of all cut and 
polished gem diamonds. Diamonds were the only export in which 
Israel was more than a marginal supplier. 

Unlike other industries, the diamond industry was affected en- 
tirely by external factors not under Israeli control. The diamond 
industry imported rough diamonds, cut and polished them, and 
then exported them. The slump in the industry from 1980 through 
1982 surprised many Israeli firms that had speculative stockpiles. 
The result was a complete restructuring of the industry in FY 1984, 
and the creation of approximately 800 new and smaller manufac- 
turing units. These small entities in mid- 1986 concentrated exclu- 
sively on cutting, leaving the marketing to larger export firms. This 
latter task was supported by the 2,000-member Israel Diamond 
Exchange and the 300-member Israel Precious Stones and Dia- 
monds Exchange, together with the quasi-governmental Israel Dia- 
mond Institute. 

The success of this revitalization can be seen in the trade figures 
for the industry. In 1982 net diamond exports were US$905 mil- 
lion, equal to 18 percent of total exports; in 1986, however, dia- 
mond exports had grown to nearly US$1 .7 billion, or approximately 
24 percent of total exports. 

Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 

The chemical industry began in the early 1920s, when a small 
plant was started to extract potash and bromine from the Dead 
Sea. In the past, the chemical industry concentrated on the sale 
of raw materials, such as potash and phosphates, and their processed 
derivatives. In the early 1980s, the industry undertook a compre- 
hensive research and development program, which has substan- 
tially transformed it. Helping Israel to become one of the world's 
largest chemical-producing nations was the industry's development 
of new treatment processes for ceramics, glass, textiles, plastics, 
and wood. In 1986 the chemicals, rubber, and plastics industries 
together provided 15.6 percent of total industrial sales and engaged 
11 percent of the industrial labor force. 



156 



Western pilgrims on the Via Dolorosa 
in the Old City of Jerusalem pass a seller of bagels. 

Courtesy Les Vogel 

In the 1980s, Israel Chemicals Limited (ICL) — a government- 
owned corporation — was the largest chemical complex and also 
dominated Israel's mineral resources industry. Its subsidiaries 
included the Dead Sea Works, Dead Sea Bromine, and Negev Phos- 
phates. ICL also was parent to smaller research, desalination, 
telecommunications, shipping, and trucking firms. In addition, ICL 
owned Amsterdam Fertilizers in the Netherlands and Broomchemie, 
Guilin Chemie, and Stadiek Dunger in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany). 

In the plastics field, Kibbutz Industries Association — a mem- 
ber of the Histadrut — accounted for more than 60 percent of Israel's 
plastics output and more than 75 percent of plastics exports. Vir- 
tually all the successful plastics establishments were kibbutz owned. 

Clothing and Textiles 

During the mid-1950s, Israel, like other developing countries, 
promoted the textile and apparel industry to be a ready source of 
employment. By 1985 the textile and clothing industry was 
represented by 1,523 establishments. These businesses employed 
about 46,000 workers (representing 15 percent of industrial work- 
ers) and earned revenues equal to approximately US$13 million, 
or 8.8 percent of total industrial earnings. In 1988 Israel continued 



157 



Israel: A Country Study 

to promote this industry as a source of employment for unskilled 
and semiskilled immigrants and for local Israeli Arab labor. 

The textile and apparel industries were characterized by many 
small firms and a few large, vertically integrated companies (in- 
cluding Pol gat Enterprises, considered one of the most efficient 
producers in the world). Like other Israeli industries, the textile 
and apparel industry depended for its survival on its ability to ex- 
port to Europe and the United States. Given the generally high 
tariff barriers in Europe and the United States on such products, 
the agreement Israel signed with the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC) in 1977, the Israel-EEC Preferential Agreement, 
as well as the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement (as 
of 1987) have lowered and will lower further these tariffs, thus mak- 
ing Israeli textile and apparel products marginally competitive. Duty 
savings were not expected to play a major role in increasing Israel's 
trade competitiveness in these markets as long as Israeli wages in 
these industries were higher then comparable wages in Asia. Be- 
cause they pay higher wages, Israeli textile and apparel producers 
have continued to concentrate on the more expensive segment of 
the market. 

Construction 

In 1987 the construction industry came to a turning point. 
Whereas in the preceding five years, the construction industry was 
characterized by a decline in output of about 2 percent per year, 
in 1987 the output grew at about 8 percent and returned to its 1984 
level. The only subsectors where expanding business activity has 
led to increased demand for space have been electricity, transport, 
and communications. 

The shrinking of the construction sector beginning in the late 
1970s became much sharper in the 1980s. This contraction reflected 
not only an absolute decline in output but also a decline in produc- 
tivity (over the preceding thirteen years, total productivity had been 
falling by an average of 2 percent per year). The share of the con- 
struction sector in the overall business sector declined from 19 per- 
cent in 1972 to 9 percent in 1987. In 1988 the construction period 
required for residential housing was twice as long as for most in- 
dustrialized countries in Europe or for the United States. 

Tourism 

Tourism has always been an important source of foreign cur- 
rency for Israel. In 1984 this industry earned US$1.08 billion. The 
Israeli airlines earned an additional US$210 million in tourist- 
related business. In 1986, 929,631 tourists arrived by air and 18,252 



158 



The Economy 



arrived by sea. Another 17,563 tourists arrived from Jordan by 
land via the Allenby Bridge. Sixty percent of total 1986 tourists 
originated in Europe; an additional 20 percent originated in the 
United States. 

Although the 1986 figures are respectable, they represent a decline 
by 13 percent over the preceding three years. Moreover, the 1986 
figure for American tourists is 41 percent lower than comparable 
figures for the years 1983 through 1985. This decline in tourism 
to Israel in 1986 reflected a general decline in American tourism 
to the Middle East, which was caused by security considerations 
and by a weakening of the United States dollar against European 
currencies. 

Energy 

Israel depends almost totally on imported fuel for its energy re- 
quirements; domestic production of crude petroleum and natural 
gas is negligible. After the June 1967 War, Israel acquired a large 
portion of its oil supply from captured Egyptian fields in the Sinai 
Peninsula. In 1979 these fields were returned to Egypt. Explora- 
tion within Israel was continuing in the mid-1980s, with interest 
centered on the Dead Sea and northern Negev areas, as well as 
in the Helez region along the coastal plain near Ashqelon (see 
fig. 8). Despite having spent about US$250 million between 1975 
and 1985 searching for oil, Israel remained almost devoid of domes- 
tic energy sources. By 1986 domestic and foreign oil exploration 
in Israel ground to a near halt, although Occidental Petroleum 
(headed by Armand Hammer) continued its seismic studies in 
preparation for future drilling. 

Because of the failure to find economically worthwhile deposits 
of fossil fuels, Israel has devoted large sums to developing other 
energy sources, particularly solar energy. In fact, Israel has long 
been an acknowledged leader in this field. Overall, the structure 
of Israel's energy economy has changed considerably since 1973. 
Between 1982 and 1984, about 50 percent of Israel's electricity came 
from coal. By 1985 oil-to-coal conversion programs made coal the 
source of 17 percent of Israel's primary energy. It appeared un- 
likely in 1988 that a major improvement in Israel's energy balance 
would occur. 

The Arab oil embargo and the Iranian Islamic Revolution 
have forced Israel to diversify both its coal and oil imports. In 
1986 Israel's major sources of coal were Australia, South 
Africa, and Britain. The bulk of Israel's oil came from Mexico and 
Egypt. 



159 



Israel: A Country Study 





Fuels 


1 


Natural gas 


m 


Oil field 


ft 


Oil refinery 




• Oil pipeline 




— » Gas pipeline 




Crude oil storage 


MANUFACTURING 




Diamond cutting 




Heavy industry 




Light industry 




Textiles 


Q 


Food products 


g 


Chemicals 




Aircraft industry 




Nuclear research 




MINING 


® 


Potash 




Manganese 




Phosphate 



GAZA STRIP 

(Israeli occupied, 
status to ' 
determined) 



The Israeli proclamation 
that Jerusalem be the national 
capital is not recognized by the 
United States government. 



International 
boundary 

Populated place 

Armistice line, 
1949 

Armistice line, 
1950 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 8. Economic Activity, 1988 
160 



The Economy 



Agriculture 

Historically, agriculture has played a more important role in 
Israeli national life than its economic contribution would indicate. 
It has had a central place in Zionist ideology and has been a major 
factor in the settlement of the country and the absorption of new 
immigrants although its income-producing importance has been 
minimal. As the economy has developed, the importance of agricul- 
ture has declined even further. For example, by 1979 agricultural 
output accounted for just under 6 percent of GDP. In 1985 agricul- 
tural output accounted for 5.1 percent of GDP, whereas manufac- 
turing accounted for 23.4 percent. 

In 1981 , the year of the last agricultural census (as of 1988), there 
were 43,000 farm units with an overall average size of 13.5 hect- 
ares. Of these, 19.8 percent were smaller than 1 hectare, 75.7 per- 
cent were between 1 and 9 hectares, 3.3 percent were between 10 
and 49 hectares, 0.4 percent were between 50 and 190 hectares, 
and 0.8 percent were more than 200 hectares. Of the 380,000 hect- 
ares under cultivation in that year, 20.8 percent was under per- 
manent cultivation and 79.2 percent under rotating cultivation. 
The farm units also included a total of 160,000 hectares of land 
used for purposes other than cultivation. In general, land was di- 
vided as follows: forest, 5.7 percent; pasture, 40.2 percent; culti- 
vated, 21.5 percent, and desert and all other uses, 32.6 percent. 
Cultivation was based mainly in three zones: the northern coastal 
plains, the hills of the interior, and the upper Jordan Valley. 

Agricultural activities generally were conducted in cooperative 
settlements, which fell into two principal types: kibbutzim and 
moshavim (see Glossary). Kibbutzim often served strategic or defen- 
sive purposes in addition to purely agricultural functions. In the 
1980s, such settlements usually engaged in mixed farming and had 
some processing industry attached to them. A moshav provides its 
members with credit and other services, such as marketing and 
purchasing of seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and the like. By centraliz- 
ing some essential purchases, the moshavim were able to benefit 
from the advantages of size without having to adopt the kibbutz 
ideology (see Distinctive Social Institutions, ch. 2). 

The agricultural sector declined in importance from 1952 to 1985. 
This decline reflected the rapid development of manufacturing and 
services rather than a decrease of agricultural productivity. In fact, 
from 1966 through 1984, agriculture was far more productive than 
industry. 

Efficient use of the factors of production and the change in their 
relative composition explain a significant portion of the increased 



161 



Israel: A Country Study 

productivity in the agricultural sector. From 1955 to 1983, the 
agricultural sector cut back on employed persons and increased the 
use of water, fertilizer, and pesticides, leading to a substantial in- 
crease in productivity. Other factors that contributed to increased 
productivity included research, training, improved crop varieties, 
and better organization. These changes in factor utilization led to 
a twelvefold increase in the value of agricultural production, cal- 
culated in constant prices, between 1950 and 1983. 

In absolute terms, the amount of cultivated land increased from 
250,000 hectares in FY 1950 to 440,000 hectares in FY 1984. Of 
this total, the percentage of irrigated land increased from 15 per- 
cent in FY 1950 (37,500 hectares) to around 54 percent in FY 1984 
(237,000 hectares). The amount of water used for agricultural pur- 
poses increased from 332 million cubic meters in FY 1950 to 1.2 
billion cubic meters in FY 1984. 

The most dramatic change over this period was the reduction 
in the agricultural labor force. Whereas the number of workers em- 
ployed in agriculture in the early 1950s reached about 100,000, 
or 17.4 percent of the civilian labor force, by 1986 it had dropped 
to 70,000, or 5.3 percent of the civilian labor force. 

Agriculture has benefited from high capital inputs and careful 
development, making full use of available technology over a long 
period. Specialization in certain profitable export crops, in turn, 
has generated more funds for investment in agricultural produc- 
tion and processing, as has the development of sophisticated mar- 
keting mechanisms. In particular, Israel has had success in 
exporting citrus fruit, eggs, vegetables, poultry, and melons (see 
table 9, Appendix A). 

Another factor important in Israel's agricultural development 
has been the sector's impressive performance in foreign trade. The 
rapid growth of agricultural exports was accompanied by a gen- 
eral increase in total exports. Between 1950 and 1983, a promi- 
nent development was the decline (by 65 percent) in the importance 
of citrus fruit exports in relation to total raw agricultural exports. 
This decrease was more than balanced by the increase in impor- 
tance of processed agricultural products, whose exports increased 
by 4,000 percent over the same period. 

Financial Services 

In the late 1980s, Israel's financial system consisted of various 
financial intermediaries providing a range of services from short- 
term overdraft privileges to the financing of long-term investments 
in construction, industry, agriculture, and research and develop- 
ment. This financial system was concentrated among a limited 



162 



The Economy 



number of large banking groups under the supervision and con- 
trol of the Bank of Israel. 

The government-owned Bank of Israel is Israel's central bank. 
Its legal powers and functions allow it to determine policies and 
regulate activities in all fiscal areas, including interest rates, money 
supply, foreign currency, and export financing and control. As part 
of its duties, the Bank of Israel seeks to create institutions specializ- 
ing in defined sectors of business or customers. Consequendy, bank- 
ing corporations have been divided into two main groups: ordinary 
banking institutions, such as banks, foreign banks, and merchant 
banks — all of which are subject to liquidity regulations on both assets 
and liabilities — and specialized banking institutions, such as mort- 
gage banks, investment finance banks, financial institutions, and 
joint services companies. 

The financial system in 1988 consisted of five major bank groups: 
Bank HaPoalim, Bank Leumi Le Israel, Israel Discount Bank, 
United Mizrahi Bank, and the First International Bank of Israel. 
Given the high degree of concentration (the three largest bank 
groups accounted for more than 80 percent of total bank assets), 
banks operated in an oligopolistic environment, with little compe- 
tition in determining lending and borrowing rates. 

The financial system provided three types of credit instruments: 
short-term, nondirected credit financing; short-term, directed credit 
financing, and long-term and medium-term credit financing. The 
granting of directed credit was the responsibility of the Bank of 
Israel. This credit, however, actually was provided by joint funds 
of the Bank of Israel and the commercial banks, and it was primarily 
intended to meet the working capital requirements of export enter- 
prises. Seventy-five percent of these funds were in foreign currency, 
with interest charges calculated on the basis of United States dol- 
lar credits. 

Apart from directed credit, the other major form of short-term 
capital was nondirected credit, which was composed of overdraft 
facilities. This credit facility provided the customer with great flex- 
ibility at a nonindexed fee, which adjusted with inflation on a peri- 
odic basis. The other loans that were denominated in new Israeli 
shekels (NIS — see Glossary) were either indexed to the consumer 
price index or, if nonindexed, were fixed- term credits. 

Medium-term and long-term loans (exceeding eighteen months) 
were primarily directed government loans. These credit flows were 
supervised by investment finance banks such as the Industrial De- 
velopment Bank of Israel. The government generally determined 
how medium-term and long-term investment was encouraged and 
how it was financed. In an economy with a need for short-term 



163 



Israel: A Country Study 

capital, long-term financing was also used for financial activities 
other than investment. 

Government intervention in investment financing has taken 
forms such as direct budget credits, development loans, and in- 
vestment grants (under the Law for the Encouragement of Capi- 
tal Investment). Since 1974 development loans — whose interest rates 
were not adjusted for changes in the rate of inflation — have con- 
tained a subsidy element that arises from the differential between 
the low interest rate paid by the borrower on the one hand and 
a reasonable market rate of interest plus the expected rate of infla- 
tion on the other. Beginning in 1979, the government linked de- 
velopment loans, thus reducing this subsidization. Despite this 
linkage, the persistent high rate of inflation had kept the effective 
real interest on these linked loans negative. 

Although Israel had a well-developed banking system, it did not 
have a well-developed stock market in 1988. The Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (TASE), founded in 1953, had never developed properly 
because of the government's domination of activities relating to 
the raising and allocation of capital. TASE thus remained a shal- 
low market, poorly regulated and dominated by the major banks, 
who assumed all stock market roles — brokers, underwriters, issuers, 
fund managers, counselors, and investors. 

Between 1975 and 1983, private corporations increasingly raised 
more of their capital on the stock exchange. Most of the shares 
sold were highly overvalued and carried little or no voting rights. 
By the end of 1982, the total value of the shares registered on the 
TASE reached more than US$17 billion; in real terms, the value 
had more than doubled in a year and had multiplied fivefold since 
1979. This development stood in sharp contrast to Israel's stag- 
nant GNP growth and the worsening trade and debt position 
of the economy. In January 1983, however, the market sharply 
declined. In a matter of days, most speculators lost 50 to 70 per- 
cent of the value of their stocks. Mutual funds, which had been 
responsible for much of the market manipulation, became nearly 
valueless. 

In October 1983, the shares of the banks (which up to that point 
had been unaffected by the market malaise) finally collapsed. Their 
crash precipitated a dramatic change in the development of Israel's 
banking system. 

The banking industry had expanded spectacularly in the 1970s, 
both at home and abroad. This process had forced the banks to 
increase their capital base rapidly. The gradual advance of infla- 
tion in the economy, and its distorting effect on financial statements 
drawn up under historic accounting rules, only added to this thirst 



164 



Worker assembling electronic equipment 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 



165 



Israel: A Country Study 

for capital. But in a capital market dominated by the government, 
which was able and willing to issue endless quantities of index-linked 
bonds, the banks found this capital difficult to raise. 

The banks' solution was to transform their shares into index- 
linked paper by creating a system that ensured that the price of 
their shares would keep pushing upward, irrespective of the under- 
lying market forces. Over the years, bank shares were perceived 
as a riskless investment. By 1983 the price of bank shares was stead- 
ily becoming more detached from their true value. When it be- 
came obvious in 1983 that the government would have to devalue 
its currency, many people began to liquidate their holdings of shekel- 
denominated assets in favor of foreign currency. The assets most 
widely held and most easily liquidated were bank shares. The sell- 
ing wave began in the summer of 1983 and peaked in October, 
forcing the government to intervene. In 1988 the government 
undertook to secure the US$7 billion obligation (equal to the pub- 
lic's holding of bank shares) at the United States dollar value before 
the crash. The closing of the TASE, on October 6, 1983, became 
known as the "economic day of atonement" and represented the 
end of the speculators' paradise created and supported by leading 
Israeli banks. 

Transportation and Communications 

Beginning in 1948, the government invested large sums to de- 
velop a first-class transportation infrastructure. The main projects 
undertaken were the construction of the Qishon element of the har- 
bor at Haifa and the Ashdod port, the building of railroads be- 
tween Haifa and Tel Aviv and from Tel Aviv south to Beersheba, 
Dimona, and Zin, and the construction of several major roads in 
the center of the country as well as many new roads in peripheral 
regions (see fig. 9). 

Rapid economic growth and the removal of the limitation on 
importing private cars and buses created a growing demand for 
transportation services in the early 1960s. This demand was met 
by increased public transportation services and by private trans- 
portation expenditures. In 1984 the subsidy on public transport 
equaled US$13 million. In 1985 Israel's 13,410 kilometers of roads 
were used by 776,000 vehicles, of which about 624,000 were pri- 
vate cars, about 115,000 were trucks and other commercial vehi- 
cles, and about 5,500 were buses. In 1988 there were two main 
public carriers — Egged, with about 4,000 buses operating through- 
out the country, and Dan, with approximately 1,500 buses. Both 
of these carriers were cooperatives that charged subsidized tariffs 
determined by agreement with the government. 



166 



The Economy 



Israel also had a government-run railroad system. In 1986 there 
were 528 kilometers of state-owned railroad linking Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv, Haifa, and Beersheba. The government had a long-term plan 
to extend the Beersheba line along the Dead Sea and south to Elat 
and to develop a rapid rail line from Petah Tiqwa to Tel Aviv. 
Total railroad passenger traffic was 2,814,000 in 1985, and total 
freight carried (primarily phosphates, grains, coal, and potash) was 
6,086,000 tons. Given the government status of the rail system, 
however, it could not compete with other transportation modes. 
Between 1965 and 1985, railroad use declined because of cutbacks 
in rail services. In 1986 travel by truck or car was faster than by 
rail on all lines except the Haifa-Tel Aviv line, where it was 
identical. 

As a result of Israel's geopolitical situation, almost 99 percent 
of its trade was transported by ship. Thus, in the first twenty years 
of statehood, the government made a special effort to build a com- 
mercial fleet. In 1985 about 9,205 tons of freight were unloaded 
at Israeli ports: 55 percent at Haifa, 39.3 percent at Ashdod, and 
5.7 percent at Elat. During the same year, 7,088 tons were loaded: 
22 percent in Haifa, 68.7 percent at Ashdod, and 9.3 percent at 
Elat. In the 1970s, two additional, specialized ports were opened: 
an oil terminal at Ashqelon and a coal terminal at Hadera. These 
open-sea, offshore ports were operated by special port administra- 
tions independent of the Israel Ports Authority. 

The merchant fleet was 3,050,000 deadweight tons in 1984. The 
main shipping companies were (in order of importance) Zim, El 
Yam, Dizengoff, and Maritime Fruit Carriers. During the late 
1960s, two structural and technological changes took place in the 
shipping industry. First, improved cargo-handling technologies and 
containerization led to the use of more specialized ships. Second, 
ships increased in size, especially bulk carriers and tankers. Despite 
these changes — and the importance placed on sea transportation — 
Zim (owned by the government, the Histadrut, and the Israel Cor- 
poration) and El Yam continued to sell unprofitable old ships in 
the hope of becoming profitable. 

In 1988 Israel had one international airport at Lod, but special 
charter flights also used smaller airports such as Qalandiyah, near 
Jerusalem, and Elat. El Al, the government-owned national car- 
rier, flew a total of 36.3 million kilometers in 1984, carrying 
1,450,000 passengers on 9,646 international flights. In 1985 ap- 
proximately 455,000 passengers arrived in Israel on charter flights. 
Inland air services were provided by Arkia Israeli Airlines, which 
operated flights to major cities. 



167 



Israel: A Country Study 




International 
boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Airport 

Port 

Road 

Railroad 

Armistice line, 

1949 

Armistice line, 
1950 

40 Kilometers 



United Nations 
Disengagement 
Observer Force Zone 



SYRIA 



The 1950 Israeli proclamation 
that Jerusalem be the national 
capital is not recognized by the 
United States government. 



Mediterranean Herz/ '^a 

Tel Aviv 



Cease-fire line, 1967 



Amman 



JORDAN 



)j\/lizpe Ramon / 

X I 



l\ Yqtvata i I 

tY 1 



Em. l - 
gulf of Aqafa^, 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 9. Transportation System, 1988 
168 



The Economy 



Like other developing countries, Israel has constantly battled the 
excess demand for telecommunications services. The telecommu- 
nications industry is characterized by its high capital intensity — it 
requires a full cable network system. In 1988 Israel was still lag- 
ging in the development of a telecommunications system adequate 
to meet the needs of its clients. While the industry was expanding, 
it continued to represent a major weakness of the economy. 

Israel has long been plagued by delays in building new telephone 
exchanges and laying cables to meet the growing needs of the citi- 
zenry, businesses, and the new age of computer communication. 
Israel had about 1.9 million telephones in FY 1986. More than 
250,000 citizens, however, remained on waiting lists to receive tele- 
phones that year. Some Israelis had been waiting seven or more 
years for telephones. Around 99 percent of the telephones in Israel 
were connected to the international direct dialing system. 

Three ground satellite stations in 1988 facilitated satellite con- 
nections between Israel and the rest of the world. Overseas con- 
nections also were possible through underwater cables. In April 
1988, Israel announced plans for a five-year telecommunications 
development program, costing approximately US$2 billion. The 
plan included an undersea cable from Israel to Europe and the in- 
stallation of various satellite and cable television facilities. In ad- 
dition, a multicapacity transatlantic cable was being planned in 
1988 to provide 600 channels for communication with the North 
American continent. Furthermore, in May 1988 the cornerstone 
was laid for a US$1 70 million Voice of America transmission relay 
station in the Nahal HaArava north of Elat. 

Foreign Trade 

In 1988 Israel had a quasi-open economy. Its chronic trade im- 
balance reflected the country's military burden, its need to import 
capital and raw materials, and its excess civilian consumption. This 
trade deficit had long been covered by transfers and loans of vari- 
ous sorts. Despite drops in the prices of oil and other commodities 
(the effects of which were felt mainly in 1986) and improvement 
in Israel's terms of trade because of the fall in value of the United 
States dollar and the parallel strengthening of European curren- 
cies, the balance of trade worsened in 1986. The drop reflected 
a surge in inventory rebuilding after the 1984-85 recession. 

Despite their high level, Israeli tariffs were not the major trade 
barrier. In addition to the standard specific and ad valorem tariffs, 
Israel also imposed a purchase tax, compulsory surcharges, un- 
linked deposits, excise duties, stamp duties, and a value-added tax 
on all imported products. These taxes were designed to regulate 



169 



Israel: A Country Study 

domestic demand and to raise revenue. Lacking a mechanism by 
which to deal with dumping and other unfair trade practices, the 
government historically used the unilaterally imposed compulsory 
surcharge as a convenient measure by which to protect domestic 
products from foreign competition. Most of these charges, however, 
were rebatable to exporters as part of the export subsidy program. 
The brunt of these taxes, therefore, was borne by the nonexport 
sector. 

One potentially discriminatory nontariff barrier arose from the 
administration of the purchasing tax. For purposes of the purchasing 
tax, the taxable value of an imported product must reflect its domes- 
tic wholesale price. The percentage difference between the imputed 
wholesale price and the tariff-included import price represents the 
markup, known by the Hebrew acronym TAMA. As long as the 
TAMA reflects the true wholesale markup, there is no increased 
protectionism. Only to the extent that the true markup is less than 
the TAMA, is there an implicit hidden tariff in Israel. 

From 1970 to 1986, Israel's primary exports consisted of basic 
manufactures, machines, and transportation equipment, chemi- 
cals, and miscellaneous manufactures. Primary imports were basic 
manufactures, machines, and transportation equipment. The 
United States has been Israel's single largest trading partner, 
providing a market for approximately 25 percent of Israel's ex- 
ports and supplying about 20 percent of its nonmilitary imports 
(see table 10, Appendix A). 

Although as of 1988 the United States was Israel's largest in- 
dividual trading partner, the majority of trade has been with the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Since 1975 Israel-EEC 
trade has been governed by the Israel-EEC Preferential Agreement. 
This agreement eliminated tariff barriers on trade in manufactured 
goods between the two entities. Under its terms, imports of Israeli 
manufactured products were granted duty-free entry to the EEC 
in July 1977, except for certain products (considered to be import- 
sensitive by the EEC) on which full duty elimination was delayed 
until December 1979. Because the EEC offered trade preferences 
to other developing countries and because Greece, Spain, and Por- 
tugal entered the EEC, Israel did not receive significant preferen- 
tial benefits from the EEC. Israel eliminated duties on about 60 
percent of its manufactured imports from the EEC in January 1980, 
and complete duty-free treatment was to be phased in by January 
1989. 

The Israel-EEC Preferential Agreement also attempted to pro- 
vide for a substantial reduction in trade barriers for agricultural 
products. Although the EEC agreed to make tariff reductions on 



170 



Israeli-invented Koffler 
nuclear accelerator at the 
Weizmann Institute of Science, 
Rehovot 
Courtesy Embassy 
of Israel, Washington 




Solar energy absorbers 
used in producing electricity 
Courtesy Embassy 
of Israel, Washington 




171 



Israel: A Country Study 

about 80 percent of its agricultural imports from Israel, Israeli ex- 
porters still had to comply with the EEC's Common Agricultural 
Policy nontariff requirements and often were faced with quotas and 
voluntary export restraint agreements. As a result, reciprocal Israeli 
agricultural tariff concessions to the EEC have been very limited. 

Israel-United States trade was far less distorted by tariff and non- 
tariff barriers, at least from the United States' side. The overwhelm- 
ing majority of Israeli exports entered the United States market 
duty free. By contrast, a large share of United States exports to 
Israel not only were subject to substantially higher tariffs, but also 
were subject to a variety of nontariff barriers, including a substantial 
"hidden tariff." 

Total Israeli exports to the United States were about US$2.3 
billion in 1986. Of this amount, only 2.4 percent (US$57.6 mil- 
lion) was subject to duty. Duties collected on these products were 
US$5.4 million, an average rate of 9.6 percent. Because the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff rate is calculated as the ratio of duties 
collected to dutiable value, this figure overstates the average tariff 
rate on Israeli exports to the United States. 

The leading General System of Preferences (GSP) exports to the 
United States from 1978 through 1986 consisted of jewelry, X-ray 
equipment, gold necklaces, telephone equipment and parts, electro- 
medical equipment and parts, office machines, and radiation equip- 
ment. Apart from jewelry, all the other major GSP exports were 
high-technology goods. 

The product composition of dutiable exports helped explain the 
low overall duty paid. The primary reason for the low duties paid 
was that, between 1978 and 1980, the United States subjected dia- 
mond imports (Israel's principal export), to a 1 to 2 percent duty. 
As of 1981 , these items entered at a zero most favored nation (MFN) 
rate. The other major export items that entered the United States 
at a zero MFN duty rate included potassium chloride, airplanes, 
emeralds, aircraft parts, potassium nitrate, and antiques. Major 
exports that remained dutiable in 1986 included agricultural 
products, footwear, textiles, and apparel. 

Informed sources claimed that an elimination of United States 
duties under the United States-Israel Free Trade Area (FT A) Agree- 
ment on these products would lead to an estimated increase of ap- 
proximately 1 percent of total Israeli exports to the United States. 
The major categories affected will be agricultural products such 
as cheeses, olives, and processed tomato products, and textile and 
apparel items such as swimsuits, knitwear, undergarments, and 
thread. Very few high-technology products will be affected by the 
FT A agreement. 



172 



The Economy 



Balance of Payments 

Israel has had a balance of payments deficit throughout its exis- 
tence, primarily because of its heavy defense burden and the costs 
associated with immigration. This deficit has been covered by capital 
transfers in the form of loans and, in recent years, grants. These 
grants historically have come from Diaspora Jewry. Since 1974 the 
United States government has become by far the most important 
source of financial support, at first in the form of loans, but since 
1979 in the form of grants. 

The balance of payments position fluctuated widely, following 
major shifts in economic policy. Between 1980 and 1983, the civilian 
portion of the import deficit rose rapidly, with a mounting increase 
in the foreign debt. In 1984 and 1985, these trends reversed them- 
selves as increased United States grants halted the rise in foreign 
debt and capital exports. 

At the end of 1986, Israel's net foreign debt totaled about US$19 
billion. The size of this debt was less of a burden than it would 
appear, however, because US$10 billion of it was owed to the 
United States government and had a long repayment period. A 
further US$5.5 billion was owed primarily to Diaspora Jewry (see 
table 11, Appendix A). 

In August 1986, the Israeli exchange rate was pegged to a five- 
country currency basket. The exchange rate remained fixed until 
January 1987. This policy, combined with a US$750 million United 
States emergency grant-in-aid and a reduction in oil prices, led 
to increased stabilization of Israel's inflation. In the first quarter 
of 1988, the dollar-NIS exchange rate stood at NISI. 60 = US$1.00. 

The Economic Stabilization Program of July 1985 

The Economic Stabilization Program adopted in July 1985 in- 
volved the simultaneous implementation of several measures. First, 
the exchange rate was devalued by 18.8 percent and was fixed at 
the level of NISI. 50 equaled US$1.00. This rate was allowed to 
fluctuate within a 2-percent band. Second, domestic prices were 
allowed to rise by 1 7 percent and thereafter were frozen with a strin- 
gent price control. Third, subsidies were reduced by US$750 mil- 
lion, as taxes were increased and a budget cut of US$750 million 
was implemented. Fourth, the regular anticipated cost-of-living 
adjustment was suspended. This resulted in a 20 to 30 percent ero- 
sion in real wages. Under Histadrut pressure, the government was 
forced to adjust wages to counter the effects of the devaluation. 
By March 1986, real wages had recovered their losses. Finally, 
monetary policy became extremely restrictive. Because the inflation 



173 



Israel: A Country Study 

rate was reduced to 20 percent by the end of the year, the return 
on unlinked shekel deposits became unprecedented. This situation 
induced a shift of capital from linked dollar deposits to unlinked 
shekel deposits. Although the government had conceived this pro- 
gram as a short-term, emergency program, it was extended sev- 
eral times because of its success. By the end of 1986, many of the 
price controls were removed with no visible "repressed inflation" 
appearing. 

Many observers believe that this economic program was suc- 
cessful because its two anchors were the exchange rate and wage 
stability. The stability in these two prices, coupled with the new 
notion that inflation would erode the government's real revenues, 
forced the government to borrow more. The program's impact on 
the rate of inflation, which peaked at 445 percent in FY 1984, was 
little short of sensational. By the end of 1986, the inflation rate 
had stabilized at 20 percent — the lowest rate since 1972. 

Outside factors also helped the success of this stabilization pro- 
gram. The program's introduction coincided with the acceleration 
of the fall of the United States dollar on international markets. Con- 
currently, the decline in oil prices lowered the cost of increased 
imports spurred by increased Israeli export and capital market 
earnings. 

The success up to 1988 of the measures taken has encouraged 
the government to consider additional reforms. In the fall of 1987, 
discussion began regarding reforming the tax system, initiating a 
privatization program, and streamlining the tariff structure. 

* * * 

Information on the Israeli economy is extensive. Basic data are 
contained in the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel published by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and the Annual Report published by the 
Bank of Israel. The Ministry of Finance's annual Budget in Brief 
provides considerable data and text on the budget. Additional data 
and text are included in the Bank of Israel Economic Review (pub- 
lished quarterly) and Bank of Israel Recent Economic Developments (pub- 
lished irregularly), and in the Central Bureau of Statistics' Monthly 
Bulletin of Statistics . An additional general source covering a range 
of economic subjects is the monthly Israel Economist. 

The best up-to-date work on the Israeli economy and Israeli de- 
velopments from 1968 to 1978 is The Israeli Economy: Maturing 
Through Crises, edited by Yoram Ben-Porath. The best coverage 
of the period from 1948 to 1968 can be found in Nadav Halevi 
and Ruth Klinov-Malul's The Economic Development of Israel. Other, 



174 



The Economy 



more specialized, books include: Israel: A Developing Society, edited 
by A. Arian; Salomon J. Flink's Israel, Chaos and Challenge: Politics 
vs. Economics; Fanny Ginor's Socio- Economic Disparities in Israel; David 
Horowitz's Enigma of Economic Growth: A Case Study of Israel; Michael 
Michaely's Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Israel; 
Howard Pack's Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel; Don 
Patinkin's The Israeli Economy; Ira Sharkansky's What Makes Israel 
Tick: How Domestic Policy-Makers Cope with Constraints; and Michael 
Wolffsohn's Israel, Polity, Society, and Economy, 1882-1986. 

The best report on economic developments in the occupied ter- 
ritories is Raphael Meron's Economic Development in Judea-Samaria 
and the Gaza District: Economic Growth and Structural Change, 1970-80. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



175 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Sephardic chief rabbi, Orthodox woman with wrapped bandana, and Arab 
male with qafiyah 



Israeli governmental and political structures 

stem from certain premises and institutional arrangements gener- 
ally associated with West European parliamentary democracies, 
East European and Central European institutions and traditions, 
and even some Middle Eastern sociopolitical patterns. These in- 
fluences were transmitted though the unique history, political cul- 
ture, and political institutions of Israel's formative prestate period 
and the Middle Eastern environment in which it is situated. The 
legitimacy of Israeli society and the identification by the majority 
Jewish population with the state and its institutions rest on several 
foundations: Zionist Jewish nationalism, the existence of an out- 
side threat to Israeli security, Judaism, collectivism, and democracy. 
These bases are affected by the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
(hereafter the Arab-Israeli conflict) and by the pluralist nature of 
Israeli society, in which a substantial Arab minority participates 
in the country's political system, but has an ambivalent role within 
the majority Jewish society (see Minority Groups, ch. 2). 

The Israeli political system is characterized by certain West 
European democratic arrangements: elected government, multi- 
party competition, a high level of voter participation in local and 
national elections, an independent judiciary that is the country's 
foremost guardian of civil liberties, a vigorous and free press, and 
the supremacy of civilian rule. Other features, such as collectivism 
and a lack of expression of the liberal component in Israeli poli- 
tics, are distinctly East European and Central European in ori- 
gin. These features are expressed by the absence of a written 
constitution limiting the powers of government and imposing re- 
straints on the majority to safeguard the rights of individuals, par- 
ticularly in matters of civil rights and relations between state and 
religious interests. In the late 1980s, increasing disagreement over 
some fundamental questions, for instance, the state's territorial 
boundaries and the role of religion in the state, led to a breakdown 
in the pre- 196 7 national consensus over such issues. Such disagree- 
ment has resulted in intense ideological polarization as reflected 
in electoral and parliamentary stalemates between the two major 
political parties — Likud (Union) and the Israel Labor Party (gener- 
ally referred to as the Labor Party or simply Labor) — and their 
allies. 

In July 1984, the political system faced a challenge of unprece- 
dented magnitude. For the first time in the country's thirty-six-year 



179 



Israel: A Country Study 

postindependence history, neither major party was able to form 
a coalition government without the other's equal participation. The 
result, the National Unity Government formed in September 1984, 
represented a milestone in the country's political development. That 
development had already undergone an unprecedented shock in 
May 1977, when the left-of-center Labor Party was voted out of 
office for the first time after nearly half a century of unbroken politi- 
cal dominance in pre- and post- state Israel. In 1977 a newly man- 
dated regime was ushered in under Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, who led the right -of- center Likud Bloc and who differed 
sharply with the Labor Party over political philosophy and both 
domestic and foreign policy. Likud was reconfirmed in power by 
the 1981 elections, but it suffered an almost irreparable blow with 
Begin 's resignation in September 1983, which followed a series of 
failed policies concerning the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the 
domestic economy. The less charismatic and more cautious Yitzhak 
Shamir succeeded Begin. Under the terms of the National Unity 
Government, established in September 1984, the leader of the Labor 
Party, Shimon Peres, was entrusted with the formation of a govern- 
ment with himself as prime minister, on the written understand- 
ing that he would relinquish the prime ministership in two years' 
time — halfway through the parliamentary term — to his designated 
"vice prime minister" (or vice premier) Shamir. The next elec- 
tions to the Knesset (parliament — see Glossary) were held in 
November 1988; by reproducing the same inconclusive electoral 
results as in 1984, they led to the formation of a second Likud- 
and-Labor-led National Unity Government, except that this time 
Labor joined as a junior partner. Following a period of protracted 
coalition bargaining, Shamir was reinstated as prime minister, with 
Peres moving from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minis- 
try of Finance. Moshe Arens, a former Likud minister of defense 
and a Shamir ally, was appointed minister of foreign affairs, and 
Labor's Yitzhak Rabin became minister of defense. 

From 1984 to 1988, the National Unity Government acted as 
a joint executive committee of Labor and Likud. Under its direc- 
tion, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew to an Israeli- 
dominated security zone in southern Lebanon; Israel's runaway 
inflation, which had plagued the economy under previous Likud 
rule, was curbed; and divisive political debates on major national 
issues were, to some extent, subdued (see The Economic Stabili- 
zation Program of July 1985, ch. 3). Nevertheless, on major is- 
sues such as participation in United States-sponsored peace 
initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the exchange of "land 
for peace," and the political future of the West Bank (see Glossary) 



180 



Government and Politics 



and Gaza Strip territories, unity between Labor and Likud was 
lacking. The unity cabinet became deadlocked as each partner con- 
tinuously strove to advance its own foreign policy agenda. In the 
latter half of the unity government's term, from 1986 to 1988, con- 
sensus on domestic issues disintegrated as the parties prepared for 
the 1988 Knesset elections. For the most part, this breakdown in 
consensus continued following the elections; although the United 
States began a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO), the government continued to preserve the status quo 
on security issues. 

The Constitutional Framework 

The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 
proclaimed by the Provisional Government and the Provisional 
Council of State on May 14, 1948, mentions a draft constitution 
to be prepared by a constitutional committee and to be adopted 
by an elected constituent assembly not later than October 1 , 1948. 
After convening on February 14, 1949, the Constituent Assem- 
bly, however, instead of drafting a constitution, on February 16 
converted itself into a legislative body (the first Knesset) and enacted 
the Transition Law, commonly referred to as the "small constitu- 
tion." The Constituent Assembly could not agree on a compre- 
hensive written constitution, primarily for fear that a constitution 
would unleash a divisive conflict between religious and state authori- 
ties, a fear that continued to exist in late 1988. The ensuing 
parliamentary debate, from February 1 through June 13, 1950, 
between those favoring a written constitution and those opposing 
it was a microcosm of the conflict between state and religious in- 
terests that would continue to agitate Israeli political life. 

Proponents argued that under a bill of rights incorporated into 
a constitution Israel would benefit from the experience of other na- 
tions that had adopted written safeguards to ensure religious free- 
dom, minority rights, equal rights, and civil liberties. A written 
constitution, they asserted, would also safeguard the principle of 
the separation of powers and, in a period of rapid immigration, 
referred to in Israel as the "ingathering of exiles," would be a unify- 
ing factor, unequivocally establishing the supremacy of civil law. 

Opponents contended that the domestic and external circum- 
stances of Israel in 1949 were not auspicious for the adoption of 
a constitution. They stressed that a written constitution would be 
politically divisive because the controversial issue of the bound- 
aries between state and religion would inevitably be raised in for- 
mulating the principles, goals, and nature of the state as codified 
in a constitution (see The Role of Judaism, ch. 2). Prime Minister 



181 



Israel: A Country Study 

David Ben-Gurion, the leading opponent of a written constitution, 
maintained that the Proclamation of Independence, however great 
an event, was merely the beginning of a long process in Israel's 
evolution as a democratic state and not "the redemption." Perhaps 
most significantly, Ben-Gurion and Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz 
Yisrael, Israel Workers' Party — see Appendix B), the Labor Party's 
predecessor, had already formed an alliance with Orthodox reli- 
gious parties by entering into a "historical partnership" with 
Mizrahi (Spiritual Center — see Appendix B) in 1933. As part of 
the Mapai-Mizrahi agreement of June 19, 1947, they obtained unity 
among the various groups in the Yishuv (the prestate Jewish com- 
munity) by promising the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox Agudat 
Israel (Society of Israel — see Appendix B) that the status quo on 
issues involving state and religion would be maintained in the 
new state. Some observers felt that Ben-Gurion and other Labor 
leaders grossly underestimated the long-term consequences of delay- 
ing resolution of the role of religion in a modern Jewish state. In 
later years, the Orthodox-dominated Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Ministry of Interior, rabbinate, rabbinic courts, and municipal re- 
ligious councils gained a virtual monopoly in patronage and 
resources over Israel's organized Jewish religious institutions to 
the detriment of the more moderate Conservative and Reform 
movements of Judaism. As a consequence of the resurgence of right- 
wing fundamentalist religious movements, the influence of secu- 
lar elements in Israeli society, especially of Labor and its allies, 
was ultimately diminished. 

The Israeli solution to the lack of a constitution has been a 
"building-block" method. In June 1950, the Knesset passed a com- 
promise resolution, known as the "Harari decision" (named after 
Knesset member Izhar Harari), approving a constitution in prin- 
ciple but postponing its enactment until a future date. The resolu- 
tion stated that the constitution would be evolved "chapter by 
chapter in such a way that each chapter will by itself constitute a 
fundamental law." It stipulated: "The chapters will be submitted 
to the Knesset to the extent to which the Committee [for Consti- 
tution, Law, and Justice of the Knesset] completes its work, and 
the chapters will be incorporated in the constitution of the State." 
By 1988 nine Basic Laws had been enacted to deal with the 
Knesset (1958), Israeli Lands (1960), the Presidency (1964), the 
Government (1968), the State Economy (1975), the Army (1976), 
Jerusalem (1980), the Judiciary (1984), and Elections (1988). These 
Basic Laws, transcending regular legislation, may be amended or 
changed only by a special majority; in most cases the majority 
required is at least 80 members of the 120-member Knesset. 



182 



Government and Politics 



Moreover, to ensure the country's stability, the Basic Laws may 
not be amended, suspended, or repealed by emergency legislation. 

Apart from the nine Basic Laws, as of the end of 1988 there were 
a number of ordinary laws that legitimized the structure, functions, 
and actions of state institutions. These ordinary statutes were in- 
tended eventually to take the form of Basic Laws, presumably with 
appropriate revisions to account for changing needs and circum- 
stances. Among these laws were the Law of Return (1950), Na- 
tionality Law (1952), the Judges Law (1953), the State Education 
Law (1953), the Courts Law (1957), the State Comptroller Law 
(1958), and the Knesset Elections Law (1969). Legislation such as 
the Law of Return, the Nationality Law, and the State Education 
Law sought to resolve fundamental secular-religious disagreements. 
In the judgment of most Israeli observers, however, the enactment 
of such laws did not resolve fundamental controversies because 
Orthodox figures later sought to overturn them. For example, in 
1988 the government was engaged in a legislative struggle involv- 
ing renewed attempts by Orthodox religious parties to amend the 
1950 Law of Return, the country's basic immigration law, by grant- 
ing Orthodox religious authorities exclusive power to decide who 
is Jewish and to exclude people who had converted to Judaism 
through the Reform or Conservative movements. On June 14, 
1988, the Knesset defeated two such bills by votes of sixty to fifty- 
three and sixty to fifty-one. 

The question of human rights and civil liberties has been an im- 
portant concern of all Israeli governments. It is reflected, for in- 
stance, in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 
sometimes considered analogous to the United States Declaration 
of Independence. The Israeli declaration reads in part: "The State 
of Israel will . . . foster the development of the country for the 
benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice, 
and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure com- 
plete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants 
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education and culture." The decla- 
ration contains sections that were intended to grant constitutional 
authority for the establishment and operation of state organs dur- 
ing the immediate postindependence years. Apart from that legal 
significance, however, the declaration lacks the status of a formal 
constitution against which the legality of other enactments can be 
tested. This is especially true regarding the issue of fundamental 
civil rights. 

In the absence of an expressed bill of rights, Israeli governments 
have relied on the court system to safeguard civil rights and liberties. 



183 



Israel: A Country Study 

Israeli citizens have enjoyed a large measure of civil rights as a 
result of high standards of fairness in the administration of justice 
in Israel proper. Nonetheless, certain infringements have been 
caused by the dictates of internal security (see Israeli Arabs, Arab 
Land, and Arab Refugees, ch. 1). According to a United States 
Department of State report on human rights practices in Israel 
released in February 1988, "Israel is a parliamentary democracy 
which guarantees by law and respects in practice the civil, politi- 
cal, and religious rights of its citizens . . . As in the past, the most 
significant human rights problems for Israel in 1987 derived from 
the strained relations between the Israeli authorities and some 
Israelis on the one hand and the Arab inhabitants of the occupied 
territories on the other hand." 

A number of attempts have been made to introduce proposals 
for a detailed constitution. The latest occurred in August 1987, 
when the Public Council for a Constitution for Israel, a group of 
Tel Aviv University professors led by Uriel Reichman, dean of 
its faculty of law, launched a campaign to enact a constitution. The 
group argued that the existing Basic Laws were not tantamount 
to a constitution because such topics as judicial review and a bill 
of rights were not covered and because most of the Basic Laws were 
regular laws that could be amended by a simple majority vote of 
the Knesset. A written constitution, in contrast, would spell out 
the relationship among the different branches of government and 
establish a type of secularized bill of rights between the individual 
and the state. The group advocated three necessary reform mea- 
sures as essential for a democratic and constitutional state: the direct 
election of the prime minister; the safeguarding of all Basic Laws 
so that they could be rescinded only by a two-thirds or three-fifths 
Knesset majority; and the establishment of a well-defined system 
of judicial review. While the proposal had little chance of Knesset 
passage, it aroused renewed interest in the reform of the Israeli 
electoral, legislative, and judicial systems (see Prospects for Elec- 
toral Reform, this ch.). 

Government 
The President 

The 1964 Basic Law provides that the president is the titular 
head of state (see fig. 10). The president is elected through secret 
balloting by an absolute majority of the Knesset on the first two 
ballots, but thereafter by a plurality, for a term of five years. Israeli 
presidents may not serve more than two consecutive terms, and 
any resident of Israel is eligible to be a presidential candidate. The 



184 



Government and Politics 



office falls vacant upon resignation or upon the decision of three- 
quarters of the Knesset to depose the president on grounds of mis- 
conduct or incapacity. Presidential tenure is not keyed to that of 
the Knesset in order to assure continuity in government and the 
nonpartisan character of the office. There is no vice president in 
the Israeli governmental system. When the president is temporarily 
incapacitated or the office falls vacant, the speaker of the Knesset 
may exercise presidential functions. 

Presidential powers are usually exercised based on the recom- 
mendation of appropriate government ministers. The president 
signs treaties ratified by the Knesset and laws enacted by the legis- 
lature except those relating to presidential powers. The president, 
who has no veto power over legislation, appoints diplomatic 
representatives, receives foreign envoys accredited to Israel, and 
appoints the state comptroller, judges for civil and religious courts, 
and the governor of the Bank of Israel. 

Although the president's role is nonpolitical, Israeli heads of state 
perform important moral, ceremonial, and educational functions. 
They also play a part in the formation of a coalition cabinet, or 
"a government" as the Israelis call it. They are required to con- 
sult leaders of all political parties in the Knesset and to designate 
a member of the legislature to organize a cabinet. If the member 
so appointed fails, other political parties commanding a plurality 
in the Knesset may submit their own nominee. The figure called 
upon to form a cabinet is invariably the leader of the most influential 
political party or bloc in the Knesset. 

As of 1988, all Israeli presidents have been members of, or as- 
sociated with, the Labor Party and its predecessors, and all have 
been considered politically moderate. These tendencies were es- 
pecially significant in the April 1978 election of Labor's Yitzhak 
Navon, following the inability of the governing Likud coalition to 
elect its candidate to the presidency. Israeli observers believed that, 
in counterbalance to Prime Minister Begin 's polarizing leadership, 
Navon, the country's first president of Sephardi (see Glossary) ori- 
gin, provided Israel with unifying symbolic leadership at a time 
of great political controversy and upheaval. In 1983 Navon decided 
to reenter Labor politics after five years of nonpartisan service as 
president, and Chaim Herzog (previously head of military intelli- 
gence and ambassador to the United Nations) succeeded him as 
Israel's sixth president. 

The Cabinet 

The separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches in the Israeli political system generally follows the British 



185 



Israel: A Country Study 



DO 



Oll 
xO 



dOj 

°£lu 




<1 

°o 
o 



<o 

LU cl 

'-o 



2< 

i£ 

X LU 
LU X 

^° 

Olu 



m 

coO 

o 









o 




Ox 


FINAN 




FOREI 
AFFAI 



^ LU 3 

o 



ALLY 

:ted 

NCILS 


ICIPAL | 


CAL 


IONAL | 




z 


g 


EG 








-Jluq 


2 




X 



XJO Q 



*f«il 

rotate 
*> o> o o c 



In 



© to 

c|„l 
OS o p 

tu<00 



!! 

1 I 



0) 



.2 £ 



■s = ~> 

o jg o "5 || 
■JS ^; 



& oi 



ENSE 




1 w 

O LU 
LUX 


DEF 






OCCI 
TERRI 



Lu^lu 
<lu" 
coluO 



2 £ 5 

(DP 8 

r &z 
« 3 0? 

TJ JO 13 
!= w = 
=1 c 3 



co X eg 

c t3 'c 

III 

DOT) 

< o < 

y~ <M CO 



2 IE 

£ £.E 
<» 2tr 
c >-o 

HI 
■i 1? 

X5 or 

< <.£ 



186 



Government and Politics 



pattern. The cabinet is the top executive policy-making body and 
the center of political power in the nation. It consists of the prime 
minister and an unspecified number of ministers. The head of 
government must be a Knesset member, but this is not a require- 
ment for ministers. In practice, most ministers have been Knesset 
members; when non-Knesset members are considered for cabinet 
posts, their selection is subject to Knesset approval. A deputy prime 
minister and deputy ministers may be appointed from among the 
membership of the Knesset, usually as a result of coalition bar- 
gaining, but in this instance only the deputy prime minister is con- 
sidered a regular cabinet member. As stated above, in September 
1984, the National Unity Government established the position of 
vice prime minister, or vice premier. The vice prime minister, who 
was the leader of one of the two major parties in the unity coali- 
tion, was considered the second leading cabinet minister. 

The cabinet takes office upon confirmation by the Knesset, to 
which it is collectively responsible for all its acts. To obtain this 
consent, the prime minister-designate must submit a list of cabi- 
net members along with a detailed statement of basic principles 
and policies of his or her government. The cabinet can be dissolved 
if it resigns en masse, if the Knesset passes a motion of censure 
against it, or if the prime minister resigns or dies. The prime 
minister's resignation invalidates the cabinet, but resignations of 
individual ministers do not have this effect. Since independence 
all cabinets have been coalitions of parties, each coalition having 
been formed to achieve the required total of sixty-one or more Knes- 
set seats. Although often based on political expediency, coalition 
formation is also concerned with ideological and issue compatibil- 
ity among the participating groups. Cabinet posts are divided 
among coalition partners through behind-the-scenes bargaining and 
in proportion to the parliamentary strength of the parties involved, 
usually at the ratio of one cabinet portfolio for every three or four 
Knesset seats. This formula may be dispensed with, however, in 
times of national emergency or electoral and political stalemate. 
The first precedent in this direction occurred after the June 1967 
War when a "national unity government" was formed by co-opting 
three opposition party leaders as cabinet ministers. This move, 
which was achieved without the standard cabinet formation proce- 
dure, was designed to demonstrate internal solidarity in the face 
of an external threat. 

The members of coalition governments are obligated to fulfill 
their commitments to the coalition at the time of seeking a vote 
of confidence from the Knesset. A cabinet member may be dis- 
missed for failing to support the government on any matter that 



187 



Israel: A Country Study 

is included in the original coalition pact except where the minister's 
dissenting vote in the Knesset for reasons of "conscience" is spe- 
cifically approved in advance by the minister's party. This obliga- 
tion also applies in the formation and maintenance of a national 
unity government, with the exception of times of emergency when 
opposition elements co-opted into the cabinet may disagree with 
the mainstream of the coalition on any matters other than those 
they have pledged to support. At a minimum, coalition members 
must vote with the government on issues of national defense, for- 
eign policy, the budget, and motions of censure. Failure to do so 
constitutes grounds for their expulsion; ministers may simply with- 
draw from the government in protest if they cannot reconcile them- 
selves to the mainstream. 

As a rule, the cabinet meets at least once a week on Sunday morn- 
ing or whenever extraordinary reasons warrant. Cabinet deliber- 
ations are confidential; this is especially true when the body meets 
as a session of the ministerial Committee for Security Affairs. 

The cabinet conducts much of its work through four standing 
committees dealing with economic affairs, legislation, foreign af- 
fairs and security, and home affairs and services. The committees 
meet once a week and may set up special ad hoc committees of 
inquiry to scrutinize issues affecting coalition unity or other urgent 
questions. A cabinet member may be assigned to one or more com- 
mittees. Committee decisions are final unless challenged in plen- 
ary cabinet sessions. 

As compensation for serving in the cabinet, Knesset members' 
salaries and accompanying benefits are supplemented by the govern- 
ment. Ministers are given a car and a driver and offices in Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem. The government provides them with an offi- 
cial residence in Jerusalem and covers personal expenses such as 
travel, hotels, and food on official business. They also receive com- 
prehensive medical insurance and other allowances. 

Until November 1988, the unity cabinet included, in addition 
to Prime Minister Shamir, nineteen ministers with portfolio, in- 
cluding the vice-prime minister and two deputy prime ministers. 
The jurisdictions of their portfolios were agriculture, communica- 
tions, defense, economics and planning, education and culture, 
energy and infrastructure, finance, foreign affairs, health, hous- 
ing and construction, immigration and absorption, industry and 
trade, interior, justice and tourism (both ministries were headed 
by one minister), labor and social affairs, police, religious affairs, 
science and development, and transportation. In addition, there 
were six ministers without portfolio. Upon approval of the second 
unity government by the Knesset in December 1988, the new 



188 



Government and Politics 



cabinet consisted of twenty-eight ministers, the largest in the coun- 
try's history. Its size was expanded to accommodate political de- 
mands by the coalition partners. 

Interministerial coordination is the responsibility of the four 
standing cabinet committees and the Office of the Prime Minister, 
especially the Government Secretariat, which is located in that 
office. Headed by the secretary to the government (the position 
is also known as government secretary or cabinet secretary), the 
secretariat prepares the agenda for meetings of the cabinet and cabi- 
net committees, maintains their records, coordinates the work of 
ministries, and informs the public of government decisions and 
policies. 

Also in the Office of the Prime Minister are the Prime Minister's 
Bureau, which deals with confidential matters concerning the chief 
executive, and a staff of advisers on political and legal issues, na- 
tional security, terrorism and counterterrorism, the media, peti- 
tions and complaints, Arab affairs, and welfare affairs. The most 
influential advisory personnel carry the title of "director general 
and political adviser" to the prime minister. Other constituent units 
of the office include the State Archives and Library, Government 
Names Committee, Government Press Office, National Council 
for Research and Development, Technological and Scientific In- 
formation Center, Atomic Energy Commission, Institute for Bio- 
logical Research, National Parks Authority, and Central Bureau 
of Statistics. 

The Civil Service 

As of late 1988, government employees were recruited through 
a merit system, with appointment, promotion, transfer, termina- 
tion, training, discipline, and conditions of employment regulat- 
ed by law. They were prohibited, especially in the senior grades, 
from engaging in partisan politics by the Civil Service (Restric- 
tion of Party Activities and Fund-Raising) Law of 1959. As of 1988, 
there were approximately 100,000 government employees, exclud- 
ing the Israel Police, teachers (who were technically municipal em- 
ployees), civilian workers in the defense establishment, and 
employees of the State Employment Service and the autonomous 
Israel Broadcasting Authority. 

The civil service was headed by a commissioner appointed by 
the cabinet and directly responsible to the minister of finance. The 
commissioner, who like other senior government officials carried 
the rank of director general, had broad responsibility for the ex- 
amination, recruitment, appointment, training, and discipline of 
civil service personnel. In practice, however, except in the senior 



189 



Israel: A Country Study 

grades, these matters were left to the discretion of the various minis- 
tries. The commissioner was also chairman of the Civil Service 
Board, consisting of three directors general representing govern- 
ment ministries and three members representing the public. The 
purpose of the board was to administer the civil service pension 
system. In addition, the office of the commissioner directed the 
operation of the Central School of Administration in Jerusalem and 
furnished administrative services to the Civil Service Disciplinary 
Court. Civil servants were automatically members of the Civil Ser- 
vants' Union — a practice that has been in effect since 1949 when 
the union became part of the General Federation of Laborers in 
the Land of Israel (HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz 
Yisrael, known as Histadrut — literally, organization). Any basic 
changes in the conditions of government employment must have 
the concurrence of the union. The mandatory retirement age for 
civil service workers was sixty-five, and pensions ranged from 20 
to 70 percent of terminal salary, depending on length of service. 

The Knesset 

The Knesset is a unicameral parliament and the supreme author- 
ity of the state. Its 120 members are elected by universal suffrage 
for a four-year term under a system of proportional representa- 
tion. Basic Law: the Knesset provides for "general countryside, 
direct, equal, secret, and proportional" elections. This provision 
means that if, for example, in a national election a given party list 
received approximately 36,000 votes, it would be entitled to two 
seats in the Knesset. As a result, the top two names on the party's 
list would obtain Knesset seats. The legislative authority of the 
Knesset is unlimited, and legislative enactments cannot be vetoed 
by either the president or the prime minister nor can such enact- 
ments be nullified by the Supreme Court. The regular four-year 
term of the Knesset can be terminated only by the Knesset, which 
can then call for a new general election before its term expires. 

The Knesset also has broad power of direction and supervision 
over government operations. It approves budgets, monitors govern- 
ment performance by questioning cabinet ministers, provides a pub- 
lic forum for debate of important issues, conducts wide-ranging 
legislative inquiries, and can topple the cabinet through a vote of 
no confidence that takes precedence over all other parliamentary 
business. The Knesset works through eleven permanent legisla- 
tive committees, including the House Committee, which handles 
parliamentary rules and procedures, and the Law and Justice Com- 
mittee, usually referred to as "Law." The jurisdictions of the re- 
maining committees are the constitution, finance, foreign affairs 



190 



The Knesset, or Parliament, of Israel, Jerusalem 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 

and security, immigration and absorption, economics, education 
and culture, internal affairs and environment, labor and welfare, 
and state control. Committee assignments are made by the Arrange- 
ments Committee, a committee consisting of representatives of the 
various parties established at the beginning of each Knesset ses- 
sion, enabling each party to determine for itself where it wants its 
stronger delegates placed. Committee assignments are for the dura- 
tion of the Knesset's tenure. Committee chairmen are formally 
elected at the first meeting of each respective committee upon the 
nomination of the House Committee. As a rule, however, the chair- 
manship of important committees is reserved for members of the 
ruling coalition. If a member resigns from his or her party, the 
place on the committee reverts to the party, even if the member 
remains in the Knesset. 

Among the first tasks of a new Knesset is to assign members to 
the various standing committees and to elect a speaker, his or her 
deputies, and the chairmen of committees. The speaker is assisted 
by a presidium of several deputies chosen by the Knesset from the 
major parties. At a minimum, the Knesset is required to hold two 
sessions a year and to sit not fewer than eight months during the 
two sessions. The Knesset meets weekly to consider items on its 
agenda, but not on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays in deference 
to its Muslim, Jewish, and Christian members. Agendas are set 



191 



Israel: A Country Study 



by the speaker to permit the questioning of ministers and the con- 
sideration of proposals from the government or motions from mem- 
bers. Time allocations to individual members and parties are made 
in advance by the speaker so as to preclude filibusters or cloture. 
Other than national emergencies, budgetary issues have usually 
been the most important items dealt with by the Knesset at any 
of its session. 

Following the British pattern, legislation is generally introduced 
by the cabinet; to a lesser extent it is initiated by various Knesset 
committees; and in limited cases, private bills are initiated by in- 
dividual Knesset members. Bills are drafted by the ministries con- 
cerned in consultation with the Ministry of Justice. By majority 
vote of the cabinet, draft bills are sent to the speaker of the Knesset 
for legislative action. Proposed bills are considered by appropriate 
committees and go through three readings before being voted on 
by the Knesset after the third reading. Any number of Knesset 
members present constitutes a quorum, and a simple majority of 
those present is required for passage. Exceptions to this rule apply 
in the election or removal of the president of the state, removal 
of the state comptroller, changes to the system of proportional elec- 
tions, and changes to or repeal of Basic Laws; in these instances, 
required majorities are specified by law. 

Apart from the Knesset, which is the principal source of legisla- 
tion, such public institutions as ministries, local authorities, and 
independent bodies can frame rules and regulations or subsidiary 
legislation on a wide range of matters. Subsidiary legislation has 
the effect of law, but it can be declared invalid by the courts when 
it contravenes any enactment of the Knesset. 

Knesset members are granted extensive legal immunity and 
privileges. Their special legal status, which many observers regard 
as excessive, ranges from parliamentary immunity to protection 
from criminal proceedings for the entire period of Knesset mem- 
bership. Immunity extends to acts committed before becoming a 
Knesset member, although such immunity can be removed by the 
Knesset upon the recommendation of the House Committee. 
Knesset members are also exempt from compulsory military ser- 
vice. The official language of the Knesset is Hebrew, but Arab 
members may address the legislature in Arabic, with simultane- 
ous translation provided. 

The State Comptroller 

The power of the Knesset to supervise and review government 
policies and operations is exercised mainly through the state comp- 
troller, also known as the ombudsman or ombudswoman. The 



192 



Government and Politics 



state comptroller is appointed by the president upon the recom- 
mendation of the House Committee of the Knesset for a renew- 
able term of five years. The incumbent is completely independent 
of the government and is responsible to the Knesset alone (the state 
controller's budget is submitted directly to the Knesset's Finance 
Committee and is exempt from prior consideration by the Minis- 
try of Finance). The state comptroller can be relieved only by the 
Knesset or by resignation or demise. During the incumbent's term 
of office, he or she may not be a member of the Knesset or other- 
wise engage in politics and is prohibited from any public or pri- 
vate activity that could create a conflict of interest with the 
independent performance of the duties of the office. The state comp- 
troller, although lacking in authority to enforce compliance, has 
broad investigative powers and employs hundreds of staff mem- 
bers, including accountants, lawyers, and other relevant profes- 
sionals. Since 1949, when the state comptrollership was created, 
three individuals have held the office, with each having served for 
an extended period. 

The principal function of the state comptroller is to check on 
the legality, regularity, efficiency, economy, and ethical conduct 
of public institutions. The checks are performed by continuous and 
spot inspections of the financial accounts and activities of all minis- 
tries, the armed forces and security services, local government 
bodies, and any corporations, enterprises, or organizations subsi- 
dized or managed by the state in any form. 

The state comptroller acts in conjunction with the Finance Com- 
mittee of the Knesset and reports to it whenever necessary. The 
state comptroller may recommend that the Finance Committee ap- 
point a special commission of inquiry, but having no statutory 
authority of its own it relies on the Knesset to impose sanctions 
on errant bodies. The state comptroller's office is divided into five 
major inspection units. The first four are concerned with minis- 
tries, defense services, local authorities, and corporations; the fifth 
deals with public complaints concerning government bodies. 

The Judicial System 

The Judiciary Law of 1984 formalized the judicial structure con- 
sisting of three main types of courts: civil, religious, and military. 
There also are special courts for labor, insurance, traffic, municipal, 
juvenile, and other disputes. Each type of court is administrative- 
ly responsible to a different ministry. Civilian courts come under 
the Ministry of Justice; religious courts fall under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, and military courts come under the Ministry of 
Defense (see The Role of Judaism, ch. 2; Discipline and Military 



193 



Israel: A Country Study 

Justice, ch. 5). In the administration of justice, however, all courts 
are independent and Israelis generally concede their fairness. 

Legal codes and judicial procedures derive from various sources. 
Laws applicable to Israeli Jews in matters of personal status are 
generally based on the Torah (see Glossary) and the halakah (see 
Glossary). Influences traceable to the British Mandate period in- 
clude parts of Ottoman legal codes, influenced by the Quran, Arab 
tribal customary laws, and the Napoleonic Code. In general, Brit- 
ish law has provided the main base on which Israel has built its 
court procedure, criminal law, and civil code, whereas American 
legal practice has strongly influenced Israeli law regarding civil 
rights. 

The status of the judiciary and the definition and authority of 
the court structure are spelled out in the Judges Law of 1953, the 
Courts Laws of 1957, the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Mar- 
riage and Divorce) Law of 1953, the Dayanim Law of 1955 (sing., 
dayan, rabbinical court judge), the Qadis Law of 1961 (sing., qadi, 
Muslim religious judge), the Druze Religious Courts Law of 1962 
{qadi madhab, Druze religious judge), the Jurisdiction in Matters 
of Dissolution of Marriages (Special Cases) Law of 1969, and the 
Judiciary Law of 1984. The principal representative of the state 
in the enforcement of both criminal and civil law is the attorney 
general, who is responsible to the minister of justice. As was the 
case during the British Mandate, courts do not use the jury sys- 
tem; all questions of fact and law are determined by the judge or 
judges of the court concerned, and the system upholds the princi- 
ple of innocence until proven guilty. 

The president, on the recommendation of a nominating com- 
mittee chaired by the minister of justice, appoints civil courts judges. 
The nominating committee consists of the president of the Supreme 
Court, two other justices of the highest court, two members of the 
Knesset, one cabinet member in addition to the minister of justice, 
and two practicing lawyers who are members of the Israel Bar 
Association, a body established in 1961 charged with certifying law- 
yers for legal practice. The independence of committee members 
is safeguarded in part by a procedure whereby, except for the 
minister of justice and the president of the Supreme Court, they 
are elected through secret ballot by the members of their respec- 
tive institutions. Whereas the composition of the committee is meant 
to depoliticize the nominations process, political considerations 
require the inclusion of at least one religious justice on the Supreme 
Court, as well as the representation on the nominating committee 
of Sephardim and women. 



194 



Government and Politics 



The president of the state, on the recommendation of nominat- 
ing committees, also appoints judges of religious courts, except 
Christian courts. Nominating committees, chaired by the minister 
of religious affairs, are organized to ensure the independence of 
their members and to take account of the unique features of each 
religious community. Religious courts of the ten recognized Chris- 
tian communities are administered by judges appointed by indi- 
vidual communities (see Minority Groups, ch. 2). 

Civil and religious judges hold office from the day of appoint- 
ment; tenure ends only upon death, resignation, mandatory re- 
tirement at age seventy, or removal from office by disciplinary 
judgment as specified by law. Transfers of judges from one local- 
ity to another require the consent of the president of the Supreme 
Court. The salaries of all judges are determined by the Knesset. 
Judges may not be members of the Knesset or engage in partisan 
political activity. 

Before assuming office, all judges, regardless of religious affilia- 
tion, must declare allegiance to the State of Israel and swear to 
dispense justice fairly. Judges other than dayanim must also pledge 
loyalty to the laws of the state; dayanim are subject only to religious 
law. The implication is that Jewish religious law suspersedes the 
man-made laws of the Knesset; where the two conflict, a dayan will 
follow religious law in matters of personal status. Israeli civil liber- 
tarians view this as a blemish on the judiciary system because, as 
Israeli political scientist Asher Arian points out, religious laws "re- 
strict certain liberties taken for granted in other liberal systems." 

At the top of the court hierarchy is the Supreme Court, located 
in Jerusalem and composed of a number of justices determined 
by the Knesset. In late 1988, there were eleven justices: a presi- 
dent or chief justice, a vice president, and nine justices. The court 
has both appellate and original jurisdiction. A minimum of three 
justices is needed for a court session. 

The Supreme Court hears appeals from lower courts in civil and 
criminal cases. As a court of first instance, it may direct a lower 
district court to hold a retrial in a criminal case if the original ver- 
dict is based on questionable evidence, subject to the stipulation 
that penalties imposed at retrial should not exceed the severity of 
those originally imposed. In addition, the Supreme Court has origi- 
nal jurisdiction over petitions seeking relief from administrative 
decisions that fall outside the jurisdiction of any court. In this role, 
the Supreme Court sits as the High Court of Justice and may re- 
strain government agencies or other public institutions by such writs 
as habeas corpus and mandamus, customary under English com- 
mon law. In its capacity as the High Court of Justice, it may also 



195 



Israel: A Country Study 



order a religious court to deal with a case concerned with its com- 
petence as a religious body, but only on petitions raised before a 
verdict is handed down. In this regard, the Supreme Court is limited 
to the procedural question and may not impinge on the merits of 
the case. 

The Supreme Court serves as the principal guardian of fun- 
damental rights, protecting the individual from any arbitrary action 
by public officials or agencies. It does not have the power of judi- 
cial review and cannot invalidate Knesset legislation. It is em- 
powered, however, to nullify administrative rules and regulations 
or government and local ordinances on the ground of their illegal- 
ity or conflict with Knesset enactments. As the highest court of the 
land, the Supreme Court may also rule on the applicability of laws 
in a disputed case and on jurisdictional disputes between lower civil 
courts and religious courts. There is no appeal from its decisions. 

The second tier of the civil court structure consists of six district 
courts located in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramla, Haifa, Beersheba, 
and Nazareth (see fig. 1). As courts of first instance, district courts 
hear civil and criminal cases outside the jurisdiction of lower courts. 
Their jurisdiction includes certain matters of personal status in- 
volving foreigners. If the foreigners concerned consent to the 
authority of religious courts, however, there is concurrent juris- 
diction over the issue. The district court at Haifa has additional 
competence as a court of admiralty for the country as a whole. 

District courts also hear appeals from magistrate courts, muni- 
cipal courts, and various administrative tribunals. Israel's twenty- 
eight magistrate courts constitute the most basic level of the civil 
court system. They are located in major towns and have criminal 
as well as civil jurisdiction. There are a small number of municipal 
courts that have criminal jurisdiction over any offenses commit- 
ted within municipal areas against municipal regulations, local 
ordinances, by-laws, and town-planning orders. 

The civil court structure includes bodies of special jurisdiction, 
most notably traffic courts; juvenile courts; administrative tribunals 
concerned with profiteering, tenancy, and water; and tribal courts 
specific to the Southern District having jurisdiction in any civil or 
criminal cases assigned to them by the president of the district court 
or the district commissioner. Disputes involving management- 
employee relations and insurance claims go to regional labor courts. 
The courts, established in 1969, are located in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, 
Haifa, and Beersheba. Appeals from the decisions of these courts 
are made directly to the National Labor Court, located in Jerusa- 
lem. Finally, distinct from court-martial proceedings is the military 



196 



Yitzhak Shamir, 
Prime Minister of 
Israel and head of 
the Likud Party 
Courtesy Embassy 
of Israel, Washington 



Shimon Peres, 
leader of the Labor Party 
Courtesy Embassy 
of Israel, Washington 



Israel: A Country Study 



court system, empowered to prosecute civilians for offenses against 
defense emergency regulations. 

Local Government 

As of late 1988, there were two levels of local government: the 
central government operated the upper or district level; citizens 
elected the lower and relatively autonomous municipal level offi- 
cials. The system of district administration and local government 
was for the most part based on statutes first promulgated during 
the Ottoman era and perpetuated under the British Mandate for 
Palestine and under Yishuv policies. Since independence it has been 
modified to deal with changing needs and to foster local self-rule. 
As of late 1988, local government institutions had limited powers, 
experienced financial difficulties, and depended to a great extent 
on national ministries; they were, nevertheless, important in the 
political framework. 

Israel consisted of six administrative districts and fourteen 
subdistricts under, respectively, district commissioners and district 
officers. The minister of interior appointed these officials, who were 
responsible to him for implementing legislative and administrative 
matters. District officials drafted local government legislation, ap- 
proved and controlled local tax rates and budgets, reviewed and 
approved by-laws and ordinances passed by locally elected coun- 
cils, approved local public works projects, and decided on grants 
and loans to local governments. In their activities, local officials 
were also accountable to the Office of the State Comptroller. Staff 
of other ministries might be placed by the minister of interior under 
the general supervision of district commissioners. 

Israel's local self-government derived its authority from the by- 
laws and ordinances enacted by elected municipal, local, and re- 
gional councils and approved by the minister of interior. Up to 
and including the municipal elections of 1973, mayors and mem- 
bers of the municipal councils were elected by universal, secret, 
direct, and proportional balloting for party lists in the same man- 
ner as Knesset members. Council members in turn chose mayors 
and municipal council chairpersons. After 1978 mayoral candidates 
were elected directly by voters in a specific municipality, while mem- 
bers of municipal and local councils continued to be elected 
according to the performance of party lists and on the basis of 
proportional representation (see The Knesset, this ch.). 

Population determined the size of municipal and local councils. 
Large urban areas were classified as municipalities and had 
municipal councils. Local councils were designated class "A" 
(larger) or class "B" (smaller), depending on the number of 



198 



Government and Politics 



inhabitants in villages or settlements. Regional councils consisted 
of elected delegates from settlements according to their size. Such 
councils dealt mainly with the needs of cooperative settlements, 
including kibbutzim and moshavim (see Glossary). The extensive 
local government powers of the minister of interior included author- 
ity to dissolve municipal councils; district commissioners had the 
same power with regard to local councils. 

Local authorities had responsibility for providing public services 
in areas such as education, health care and sanitation, water 
management, road maintenance, parks and recreation, and fire 
brigades. They also levied and collected local taxes, especially 
property taxes, and other fees. Given the paucity of locally raised 
tax revenues, most local authorities depended heavily on grants 
and loans from the national Treasury. The Ministry of Education 
and Culture, however, made most of the important decisions 
regarding education, such as budgets, curriculum, and the hiring, 
training, and licensing of teachers. Nationwide, in 1986 local 
authorities contributed approximately 50 percent to financing local 
budgets. In 1979 the figure was about 29 percent. Over the years, 
municipalities have relied on two other methods for raising funds: 
cities such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa used special municipal 
endowment funds, particularly for cultural purposes; and Project 
Renewal, a collaboration among local authorities, government 
ministries, and the Jewish Agency (see Glossary) provided funds 
to rehabilitate deteriorated neighborhoods. 

Local government employees came under the Local Authorities 
Order (Employment Service) of 1962. The statutes pertaining to 
the national Civil Service Commission did not cover them. 

The Local Government Center, a voluntary association of major 
cities and local councils, was originally established in 1936, and 
reorganized in 1956. It represented the interests of local govern- 
ing bodies vis-a-vis the central authorities, government ministries, 
and Knesset committees. It also represented local authorities in 
wage negotiations and signed relevant agreements together with 
the Histadrut and the government. The center organized confer- 
ences and advisory commissions to study professional, budgetary, 
and managerial issues, and it participated in various national com- 
missions. 

Civilian Administration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 

A civilian administration has been set up in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip as an interim measure pending final resolution of 
the political future of these two areas, which are not part of Israel 
proper. While Labor was in power, Israeli-sponsored municipal 



199 



Israel: A Country Study 

elections were held in the West Bank in 1976. The civilian adminis- 
tration of the area until late 1987 employed approximately 13,000 
to 14,000 Palestinian civil servants. The Palestinian uprising 
(intifadah) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that began in De- 
cember 1987, however, had a profound impact on the relationship 
between the civilian administration and the Palestinian inhabitants 
of the occupied territories (see Introduction; Palestinian Uprising, 
December 1987-, ch. 5). 

National Institutions 

As of late 1988, Israel had a number of so-called "nongovern- 
ment public sector" organizations, also known as "national insti- 
tutions." For all practical purposes, they constituted an integral 
part of the government system, performing functions that were vital 
to the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations and to the maintenance of 
Israeli society. Political parties competed for leadership and 
patronage within them. During the Mandate period, these organi- 
zations served as the British administration's officially recognized 
governing bodies for the Jewish community in Palestine. The Jewish 
Agency Executive, for instance, was recognized by the governments 
of Britain, the United States, and other states and international 
organizations, including the United Nations (UN). In the process 
of their work, the organizations acquired considerable experience 
in self-rule, not to mention jealously guarded bureaucratic 
prerogatives. 

These bodies engaged in fund-raising in the Diaspora (see Glos- 
sary), operated social welfare services, and were involved in edu- 
cation and cultural work. They operated enterprises, including 
housing companies; organized immigration; and promoted Zionist 
work. After Israel achieved independence, many of these services 
were taken over by the state, but others remained under the con- 
trol of these well-entrenched organizations. They came to func- 
tion side by side with the government, and their activities often 
overlapped, especially in the field of social welfare services. Until 
the early 1970s, these organizations were almost completely domi- 
nated by Israeli governments; later, the organized representatives 
of Diaspora Jewry began to function more independently. 

World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency 

Principal among these bodies were the World Zionist Organi- 
zation (WZO — see Glossary) and the Jewish Agency. The Jewish 
Agency for Palestine was established in 1929 under the terms of 
the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine as the operative arm 
of the WZO in building a Jewish national homeland. In 1952 the 



200 



Government and Politics 



Knesset enacted the World Zionist Organization-The Jewish Agen- 
cy (Status) Law, defining the WZO as "also the Jewish Agency." 
The 1952 law expressly designated the WZO as "the authorized 
agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the 
development and settlement of the country, the absorption of im- 
migrants from the Diaspora and the coordination of activities in 
Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields." 
The same statute granted tax-exempt status to the Jewish Agency 
and the authority to represent the WZO as its action arm for fund 
raising and, in close cooperation with the government, for the pro- 
motion of Jewish immigration. The specifics of cooperation were 
spelled out in a covenant entered into with the government in 1954. 
The 1954 pact also recognized the WZO and the Jewish Agency 
as official representatives of world Jewry. 

These two bodies played a significant role in consolidating the 
new State of Israel, absorbing and resettling immigrants, and en- 
listing support from, and fostering the unity of, the Diaspora. Their 
activities included organizing immigration, resettling immigrants, 
assisting their employment in agriculture and industry, education, 
raising funds abroad, and purchasing land in Israel for settlers 
through the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet). In princi- 
ple, the WZO was responsible mainly for political and organiza- 
tional matters important to Zionists — Jewish education in the 
Diaspora and supervision of the Jewish National Fund — whereas 
the Jewish Agency's main concern was for financial and economic 
activities. In practice, the division of functions was more often ob- 
scured, resulting in a duplication of efforts and a bureaucratic 
morass. 

In 1971 the relationship between the WZO and the Jewish 
Agency was reconstituted as part of a continuing effort to improve 
the operations of these bodies and to harmonize and strengthen 
ties between the state and the Diaspora. The need for this step was 
thought to be particularly acute after the June 1967 War, when 
contributions to Israel from previously uncommitted sections of 
the Diaspora reached unprecedented proportions. Impressed by 
the show of support, the congress of the WZO, which is usually 
convened every four years, directed the Jewish Agency to initiate 
discussions with all fund-raising institutions working for Israel. The 
purpose of these negotiations was to establish a central framework 
for cooperation and coordination between the Jewish Agency and 
other fund-raising groups. These discussions led to an agreement 
in 1971 whereby the governing bodies of the Jewish Agency 
were enlarged not only to provide equal representation for Israeli 
and Diaspora Jews but also to ensure a balance in geographical 



201 



Israel: A Country Study 

representation. The reconstitution helped to address the long- 
standing grievance of non-Zionist and non-Israeli supporters of 
Israel that the Jewish Agency was dominated by Israel-based 
Zionists. 

Under the 1971 rearrangement, the WZO was separated in terms 
of its functions, but not its leadership, from the Jewish Agency. 
This was necessary because of the restrictive provision of the United 
States tax code pertaining to contributions and gifts. Those of its 
activities that were "political" or otherwise questionable from a 
tax-exemption standpoint had to be grouped separately and placed 
under the WZO. The organization was directed to *' continue as 
the organ of the Zionist movement for the fulfillment of Zionist 
programs and ideals," but its operations were to be confined mainly 
to the Diaspora. Among the main functions of the WZO after 1971 
were Jewish education, Zionist organizational work, information 
and cultural programs, youth work, external relations, rural de- 
velopment, and the activities of the Jewish National Fund. For the 
most part, these functions were financed by funds funneled through 
the Jewish Agency, which continued to serve as the main financial 
arm of the WZO. However, because of United States tax law stipu- 
lations, funds allocated for the WZO by the Jewish Agency were 
required to come from those collected by Keren HaYesod (Israel 
Foundation Fund — see Glossary), the agency's financial arm in 
countries other than the United States. 

The Jewish Agency's task was not only to coordinate various 
fund-raising institutions but also to finance such programs as im- 
migration and land settlement and to assist immigrants in matters 
of housing, social welfare, education, and youth care. The United 
Jewish Appeal (UJA, sometimes designated the United Israel 
Appeal) raised the agency's funds in the United States. In the 1980s, 
contributions and gifts from the United States usually accounted 
for more than two- thirds of the total revenue of the Jewish Agency. 
In 1988 American Jews donated US$357 million to Israel through 
the UJA. 

The Jewish National Fund was the land-purchasing arm of the 
WZO. It dealt mainly with land development issues such as recla- 
mation, afforestation, and road construction in frontier regions. 
Keren HaYesod provided partial funding for programs, which were 
implemented in close cooperation with the Jewish Agency and vari- 
ous government ministries. 

Histadrut 

As of the late 1980s, the Histadrut (HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel 
HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael, General Federation of Laborers in the 



202 



Government and Politics 



Land of Israel) continued to be a major factor in Israeli life as the 
largest voluntary organization in the country. It also wielded an 
enormous influence on the government's wage policy and labor 
legislation, and was influential in political, social, and cultural 
realms (see Distinctive Social Institutions, ch. 2). The largest trade 
union organization, and largest employer in Israel after the govern- 
ment, the Histadrut has opened its membership to almost all oc- 
cupations. Its membership in 1983 was 1,600,000 (including 
dependents), accounting for more than one-third of the total popu- 
lation of Israel and about 85 percent of all wage earners. About 
170,000 Histadrut members were Arabs. Founded in 1920 by Labor 
Zionist parties, traditionally it has been controlled by the Labor 
Party, but not to the exclusion of other parties (see Multiparty Sys- 
tem, this ch.). Almost all political parties or their affiliated socioeco- 
nomic institutions were represented in the organization. 

The Histadrut performed functions that were unique to Israeli 
society, a legacy of its nation-building role in a wide range of eco- 
nomic, trade union, military, social, and cultural activities. Through 
its economic arm, Hevrat HaOvdim (Society of Workers), the 
Histadrut operated numerous economic enterprises and owned and 
managed the country's largest industrial conglomerates. It owned 
the country's second largest bank (Bank HaPoalim) and provided 
the largest and most comprehensive system of health insurance and 
also operated medical and hospital services. In addition, it coordi- 
nated the activities of domestic labor cooperative movements, and 
through its International Department, as well as organizations such 
as the Afro-Asian Institute, it maintained connections with labor 
movements in other countries. 

Israeli political parties have regularly contested elections to the 
Histadrut Conference (Veida), held every four years. They also 
have contested elections to the National Labor Council and to the 
country's seventy- two local labor councils. Voting results in these 
elections have often paralleled or preceded trends in parliamen- 
tary and municipal elections. 

The Histadrut Conference elects a General Council and an 
Executive Committee. The committee in turn elects a forty-three 
member Executive Bureau, which administers day-to-day policy. 
The Histadrut 's secretary general, its most powerful official, is 
elected by the Executive Committee. As in the past, in late 1988 
the Histadrut' s secretary general, Israel Kaissar, was a Labor Party 
leader and a member of its Knesset delegation. 

Political Framework: Elite, Values, and Orientations 

When Israel became independent, its founding political elite, as- 
sociated mainly with Mapai, had almost three decades of experience 



203 



Israel: A Country Study 

in operating self-governing institutions under the British Mandate. 
The top Mapai/Labor Party leaders continued to dominate Israeli 
politics for another three decades. Their paramount influence for 
over half a century as founders, architects, and prime movers of 
a Jewish national homeland has had an enduring effect on their 
successor generation and the political scene in Israel. The elite, 
political culture, social structure, and social makeup of any nation 
entwine in complex ways and in the process shape the character 
and direction of a given political system. This process holds true 
especially in Israel, where ideological imperatives and their institu- 
tionalization have constituted an important part of the country's 
evolution. 

The first generation of Israeli leaders came to Palestine (which 
they called Eretz Yisrael, or Land of Israel) mainly during the Sec- 
ond Aliyah (see Glossary) between 1900 and 1914 (see Labor 
Zionism, ch. 1). The Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin), who 
constituted the majority among the Yishuv's mostly Labor Zionist 
political and socioeconomic elites, were impelled by Zionist ideals. 
The majority held to Labor Zionism, while others adhered to 
moderate General Zionism (sometimes called Political Zionism) or 
right-wing Revisionist Zionism. To the early immigrants, the 
themes promoted by the different Zionist movements provided 
powerful impulses for sociopolitical action. These pioneers were 
essentially Labor Zionists with an abiding faith in the rectitude of 
values that stressed, among other things, the establishment of a 
modern Jewish nation promoting mutual assistance under the prin- 
ciple of "from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his needs," abolition of private ownership of the means of produc- 
tion, and the idea that human consciousness and character were 
conditioned by the social environment. They also held that Jewish 
land should be developed in a collectivist agricultural framework, 
that well-to-do Jews in the Diaspora should materially aid the cause 
of the Jewish homeland, and that the Jews of the Diaspora should 
seek the fullest measure of redemption by immigrating to the new 
Yishuv. In addition, collectivist values of East European and Central 
European origin, in which the founding generation had been so- 
cialized, affected the political orientation of Israel both before and 
after independence. 

The value system of the first generation came to be exemplified 
first and foremost in the communal and egalitarian kibbutz and 
to a lesser extent in the moshav. Together these institutions ac- 
counted for less than 3 percent of the Jewish population at any given 
time, but they have held a special place in Israeli society as the 
citadel of pioneer ideology. They also gave Israel a distinctive 



204 



Government and Politics 



self-image as a robust, dedicated, egalitarian, "farmer- or citizen- 
soldier" society. The kibbutzim also produced numbers of national 
leaders out of proportion to their small population; they also pro- 
vided the country with some of its best soldiers and officers. 

The founding generation of Israeli leaders, including David Ben- 
Gurion, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Berl Katznelson, Moshe Sharett, and 
later, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, in effect shaped the country's 
socioeconomic structures and political patterns. These people were 
instrumental in establishing the original Labor Zionist parties be- 
ginning in 1905, in merging them to establish Mapai in 1930, and 
in organizing the Histadrut and Jewish self-defense institutions, 
such as the Haganah (see Glossary), which later became the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) in 1948. These formative, nation-building 
organizations, along with the quasi-governmental Elected Assem- 
bly (Asefat Hanivharim — see Glossary), the National Council 
(Vaad Leumi), the WZO, and the Jewish Agency, served as the 
Yishuv's national institutions, shaping the character of postindepen- 
dence Israel. 

From its earliest days, Mapai, which had an interlocking leader- 
ship with the Histadrut, dominated Israeli public life, including 
the top echelons of the IDF, the WZO, and the Jewish Agency. 
Its legitimacy as a ruling party was seldom questioned because it 
was identified with the mystique of the Zionist struggle for indepen- 
dence, patriotism, and the successful consolidation of statehood. 
The essentially secular political values espoused by Mapai leaders 
were endorsed by most of the Jewish population. The absence of 
effective alternative governing elites or countervalues within the 
country's multiparty coalition- type government system made it 
difficult to challenge the Mapai-controlled political mainstream. 
Moreover, political patterns from the 1920s until the June 1967 
War generally discouraged the rise of radical right-wing or left- 
wing destabilizing tendencies. This trend was rooted in the over- 
all political dominance of Israel's Labor Party and its predeces- 
sors and the strength of the mutual restraints inherent in Israel's 
political subcultures. 

Mainstream Israeli society is composed of persons who represent 
pluralistic cultural and political backgrounds. Politically, some 
Israeli Jews have liberal West European orientations; others were 
reared in more collectivist Central European and East European 
environments, or in authoritarian Middle Eastern political cultures. 
Some are religiously more traditional than others, but even among 
Orthodox Jews, shades of conviction vary substantially over the 
role of Jewish customary laws and the relationship between the state 
and religion. Thus, the founding generation had to develop a 



205 



Israel: A Country Study 

political system that reconciled and accommodated the varied needs 
of a wide range of groups. 

The political system within Israel proper, excluding the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, is geared to the broadest possible level 
of public participation. Political activities are relatively free, 
although authoritarian and antidemocratic tendencies were evident 
among some of the leaders and supporters of right-wing ultra- 
nationalist parties and factions. In the late 1980s, the impetus to 
"agree to disagree" within the democratic framework of concilia- 
tion began to show some weakening as a result of intense polariz- 
ing controversies over the future of the occupied territories and 
various disputes over issues concerning the state and religion. 

By the early 1970s, Jews of Sephardic origin (popularly referred 
to in Israel as Oriental Jews) outnumbered their Ashkenazic coun- 
terparts as a demographic group. The older Sephardim were, in 
general, from politically authoritarian and religiously traditional 
North African and Middle Eastern societies that regarded the Cen- 
tral European and West European secular and social democratic 
political value spectrum as too modern and far-reaching as com- 
pared to their own. They were accustomed to strong authoritarian 
leaders rather than ideals emphasizing social democratic collecti- 
vism and popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, a sizable proportion 
of Sephardim joined Labor's ranks both as leaders and rank-and- 
file party members. 

Oriental Jews came to be referred to in the 1960s as "the Sec- 
ond Israel" — the numerically larger but socially, culturally, eco- 
nomically, and politically disadvantaged half of the nation (see 
Jewish Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Not all Orientals were economically 
deprived, but nearly all of those who were relatively poor belonged 
to Sephardic communities. The communal gap and attendant ten- 
sions between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews have naturally en- 
gaged the remedial efforts of successive governments, but results 
have fallen far short of Oriental expectations. The problem was 
partly rooted in the country's political institutions and processes. 
Ashkenazic dominance of sociopolitical and economic life had been 
firmly institutionalized before independence. Over the years, how- 
ever, Sephardic representation substantially increased in the coun- 
try's major political parties, and as of the 1980s, Sephardic Jews 
occupied leadership positions in many municipalities. 

Not surprisingly, beginning in the 1950s, most Sephardim tended 
to vote against Mapai and its successor, Labor. Both were per- 
ceived as representing the Ashkenazic establishment, even though 
Sephardim were always represented among the ranks of party 
leaders. In the 1950s and early 1960s, while many Sephardim were 



206 



Government and Politics 



impressed with Ben-Gurion's charismatic and authoritative leader- 
ship, they nevertheless tended to support Herut, the major oppo- 
sition party led by Menachem Begin, whose right-wing populism 
and ultranationalist, anti-Arab national security posture appealed 
to them. Paradoxically, the socialist-inspired social welfare system, 
a system built by Mapai and sustained by Labor and the Labor- 
dominated Histadrut, benefited the Sephardim particularly. In 
general, the Sephardim tended to support the right-wing Gahal/ 
Likud blocs that for years had advocated a substantial modifica- 
tion of the welfare system so as to decrease its socialist emphasis. 
In terms of long-range electoral trends, the Sephardic position did 
not augur well for the Labor Zionist elite of the Labor Party. 

Pressure for greater political representation and power has come 
from the younger, Israeli-born generation of both Ashkenazic and 
Sephardic origins. As a group, they were less obsessed with the 
past than their elders. The youth have been moving toward a strong, 
industrialized, capitalist, Western-style, middle-class society as the 
national norm. Although some younger right-wing ultranationalists 
and right-wing religious advocates continued to be imbued with 
the extremist nationalism and religious messianism of their elders — 
as shown, for example, by their support of parties favoring annex- 
ation of the occupied territories — most of the younger generation 
were more secular, pragmatic, and moderate on such issues. 

The concerns of secular young people went beyond the ques- 
tion of "Who is a Jew" — which they continuously had to confront 
because of right-wing religious pressures — to such critical issues 
as the quality of education, social status, economic conditions, and 
the comforts of modern life. Their primary interests have been how 
to make Israel more secure from external threat and how to im- 
prove the quality of life for all. Nevertheless, for many Israelis, 
the founding ideologies remained a ritualized part of national po- 
litics. 

Urbanization and industrialization were equally potent forces 
of change; their adulterating effect on Israel's founding ideology 
has been particularly significant. They have led to new demands, 
new opportunities, and new stresses in social and economic life af- 
fecting all social and political strata. The older commitment to 
agriculture, pioneering, and collectivism has crumbled before the 
relentless pressure of industrialization and the bridging of the gap 
between urban and rural life. Collective and communal settlements 
have become increasingly industrialized; factories and high- 
technology industries have been set up; the mass media have facil- 
iated an influx of new information and ideas; and additional lay- 
ers of bureaucratic and institutional arrangements have emerged. 



207 



Israel: A Country Study 



Kibbutz idealism, the pride of Israel, has declined, especially among 
increasingly individualistic and consumer-oriented young people. 
To stem this tide and to retain young members, kibbutz federa- 
tions and individual kibbutzim have established many educational 
and vocational programs and activities. 

As the 1970s began, the social base of Israeli politics had be- 
come highly complex, and political fluidity resulted. A major 
catalyst in creating a new mood was the October 1973 War, known 
in Israel as the Yom Kippur War, which dealt a crushing blow 
to popular belief in Israel's strength and preparedness in the face 
of its Arab adversaries (see The October 1973 War, ch. 5). The 
result was a loss of confidence in the political and national security 
elite, headed at the time by Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister 
of Defense Moshe Dayan, and Minister- Without-Portfolio Israel 
Galilee. After the war, in which Egyptian and Syrian forces scored 
military gains, many charges and countercharges concerned inade- 
quate military preparedness. Nevertheless, Meir's government 
returned to power in the country's parliamentary elections held 
on December 31, 1973. Apparently, despite widespread misgiv- 
ings, many Israelis believed that continuity was preferable to change 
and uncertainty under Begin 's newly formed and untried center- 
right Likud Bloc (see The Likud Bloc, this ch.). 

Meir's resignation from the prime ministership in April 1974 
resulted in a succession crisis and the departure of the last of Labor's 
old guard party leaders, mostly in their late sixties and seventies, 
such as Meir, Pinchas Sapir, and Israel Galilee. Meir's departure 
triggered political infighting among the Labor elite, specifically be- 
tween the former Mapai and Rafi (Israel Labor List — see Appen- 
dix B) factions; a new generation centered around the triumvirate 
of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yigal Allon, succeeded Meir. 

The second most striking political development in the 1970s was 
the ascendance of a new right-wing counterelite in May 1977. An 
upset victory in the ninth parliamentary elections, called an "earth- 
quake" by some, brought Begin' s center- right Likud to power, 
ending Labor's half a century of political dominance. The new po- 
litical elite won primarily because of the defection of former Labor 
leaders and previous Labor voters to the Democratic Movement 
for Change (DMC), which had been founded in 1976 by Yigal 
Yadin and several other groups. Despite the subsequent collapse 
of the DMC and the defection of moderates from the Likud-led 
cabinet — for example, former Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman 
formed his own list Yahad (Together — see Appendix B) in 1981 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan created Telem — 
Likud's success in the tenth parliamentary elections of 1981 resulted 



208 



Government and Politics 



from its continued ability to present itself as a viable governing 
group and a party dedicated to ultranationalism and territorial ex- 
pansionism. 

The top echelons of the Israeli political elite as of the late 1980s 
were still predominantly of European background; many of them 
had either immigrated to Palestine during the 1930s and the 1940s 
or had been born in the Yishuv to parents of East European or 
Central European origin. A growing number of Oriental politi- 
cians, however, were making their mark in the top ranks of all the 
major parties and at the ministerial and subministerial levels. A 
majority of the elite had a secular university education, while a 
minority had a more traditional religious education. The political 
elite was overwhelmingly urban — most resided in Tel Aviv, Jerusa- 
lem, or Haifa. A minority, particularly the Sephardim, came from 
the newer development towns. Among the elite who resided in rural 
areas most, especially members of Labor and its satellites, repre- 
sented communal kibbutzim and, to a lesser extent, moshavim. 

By occupational category, professional party politicians consti- 
tuted by far the largest single group, followed, in numerical order, 
by lawyers, kibbutz officials, educators, Histadrut or private sec- 
tor corporate managers, journalists, ex-military officers, and, to 
a lesser degree, functionaries of religious institutions. Many of the 
elite were in the forty-to-mid-sixty age bracket. In 1988 the politi- 
cal elite numbered more than 200 individuals, excluding the broader 
social elite encompassing business, military, religious, educational, 
cultural, and agricultural figures. The number would be greater 
if senior officials in such key offices as the Office of the Prime 
Minister and the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and 
commerce, as well as the Histadrut and its industrial and finan- 
cial enterprises and trade unions, were included. 

The power of individual members of the elite varied depending 
on their personal reputation and their offices. The most influen- 
tial were found in the cabinet. Members of the Knesset came next. 
Elected mayors of large municipalities such as Tel Aviv, Jerusa- 
lem, and Haifa had considerable importance because of the in- 
fluence of local politics on national-level politics. In addition, the 
president, Supreme Court justices, and the head of the Office of 
the State Comptroller had the prestige of cabinet members although 
they lacked decision-making responsibility. 

During the late 1980s, the criteria for entrance into the top elite 
were more open and competitive than previously. Political parties, 
and, to some extent, the civil service, continued to be the prin- 
cipal vehicles for upward mobility. Under the country's electoral 
system of proportional representation, participation in party politics 



209 



Israel: A Country Study 

remained essential for gaining top positions, except in limited cases 
of co-optation from nonparty circles, principally the military. In 
earlier periods, party nominating committees primarily determined 
a politician's entry into a parliamentary delegation; in the 1980s, 
internal party elections increasingly governed this decision. This 
system placed a high premium on partisan loyalty, membership 
in a party faction, and individual competence. 

The political establishment, whether in office or in opposition, 
secularist or Orthodox, left-wing or right-wing, has remained 
basically loyal to the state. Establishment interpretations of classi- 
cal Zionist ideologies have varied according to the adherents' diverse 
backgrounds and political and religious orientations, but internal 
political cleavages have not undermined the essential unity of Israeli 
society and political institutions. Except for certain segments among 
a minority of extremist right-wing religious or secular ultranation- 
alists, most Israeli citizens have sought to maintain democratic 
values and procedures; their differences have centered mainly on 
tactics rather than on the goal of realizing a modern, democratic, 
prosperous social welfare state. 

Multiparty System 

Political power in Israel has been contested within the frame- 
work of multiparty competition. Parliamentary elections are held 
every four years, and, unlike many parliamentary systems, the elec- 
torate votes as a single national constituency. Power has revolved 
around the system of government by coalition led by one of the 
two major parties, or in partnership among them. From the estab- 
lishment of Mapai in 1930 until the 1977 Knesset elections, Labor 
(and its predecessor, Mapai) was the dominant party. Labor's defeat 
in the 1977 Knesset election, however, transformed the dominant 
party system into a multiparty system dominated by two major 
parties, Labor and Likud, in which neither was capable of governing 
except in alliance with smaller parties or, as in 1984 and 1988, in 
alliance with each other. 

Since 1920, when the first Elected Assembly was held, no party 
has been able to command a simple majority in any parliamen- 
tary election. Israel has always had a pluralistic political culture 
featuring at least three major polarizing social and political ten- 
dencies: secular left-of-center, secular right-of-center, and religious 
right-of-center. No single tendency was dominant in the 1980s. 
Political fragmentation, as marked by the proliferation of parties, 
is a long-standing feature of Israeli society. For example, in the 
prestate period, between 1920 and 1944, from twelve to twenty- 
six party lists were represented in the Elected Assembly. In the 



210 



Government and Politics 



first Knesset election in 1949, twenty-four political parties and 
groups competed. Since then the number has fluctuated as a result 
of occasional splits, realignments, and mergers. However, domi- 
nance by two major parties and a multiplicity of smaller parties 
remained deeply embedded in Israeli political culture (for details 
of individual political parties, see Appendix B). 

In addition to political operations, party functions during the 
prestate period included "democratic integration," that is, the pro- 
vision of social, economic, military, and cultural services for party 
members and supporters. During the postindependence period, 
party politics, in particular regarding competition between Labor 
and Likud and their respective allies, continued to be vigorous. 
Many analysts saw signs of a political crisis looming with the emer- 
gence of extremist minor parties and extraparliamentary protest 
movements (e.g., Kach and Gush Emunim). These groups chal- 
lenged the traditional parties on such issues as the roles of the state 
and religion and the future territorial boundaries of the Jewish state. 

Israel's major parties originated from the East European and 
Central European branches of the WZO, founded by Theodor 
Herzl in 1897, and from political and religious groups in the Man- 
date period. For example, a faction called the Democratic Zionists, 
including among its members Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first presi- 
dent, was active in 1900; Mizrahi (Spiritual Center), an Ortho- 
dox religious movement, was founded in 1902; and the non-Marxist 
Labor Zionist HaPoel HaTzair (The Young Worker), was estab- 
lished in 1905. Aaron David Gordon, the latter group's spiritual 
leader, was instrumental in founding the first kibbutz and moshav 
soon after the party's establishment (see Political Zionism, ch. 1). 
Moreover, in 1906 the Marxist Poalei Tziyyon (Workers of Zion — 
see Appendix B) was created to initiate a socialist-inspired class 
struggle in Palestine. Ber Borochov was its ideological mentor, and 
Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi were among its founding leaders. 
Vladimir Jabotinsky founded the right-wing Revisionist Party in 
1925 to oppose what he considered the WZO executive's concilia- 
tory policy toward the British mandatory government and toward 
the pace of overall Zionist settlement activity in Palestine. 

These early, formative experiences in political activity produced 
three major alignments. All were Zionist, but they had varying 
shades of secularism and religious orthodoxy. Two of the align- 
ments were secular but ideologically opposed. The first consisted 
of leftist or socialist labor parties of which Mapai, founded in 1930, 
was the dominant party. The second consisted of centrist-rightist 
parties; Herut (Freedom Movement — see Appendix B), founded 
in 1949, the Revisionist Party's successor and the present Likud's 



211 



Israel: A Country Study 

mainstay, dominated that alignment. Herut, which had become 
part of Likud, eventually won a mandate to govern in 1977 under 
Begin. The third major political alignment consisted of Orthodox 
religious Zionists. A fourth category of minor Zionist parties also 
emerged, traditionally allied with one of the two major alignments; 
non- Zionist communist Arab or nationalist Arab parties constituted 
the fifth grouping. 

In the late 1980s, the stated values of Israeli political parties, 
including religious, communist, Arab nationalist, and mainstream 
parties, could not properly be placed on the left-right or liberal- 
conservative spectrum except, perhaps, on the issue of the future 
of the occupied territories. The positions advocated by Labor, 
Likud, Orthodox religious parties, and the constellation of smaller 
parties allied to them have varied greatly. On the extreme left, the 
most anti-Western element in Israeli politics was Rakah (New Com- 
munist List — see Appendix B), a Moscow-oriented group with a 
contingent of former Sephardic Black Panther activists that appealed 
to Palestinian Arab nationalist sentiment. Of the long-established 
minor parties, the moderate left-of-center Mapam (formally 
Mifleget Poalim Meuchedet, United Workers' Party — see Appendix 
B), which from 1969 to 1984 constituted a faction in the electoral 
alignment with Labor, the Citizens' Rights Movement (see Ap- 
pendix B), and Shinui (Change — see Appendix B), were Labor's 
traditional satellites. Labor, in alignment with Mapam from 1969 
until 1984, favored a negotiated settlement concerning the occupied 
territories involving the exchange of land for peace. 

On the center-right of the political spectrum were Likud and its 
satellite parties, Tehiya, Tsomet, and Moledet. On the fringe right 
was Kach, which the Knesset oudawed in 1988 because of its racist 
platform that wished to expel all Arabs from the occupied territo- 
ries. Likud, especially its Herut component, favored retaining much 
of the occupied territories to regain what it considered to be the 
ancient boundaries of Eretz Yisrael. The positions of the religious 
parties — the National Religious Party (NRP — see Appendix B), 
Agudat Israel, Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians — see Appendix 
B), and Degel HaTorah (Torah Flag — see Appendix B) — generally 
coincided with the right-of-center parties, although the NRP trade- 
union component has continued its alliance with Labor in the 
Histadrut. 

Israeli parties have engaged in many activities even in nonelec- 
tion years. Indoctrination of young people has been important, 
although in the case of the Labor Party it had markedly lessened 
in the 1980s in comparison to the prestate period. Political parties 
retained much of their early character as mutual aid societies. 



212 



Government and Politics 



Consequently, voters have tended to support the country's politi- 
cal parties as a civic duty. Membership in a registered party has 
not been a requirement for voting, but formal party membership 
was high and party members have accounted for 25 to 50 percent 
of the vote. 

Except for small Arab and communist groups, Israeli political 
parties have been basically Zionist in their orientation. Given the 
shades of interpretation inherent in Zionism, parties drew their sup- 
port from adherents who might be secular, religious, or anti- 
religious, adherents of social welfare policies or free enterprise (the 
distinction was not always clear because Mapai/Labor in fact created 
Israel's capitalist economy), advocates of territorial compromise 
or territorial expansion. In general, attempts to organize parties 
on the basis of ethnic origin — for example, in the cases of Yemeni, 
Iraqi, or Moroccan Jews — had been unsuccessful until the early 
1980s, when the Sephardi-based Tami (Traditional Movement of 
Israel — see Appendix B) and Shas were formed. 

With the exception of religious parties, Israeli parties possessed 
national constituencies but also engaged in politics based on ter- 
ritorial subdivisions and local interests. Increasingly during the late 
1980s, local party branches enjoyed greater independence in select- 
ing local personalities in internal party nominations for mayoral, 
municipal council, Histadrut, and Knesset elections, as well as their 
own party's central committees and conventions. This indepen- 
dence resulted in part from the growing tendency to vote on the 
basis of individual merit — mayoral elections, for example, reflected 
an emerging pattern of split-ticket voting — rather than traditional 
party loyalty. This trend, if sustained, was likely to lead to the de- 
centralization of party control, if only to ensure that voters will 
support the same party in national as well as local elections. 

Alignment Parties 

Labor Party 

Until 1977 Mapai and the Labor Party dominated the political 
scene. Labor became Israel's dominant party as a result of its 
predecessors' effective and modernizing leadership during the 
formative prestate period (1917-48). The Labor Party (see Ap- 
pendix B) resulted in 1968 from the merger of Mapai, Ahdut 
HaAvoda (Unity of Labor — see Appendix B), and Rafi (see fig. 11). 
In addition, shortly before the 1969 elections an electoral Align- 
ment (Maarakh) occurred between Labor and the smaller Mapam 
Party. Although the two parties retained their organizational 



213 



Israel: A Country Study 





214 



Government and Politics 







CC > 


< 




O i- 


CL 




m cc 


< 




< ^ 






_l CL 








> 






l- 






LABOR PAR 

(1984) 


APA 
1984 




2 — 








z 

LU 
UJ 2 

> LU 
CO > 
CO O 

01 _l 
< 



LU > 

DC 
Q_ 




3 

t 

CO 
CO 
I 

CO 



215 



Israel: A Country Study 



independence, they shared a common slate in elections to the Knes- 
set, the Histadrut, and local government offices. The Alignment 
lasted until 1984. 

Labor's political dominance broke down, particularly following 
the June 1967 War, when the party split over its leaders' inability 
to reach a consensus concerning the future of the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula; there was agreement only on 
the need to retain the Golan Heights to ensure strategic depth 
against Syria. Later, the October 1973 War dealt a blow to public 
confidence in Labor from which its leadership was unable to recover. 
The war also exacerbated a number of crises confronting the partv 
such as those concerning leadership succession. Although the party 
survived the Knesset elections of December 31 . 1973, with a slightly 
reduced plurality, the war led to the resignation of Prime Minister 
Meir's government on April 10. 1974. The new leadership team 
of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yigal Allon, which assumed 
power in June 1974, proved unable to govern effectively or to resolve 
major issues such as the future of the occupied territories. Follow- 
ing its electoral defeat in the 1977 Knesset elections, the Labor Party 
provided the principal opposition to Likud in the elections of 1981 . 
1984, and 1988. In the 1988 Knesset elections, the Labor Party, 
despite its efforts to present a revived platform advocating territorial 
compromise, gained only thirty-nine seats, down from fortv-four 
m 1984. 

In 1988 the dominant personalities in Labor, in addition to Peres 
and Rabin, included former president Yitzhak Navon. former IDF 
Chief of Staff Moredechai Gur, and former Likud Defense Minister 
Ezer Weizman, who joined Labor in preparation for the 1984 elec- 
tions. Labor's biggest problem in the 1980s has been the gradual 
decline in its electoral support among growing segments in the elec- 
torate, notably Orientals and the young. 

Map am 

A moderate, left-of-center Labor Zionist party. Map am has had 
representatives in the Knesset since the inception of the state; it 
won three seats in the November 1988 Knesset elections. Opposi- 
tion to the formation of the unity government in September 1984 
led Mapam to withdraw from its fifteen-year-long electoral align- 
ment with Labor. The 1988 Knesset elections represented the first 
time in twenty years that Mapam had contested an election indepen- 
dently. Mapam 's top leaders included the party's secretary gen- 
eral, Elazar Granot, and Knesset member Yair Tzaban. 

Mapam has advocated a strong national security and defense 
posture, with many of its members playing leading roles in the IDF. 



216 



Government and Politics 



At the same time, it has urged continuing peace initiatives and ter- 
ritorial compromise, and has opposed the permanent annexation 
of the territories occupied in the June 1967 War beyond minimal 
border changes designed to provide Israel with secure and defen- 
sible boundaries. Mapam has long believed in Jewish-Arab coex- 
istence and friendship as a means of hastening peace between Israel, 
the Palestinians, and the Arab states. 

Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM) 

Founded in 1973 by Shulamit Aloni, a former Labor Party Knes- 
set member, the CRM has played an active role in calling for 
strengthening civil rights in Israel, particularly regarding issues in- 
volving the boundaries between the state and religion, and in ad- 
vocating a peace setdement with the Palestinians and the Arab states 
based on territorial compromise. In the 1988 Knesset elections, 
the party increased its representation to five seats, compared with 
three in 1984. The party has traditionally allied itself with Labor, 
although it has refused to join Labor in unity governments with 
Likud. The CRM received considerable support from the coun- 
try's liberal community, and prominent among its leaders were 
Knesset members Yossi Sarid (formerly of the Labor Party); Ran 
Cohen, a high-ranking reservist in the IDF; and Mordechai Bar- 
On and Dudy Zucker, leaders of the Peace Now (see Appendix B) 
movement. 

Shinui (Change) 

Founded in 1977 by Amnon Rubenstein, a law professor at Tel 
Aviv University and a columnist for Ha 'aretz, Shinui represented 
a large faction in the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC). 
The DMC won fifteen seats and played a major role in toppling 
the Labor Party in the 1977 Knesset elections. Within less than 
three years, however, the DMC broke up over the issue of con- 
tinued participation in the Likud government. During the next 
decade Shinui served as an ally of Labor and was a leading advo- 
cate for constitutional and electoral reform and greater flexibility 
on the Palestinian problem. In the November 1988 elections, 
Shinui 's Knesset representation declined from three to two seats. 

The Likud Bloc 

In the ninth Knesset elections in May 1977, the center-right 
Likud alliance emerged victorious and replaced the previously 
dominant Labor alignment for the first time in the history of in- 
dependent Israel. The Likud Bloc, founded in 1973, consisted of 
the Free Center, Herut (Tnuat HaHerut or Freedom Movement — 



217 



Israel: A Country Study 



see Appendix B), Laam (For the Nation — see Appendix B), and 
Gahal (Freedom- Liberal Bloc — see Appendix B). In large part, 
Likud was the direct ideological descendant of the Revisionist 
Party, established by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1925 (see Revisionist 
Zionism, ch. 1). 

The Revisionist Party, so named to underscore the urgency of 
revision in the policies of the WZO's executive, advocated militancy 
and ultranationalism as the primary political imperatives of the 
Zionist struggle for Jewish statehood. The Revisionist Party 
demanded that the entire mandated territory of historical Pales- 
tine on both sides of the Jordan River, including Transjordan, im- 
mediately become a Jewish state with a Jewish majority. Revisionist 
objectives clashed with the policies of the British authorities, Labor 
Zionists, and Palestinian Arabs. The Revisionist Party, in which 
Menachem Begin played a major role, contended that the British 
must permit unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and 
demanded that the Jewish Legion be reestablished and that Jew- 
ish youths be trained for defense. 

The Revisionist Party also attacked the Histadrut, whose Labor 
Zionist leadership under Ben-Gurion was synonymous with the 
leadership of the politically dominant Mapai. Ben-Gurion accused 
the revisionists of being "fascists"; the latter countercharged that 
the policies being pursued by Ben-Gurion and his Labor Zionist 
allies, including Chaim Weizmann, were so conciliatory toward 
the British authorities and Palestinian Arabs and so gradual in terms 
of state-building as to be self-defeating. 

In 1933 the Revisionist Party seceded from the WZO and formed 
the rival New Zionist Organization. After 1936 the revisionists re- 
jected British and official Zionist policies of restraint in the face 
of Arab attacks, and they formed two anti-British and anti-Arab 
guerrilla groups. One, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military 
Organization, Irgun for short) was formed in 1937; an offshoot 
of the Irgun, the Stern Gang also known as Lehi (from Lohamei 
Herut Israel, Fighters for Israel's Freedom), was formed in 1940 
(see Historical Background, ch. 5). These revisionist paramilitary 
groups operated independently of, and at times in conflict with, 
the official Zionist defense organization, the Haganah; they en- 
gaged in systematic terror and sabotage against the British authori- 
ties and the Arabs. 

After independence Prime Minister Ben-Gurion dissolved the 
Irgun and other paramilitary organizations such as Lehi and the 
Palmach (see Glossary). In 1948 remnants of the dissolved Irgun 
created Herut. 



218 




"WOULD YOU TRUST HIM (SHAMIR) AS A SHIP CAPTAIN?! 



November 1988 election flyer of the Young Guard 
faction of the Labor Party. The flag reads "Annexed!" 

In the mid-1960s, Herut took steps to broaden its political base 
and attain greater legitimacy. In 1963 it established the Blue-White 
(Tehelet-Lavan) faction to contest the previously boycotted 
Histadrut elections. In 1965 Herut and the Liberal Party (see 
Appendix B) formed Gahal (Gush Herut-Liberalim), a parliamen- 
tary and electoral bloc, to contest both Knesset and Histadrut elec- 
tions. The final step in gaining greater political legitimacy occurred 
just before the outbreak of the June 1967 War, when Begin and 
his Gahal associates agreed to join the government to demonstrate 
internal Israeli unity in response to an external threat. 

Gahal continued as part of the Meir cabinet formed after the 
1969 elections. Gahal ministers withdrew from the cabinet in 1970 
to protest what they believed to be Prime Minister Meir's concilia- 
tory policy on territorial issues (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). 
In the summer of 1973, Gahal organized the Likud alignment in 
which Herut continued to be preeminent. 

In the November 1988 elections, Likud lost one Knesset seat. 
Nevertheless, observers believed that demographic indicators fa- 
vored continued support for Likud and its right-wing allies among 
young people and Orientals. 

The most prominent leaders of Likud in 1988, as in previous 
years, were members of its Herut faction. They included Prime 
Minister Shamir; Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Arens, a likely 



219 



Israel: A Country Study 

successor to Shamir as leader of Herut; Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Housing David Levi, the chief Sephardic political 
figure; Minister of Commerce and Industry Ariel Sharon; and 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Benjamin Netanyahu. 

Religious Parties 

Israel's religious parties were originally organized not to seize 
the reins of power, but rather to engage in what American scholar 
Norman L. Zucker has called "theopolitics" — to gain theological 
ends by means of political activity. From the Orthodox viewpoint, 
Israel remained an imperfect state as long as secular rather than 
religiously observant Jews constituted a majority. As of 1988, policy 
issues concerning religious parties included the question of ' ' Who 
is a Jew," maintaining Orthodox rabbinical control over marriage 
and divorce, increasing sabbath observance, observing kosher 
dietary regulations, maintaining and expanding the state religious 
education systems, ensuring the exemption of religious women and 
ultra-Orthodox men from military service, and such social issues 
as abortion. 

Despite the minority position of adherents of Orthodox Juda- 
ism, several factors have enabled this religious bloc to maintain 
a central role in the state. Such factors have included the links be- 
tween Judaism and Israeli nationalism; the political and organiza- 
tional power of the religious parties — particularly the NRP and 
later Agudat Israel and Shas — in assuming a pivotal role in the 
formation and maintenance of coalition governments; and the in- 
ability of the Reform and Conservative Jewish religious movements, 
although powerful in the Jewish Diaspora, to penetrate effectively 
Israel's religious administrative apparatus. This apparatus consisted 
particularly of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Chief Rab- 
binate, the Chief Rabbinical Council, and local religious councils. 
The Reform and Conservative movements played a minor role in 
Zionism during the prestate period and thus allowed the Ortho- 
dox to dominate religious activities in the new state. Among the 
Orthodox there were varying forms of religious observance in 
accordance with halakah. The main division was between the ultra- 
Orthodox, who rejected Zionism and were associated with Agudat 
Israel and Shas, and the modern Orthodox, who attempted to recon- 
cile Zionism and religious orthodoxy and were associated with the 
NRP. 

Taken together, Israel's religious parties have over the years 
generally commanded from fifteen to eighteen seats in the Knes- 
set, or about 12 to 15 percent of the Knesset. On occasion they 
have formed religious coalitions of their own, such as the United 



220 



Government and Politics 



Religious Front (see Appendix B) and the Torah Religious Front 
(see Appendix B). The voter strength of the religious parties, par- 
ticularly the NRP, made them ideal coalition partners for the two 
major blocs. Because neither bloc has ever been able to achieve 
a majority in the Knesset, the potentially pivotal position of the 
religious parties has given them disproportionate political power. 
One of the greatest shocks of the 1988 Knesset elections was the 
surprising increase in strength of the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox 
parties, which went from thirteen to eighteen Knesset seats. 

National Religious Party 

The National Religious Party, Israel's largest religious party, 
resulted in 1956 from the merger of its two historical antecedents, 
Mizrahi (Spiritual Center — see Appendix B) and HaPoel HaMiz- 
rahi (Spiritual Center Worker — see Appendix B). The NRP (as 
Mizrahi prior to 1956) has participated in every coalition govern- 
ment since independence. Invariably the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Interior, have been headed by 
Knesset members nominated by this party. 

Although the NRP increased from four to five Knesset seats in 
the 1988 elections, it had not fully recovered from major political 
and electoral setbacks suffered in the 1981 and 1984 elections. In 
those elections, much of its previous electoral support shifted to 
right-wing religio-nationalist parties. As a sign of its attempted 
recovery, in July 1986 the NRP held its first party convention since 
1973. The long interval separating the two conventions was caused 
by factional struggles between the younger and the veteran leader- 
ship groups. In the 1986 convention, the NRP's second genera- 
tion of leaders, members of the Youth Faction, officially took over 
the party's institutions and executive bodies. The new NRP leader 
was Knesset member Zevulun Hammer, former minister of edu- 
cation and culture in the Likud cabinet (1977-84) and secre- 
tary general of the party (1984-86). In 1986 Hammer succeeded 
long-time member Yosef Burg as minister of religious affairs in 
the National Unity Government. Hammer and Yehuda Ben- 
Meir, coleader of the Youth Faction until 1984, were among the 
founders of Gush Emunim in 1974 (see Extraparliamentary Religio- 
Nationalist Movements, this ch.). Both leaders somewhat moder- 
ated their views on national security, territorial, and settlement 
issues following Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but the NRP's 
declining political and electoral position and the increasing radicali- 
zation of its religiously based constituency led to a reversal in Ham- 
mer's views. As a result, in the 1986 party convention the Youth 
Faction helped incorporate into the NRP the religio-nationalist 



221 



Israel: A Country Study 

Morasha (Heritage), which was led by Rabbi Chaim Druckman 
and held two seats in the Knesset. In return, Rabbi Yitzhak Levi, 
the third candidate on the Morasha Knesset list, became the NRP's 
new secretary general. Moroccan-born Levi has been a fervent sup- 
porter of Gush Emunim and an advocate of incorporating the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip into a greater Israel. 

Until the 1986 party convention, the dominant faction in the 
NRP was LaMifneh (To the Turning Point). The center-most fac- 
tion, LaMifneh advocated greater pragmatism and ideological 
pluralism. Burg, a Knesset member since 1949, who had held a 
variety of cabinet portfolios including interior (1974-84) and reli- 
gious affairs (1982-86), led LaMifneh. Burg and Rafael Ben-Natan, 
former party organization strongman, were responsible for main- 
taining the "historical partnership" with the Labor Party that offi- 
cially ended in 1977, but continued in some municipal councils 
and in the Histadrut. 

In the 1988 internal party elections, the NRP took a number 
of steps to regain the support of segments of the Oriental Ortho- 
dox electorate that were lost to Tami in 1981 and, to a lesser ex- 
tent, to Shas in 1988. The party also sought to regain the support 
of right-wing religious ultranationalists. In the internal party elec- 
tions, the NRP nominated Moroccan-born Avner Sciaki for the 
top spot on its Knesset list, Zevulun Hammer for the second posi- 
tion, and Hanan Porat, a leader of Gush Emunim and formerly 
of Tehiya, in the third spot. As a result of these steps, the NRP 
attained greater ideological homogeneity and competed with Tehiya 
and Kach for the electoral support of the right-wing ultranation- 
alist religious community. 

Agudat Israel 

During the prestate period, Agudat Israel, founded in 1912, op- 
posed both the ideology of Zionism and its political expression, the 
World Zionist Organization. It rejected any cooperation with non- 
Orthodox Jewish groups and considered Zionism profane in that 
it forced the hand of the Almighty in bringing about the redemp- 
tion of the Jewish people. A theocratic and clericalist party, Agudat 
Israel has exhibited intense factionalism and religious extremism. 
From 1955 to 1961 Agudat Israel formed a part of the Torah Reli- 
gious Front (see Appendix B). Traditionally, the party's Knesset 
delegation has consisted only of Ashkenazi factions, although ultra- 
Orthodox Orientals also provided it considerable electoral support. 

In preparation for the 1984 Knesset elections, grievances over 
a lack of representation in party institutions caused Orientals to 
defect and establish Shas. As a result, Agudat Israel's Knesset 



222 



Government and Politics 



representation declined from four to two seats. In the 1988 Knes- 
set elections, as part of an ultra-Orthodox electoral upswing, the 
Shas Knesset delegation increased from two to six seats. 

The Council of Torah Sages, a panel of rabbis to which both 
religious and secular decisions had to be referred, contained 
representatives of each faction in Agudat Israel. The main factions 
represented two Hasidic (ultra-Orthodox) courts: the court of the 
Rabbi of Gur, which dominated the party and the Council of Torah 
Sages; and the court of Rabbi Eliezer Shakh. 

Agudat Israel engaged in ultra-Orthodox educational and so- 
cial welfare activities, as well as in immigrant absorption. It usually 
took the lead in initiating legislation on religious issues. The party 
has obtained exemptions from military service for its adherents. 

Shas 

Shas resulted in 1984 from allegations of Agudat Israel's inade- 
quate representation of ultra-Orthodox Sephardim in the Council 
of Torah Sages, the party organization, and educational and so- 
cial welfare institutions. The leader of Shas was Rabbi Yitzhak 
Peretz, who served as minister of interior in the National Unity 
Government until his protest resignation in 1987. As a theocratic 
party, Shas depended heavily for policy direction on its patrons, 
former Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, and Rabbi Eliezer 
Shakh, former Ashkenazi head of the Agudat Israel-dominated 
Council of Torah Sages. Rabbi Shakh sanctioned the formation 
of Shas and its division into separate Sephardi and Ashkenazi fac- 
tions. In the negotiations to form the National Unity Government 
in 1984, Shas outmaneuvered the NRP and gained the Ministry 
of Interior portfolio. As minister of interior, Rabbi Peretz became 
a source of controversy as a result of his promoting religious fun- 
damentalism in general and the narrow partisan interests of Shas 
in particular. 

Unlike Agudat Israel, Shas saw no contradiction between its re- 
ligious beliefs and Zionism. It was far more anti-Arab than Agudat 
Israel and sought increased representation for its adherents in all 
government bodies, in Zionist institutions, and in the Jewish 
Agency. Despite its ethnic homogeneity, Shas was not immune from 
bitter infighting over the spoils of office, as shown by the rivalry 
between factions led by Rabbi Peretz and Rabbi Arieh Dari, leader 
of the party's apparatus, who remained director general of the 
Ministry of Interior until the National Unity Government's term 
ended in 1988. Shas gained four Knesset seats in the 1984 elec- 
tions and increased the size of its delegation to six in 1988. In late 



223 



Israel: A Country Study 

1988, it actually held eight Knesset seats when combined with the 
two seats gained by Degel HaTorah, a Shas Ashkenazi faction 
formed in 1988. 

Central Religious Camp 

In 1988 Rabbi Yehuda Amital of Jerusalem formed a new moder- 
ate religious party, the Central Religious Camp, in an attempt to 
counteract the growing popularity of right-wing ultranationalist 
religious parties. Rabbi Tovah Lichtenstein had the second posi- 
tion on the party's Knesset list. The party failed, however, to gain 
the minimum 1 percent of votes required for Knesset representation. 

Right-Wing Ultranationalist Parties 

Tehiya (Renaissance — see Appendix B), an ultranationalist 
party, arose in 1979 in reaction to NRP and Likud support for 
the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty of Peace Be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. The party consisted of religious and secu- 
lar leaders and activists of Gush Emunim and the Land of Israel 
Movement. The leaders and parliamentary representatives of 
Tehiya were Yuval Neeman, party chairman and former minister 
of science and technology in the Likud-led cabinet (1981-84); Geula 
Cohen, formerly of Herut; Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, head of the 
Kiryat Arba Yeshiva; Gershon Shafet; and Kiryat Arba's ultra- 
nationalist attorney Eliakim Haetzni. Former IDF Chief of Staff 
Rafael Eitan ranked among the party's leaders until 1984, when 
he left to form his own list, Tsomet. Tehiya' s platform advocated 
the eventual imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip and the transfer of the Palestinian inhabitants 
of these territories to Arab countries. In the 1984 elections, Tehiya 
gained five Knesset seats, an increase of two from 1981. In 1988, 
however, Tehiya lost two seats to the newly formed Tsomet and 
Moledet parties. 

Tsomet (Crossroads) was an extreme right-wing ultranationalist 
party founded in 1984 by Eitan. It gained two seats in the 1988 
Knesset elections. 

Moledet (Homeland) ran in 1988 on an extremist platform ad- 
vocating the forcible "transfer" of Palestinian Arabs from the West 
Bank to Arab states. Led by retired IDF General Rehavam 
(Ghandi) Zeevi, the party won two seats in the 1988 Knesset 
elections. 

Kach (Thus), another ultranationalist party, came into being 
around Rabbi Meir Kahane, an American-born right-wing Ortho- 
dox extremist. Characterized as an internal dictatorship under 
Kahane, Kach has advocated the forcible expulsion of Arabs from 



224 



Government and Politics 



Israel and the occupied territories, followed by the imposition of 
Israeli sovereignty there. A number of second-echelon party leaders 
have been implicated in Kach- supported terrorist activities. A ter- 
rorist attack on a bus carrying Arab passengers on Mount Hebron, 
near the town of Hebron, caused the imprisonment of Yehuda 
Richter, in second place on the Kach Knesset list. Avner Ozen, 
number four on Kach's 1984 list, was also imprisoned on terrorist 
charges. To counteract Kach's inflammatory political activities, 
in 1988 Likud and the Citizens' Rights Movement succeeded in 
passing a Basic Law empowering the Central Elections Board to 
prohibit a party advocating racism from contesting parliamentary 
elections in Israel and Kach was outlawed from participating in 
the November 1988 elections. Kach, largely funded by American 
supporters, had gained one seat in the 1984 elections after several 
earlier unsuccessful attempts to enter the Knesset. 

Extraparliamentary Religio-Nationalist Movements 

Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), a right-wing ultranation- 
alist, religio-political revitalization movement, was formed in March 
1974 in the aftermath of the October 1973 War. The younger gener- 
ation of NRP leaders who constituted the party's new religious elite 
created Gush Emunim. Official links between Gush Emunim and 
the Youth Faction of the National Religious Party were severed 
following the NRP's participation in the June 1974 Labor-led coa- 
lition government, but close unofficial links between the two groups 
continued. Gush Emunim also maintained links to Tehiya and fac- 
tions in the Herut wing of Likud. 

The major activity of Gush Emunim has been to initiate Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. From 1977 
to 1984, Likud permitted the launching of a number of Jewish set- 
tlements beyond the borders of the Green Line (see Glossary). The 
Likud regime gave Gush Emunim the active support of govern- 
ment departments, the army, and the WZO, which recognized it 
as an official settlement movement and allocated it considerable 
funds for settlement activities. 

A thirteen-member secretariat has governed Gush Emunim. A 
special conference elected nine of the group's secretaries and 
co-opted the other four from the leadership ranks of its affiliated 
organizations. Four persons have managed the movement's day- 
to-day affairs: Rabbi Moshe Levinger, a founder of Gush Emunim 
and the leader of the Jewish town of Kiryat Arba, near Hebron, 
on the West Bank; Hanan Porat, a founder of the organization 
and a former Tehiya Knesset member who later rejoined the 
NRP; Uri Elitzur, secretary general of Amana, Gush Emunim's 



225 



Israel: A Country Study 



settlement movement; and Yitzhak Armoni, secretary general of 
Gush Emunim since September 1988. From 1984 to August 1988, 
American-born Daniella Weiss served as Gush Emunim' s secre- 
tary general. 

Amana was Gush Emunim 's settlement arm. The Council of 
Settlements in Judea and Samaria (Yesha), chaired by Israel Harel, 
was the political organization representing the majority of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There were more 
than eighty such settlements, including those affiliated with non- 
religious parties. Yesha dealt primarily with practical matters, such 
as the utilization of land and water, relations with Israeli military 
authorities and, if necessary, mobilizing political pressure on the 
government. Yesha has created affiliations between Gush Emu- 
nim settlements and Labor, the NRP, and Herut's Betar youth 
movement. Two factors shape Yesha, a democratically elected po- 
litical organization: the right-wing and ultranationalist views of its 
members and its political dependency on external bodies such as 
government agencies. The group had five councils in Israel proper 
and six regional councils in the occupied territories. 

Arab Parties 

Israel's approximately 781,350 Arabs, constituting about 17.8 
percent of the population, articulated their views through elected 
officials on the municipal and national levels and through the Arab 
departments within governmental ministries and nongovernmen- 
tal institutions such as the Histadrut. In the past, most elected Arab 
officials traditionally affiliated with the Labor Party and its predeces- 
sors, which expected — erroneously as time has proved — that Israeli 
Arabs would serve as a "bridge" in creating peace among Israeli 
Jews, the Palestinians, and the Arab world. Beginning in the 
mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s, increasing numbers of Arab 
voters, especially younger ones, asserted themselves through or- 
ganizations calling for greater protection of minority rights and the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Generally, Israeli Arabs re- 
mained attached to their religious, cultural, and political values, 
but their ethnic homogeneity has not necessarily resulted in politi- 
cal cohesion. Internal fissures among Christians, Sunni Muslims, 
and Druzes, Negev beduins and Galilee Arabs, and communist 
and noncommunist factions have made it difficult for them to act 
as a single pressure group in dealing with Israel's Jewish majority. 

In 1988, despite their natural sympathy for the year-long upris- 
ing by their fellow Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, Israeli Arabs continued to be active participants in the Israeli 
electoral system. They increased their share in the total 1988 Knesset 



226 



Government and Politics 



vote to more than 10 percent of the electorate, and the voting per- 
centage among those eligible to participate was approximately 74 
percent, as compared to 80 percent for Jewish voters. Israeli Arabs 
increased their voting support for Arab lists from 50 percent in 1 984 
to 60 percent in 1988. 

As of 1988, Rakah (New Communist List), a predominantly 
Arab communist party, continued to adhere to the official Soviet 
line, yet explicitly recognized Israel's right to exist within its 
pre-1967 borders. Rakah succeeded Poalei Tziyyon, part of which 
split off in 1921 and became the Communist Party of Palestine. 
In 1948 it became the Communist Party of Israel, Miflaga 
Komunistit Yisraelit, known as Maki (see Appendix B), and in 
1965 it split into two factions: Rakah with mainly Arab member- 
ship, and Maki, with mainly Jewish membership. In 1977 Maki 
and several other groups created Shelli (acronym for Peace for Israel 
and Equality for Israel), which disbanded before the 1984 elections. 
In the November 1988 elections, Rakah maintained its relatively 
constant share of 40 percent of the total Arab vote and four Knes- 
set seats. In 1988 the party's secretary general was Meir Vilner, 
a veteran Israeli communist. 

Within the Israeli Arab community, Rakah' s strongest challenges 
came from two more radical parties, the Palestinian nationalist Sons 
of the Village, which had no Knesset seats, and the Progressive 
National Movement. The Progressive National Movement, also 
known as the Progressive List for Peace, came into being in 1984. 
Its platform advocated recognition of the PLO and the establish- 
ment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
In the November 1988 elections, the party, led by Muhammad 
Muari, received about 15 percent of the Arab vote; its Knesset dele- 
gation declined to one from the 1984 level of two. 

The Arab Democratic Party, founded in early 1988 by Abdul 
Wahab Daroushe, a former Labor Party Knesset member, gained 
about 12 percent of the total Arab vote and one seat in the Novem- 
ber 1988 Knesset elections. In a March 1988 interview, Daroushe 
acknowledged that his resignation from the Labor Party resulted 
from the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
and the "diminishing choices" open to Israeli Arab politicians 
affiliated with the government and yet tied to the Arab communi- 
ty by a sense of shared ethnic identity. Echoing the sentiments of 
other Israeli Arabs, Daroushe has stated that "The PLO is the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians" living outside Israel's 
pre-1967 borders. 

Interest Groups 

Major interest groups in Israel influencing the formulation of 



227 



Israel: A Country Study 



public policy have included the politically powerful Histadrut, the 
kibbutzim, and the moshavim, all of which were affiliated with or 
represented in most of the political parties. Reportedly, one of the 
main reasons for Labor to join the National Unity Government 
in 1988 was the opportunity for Peres, as minister of finance and 
chairman of the Knesset's Finance Committee, to bail out the 
Histadrut, the kibbutzim, and the moshavim, which were billions 
of dollars in debt. 

As of the late 1980s, other economically oriented interest groups 
included employer organizations and artisan and retail merchant 
associations. In addition, there were major groups concerned with 
promoting civil rights, such as the Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel and the Association for Beduin Rights in Israel. Numbered 
among groups concerned with political issues such as the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, were movements such as Peace Now and Gush 
Emunim. 

Furthermore, Diaspora Jewry might be considered, in the words 
of Canadian scholar Michael Brecher, an externally based foreign 
policy interest group. In the late 1980s, Diaspora Jewry, and es- 
pecially American Jewry, had become increasingly critical of Israeli 
government policy, particularly over the handling of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, and issues concerning religion and the state. 

Prospects for Electoral Reform 

The structural crisis facing the Israeli political system has been 
attributed to a number of factors. Such factors include the absence 
of a written constitution that provides for the separation of state and 
religion and safeguards the rights of the individual. Another factor 
often cited is the country's inability to form effective coalition govern- 
ments and cabinets — a phenomenon caused by a breakdown of the 
dominant party system and the resulting inability of any one major 
party to garner a parliamentary majority. As a consequence, in form- 
ing coalitions each major party has had to depend heavily on smaller 
parties bent on promoting their own narrow interests. 

Various reforms have been proposed to blunt the disruptive role 
of minor parties. One suggestion is to change the electoral system 
of pure proportional representation by raising the minimum per- 
centage threshold required to obtain a Knesset seat. One of the 
most comprehensive studies of this problem, The Political System in 
Israel: Proposals for Change, edited by Baruch Zisar, argues that the 
negative features of the Israeli electoral system have so far out- 
weighed its positive attributes. The study concludes that individ- 
ual district constituencies may offer Israel the best form of electoral 
representation. 



228 



Government and Politics 

Following the stalemated results of the November 1988 Knesset 
elections, a committee composed of representatives of the two major 
parties was set up to study changes in the proportional representa- 
tion system. In a newspaper interview, Shimon Peres admitted that 
"The democratic system in Israel has reached a point in which 
it has begun to be ineffective and a change is demanded in the elec- 
toral system." 

Civil-Military Relations 

The supremacy of civilian authorities over the military has rarely 
been challenged in Israel's history. The Lavon affair of 1954 re- 
mains the major exception (see The Emergence of the IDF, ch. 1). 
Factors weighing against military interference have included the 
prohibition on active officers engaging in politics and the popula- 
tion's broad support for the nonpartisan behavior of the armed 
forces. Given the ever-present external threat to Israeli security, 
however, the military looms large in everyday life. This has led 
some foreign observers to call Israel a "garrison democracy." The 
military has also served as a channel into politics, with political 
activity providing a "second career" for retired or reservist officers 
after they complete their military careers, usually between the ages 
of forty and fifty. This phenomenon has left its mark on Israeli 
politics as high-ranking retired or reservist IDF figures have often 
"parachuted" into the leadership ranks of political parties and pub- 
lic institutions. 

The most frequent instances of this tendency have occurred dur- 
ing the demobilization of officers in postwar periods, for example, 
following the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars. Until the June 1967 War, 
the great majority of reservist or retired officers joined Labor's 
ranks. In the 1950s, the first generation of such officers included 
Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Yigal Yadin, Israel Galilee, and Chaim 
Herzog. After 1967, the number of such officers co-opted into the 
political elite rose sharply, with many for the first time joining 
center-right parties. Among those joining the Labor Party were 
Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Bar- Lev {bar, son of — see Glossary), Aha- 
ron Yariv, and Meir Amit. Ezer Weizman, Ariel (Arik) Sharon, 
Mordechai Zipori, and Shlomo Lahat joined Likud. Despite their 
widespread participation in politics, these ex-military officers have 
not formed a distinct pressure group. The armed forces have gener- 
ally remained shielded from partisan politics. The only possible 
exception was the IDF's military action in Lebanon in June 1982, 
which disregarded the cabinet's decision on the limits of the ad- 
vance. The invasion occurred while Ariel Sharon was minister of 
defense (1981-83) and Rafael Eitan was chief of staff (1979-83); 



229 



Israel: A Country Study 

both individuals had stressed the independent policy role of the 
IDF (see The Military in Political Life, ch. 5). 

Foreign Relations 

The cabinet, and particularly the inner cabinet, consisting of the 
prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and 
other selected ministers, are responsible for formulating Israel's 
major foreign policy decisions. Within the inner cabinet, the prime 
minister customarily plays the major role in foreign policy deci- 
sion making, with policies implemented by the minister of foreign 
affairs. Other officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include, 
in order of their rank, the director general, assistant directors gen- 
eral, legal and political advisers, heads of departments, and heads 
of missions or ambassadors. While the director general may initi- 
ate and decide an issue, commit the ministry by making public 
statements, and respond directly to queries from ambassadors, as- 
sistant directors general supervise the implementation of policy. 
Legal and political advisers have consultative, not operational, roles. 
Heads of departments serve as aides to assistant directors general, 
administer the ministry's departments, and maintain routine contact 
with envoys. The influence of ambassadors depends on their sta- 
tus within the diplomatic service and the importance to the minis- 
try's policy makers of the nation to which they are accredited. 

In the Knesset, the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, with 
twenty-six members, although prestigious, is not as independent 
as the foreign affairs committees of the United States Congress. 
Its role, according to Samuel Sager, an Israeli Knesset official, is 
not to initiate new policies, but to "legitimize Government policy 
choices on controversial issues." Members of the committee fre- 
quently complain that they do not receive detailed information dur- 
ing briefings by government officials; government spokesmen reply 
that committee members tend to leak briefing reports to the media. 

Israeli foreign policy is chiefly influenced by Israel's strategic 
situation, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the rejection of Israel by 
most of the Arab states. The goals of Israeli policy are therefore 
to overcome diplomatic isolation and to achieve recognition and 
friendly relations with as many nations as possible, both in the Mid- 
dle East and beyond. Like many other states, throughout its his- 
tory Israel has simultaneously practiced open and secret diplomacy 
to further its main national goals. For example, it has engaged in 
military procurement, the export of arms and military assistance, 
intelligence cooperation with its allies, commercial trade, the im- 
portation of strategic raw materials, and prisoner-of-war exchanges 
and other arrangements for hostage releases. It has also sought to 



230 



Government and Politics 



foster increased Jewish immigration to Israel and to protect vul- 
nerable Jewish communities in the Diaspora. 

Relations with Middle Eastern States 

Despite the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel has established formal 
diplomatic relations with Egypt and maintained a de facto peace- 
ful relationship with Jordan. Israeli leaders have traveled to 
Morocco to discuss Israeli- Arab issues, and Morocco has often 
served as an intermediary between Israel and the other Arab states. 
In 1983 Israel signed a peace treaty with Lebanon, although it was 
quickly abrogated by the Lebanese as a result of Syrian pressure. 
Some secret diplomatic contacts may also have occurred between 
Israel and Tunisia. 

Egypt 

In late 1988, about ten years after the signing of the Camp David 
Accords and the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel (see 
The Peace Process, ch. 1), a "cool" peace characterized Egyptian- 
Israeli relations. These relations had originally been envisioned as 
leading to a reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states, but 
this development has not occurred. Egyptian-Israeli relations have 
been strained by a number of developments, including the June 
1981 Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, the Israeli inva- 
sion of Lebanon directed against Palestinian forces a year later, 
the establishment of an increasing number of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the "watering down" 
of proposals for the autonomy of the Palestinian inhabitants of these 
territories as envisaged by the Camp David Accords and the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. 

Relations between the two countries warmed somewhat during 
Peres' s tenure as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in 
the National Unity Government. They again cooled, however, fol- 
lowing the establishment of the Likud-led cabinet in December 
1988, and prime minister Shamir's rejection of Israeli participa- 
tion in an international peace conference with the PLO. Neverthe- 
less, the two countries continued to maintain full diplomatic 
relations, and in 1985 about 60,000 Israeli tourists visited Egypt, 
although Egyptian tourism to Israel was much smaller. Coopera- 
tion occurred in the academic and scientific areas as well as in a 
number of joint projects in agriculture, marine science, and dis- 
ease control. 

Another issue that had impeded normal relations between Egypt 
and Israel concerned the disposition of Taba, an approximately 
100-hectare border enclave and tourist area on the Gulf of Aqaba 



231 



Israel: A Country Study 

in the Sinai Peninsula claimed by the two countries, but occupied 
by Israel. Following a September 1988 ruling in Egypt's favor by 
an international arbitration panel, official delegations from Israel 
and Egypt met to implement the arbitral award. 

Jordan 

Secret or "discreet" contacts between the leaders of the Yishuv 
and later of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan 
or Jordan began in the early days of the British Mandate and con- 
tinued into the late 1980s. These covert contacts were initiated with 
King Abdullah, the grandfather of King Hussein, Jordan's present 
ruler. Some observers have speculated that, together with Jordan's 
annexation of the West Bank in 1950, these contacts may have been 
responsible for Abdullah's assassination by a Palestinian gunman 
in East Jerusalem in July 1951 . According to Israeli journalists Yossi 
Melman and Dan Raviv, Hussein renewed Jordan's ties with Israel 
in 1963. Following Jordan's ill-fated participation in the June 1967 
War, secret meetings took place between Hussein and Israeli leaders 
in 1968, and they lasted until Begin' s accession to power in 1977. 
This "secret" relationship was revived in 1984, following Labor's 
participation in the National Unity Government, and intensified 
in 1986-87. The participants reached agreements on Israeli- 
Jordanian cooperation on such issues as the role of pro-Jordanian 
Palestinian moderates in the peace process, setting up branches 
of Jordan's Cairo- Amman Bank in the West Bank, and generally 
increasing Amman's influence and involvement in the West Bank's 
financial, agricultural, education, and health affairs, thus block- 
ing the PLO. The last reported meeting between Minister of For- 
eign Affairs Peres and King Hussein took place in London in 
November 1987, when the two leaders signed a "memorandum 
of understanding" on a peace plan. Upon his return to Israel, 
however, Peres was unable to win support for the agreement in 
the Israeli cabinet. 

Morocco 

Morocco has been noted for its generally good relations with its 
own Jewish community, which in 1988 numbered approximately 
18,000; in 1948 there had been about 250,000 Jews in Morocco. 
Over the years discreet meetings have occurred between Moroc- 
can and Israeli leaders. Beginning in 1976, King Hassan II began 
to mediate between Arab and Israeli leaders. Then Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin reportedly made a secret visit to Morocco in 1976, 
leading to a September 1977 secret meeting between King Hassan 
and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. King Hassan also played a 



232 



Allenby Bridge across the 
Jordan River, a crossing point 
into Jordan, with Israeli 
and Jordanian soldiers talking 
Courtesy Les Vogel 



role in the Egyptian-Israeli contacts that led to the 1978 Camp David 
Accords. In July 1978, and again in March 1981, Peres, as oppo- 
sition leader, made secret trips to Morocco. In May 1984, thirty- 
five prominent Israelis of Moroccan origin attended a conference 
in Rabat. This meeting was followed by an official visit in May 
1985 by Avraham Katz-Oz, Israel's deputy minister of agricul- 
ture, to discuss possible agricultural cooperation between the two 
countries. In August 1986, Moroccan agricultural specialists and 
journalists reportedly visited Israel, and Chaim Corfu, Israel's 
minister of transport, attended a transportation conference in 
Morocco. On July 22 and 23, 1986, Prime Minister Peres met King 
Hassan at the king's palace in Ifrane. This was the first instance 
of a public meeting between an Arab leader and an Israeli prime 
minister since the Egyptian-Israeli meetings of the late 1970s. 
Hassan and Peres, however, were unable to agree on ways to resolve 
the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

Iran 

Until the overthrow of the shah's regime in 1979, Israel and Iran 
had established government missions in both countries although 
this relationship was never formalized by an exchange of ambas- 
sadors. Under the shah, from 1953 to 1979, Iran was one of Israel's 
primary suppliers of oil and a major commercial partner. In addi- 
tion, the intelligence services of the two countries cooperated closely, 



233 



Israel: A Country Study 

and Israel exported military hardware and provided training and 
other assistance to Iranian military forces. These close, but dis- 
creet, relations were abruptly terminated in 1979, upon the com- 
ing to power of the regime of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini and Iran's joining of the anti-Israel camp. Shortly there- 
after, Iran called for the "eradication" of the State of Israel through 
armed struggle and its replacement by a Palestinian state. As a 
symbolic gesture, the PLO was given the building of the former 
Israeli mission in Tehran. 

In the 1980s, however, Israeli concern about the fate of the ap- 
proximately 30,000 Jews remaining in Iran, interest in assisting 
Iran in its war with Iraq, and cooperation with the United States 
in its efforts to free American hostages held by Iranian-backed Shia 
(see Glossary) extremists in Lebanon, led to a renewal of contacts 
between Israeli and Iranian leaders and shipments of Israeli arms 
to Tehran. Israel reportedly sent arms to Iran in exchange for Iran's 
allowing thousands of Jews to leave the country. 

Relations with the United States 

For strategic security and diplomatic support, Israel has depended 
almost totally upon the United States. Since the establishment of 
the state in 1948, the United States has expressed its commitment 
to Israel's security and well-being and has devoted a considerable 
share of its world-wide economic and security assistance to Israel. 
Large-scale American military and economic assistance began dur- 
ing the October 1973 War, with a massive American airlift of vital 
military materiel to Israel at the height of the war. From 1948 
through 1985, the United States provided Israel with US$10 bil- 
lion in economic assistance and US$21 billion in military assistance, 
60 percent of which was in the form of grants. From 1986 through 
1988, total United States economic and military assistance to Israel 
averaged more than US$3 billion a year, making Israel the largest 
recipient of United States aid. Of the annual total, about US$1.8 
billion was in Foreign Military Sales credits, and about US$1.2 
billion was in economic assistance. 

During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the 
United States-Israeli relationship was significantly upgraded, with 
Israel becoming a strategic partner and de facto ally. A number 
of bilateral arrangements solidified this special relationship. In 
November 1983, the United States and Israel established a Joint 
Political-Military Group to coordinate military exercises and secu- 
rity planning between the two countries, as well as to position 
United States military equipment in Israel for use by American 
forces in the event of a crisis. In 1984 Israel and the United States 



234 



Government and Politics 



concluded the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement 
to provide tariff-free access to American and Israeli goods. In 1985 
the two countries established a Joint Economic Development Group 
to help Israel solve its economic problems; in 1986 they created 
a Joint Security Assistance Group to discuss aid issues. Also in 1986, 
Israel began participating in research and development programs 
relating to the United States Strategic Defense Initiative. In Janu- 
ary 1987, the United States designated Israel a major non-NATO 
ally, with status similar to that of Australia and Japan. Two months 
later, Israel agreed to the construction of a Voice of America relay 
transmitter on its soil to broadcast programs to the Soviet Union. 
In December 1987, Israel signed a memorandum of understand- 
ing allowing it to bid on United States defense contracts on the 
same basis as NATO countries. Finally, the two countries signed 
a memorandum of agreement in April 1988 formalizing existing 
arrangements for mutually beneficial United States-Israel technol- 
ogy transfers. 

Israel has also cooperated with the United States on a number 
of clandestine operations. It acted as a secret channel for United 
States arms sales to Iran in 1985 and 1986, and during the same 
period it cooperated with the United States in Central America. 

The United States-Israeli relationship, however, has not been 
free of friction. The United States expressed indignation with Israel 
over an espionage operation involving Jonathan Jay Pollard, a 
United States Navy employee who was sentenced to life imprison- 
ment for selling hundreds of vital intelligence documents to Israel. 
During the affair, Israeli government and diplomatic personnel in 
Washington served as Pollard's control officers. Nevertheless, 
United States government agencies continued to maintain a close 
relationship with Israel in sensitive areas such as military cooper- 
ation, intelligence sharing, and joint weapons research. 

The main area of friction between the United States and Israel 
has concerned Washington's efforts to balance its special ties to 
Jerusalem with its overall Middle Eastern interests and the need 
to negotiate an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the United 
States has played a major mediating role. In 1948 the United States 
hoped that peace could be achieved between Israel and the Arab 
states, but this expectation was quickly dashed when Arab nations 
refused to recognize Israel's independence. American hopes were 
dashed again when in 1951 Jordan's King Abdullah, with whom 
some form of settlement seemed possible, was assassinated and in 
1953 when the Johnston Plan, a proposal for neighboring states 
to share the water of the Jordan River, was rejected. 



235 



Israel: A Country Study 

The June 1967 War provided a major opportunity for the United 
States to serve as a mediator in the conflict; working with Israel 
and the Arab states the United States persuaded the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council to pass Resolution 242 of November 22, 
1967. The resolution was designed to serve as the basis for a peace 
settlement involving an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied 
in the June 1967 War in exchange for peace and Arab recognition 
of Israel's right to exist. Many disputes over the correct interpre- 
tation of a clause concerning an Israeli withdrawal followed the 
passage of the UN resolution, which was accepted by Israel. The 
resolution lacked any explicit provision for direct negotiations be- 
tween the parties. Although the Arab states and the Palestinians 
did not accept the resolution, it has remained the basis of United 
States policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

In December 1969, the Rogers Plan, named after United States 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers, although unsuccessful in 
producing peace negotiations, succeeded in ending the War of At- 
trition between Israel and Egypt that followed the June 1967 War 
and established a cease-fire along the Suez Canal. In 1971 United 
States assistant secretary of state Joseph P. Sisco proposed an " in- 
terim Suez Canal agreement" to bring about a limited Israeli with- 
drawal from the canal, hoping that such an action would lead to 
a peace settlement. The proposal failed when neither Israel nor 
Egypt would agree to the other's conditions. 

In October 1973, at the height of the Arab-Israeli war, United 
States-Soviet negotiations paved the way for UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 338. In addition to calling for an immediate cease- 
fire and opening negotiations aimed at implementing Resolution 
242, this resolution inserted a requirement that future talk be con- 
ducted "between the parties concerned," that is, between the Arabs 
and the Israelis themselves. 

In September 1975, United States secretary of state Henry Kis- 
singer's "shuttle diplomacy" achieved the Second Sinai Disengage- 
ment Agreement between Israel and Egypt, laying the groundwork 
for later negotiations between the two nations. The United States 
also pledged, as part of a memorandum of understanding with 
Israel, not to negotiate with the PLO until it was prepared to recog- 
nize Israel's right to exist and to renounce terrorism. 

Another major United States initiative came in 1977 when Presi- 
dent Jimmy Carter stressed the need to solve the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict by convening an international peace conference in Geneva, 
cochaired by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although 
Egyptian President Anwar as Sadat conducted his initiative in open- 
ing direct Egyptian-Israeli peace talks without United States 



236 



Government and Politics 



assistance, the United States played an indispensable role in the 
complex and difficult negotiation process. Negotiations ultimately 
led to the signing, under United States auspices, of the September 
17, 1978, Camp David Accords, as well as the March 1979 Treaty 
of Peace Between Egypt and Israel. The accords included provi- 
sions that called for granting autonomy to Palestinians in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip through a freely elected self-governing 
authority during a five-year transitional period; at the end of the 
period the final status of the occupied territories was to be decided. 
Carter had hoped that this process would enable the Palestinians 
to fulfill their legitimate national aspirations while at the same time 
safeguarding Israeli security concerns. While criticizing the Begin 
government's settlement policy in the occupied territories, the 
Carter administration could not prevent the intensified pace of con- 
struction of new settlements. 

Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in early June 1982, on 
September 1, 1982, President Reagan outlined what came to be 
called the Reagan Plan. This plan upheld the goals of the Camp 
David Accords regarding autonomy for the Palestinians of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and disapproved of Israel's establishment 
of any new settlements in these areas. It further proposed that at 
the end of a transitional period, the best form of government for 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would be self-government by 
the resident Palestinian population in association with Jordan. 
Under the plan, Israel would be obliged to withdraw from the oc- 
cupied territories in exchange for peace, and the city of Jerusalem 
would remain undivided; its final status would be decided through 
negotiations. The plan rejected the creation of an independent Pales- 
tinian state. Although Labor leader Peres expressed support for 
the plan, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Likud opposed 
it, as did the PLO and the Arab states. The plan was subsequently 
shelved. 

The United States nevertheless continued its efforts to facilitate 
Arab-Israeli peace. In March 1987, the United States undertook 
intensive diplomatic negotiations with Jordan and Israel to achieve 
agreement on holding an international peace conference, but differ- 
ences over Palestinian representation created obstacles. In Israel, 
Likud prime minister Shamir and Labor minister of foreign af- 
fairs Peres were at odds, with Shamir rejecting an international 
conference and Peres accepting it. Peres and Labor Party minister 
of defense Rabin reportedly held talks with Jordan's King Hus- 
sein, who wanted the conference to include the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, as well as Israel, the Arab 
states, and the PLO. The Reagan administration, on the other 



237 



Israel: A Country Study 



hand, was reluctant to invite the Soviet Union to participate in 
the diplomatic process. The administration insisted that any 
prospective conference adjourn speedily and then take the form 
of direct talks between Israel and Jordan. The administration also 
insisted that the conference have no power to veto any agreement 
between Israel and Jordan. 

A major difficulty involved the nature of Palestinian represen- 
tation at a conference. A Soviet-Syrian communique repeated the 
demand for PLO participation, which Israel flatly rejected. The 
United States asserted that, as the basis for any PLO participa- 
tion, the PLO must accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 with their 
implied recognition of Israel's right to exist. Both the PLO main- 
stream and its radical wings were unwilling to agree to this de- 
mand. The Palestinian uprising (intifadah) in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip began in December 1987. In February 1988, Secre- 
tary of State George Shultz visited Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; 
in a statement issued in Jerusalem he called for Palestinian partic- 
ipation, as part of a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, in an inter- 
national peace conference. The PLO rejected this initiative. The 
United States proposal called for a comprehensive peace provid- 
ing for the security of all states in the region and for fulfillment 
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The proposal con- 
sisted of an "integrated whole" and included the following negotiat- 
ing framework: "early negotiations between Israel and each of its 
neighbors willing to do so," with the door "specifically open for 
Syrian participation"; "bilateral negotiations . . . based on United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their 
parts"; "the parties to each bilateral negotiation" to determine 
"the procedure and agenda of the negotiation"; "negotiations be- 
tween an Israeli and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation on arrange- 
ments for a transitional period for the West Bank and Gaza, ' ' with 
the objective of completing "these talks within six months"; and 
"final status negotiations" beginning "on a date certain seven 
months after the start of transitional talks," with the objective of 
completing the talks "within a year." 

On March 26, 1988, Shultz met with two members of the Pales- 
tine National Council (PNC), which represents Palestinians out- 
side Israel, various political and guerrilla groups within the PLO, 
and associated youth, student, women's, and professional bodies. 
According to a PLO spokesman, the PNC members, Professors 
Ibrahim Abu Lughod and Edward Said, both Arab Americans, 
were authorized by Yasir Arafat to speak to Shultz, and they later 
reported directly to the PLO leader about their talks. Little resulted 



238 



Government and Politics 



from this meeting, however, and Shultz found no authoritative party 
willing to come to the conference table. 

The United States once again involved itself in the peace process 
to break the stalemate among the Arab states, the Palestinians, and 
Israel following King Hussein's declaration on July 31 , 1988, that 
he was severing most of Jordan's administrative and legal ties with 
the West Bank, thus throwing the future of the West Bank onto 
the PLO's shoulders. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat thereby gained 
new international status, but Shultz barred him from entering the 
United States to address the UN General Assembly in early De- 
cember because of Arafat's and the PLO's involvement in terrorist 
activities. When Arafat, following his December 14 address to a 
special session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva, met Ameri- 
can conditions by recognizing Israel's right to exist in "peace and 
security," accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced 
"all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state ter- 
rorism," the United States reversed its thirteen-year policy of not 
officially speaking to the PLO. 

The Israeli National Unity Government, installed in late De- 
cember, denounced the PLO as an unsuitable negotiating part- 
ner. It did not accept the PLO's recognition of Israel and 
renunciation of terrorism as genuine. 

Whether the United States-PLO talks would yield concrete results 
in terms of Arab-Israeli peace making remained to be seen as of 
the end of 1988. Notwithstanding the possibility of future progress, 
the new willingness of the United States to talk to the PLO demon- 
strated that, despite the special relationship between the United 
States and Israel and the many areas of mutual agreement and 
shared geopolitical strategic interests, substantial differences con- 
tinued to exist between the United States and certain segments of 
the Israeli government. This was especially true with regard to the 
Likud and its right-wing allies. 

Relations with the Soviet Union 

In August 1986, the Soviet Union renewed contacts with Israel 
for the first time since severing diplomatic relations immediately 
following the June 1967 War. The Soviet Union had been an early 
supporter of the 1947 UN Partition of Palestine Resolution, and 
in 1948 it had recognized the newly established State of Israel. Re- 
lations between Israel and the countries of Eastern Europe, however, 
markedly worsened in the 1950s. The Soviet Union turned to Egypt 
and Syria as its primary partners in the Middle East, and in the 
early 1960s it began to support the Palestinian cause and supply 
the PLO and other Palestinian armed groups with military 



239 



Israel: A Country Study 



hardware. But in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union turned its at- 
tention to improving relations with Israel as part of its "new 
diplomacy" and a change in its Middle Eastern strategy. 

Soviet and Israeli representatives held talks in Helsinki, Finland, 
on August 17, 1986. Although the talks did not lead to renewed 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, they indicated Soviet 
interest in improving ties with Israel. Israel viewed the Soviet in- 
itiative as an attempt to obtain Israel's agreement to participate 
in an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict and to increase Soviet involvement in the Middle East as a 
counterweight to the United States. The Soviets raised three is- 
sues: the activity of the Soviet section based in the Finnish lega- 
tion in Tel Aviv; consular matters connected with the travels of 
Soviet citizens to Israel; and Soviet property, mainly that belong- 
ing to the Russian Orthodox Church, in Israel. In talks with the 
Soviets, the Israelis demanded that greater numbers of Jews be per- 
mitted to emigrate to Israel, that a radical change take place in 
official Soviet attitudes toward its Jewish community, and that 
Moscow cease publishing virulent anti-Zionist tracts. Soviet and 
Israeli officials held a number of additional meetings in 1987. 

A major group influencing improved relations between the two 
countries was the active Israeli lobby, the Soviet Jewry Education 
and Information Center. This lobby represented about 170,000 
Soviet Jews living in Israel, who pressured the government not to 
restore diplomatic relations with Moscow until the Soviet Union 
permitted free Jewish emigration. 

Despite its renewed contacts with Israel, the Soviet Union con- 
tinued to support the PLO and the Palestinian cause through mili- 
tary training and arms shipments. Moscow also used various front 
organizations, such as the World Peace Council, to wage propa- 
ganda campaigns against the Israeli state in international forums. 

Relations with Eastern Europe 

Improved Israeli-Soviet relations led to increased ties with East 
European states as well. Israel and Poland reestablished diplomatic 
relations in September 1986. Trade and tourism between Israel 
and Hungary also improved in 1986. On August 6, 1986, a senior 
Romanian envoy visited Jerusalem and met with Prime Minister 
Peres to discuss relations with the Soviet Union. At the time, there 
was speculation that the Romanian president, Nicolae Ceaucescu, 
had helped arrange behind-the-scenes contacts between the Soviet 
Union and Israel. On August 30, 1986, talks followed between 
Yehuda Horam, head of the East European Division of the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Romanian officials. Also in 



240 



Government and Politics 



August, Mrs. Shulamit Shamir, the wife of then-Minister of For- 
eign Affairs Yitzhak Shamir, received an invitation to visit Bul- 
garia, the first such official Bulgarian gesture toward Israel. In 
January. 1987, an Israeli delegation held negotiations with Polish, 
Bulgarian, and Hungarian representatives concerning agricultural 
cooperation. 

Relations with Western Europe 

Israeli relations with the states of Western Europe have been con- 
ditioned by European desires to further their own commercial in- 
terests and ties with the Arab world and their heavy dependence 
on Middle Eastern oil. Europeans have provided political support 
for Arab states and the Palestinian cause, even though Europe has 
served as the battleground for Arab and Palestinian terrorist groups. 
For example, beginning in the early 1970s, the ministers of for- 
eign affairs of the European Community called for Israel to with- 
draw from territories occupied during the June 1967 War, expressed 
"reservations" over the 1978 Camp David Accords, and accepted 
the "association" of the PLO in solving the Palestinian problem. 

Despite such official declarations, West European states have 
been important trading partners for Israel; about 40 percent of 
Israel's foreign trade occurred with European countries. Further- 
more, there has been strong European-Israeli cooperation — except 
with Greece — in the area of counterterrorism. Britain was Israel's 
most important European trading partner although relations be- 
tween the two countries were never free of tensions. In 1979, for 
example, Britain disallowed Israel's purchase of British crude oil 
after Israel lost oil deliveries from Iran and Sinai. Moreover, Brit- 
ain imposed an arms embargo on Israel following its June 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. 

In the early 1950s, France and Israel maintained close political 
and military relations, and France was Israel's main weapons sup- 
plier until the June 1967 War. At that time, during Charles de 
Gaulle's presidency, France became highly critical of Israeli poli- 
cies and imposed an arms embargo on Israel. In the early 1980s, 
French-Israeli relations markedly improved under the presidency 
of Francois Mitterrand, who pursued a more even-handed approach 
than his predecessors on Arab-Israeli issues. Mitterand was the first 
French president to visit Israel while in office. 

Relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) were "second in importance only to [Israel's] part- 
nership with the United States," according to Michael Wolffsohn, 
a leading authority on the subject. In Wolffsohn 's view, the 
dominant issues in West German-Israeli relations were: the question 



241 



Israel: A Country Study 



of reparations (up to 1953); the establishment of diplomatic rela- 
tions (up to 1965): the solidification of normal relations (through 
1969): the erosion in the West German-Israeli relationship as Chan- 
cellor Willi Brandt — the first West German chancellor to visit 
Israel — began to stress Israel's need to withdraw from all territo- 
ries occupied in the June 1967 War and to recognize the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination; and, finally, during 
the 1980s, under the Christian Democrats, West Germany's closer 
adherence to United States policies on Arab-Israeli issues. 

In January 1986, Spain established full diplomatic relations with 
Israel despite pressures from Arab states and policy differences be- 
tween Madrid and Jerusalem over the Palestinian question. This 
step concluded intensive behind-the-scenes Israeli efforts — begun 
upon the death of President Francisco Franco in 1975 — to achieve 
normal relations with Spain. Prior to establishing diplomatic rela- 
tions, the two countries discreetly collaborated in antiterrorism ef- 
forts, and there were close ties between Labor and Spain's Socialist 
Party. 

Although in 1947 Turkey voted against the UN resolution to 
establish the Jewish state, in 1948 it became the first Muslim country 
to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. The two countries 
subsequently maintained normal relations. 

Relations with African States 

Until the early 1970s. Israel sent hundreds of agricultural ex- 
perts and technicians to aid in developing newly independent sub- 
Saharan African states, seeking diplomatic relations in return. The 
Arab countries, however, exerted pressure on such states to break 
ties with Israel. Most African states eventually complied with this 
pressure because of their need for Arab oil at concessionary prices 
and because of Arab promises of financial aid. Furthermore, Israel 
received heavy criticism from African nations because of its rela- 
tions with South Africa. Moreover. Israeli support for the Biafran 
secessionist movement in Nigeria alarmed the members of the 
Organization of African Unity, many of whom faced threatening 
national liberation movements in their own countries. The June 
1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the 
Sinai Peninsula stirred a sense of unease among the African states; 
after the October 1973 War twenty-nine African states severed 
diplomatic relations with Israel. Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
were the only sub-Saharan countries to maintain diplomatic rela- 
tions with Israel. 

The African "embargo" of Israel began to collapse after the 1978 
Camp David Accords and the establishment of diplomatic relations 



242 



Government and Politics 



between Egypt and Israel. Following Zaire's lead in 1982, Liberia 
(1983), the Cote d'lvoire (1986), Cameroon (1986), and Togo 
(1987) renewed diplomatic ties with Israel. Kenya, Gabon, Sene- 
gal, and Equatorial Guinea have also shown interest in renewing 
diplomatic relations. Several other African countries, although 
maintaining their diplomatic distance, nevertheless had unofficial 
ties with Israel, as expressed by the presence of Israeli advisers and 
technicians. Ghana had an Israeli "interests office," and Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic all maintained un- 
official ties with Israel. 

Israeli military expertise and technical skills, particularly in desert 
reclamation, have often facilitated ties with the sub-Saharan na- 
tions. In Cameroon, Israel built a training center to assist in halt- 
ing the advance of the Sahara Desert, and in Cote d'lvoire, Israeli 
contractors undertook several major building projects. Israel also 
trained the elite armed units protecting the presidents of Came- 
roon, Liberia, Togo, and Zaire. 

Israel has long had a special interest in Ethiopia, a partially Chris- 
tian country, because of the presence of Falashas (Ethiopian Jews) 
in that country. Ethiopian-Israeli relations had been close until the 
overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the imposition of a 
Marxist, pro-Soviet military regime in 1974. In 1978 Ethiopia 
received military aid from Israel as well as from the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, and Libya in its border war with Somalia. In 1984 and 1985, 
it was reported that, in exchange for Israeli military aid to Ethio- 
pia in its battle against Muslim Eritrean secessionists supported 
by Arab states, Israel organized an airlift of more than 10,000 
Falashas from Ethiopia to Israel. In 1988 it was estimated that be- 
tween 10,000 and 15,000 Falashas still remained in Ethiopia. 

Israel has also had a longstanding interest in South Africa be- 
cause of its approximately 110,000 Jews and 15,000 Israelis. Israeli 
leaders justified trade with South Africa on the ground that it offered 
protection for the South African Jewish community and developed 
export markets for Israel's defense and commercial industries. Ex- 
cluding the arms trade, in 1986 Israel imported approximately 
US$181 . 1 million worth of South African goods, consisting primar- 
ily of coal; it exported products worth about US$58.8 million. 

Israel has traditionally opposed international trade embargoes 
as a result of its own vulnerability at the hands of the UN and Third 
World-dominated bodies. In 1987, however, Israel took steps to 
reduce its military ties with South Africa so as to bring its policies 
in line with those of the United States and Western Europe, which 
had imposed limited trade, diplomatic, and travel sanctions on 
South Africa. In a speech to the Knesset on March 19, then Minister 



243 



Israel: A Country Study 

of Foreign Affairs Peres formally presented the Israeli cabinet's 
four-point plan to ban military sales contracts with South Africa 
(Israel's arms trade with South Africa was reportedly between 
US$400 and US$800 million a year); to condemn apartheid, which 
Peres characterized as "a policy totally rejected by all human be- 
ings;" to reduce cultural and tourist ties to a minimum; and to 
appoint an official committee to draft a detailed list of economic 
sanctions in line with those of the United States and other Western 
nations. The cabinet also announced its decision to establish an 
educational foundation for South African blacks and people of mixed 
race in Israel. 

Relations with Asian States 

Many Asian nations have not established full diplomatic rela- 
tions with Israel because of their large Muslim populations and 
the close ties they have maintained, as part of the Non- Aligned 
Movement, with the Arab states and the PLO. Nevertheless, there 
were back-channel contacts between Israel and India, and Israel 
has maintained a consul in Bombay since 1948. In August 1977, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dayan covertly visited India to meet 
with Prime Minister Morarji Desai, but the meeting proved in- 
conclusive. In addition, there has been a tacit relationship between 
Israel and the People's Republic of China in such fields as com- 
merce, technical and agricultural programs, and arms sales. Israel 
has maintained friendly relations with Australia, New Zealand, Sin- 
gapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. It also has diplomatic 
relations with Japan, although Japan's trade relations with the Arab 
states and Iran take precedence over those with Israel. 

Relations with Latin America 

The traditional pro-Western stance of most Latin American states 
has proven to be politically and economically advantageous to Israel, 
as they have tended to be more sympathetic to Israel in the UN 
than African or Asian countries. They have also been more will- 
ing to maintain economic and military relations with Israel. 
Although Latin American states are primarily Roman Catholic and 
follow the Vatican's position favoring the internationalization of 
Jerusalem, Israel has obtained crude oil from Mexico, it maintains 
a lucrative arms trade with Argentina and other countries, and it 
has assisted Latin American regimes in their counterinsurgency 
efforts against Cuban and Nicaraguan-supported guerrillas. 

Communications Media 

Western observers have considered the Israeli press for the most 
part to be highly independent and a reliable source of information. 



244 



Government and Politics 



The press has reflected accurately the range of political opinions 
in the country and played a leading role in investigating and un- 
covering many scandals involving official corruption and mis- 
management. It has also covered developments in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. In addition to providing news and informa- 
tion, Israel's press, television and radio, in effect constituted an 
"extra-parliamentary opposition," according to William Frankel, 
a British Jewish journalist who is an authority on Israel. The in- 
fluence of the press is considerable; 1988 estimates were that on 
a daily basis more than 75 percent of all adult Israelis read one 
daily newspaper and that about 11 percent read two or more. 

As of 1988, most daily newspapers were published in Hebrew; 
because Israel is a nation of immigrants, others appeared in Arabic, 
English, Yiddish, Russian, Polish, Hungarian, French, and Ger- 
man, with weeklies adding more languages to the list. Many of 
the country's daily newspapers, particularly the English-language 
Jerusalem Post and those printed in Hebrew, were founded by Zionist 
political parties during the prestate period, and they have continued 
to be politically affiliated with such parties. Since independence, 
however, the "party newspaper" has declined as political align- 
ments have changed. For example, the consolidation of Israel's 
socialist parties led to the demise of some papers affiliated with the 
former parties. In addition, the management and editorial direc- 
tion of some papers, such as the Jerusalem Post (circulation of 30,000 
on weekdays, 47,000 on weekends), has become increasingly in- 
dependent, production costs have risen, and party supporters have 
turned to rapidly growing independent dailies. Such papers have 
included Ma'ariv (Afternoon — circulation of 147,000 on weekdays, 
245,000 on weekends), Yediot Aharonot (Latest News — circulation 
of 180,000 on weekdays, 280,000 on weekends), Hadashot (News), 
which was founded in 1984, and the influential Ha'aretz (The 
Land — circulation of 55,000 on weekdays, 75,000 on weekends), 
an independent morning daily. Israel's two leading and politically 
liberal dailies have been Davar (News — circulation of 39,000), the 
official organ of the Histadrut, and Al HaMishmar (On Guard — 
circulation of 25,000), published by Mapam. 

In 1953 the Editors' Committee, whose prestate name was the 
Redaction Committee, was officially registered as an independent 
association serving as a channel between the government and the 
press, and as a "voluntary partner" in carrying out the military 
censorship code — an arrangement that involved the exchange of 
confidential information with the general staff of the IDF. This 
arrangement functioned relatively smoothly as long as there was 
consensus over national security issues; relations between the press 



245 



Israel: A Country Study 

and the IDF became more strained, however, following the 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. Another organization concerned with media 
oversight, the Israel Press Council, came into being in 1963. The 
press council is a professional association responsible, among other 
matters, for administering the code of ethics binding journalists. 

The Israel Broadcasting Authority (IB A), established in 1965 
and modeled after the British Broadcasting Corporation, controlled 
the country's radio and television networks. It was subject to the 
general supervision of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The 
IBA, however, operated autonomously under a self-governing board 
of directors whose discretion over content and presentation, with 
the exception of a stormy period during Begin 's prime minister- 
ship, was rarely limited. The two leading radio stations were the 
IBA and Galei Tzahal (Voice of the IDF), the highly popular IDF 
broadcasting station. In 1968 Israeli television began broadcast- 
ing in both Hebrew and Arabic. 

According to two polls conducted in 1988 by Public Opinion 
Research of Israel, a plurality of Jewish Israelis (42 percent) con- 
sidered television news programs as their "best source" of inter- 
national news, followed by newspapers (27 percent) and radio (25 
percent). Only 3 percent of Israelis relied on magazines to keep 
them informed. These figures revealed a dramatic shift from 1986 
figures that indicated reliance on newspapers as the best source 
for news coverage (46 percent), followed by magazines (26 per- 
cent), and television (19 percent). The poll attributed the sharp 
increase in reliance on the broadcast media to the strong visual 
impact of the Palestinian uprising on Israeli society. 

As of 1988, Israeli Arabic language daily newspapers were led 
by the Jerusalem-based Al Anba (The News), with a circulation of 
about 10,000. Rakah also published an Arabic paper, Al Ittihad 
(Unity). An increasing number of Israeli Arabs also read Hebrew 
dailies. Al Quds (Jerusalem), founded in 1968 for Arabs in Jerusa- 
lem and the West Bank, resulted from the merger of two veteran 
Palestinian dailies founded on the West Bank following Jordan's 
annexation of the territory in 1950. By 1988 the paper had largely 
transferred its operations to Amman. In the early 1970s, additional 
Palestinian papers appeared, including Al Fajr al Jadid (The New 
Dawn), with a circulation of about 3,000 to 5,000, and Ash Shaab 
(The People), with 2,000 to 3,000 readers. Weekly and monthly 
magazines and periodicals published in Arabic include the liter- 
ary monthly Al Jadid (The New); At Taawun (Cooperation), pub- 
lished by the Histadrut Arab Workers' Department; and the 
Mapam party's Arab organ Al Mir sad (The Lookout). Israeli Arab 
and Palestinian newspapers have relied on Israeli and international 



246 



Government and Politics 



sources for their reports on Israeli government decisions and ac- 
tions concerning Israel's Arab community and Palestinian com- 
munities on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 

The Israeli Arab press has faced the same censorship constraints 
as have Jewish newspapers, namely, the Press Ordinance of 1933. 
This regulation was first enacted by the British mandatory author- 
ity. In 1948 it was adopted by Israel and administered by the Minis- 
try of Interior to license, supervise, and regulate the press. The 
IDF had responsibility for administering censorship regula- 
tions, and, under an agreement with the Editors' Committee, most 
Hebrew-language newspapers could exercise self-censorship, with 
the censor receiving only articles dealing with national security mat- 
ters. This arrangement, however, did not cover Palestinian publi- 
cations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose editors were 
required to submit items for publication to the military adminis- 
tration on a nightly basis. Failure to abide by these regulations has 
resulted in warnings and newspaper shutdowns. As a result of these 
regulations, many West Bank newspapers have preferred to pub- 
lish in Jerusalem, which has less rigid civilian legislation and courts. 
In late 1988, Israeli authorities, suspecting Palestinian journalists 
of involvement in the intifadah, censored and shut down many Pales- 
tinian newspapers and magazines in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip and arrested Arab journalists, including several members of 
the board of the Arab Journalists' Association. 

* * * 

The literature on the Israeli political system is extensive. Useful 
bibliographies and bibliographical essays on Israel include Gregory 
S. Mahler's Bibliography of Israeli Politics; Joshua Sinai's "A Bib- 
liographic Review of the Modern History of Israel"; and Books on 
Israel: Vol. I, edited by Ian S. Lustick. 

Comprehensive studies on Israeli government and politics in- 
clude Yonathan Shapiro's HaDemokratia Be Yisrael; Asher Arian's 
Politics in Israel: The Second Generation; Michael Wolffsohn's Israel, 
Polity, Society, and Economy, 1882-1986; Bernard Reich's, Israel: Land 
of Tradition and Conflict; Howard M. Sachar's two-volume A His- 
tory of Israel; William Frankel's Israel Observed: An Anatomy of the State; 
Bernard Avishai's The Tragedy of Zionism: Revolution and Democracy 
in the Land of Israel; and Mitchell Cohen's Zion and State: Nation, 
Class, and the Shaping of Modern Israel. 

Aspects of Israeli government and politics are covered in a ser- 
ies of volumes on the Knesset elections of 1969, 1973, 1977, and 
1981 , edited by Asher Arian; Israel at the Polls, 1981: A Study of the 



247 



Israel: A Country Study 



Knesset Elections, edited by Howard Penniman and Daniel J. Elazar; 
The Roots of Begin 's Success: The 1981 Israeli Elections, edited by Dan 
Caspi, et al; Israel in the Begin Era, edited by Robert O. Freedman; 
Nathan Yanai's Party Leadership in Israel: Maintenance and Change; 
Samuel Sager's The Parliamentary System of Israel; Local Government 
in Israel, edited by Daniel Elazar and Chaim Kalchheim; and Yoram 
Peri's Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics. Two leading 
books on the Labor Party are Peter Y. Medding's Mapai in Israel: 
Political Organisation and Government in a New Society and Myron J. 
Aronoff s Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party. The religious par- 
ties are covered in S. Zalman Abramov's Perpetual Dilemma: Jewish 
Religion in the Jewish State; Norman L. Zucker's The Coming Crisis 
in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy; Gary S. Schiff s Tradition and 
Politics: The Religious Parties of Israel; and Ian S. Lustick's For the 
Land .and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. 

Foreign relations are discussed in Michael Brecher's The Foreign 
Policy System of Israel, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, and Decisions 
in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973; Bernard Reich's Quest for Peace: United 
States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict and The United States 
and Israel: The Dynamics of Influence; Shlomo Aronson's Conflict and 
Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective; Gideon Rafael's 
Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy; Dynamics of 
Dependence: U.S. -Israeli Relations, edited by Gabriel Sheffer; and 
Aaron S. Klieman's Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet 
Diplomacy. The Arab-Israeli peace process is discussed in William B. 
Quandt's Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics and Harold H. 
Saunders's The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab -Israeli Peace Process. 
Finally, materials on various peace proposals include the Brook- 
ings Institution's report Toward Arab -Israeli Peace. (For further in- 
formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



248 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Man in a military beret and woman in service cap 



IN FEW COUNTRIES of the world have matters of national secu- 
rity played as pervasive a role in society as in Israel. The Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF — commonly known in Israel as Zahal, the 
Hebrew acronym for Zvah Haganah Le Yisrael) was organized 
to be the ultimate guarantor of national security. Israeli policy mak- 
ers, however, have believed that strong armed forces alone were 
not enough to protect the state. All of the state's resources were 
to be marshalled and applied to national security. In 1960 David 
Ben-Gurion stated that Israeli security also depended on the inte- 
gration of immigrants, the settlement and peopling of ''empty 
areas," the dispersal of the population and establishment of indus- 
tries throughout the country, the development of agriculture, the 
"conquest of the sea and air," economic independence, and the 
fostering of research and scientific skill at the highest level of tech- 
nology in all branches of science. Israel's quest for national secu- 
rity has been a prime motivating factor behind the state's rapid 
development. 

The quest for national security also has imposed great costs on 
the state and its citizens. Defense expenditures on a per capita basis, 
and as a percentage of gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary), have been consistently higher in Israel than in almost any 
other country in the world. Moreover, the IDF has diverted scarce 
manpower from the civilian economy, and Israeli industry has been 
compelled to manufacture military materiel instead of the consumer 
items that would raise the standard of living. Defense spending has 
also fueled double digit inflation for protracted periods and created 
a large national debt. 

The prominence given national security by Israeli society stems 
from the perceived massive security threat posed by Israel's Arab 
neighbors. Having founded the State of Israel in the wake of the 
Holocaust, in which Diaspora (see Glossary) Jews were defense- 
less against an enemy bent on their destruction, Israeli Jews were 
determined to devote considerable resources to defend their young 
nation. In 1988 most outside observers agreed that the IDF was 
stronger than ever and clearly superior to the armies of its Arab 
enemies. Unlike the years after the June 1967 War, however, 
Israelis in the late 1980s did not display overconfidence in their 
defense capability. The surprise Arab offensive in October 1973 
had renewed Israel's fears of defeat at the hands of its Arab ene- 
mies. Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon restored confidence in the 



251 



Israel: A Country Study 

tactical superiority of the IDF, but it also engendered controversy. 
The invasion was opposed from its inception by many Israeli poli- 
ticians and IDF officers, who referred to it as Israel's first impe- 
rial war. Moreover, the IDF's victory on the battlefield was not 
matched by strategic accomplishments. In 1988 the IDF confronted 
a new problem — sustained protest by Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. 

Many observers in the late 1980s described Israel as a democratic 
garrison state and a praetorian society. Indeed, in many respects 
Israel resembled an armed camp, and a wide range of government 
policies, particularly in foreign affairs, was dictated by security con- 
siderations as advised by IDF commanders. Unlike many garri- 
son states, however, in Israel the armed forces played an indirect 
role in politics, and the IDF was unlikely to abandon its tradition 
of strict subordination to civilian authority. 

Nevertheless, national defense policy was a major component 
of civilian politics during 1988. The Palestinian uprising in the occu- 
pied territories, known as the intifadah, created a new threat to 
Israel's security. Although the army seemed able to contain the 
violence militarily, its resources were strained by the dual role of 
policing the territories while maintaining strong border defenses. 
A nationwide debate centered on the question of whether Israeli 
concessions were strategically preferable to further Jewish settle- 
ment in the occupied territories. With the growing sophistication 
and deadliness of modern armaments in the Middle East, the alter- 
native to peace with Israel's neighbors was the specter of increas- 
ingly costly wars. Since Israel's birth forty years earlier, such 
conflicts already had cost nearly 12,000 Israeli lives. 

Security: A Persistent National Concern 
Historical Background 

Ancient Jewish military tradition is deeply rooted in biblical his- 
tory and begins with Abraham, who led an ad hoc military force. 
Joshua, who conquered Canaan, is an early hero, and David, who 
captured Jerusalem, is regarded by Israeli Jews as their greatest 
king and warrior. Solomon organized and maintained the first 
standing Jewish army (see Ancient Israel, ch. 1). 

Little in the way of military tradition arose out of the nearly 2,000 
years of the Diaspora. In fact, the lack of military prowess in the 
Jewish communities of the Diaspora was commonly viewed as a 
cause of their hardships and became a major motivation for build- 
ing a strong defense establishment within Israel. As a result of the 
Russian pogroms of the 1880s, a small number of Jews began 



252 



National Security 



settling in the area of Palestine and, determined to end the centu- 
ries of persecution, created self-defense units called Shomrim, or 
Guardsmen, to protect the early settlements. In 1909 the Shom- 
rim were formally organized throughout the area of Jewish settle- 
ment in Palestine and renamed HaShomer, or the Watchmen. 
Although HaShomer numbered fewer than 100 men at the organi- 
zation's peak, these armed militias became extremely important 
to Israeli military tradition. Many members of HaShomer joined 
the Jewish Legion, which fought with the British against imperial 
Germany during World War I. They also established a precedent 
of armed self-defense of the Zionist movement, which during the 
War of Independence in 1948 would flower into the IDF. 

Increasing tensions between the Arab communities and the grow- 
ing Jewish communities of Palestine brought the need to expand 
the capacity of the Yishuv (see Glossary) for self-defense (see Events 
in Palestine: 1908-48, ch. 1). In 1920, after serious Arab distur- 
bances in Jerusalem and in northern Palestine, HaShomer militias 
were disbanded and replaced by the Haganah (abbreviation for 
Irgun HaHaganah, Defense Organization), which was intended 
to be a larger and more wide-ranging organization for the defense 
of all Palestinian Jewry. By 1948, when it was disbanded so that 
the IDF would be the sole Israeli military organization, the Haganah 
was a force of about 30,000. 

The Haganah, financed originally through the Zionist General 
Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel (HaHistadrut HaKlalit 
shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael, known as Histadrut) and later 
through the Jewish Agency (see Glossary), operated clandestinely 
under the British Mandate, which declared the bearing of unautho- 
rized arms by Palestinian Jews to be illegal. Arms and ammuni- 
tion were smuggled into the country, and training was conducted 
in secret. In addition to guarding settlements, the Haganah 
manufactured arms, built a series of roads and stockades through- 
out Palestine to facilitate defense, and organized and defended 
groups of Jewish immigrants during periods under the Mandate 
when immigration was illegal or restricted. 

Arab attacks on Jewish communities in 1921 and 1929 found 
the Haganah ill-equipped and ineffective: more than 100 Jews were 
killed in 1929 alone. When renewed Arab rioting broke out in Jaffa 
(Yafo) in 1936 and soon spread throughout Palestine, the Man- 
date authorities — realizing that they could not defend every Jew- 
ish settlement — authorized the creation of the Jewish Settlement 
Police, also known as Notrim, who were trained, armed, and paid 
by the British. In 1938 a British intelligence officer, Captain Orde 
Charles Wingate, organized three counterguerrilla units, called 



253 



Israel: A Country Study 

special night squads, manned by British and Jewish personnel. As 
both of these organizations contained a large number of Haganah 
members, their formation greatly increased the assets of the 
Haganah while providing a legal basis for much of their activities. 
Although these nearly continuous disturbances from 1936 to 1939 
cost the lives of nearly 600 Jews and more than 5,000 Arabs, Israeli 
observers have pointed out that Jewish casualties would have been 
far greater were it not for the increasing effectiveness of these 
paramilitary units (see The Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39, ch. 1). 

During these disturbances, the Haganah' s policy of havlaga, or 
self-restraint, under which retaliation against the Arab community 
at large was strictly forbidden, was not aggressive enough for some. 
Under Vladimir (Zeev) Jabotinsky and later Menachem Begin, 
these dissidents in 1937 established the National Military Organi- 
zation (Irgun Zvai Leumi, known both as the Irgun and by the 
acronym Etzel). Initially the Irgun waged a campaign of terror, 
sabotage, and reprisal against the Arabs. After the British govern- 
ment issued a white paper in May 1939 extending the Mandate 
for ten years and placing limits on Jewish immigration, however, 
the Irgun turned its terrorist activities against the British troops 
in Palestine in an all-out struggle against the Mandate authority. 

With the outbreak of World War II, Irgun leaders settled on 
a policy of cooperation with the British in the war effort; but a hard 
core within the organization opposed the policy and accordingly 
split off from the larger body. This group, led by Avraham Stern, 
formed the Fighters for Israel's Freedom (Lohamei Herut Israel — 
Lehi), known as the Stern Gang. The Stern Gang, which includ- 
ed Begin and later Yitzhak Shamir, specialized in the assassina- 
tion of British and other officials. At their peaks, the Irgun contained 
about 4,000 men; the Stern Gang, 200 to 300. Defeat of Nazi Ger- 
many in 1945 precipitated a resumption of anti-British activities 
by both Haganah and Irgun in pursuance of their common ulti- 
mate goal, the establishment of a national home and the creation 
of a sovereign Jewish state. 

During World War II, about 32,000 Palestinian Jews, both men 
and women, volunteered for the British army. In 1944 about 5,000 
of these were formed into the Jewish Brigade, which fought suc- 
cessfully in Italy in 1945. With so many of its members serving 
abroad, the ranks of the Haganah were depleted, and in 1941 its 
leaders decided to raise a mobile force — the Palmach (abbrevia- 
tion of Pelugot Mahatz — Shock Forces — see Glossary) — of approx- 
imately 3,000 full-time soldiers, whose mission was to defend the 
Yishuv. Trained with the aid of the British, the Palmach was the 
first full-time standing Jewish army in more than 2,000 years and 



254 



National Security 



is considered the direct forerunner to the IDF. For many years, 
the vast majority of IDF officers were veterans of either the Palmach 
or the Jewish Brigade. 

War of Independence 

When Israel achieved its independence on May 14, 1948, the 
Haganah became the de facto Israeli army. On that day, the country 
was invaded by the regular forces of Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and 
Syria. Eleven days later, Israel's provisional government issued 
an order that provided the legal framework for the country's armed 
forces. The order established the official name Zvah Haganah Le 
Yisrael and outlawed the existence of any other military force within 
Israel. 

The dissident Irgun and Stern Gang were reluctant to disband. 
Fighting between Irgun and regular military forces broke out on 
June 21 when the supply ship Altalena arrived at Tel Aviv with 900 
men and a load of arms and ammunition for the Irgun. The army 
sank the ship, destroying the arms, and many members of the Irgun 
were arrested; both organizations disbanded shortly thereafter. A 
more delicate problem was how to disband the Palmach, which had 
become an elite military unit within the Haganah and had strong 
political ties to the socialist-oriented kibbutzim. Nonetheless, David 
Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister and minister of defense, 
was determined to see the IDF develop into a single, professional, 
and nonpolitical national armed force . It was only through his skill 
and determination that the Palmach was peacefully abolished and 
integrated into the IDF in January 1949. 

The ranks of the IDF swelled rapidly to about 100,000 at the 
height of the War of Independence. Nearly all able-bodied men, 
plus many women, were recruited; thousands of foreign volunteers, 
mostly veterans of World War II, also came to the aid of Israel. 
The newly independent state rapidly mobilized to meet the Arab 
invaders; by July 1948, the Israelis had set up an air force, a navy, 
and a tank battalion. Weapons and ammunition were procured 
abroad, primarily from Czechoslovakia. Three B-17 bombers were 
bought in the United States through black market channels, and 
shortly after one of them bombed Cairo in July 1948, the Israelis 
were able to establish air supremacy. Subsequent victories came 
in rapid succession on all three fronts. The Arab states negotiated 
separate armistice agreements. Egypt was the first to sign (Febru- 
ary 1949), followed by Lebanon (March), Transjordan (April), and 
finally Syria (July) . Iraq simply withdrew its forces without sign- 
ing an agreement. As a result of the war, Israel considerably ex- 
panded its territory beyond the United Nations (UN) partition plan 



255 



Israel: A Country Study 

for Palestine at the expense of its Arab neighbors. Victory cost more 
than 6,000 Israeli lives, however, which represented approximately 
1 percent of the population. After the armistice, wartime recruits 
were rapidly demobilized, and the hastily raised IDF, still lacking 
a permanent institutional basis, experienced mass resignations from 
its war- weary officer corps. This process underscored the basic man- 
power problem of a small population faced with the need to mobi- 
lize a sizable army during a wartime emergency. In 1949, after 
study of the Swiss reservist system, Israel introduced a three-tiered 
system based on a small standing officer corps, universal conscrip- 
tion, and a large pool of well-trained reservists that could be rapidly 
mobilized. 

In early 1955, Egypt began sponsoring raids launched by 
fedayeen (Arab commandos or guerrillas) from the Sinai Penin- 
sula, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan, into Israel (see fig. 1). As the 
number and seriousness of these raids increased, Israel began 
launching reprisal raids against Arab villages in Gaza and the West 
Bank (see Glossary) of the Jordan. These retaliatory measures, 
which cost the lives of Arab civilians and did little to discourage 
the fedayeen, became increasingly controversial both within Israel 
and abroad. Shortly thereafter Israeli reprisal raids were directed 
against military targets, frontier strongholds, police fortresses, and 
army camps. 

In addition to these incidents, which at times became confron- 
tations between regular Israeli and Arab military forces, other de- 
velopments contributed to the generally escalating tensions between 
Egypt and Israel and convinced Israeli military officials that Egypt 
was preparing for a new war. Under an arms agreement of 1955, 
Czechoslovakia supplied Egypt with a vast amount of arms, in- 
cluding fighter aircraft, tanks and other armored vehicles, destroy- 
ers, and submarines. The number of Egyptian troops deployed in 
Sinai along the Israeli border also increased dramatically in 1956. 
In July Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal; shortly thereafter Egypt 
closed the Strait of Tiran, at the southern tip of Sinai, and block- 
aded Israeli shipping. 

1956 War 

Fearing these actions to be signs of an imminent Egyptian inva- 
sion, Israel rapidly mobilized its reserves. On October 29, under 
Major General Moshe Dayan, the IDF launched a preemptive at- 
tack into Sinai. Israeli advances on the ground were rapid, and, 
supported by air cover, by November 2 they had routed the Egyp- 
tian forces and effectively controlled the entire peninsula. With 
Israeli troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal, British and French 



256 



United Nations checkpoint 
in the occupied territories, on the road to Damascus 
Courtesy Jean E. Tucker 
A view of a Palestinian refugee camp in Gaza 
Courtesy International Committee for the Red Cross (Jean-Luc Ray) 



257 



Israel: A Country Study 



troops landed at Port Said and demanded withdrawal of both sides 
from the Canal. The UN met in an emergency session and de- 
manded that the British and French leave Suez, which they did 
in December 1956 in response to both United States and UN pres- 
sure, and that Israel withdraw to the Armistice line of 1949. which 
it did somewhat reluctantly in March 1957 after the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) had been stationed in the Gaza Strip 
and at Sharm ash Shaykh on the Strait of Tiran. 

Israel's victors' in the 1956 War (known in Israel as the Sinai 
Campaign) thus afforded it a modicum of increased security by 
virtue of the UN presence. Far more important, however, was that 
it enhanced Israel's standing as a military power and as a viable 
nation. Although many Israelis felt that the military victory was 
nullified by the UN demand to withdraw from Sinai. Israel had 
achieved significant psychological gains at a cost of fewer than 1 70 
lives. 

The decade after the 1956 War was the most tranquil period in 
the nation's history. The Egyptian armistice line remained quiet, 
and there were few incidents along the Jordanian line until 1965. 
when Egyptian- sponsored guerrilla raids by Al Fatah first occurred. 
Beginning in 1960. there were repeated guerrilla activities and shell - 
ings of Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights of Syria, but 
these incidents remained localized until 1964. 

Underlying tensions, however, did not abate. By the early 1960s, 
both sides considered a third round of war inevitable. An ominous 
arms race developed. Egypt and Syria were supplied with Soviet 
aid and military hardware, and Israel suddenly found European 
powers — the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Brit- 
ain, and especially France — to be willing suppliers of modern arma- 
ments. Jordan continued to receive arms from Britain and the 
United States. 

Tensions mounted in 1964. when, after Israel had nearly com- 
pleted a massive irrigation project that involved diverting water 
from the Jordan River into the Negev Desert. Syria began a simi- 
lar project near the river's headwaters that would have virtually 
dried the river bed at the Israeli location. Israel launched air and 
artillery attacks at the Syrian site, and Syria abandoned the project. 
Guerrilla incursions from Syria and Jordan steadily mounted, as 
did the intensity of Israeli reprisal raids. 

In April 1967. increased Syrian aircraft-shelling of Israeli bor- 
der villages encountered an Israeli fighter attack during which six 
Syrian MiGs were shot down. Syria feared that an all-out attack 
from Israel was imminent, and Egypt, with whom Syria had re- 
cently signed a mutual defense treaty, began an extensive military 



258 



National Security 



buildup in early May. On May 18, Egypt's president, Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, demanded the withdrawal of UN forces from Gaza and 
Sinai; Secretary General U Thant promptly acceded and removed 
the UNEF. Four days later, Nasser announced a blockade of Israeli 
shipping at the Strait of Tiran, an action that Israel since the 1956 
War had stressed would be tantamount to a declaration of war. 
Jordan and Iraq rapidly joined Syria in its military alliance with 
Egypt. 

June 1967 War 

On May 30, mounting public opinion led to the appointment 
of Dayan as minister of defense. Levi Eshkol, who had been both 
prime minister and minister of defense since Ben-Gurion's resig- 
nation in 1963, retained the prime minister's position. Dayan im- 
mediately made a series of public declarations that war could be 
avoided, while secredy planning a massive preemptive strike against 
the Arab enemy. On the morning of June 5, Israel launched a 
devastating attack on Arab air power, destroying about 300 Egyp- 
tian, 50 Syrian, and 20 Jordanian aircraft, mostly on the ground. 
This action, which virtually eliminated the Arab air forces, was 
immediately followed by ground invasions into Sinai and the Gaza 
Strip, Jordan, and finally Syria. Arab ground forces, lacking air 
support, were routed on all three fronts; by the time the UN- 
imposed cease-fire took effect in the evening of June 1 1 , the IDF 
had seized the entire Sinai Peninsula to the east bank of the Suez 
Canal; the West Bank of Jordan, including East Jerusalem; and 
the Golan Heights of Syria. Unlike the aftermath of the 1956 War, 
however, the IDF did not withdraw from the areas it occupied in 
1967. 

Israel was ecstatic about its swift and stunning victory, which 
had been achieved at the relatively low cost of about 700 lives. The 
IDF had proven itself superior to the far larger forces of the com- 
bined Arab armies. More important, it now occupied the territory 
that had harbored immediate security threats to Israel since 1948. 
For the first time since independence, the Israeli heartland along 
the Mediterranean Sea was out of enemy artillery range. The ex- 
ploits of what was known in Israel as the Six-Day War soon be- 
came legend, and the commanders who led it became national 
heros. 

Although control of the occupied territories greatly improved 
Israel's security from a geographical standpoint, it also created new 
problems. The roughly 1 million Arabs within the territories pro- 
vided potential cover and support for infiltration and sabotage by 
Arab guerrillas. From shortly after the June 1967 War until 1970, 



259 



Israel: A Country Study 

a steady stream of men and weapons were sent into the West Bank 
by a number of guerrilla groups, in particular Al Fatah (see Pales- 
tinian Terrorist Groups, this ch.). Incidents of sabotage and clashes 
with Israeli security forces were commonplace. In the spring of 1970, 
the guerrilla strategy reverted to shelling Israeli towns from across 
the Jordanian and Lebanese borders. International terrorism, aimed 
at focusing world attention on the grievances of Palestinian Arabs 
against Israel, also appeared after the June 1967 War. 

Hostilities on the Egyptian front were far more serious. The deci- 
mated Egyptian army was rapidly resupplied with advanced Soviet 
weapons, and the Soviet presence at the Suez Canal increased dra- 
matically. In October 1967, the Israeli destroyer and flagship Elat 
was sunk by a missile fired from an Egyptian ship docked in Port 
Said; Israel retaliated with the destruction of Egyptian oil refiner- 
ies at Suez. A year later, shelling began along the canal, and a 
new round of fighting, commonly known as the War of Attrition, 
commenced. For nearly two years, until a new cease-fire was im- 
posed on August 7, 1970, Egypt (with growing and direct support 
from the Soviet Union) threw an increasingly heavy barrage of ar- 
tillery and missiles at fortified Israeli positions along the east bank 
of the canal, while Israel stood its ground and launched a series 
of fighter-bomber raids deep into the Egyptian heartland. This 
deadly but inconclusive conflict culminated on July 30, 1970, when 
Israeli and Soviet-piloted fighters clashed in a dogfight near the 
Suez Canal. Israeli pilots reportedly shot down four MiGs and lost 
none of their own, but this direct confrontation with a nuclear super- 
power was a frightening development and helped bring about the 
cease-fire. 

Although activity aimed against Israel by Palestinian guerrillas 
continued throughout the early 1970s, Israel felt relatively secure 
vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors after the War of Attrition. Israel's mili- 
tary intelligence was convinced that Syria would launch a war only 
in concert with Egypt and that Egypt would go to war only if it 
were convinced that its air power was superior to Israel's. This 
theory, which became so institutionalized in Israeli military thinking 
as to be dubbed "the concept," contributed to the country's general 
sense of security. Defense expenditures declined markedly from 
1970 levels, the annual reserve call-up was reduced from sixty to 
thirty days, and in 1973 the length of conscription was reduced 
from thirty- six to thirty- three months. 

October 1973 War 

The October 1973 War (known in Israel as the Yom Kippur 
War and in the Arab world as the Ramadan War) developed 



260 



Israeli liaison officers visit beduins 
in the southern Sinai Peninsula, November 1975 
Courtesy United Nations (Zuhair Saade) 

rapidly, and the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive caught Israel 
by surprise. On September 28, Palestinian guerrillas detained an 
Austrian train carrying Soviet Jews en route to Israel. Subsequent 
Egyptian and Syrian military deployments were interpreted by 
Israel as defensive actions in anticipation of Israeli reprisals. For 
one week, Israel postponed mobilizing its troops. Not until the 
morning of Yom Kippur (October 6), about six hours before the 
Arab offensive, were Israeli officials convinced that war was im- 
minent; a mobilization of the reserves was then ordered. In the 
early days of the war, the IDF suffered heavy losses as Egyptian 
forces crossed the Suez Canal and overran Israeli strongholds, while 
Syrians marched deep into the Golan Heights. Israel launched its 
counteroffensive first against the Syrian front, and only when it 
had pushed the Syrians back well east of the 1967 cease-fire line 
(by October 15) did Israel turn its attention to the Egyptian front. 
In ten days of fighting, Israel pushed the Egyptian army back across 
the canal, and the IDF made deep incursions into Egypt. On Octo- 
ber 24, with Israeli soldiers about one kilometer from the main 
Cairo-Ismailia highway and the Soviet Union threatening direct 
military intervention, the UN imposed a cease-fire. 

After several months of negotiations, during which sporadic fight- 
ing continued, Israel reached a disengagement agreement in 



261 



Israel: A Country Study 



January 1974, whereby the IDF withdrew across the canal and 
Israeli and Egyptian troops were separated in Sinai by a UNEF- 
manned buffer zone. Israel signed a similar agreement with Syria 
on May 31, 1974, whereby Israel withdrew to the 1967 cease-fire 
line in the Golan Heights and a United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force (UNDOF) occupied a buffer zone between Israeli 
and Syrian forces. On September 4, 1975, after further negotia- 
tions, the Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement was signed be- 
tween Egypt and Israel that widened the buffer zone and secured 
a further Israeli withdrawal to the east of the strategic Gidi and 
Mitla passes. 

Israel's military victory in 1973 came at a heavy price of more 
than 2,400 lives and an estimated US$5 billion in equipment, of 
which more than US$1 billion was airlifted by the United States 
during the war when it became apparent that Israel's ammunition 
stores were dangerously low. This action, and the threatened Soviet 
intervention, raised more clearly than ever the specter of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict escalating rapidly into a confrontation between the 
superpowers. The October 1973 War also cost Israel its self- 
confidence in its military superiority over its Arab enemy. The 
government appointed a special commission, headed by Chief 
Justice Shimon Agranat, president of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
to investigate why Israel had been caught by surprise and why so 
much had gone wrong during the war itself. The commission's 
report, completed in January 1975, was highly critical of the per- 
formance of the IDF on several levels, including intelligence gather- 
ing, discipline within the ranks, and the mobilization of reserves. 
The euphoria of the post- 1967 era faded. 

1982 Invasion of Lebanon 

Since 1970, Israeli settlements near the southern border of 
Lebanon had been exposed to harassing attacks from forces of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been driven 
out of Jordan. On three occasions, in 1970, 1972, and 1978, Israel 
had retaliated by ground operations carried out up to Lebanon's 
Litani River. The inhabitants of southern Lebanon deeply resented 
the conversion of their region to a battlefield by the PLO. Sup- 
ported by Israeli arms and training since 1973, they formed a militia 
under Saad Haddad, a major in the Lebanese Army. Israeli sup- 
port was gradually extended to other Christian militias, including 
the Phalangist movement of Pierre Jumayyil (also seen as Gemayel), 
as the Christian Maronites increasingly found themselves pressured 
by the involvement of the PLO in the 1975 Lebanese Civil War. 
A complicating element was the presence of the Syrian army in 



262 



National Security 



Lebanon, tolerated by Israel on the understanding that Israel's secu- 
rity interests in southern Lebanon would not be threatened. 

The Israeli government rejected appeals by Maronite Christians 
for direct Israeli military intervention to evict the PLO and Syrians 
from Lebanon. Pierre Jumayyil's son Bashir, however, determined 
to embroil Israel against Syria, staged an incident in 1981 in the 
city of Zahlah using approximately 100 Phalangist militiamen who 
had been infiltrated to attack Syrian positions. Jumayyil persuaded 
Israel to honor an earlier pledge for air strikes, which resulted in 
the downing of two Syrian helicopter transports. Syrian President 
Hafiz al Assad responded by stationing SA-6 surface-to-air mis- 
siles (SAMs) in the vicinity of Zahlah. Other SAMs and surface- 
to-surface missiles were deployed on the Syrian side of the border. 
Although the Phalangists abandoned Zahlah, the net effect was that 
Syrian air defense missiles were deployed in Lebanon, a situation 
that Israel regarded as an unacceptable shift in the balance of power 
in the area. 

Meanwhile Israel had conducted preemptive shelling and air 
strikes to deter PLO terrorist attacks on settlements in Galilee in 
northern Israel. The PLO fought back by shelling Israeli towns 
in Upper Galilee and coastal areas, especially after a devastating 
Israeli air raid against a heavily populated Palestinian neighborhood 
in West Beirut that killed more than 100 people and wounded more 
than 600. In July 1981, United States Middle East Special Am- 
bassador Philip Habib negotiated a truce in the artillery duel. Dur- 
ing this cease-fire, PLO leader Yasir Arafat reinforced his position 
by purchases of artillery rockets and obsolete tanks of Soviet 
manufacture. The forces under his control, the Palestine Libera- 
tion Army (PL A), were transformed from a decentralized assem- 
blage of terrorist and guerrilla bands to a standing army. 

When, in early June 1982, terrorists of the Abu Nidal organi- 
zation, a PLO splinter group, badly wounded the Israeli ambas- 
sador in London during an assassination attempt, Israel seized the 
pretext for launching its long-planned offensive. The Israeli cabi- 
net's authorization for the invasion, named Operation Peace for 
Galilee, set strict limits on the incursion. The IDF was to advance 
no farther than forty kilometers, the operation was to last only 
twenty-four hours, there would be no attack on Syrian forces and 
no approach to Beirut. Because of these limits, the IDF did not 
openly acknowledge its actual objectives. As a result, the IDF ad- 
vance unfolded in an ad hoc and disorganized fashion, greatly in- 
creasing the difficulty of the operation. 

When IDF ground forces crossed into Lebanon on June 6, five 
divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units conducted the 



263 



Israel: A Country Study 

three-pronged attack. On the western axis, two divisions converged 
on Tyre and proceeded north along the coastal highway toward 
Sidon, where they were to link up with an amphibious command 
unit that had secured a beachhead north of the city. In the central 
sector, a third division veered diagonally across southern Leba- 
non, conquered the Palestinian-held Beaufort Castle, and headed 
west toward Sidon, where it linked up with the coastal force in a 
pincer movement. The PLO was the only group to resist the IDF 
advance. Although many PLO officers fled, abandoning their men, 
the Palestinian resistance proved tenacious. In house-to-house and 
hand-to-hand combat in the sprawling refugee camps near Tyre 
and Sidon, the Palestinians inflicted high casualties on the IDF. 
In the eastern sector, two Israeli divisions thrust directly north into 
Syrian-held territory to sever the strategic Beirut-Damascus high- 
way. A brigade of Syrian commandos, however, ambushed the 
Israeli column in mountainous terrain, approximately five kilo- 
meters short of the highway. Syria's strong air defense system 
prevented the Israeli air force from attacking the entrenched Syrian 
positions. Nevertheless, in a surprise attack on Syrian SAM sites 
in the Biqa Valley, the Israelis destroyed seventeen of nineteen bat- 
teries. The Syrian air force was decimated in a desperate air battle 
to protect the air defense system. 

With total air superiority, the IDF mauled the Syrian First 
Armored Division, although in the grueling frontal attacks the 
Israelis also suffered heavy casualties. Still stalled short of the Beirut- 
Damascus highway, the IDF was on the verge of a breakthrough 
when, on June 11, Israel bowed to political pressure and agreed 
to a truce under United States auspices (see fig. 12). 

The Siege of Beirut and Its Aftermath 

The cease-fire signaled the start of a new stage in the war, as 
Israel focused on PLO forces trapped in Beirut. Although Israel 
had long adhered to the axiom that conquering and occupying an 
Arab capital would be a political and military disaster, key Israeli 
leaders were determined to drive the PLO out of Beirut. Israel main- 
tained the siege of Beirut for seventy days, unleashing a relentless 
air, naval, and artillery bombardment. The Israeli air force con- 
ducted what was called a ' ' manhunt by air" for Arafat and his 
lieutenants and on several occasions bombed premises only minutes 
after the PLO leadership had vacated them. If the PLO was hurt 
physically by the bombardments, the appalling civilian casualties 
earned Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted among IDF 
officers and enlisted men, many of whom personally opposed the 
war. Lebanese leaders petitioned Arafat, who had threatened to 



264 



National Security 



fight the IDF until the last man, to abandon Beirut to spare fur- 
ther civilian suffering. Arafat's condition for withdrawal was that 
a multinational peacekeeping force be deployed to protect the Pales- 
tinian families left behind. Syria and Tunisia agreed to host depart- 
ing PLO fighters. An advance unit of the Multinational Force, 350 
French troops, arrived in Beirut on August 1 1 , followed within one 
week by a contingent of 800 United States marines. By Septem- 
ber 1, approximately 8,000 Palestinian guerrillas, 2,600 PLA regu- 
lars, and 3,600 Syrian troops had evacuated West Beirut. 

Taking stock of the war's toll, Israel announced the death of 344 
of its soldiers and the wounding of more than 2,000. Israel calcu- 
lated that hundreds of Syrian soldiers had been killed and more 
than 1,000 wounded, and that 1,000 Palestinian guerrillas had been 
killed and 7,000 captured. By Lebanese estimates, 17,825 Lebanese 
had died and more than 30,000 had been wounded. 

On the evening of September 12, 1982, the IDF, having sur- 
rounded the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, dis- 
patched 300 to 400 Christian militiamen into the camps to rout 
what was believed to be the remnant of the PLO forces. The militia- 
men were mostly Phalangists but also included members of the 
Israeli-sponsored South Lebanon Army (SLA). The IDF ordered 
its soldiers to refrain from entering the camps, but IDF officers 
supervised the operation from the roof of a six-story building over- 
looking part of the area. According to the report of the Kahan Com- 
mission created later by the Israeli government to investigate the 
events, the IDF monitored the Phalangist radio network and fired 
flares from mortars and aircraft to illuminate the area. Over a period 
of two days, the Christian militiamen massacred 700 to 800 Pales- 
tinian men, women, and children. 

Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israel's war 
in Lebanon, was forced to resign his portfolio in the wake of the 
Sabra and Shatila investigation, although he remained in the cabi- 
net. He was replaced by former ambassador to the United States 
Moshe Arens, who wanted Israel to withdraw promptly from 
Lebanon, if only to avoid further antagonizing Washington. 

Israel withdrew its forces to the outskirts of the capital but it no 
longer had a clear tactical mission in Lebanon. Israel intended its 
continued presence to be a bargaining chip to negotiate a Syrian 
withdrawal. While awaiting a political agreement, the IDF had to 
fight a different kind of war. Turned into a static and defensive 
garrison force, it was now caught in a crossfire between warring 
factions. Its allies in Lebanon, the Christian Maronite militias, 
proved to be incapable of providing day-to-day security and hold- 
ing territory taken from the PLO. The hostility engendered among 



265 



Israel: A Country Study 



A 



LEBANON 



Mediterranean 
Sea 



Ad 
Damur 



Tyre 




SYRIA 



y Damascus 



ISRAEL 

Boundary representation 
i not necessarily authoritative 



^ k ( ) ^ (SQkAN . 
S* » iipppnf HEIGHTS 

/ y i / V •' / 



✓ .' United Nations Disengagement 
' ■ / Observer Force Zone 





International 
boundary 

Armistice line, 1949 




Northern limit of 
Israeli advance 
on June 11,1982 


• 


Populated place 




Road 






Israel Defense Forces 
line of advance 




Israel Defense Forces 
amphibious assault 


5 10 


15 Kilometers 


5 


10 15 Miles 



Figure 12. Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon 



the predominant Shia population of southern Lebanon over the 
prolonged Israeli occupation was in some ways potentially more 
dangerous than the threat posed by Palestinian guerrillas. In 
November 1983, the blowing up of the Israeli command post in 
Tyre signaled the beginning of full-scale guerrilla warfare by Shia 
groups, some of which were linked militarily and ideologically to 
Iran. During 1984, more than 900 attacks — hit-and-run ambushes, 
grenade assaults, and antipersonnel mine detonations — took place 
upon Israeli troops. Realizing that to attempt to hold a hostile region 
like southern Lebanon indefinitely contravened its basic strategic 
doctrine, the IDF pulled back its forces between January and June 
1985, leaving only a token force to patrol a narrow security zone 
with its proxy, the SLA. 

Israeli Concepts of National Security 

The need for a strong military posture in the face of the perceived 



266 



National Security 



Arab threats to Israel's survival has been endorsed with near una- 
nimity by Israeli policy makers and citizens. Nevertheless, the ques- 
tion of which strategies best ensure national defense has often caused 
acrimonious national, as well as international, controversy. Events 
subsequent to Ben-Gurion's initial concepts of national security 
laid down when Israel was founded in 1948, particularly Israel's 
occupation of Arab territories since the June 1967 War, have modi- 
fied the foundations for Israel's concepts of national security. 

Dormant War 

Israelis traditionally viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strug- 
gle for survival, convinced that even one military defeat would mean 
the end of their country. National defense became the first prior- 
ity, with proportionately more human and material resources de- 
voted to defense than in any other nation in the world. Israelis 
regarded major conflicts, such as occurred in 1967 and 1973, as 
"rounds" or battles in a continuous war. Even when it was not 
engaged in outright combat with its Arab enemies, Israel remained 
in what General Yitzhak Rabin, who became minister of defense 
in 1984, called a "dormant war" that, "like a volcano," could 
erupt with little warning into a major conflagration. 

Extensive Threat 

Another premise was that every Arab country was at least a 
potential member of a unified pan-Arab coalition that could at- 
tack Israel — a concept sometimes referred to by Israeli strategic 
planners as the "extensive threat." To confront this extensive 
threat, the IDF aimed to have the capability to defend Israel not 
only against an attack by a single Arab adversary or an alliance 
of several Arab states, but also against the combined forces of all 
Arab countries. Israeli strategists felt that planning for such a worst- 
case scenario was prudent because Arab states had often rhetori- 
cally threatened such a combined attack. The concept of extensive 
threat also justified requests for greater military aid from the United 
States and protests against United States military support of moder- 
ate Arab states that, from the American perspective, posed no credi- 
ble threat to Israel's security. Some Israeli military leaders insisted 
that, despite the 1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt remained a 
major potential enemy in any future Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, 
some Israeli strategists worried about threats from outside the Arab 
world. In a 1981 speech, then Minister of Defense Sharon stated 
that "Israel's sphere of strategic and security interests must be 
broadened in the 1980s" to confront new adversaries in Africa and 



267 



Israel: A Country Study 

Asia, and cited Pakistan as one potential threat. Some strategists 
even envisioned Israeli clashes with Iran and India. 

At the other end of the spectrum were those who felt that the 
concept of extensive threat exaggerated the danger to Israel. Some 
Israeli strategists argued in the late 1980s that the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict was evolving into a bilateral contest between Israel and Syria 
to which other Arab actors were becoming peripheral. They con- 
sidered that the IDF for pragmatic reasons should deploy its lim- 
ited resources to counter the threat of a cross-border attack by Syria. 
Speaking in 1987, Minister of Defense Rabin stated that Egypt 
had placed itself "outside the circle of nations at war with Israel" 
and that the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel had "sig- 
nificantly altered the Middle East balance of power in Israel's 
favor." 

Demographic and geographic pressures arising from Israel's small 
size and concentrated population meant that a war fought within 
Israel would be extremely costly in terms of civilian casualties and 
damage to the economic infrastructure. Morale and, hence, fu- 
ture immigration would also suffer. It was therefore an ironclad 
rule of Israeli strategists to transfer military action to enemy terri- 
tory, and no regular Arab troops have hit on Israeli soil since 1948. 
Because Israel could never defeat its Arab enemy permanently, no 
matter how many victories or "rounds" it won on the battlefield, 
and because in each full-scale war it incurred the risk, however 
minimal, of combat being conducted on its territory or even a defeat 
that would destroy the state, Israel's official policy was to avoid 
all-out war unless attacked. Deterrence therefore became the main 
pillar of Israel's national security doctrine. 

Strategic Depth 

Israel considered an offensive rather than a defensive strategy 
the best deterrent to Arab attack. Because of the absence until 1967 
of the depth of terrain essential for strategic defense, Israel could 
ensure that military action was conducted on Arab territory only 
by attacking first. Moreover, Israel feared that a passive defensive 
strategy would permit the Arabs, secure in the knowledge that Israel 
would not fight unless attacked, to wage a protracted low-level war 
of attrition, engage in brinkmanship through incremental escala- 
tion, or mobilize for war with impunity. Paradoxically, then, the 
policy of deterrence dictated that Israel always had to strike first. 
The Israeli surprise attack could be a "preemptive" attack in the 
face of an imminent Arab attack, an unprovoked "preventive" 
attack to deal the Arab armies a setback that would stave off fu- 
ture attack, or a massive retaliation for a minor Arab infraction. 



268 



National Security 



Israel justified such attacks by the concept that it was locked in 
permanent conflict with the Arabs. 

The occupation of conquered territories in 1967 gready increased 
Israel's strategic depth, and Israeli strategic thinking changed ac- 
cordingly. Many strategists argued that the IDF could now adopt 
a defensive posture, absorb a first strike, and then retaliate with 
a counteroffensive. The October 1973 War illustrated that this 
thinking was at least partially correct. With the added security buffer 
of the occupied territories, Israel could absorb a first strike and 
retaliate successfully. 

But when Sharon was appointed minister of defense in 1981, 
he advocated that Israel revert to the more aggressive pre- 1967 
strategy. Sharon argued that the increased mechanization and mo- 
bility of Arab armies, combined with the increased range of Arab 
surface-to-surface missile systems (SSMs), nullified the strategic 
insulation and advanced warning that the occupied territories af- 
forded Israel. Israel, therefore, faced the same threat that it had 
before 1967 and, incapable of absorbing a first strike, should be 
willing to launch preventive and preemptive strikes against poten- 
tial Arab threats. After the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, for which 
Sharon was substantially responsible, the aggressive national secu- 
rity posture that he advocated waned in popularity. By 1988, 
however, Iraq's use of SSMs against Iran and Saudi Arabia's ac- 
quisition of long-range SSMs from China suggested to some Israeli 
strategists that the concepts of extensive threat and preemption 
should again be given more weight. 

Potential Causes of War 

Israel made clear to the Arabs that certain actions, even if not 
overtly hostile or aimed at Israel, would trigger an Israeli preemp- 
tive attack. Israel announced various potential causes of war. Some 
causes, such as interference with Israeli freedom of navigation in 
the Strait of Tiran, were officially designated as such. In 1982 
Sharon listed four actions that would lead to an attack: the attempt 
by an Arab country to acquire or manufacture an atomic bomb, 
the militarization of the Sinai Peninsula, the entry of the Iraqi army 
into Jordan, and the supply of sophisticated United States arms 
to Jordan. In 1988 the government of Israel continued to commu- 
nicate potential causes to its Arab adversaries. Their tacit acquies- 
cence in these unilateral Israeli demands constituted a system of 
unwritten but mutually understood agreements protecting the short- 
term status quo. 

Since the establishment of Israel, the IDF has been obliged to 
deal with terrorist actions, cross-border raids, and artillery and 



269 



Israel: A Country Study 



missile barrages of the various Palestinian organizations under the 
loose leadership of the PLO. The IDF*s approach in contending 
with PLO activity has combined extreme vigilance with prompt 
and damaging retaliatory measures, including" punishment of Arab 
nations giving sanctuarv to terrorists and guerrillas. The presence 
of innocent noncombatants was not accepted as a reason for with- 
holding counterstrikes. Although striving to limit harm to unin- 
volved persons, the Israelis gave priority to the need to demonstrate 
that acts of terrorism would meet with quick retribution in painful 
and unpredictable forms. 

Israeli strategists believed the periodic outbreak of war to be vir- 
tually inevitable and that once war broke out it was essential that 
it be brief and lead to decisive victory. The requirement of a rapid 
war followed from at least two factors. During full mobilization, 
virtually the entire Israeli population was engaged in the defense 
effort and the peacetime economy ground to a halt. Sustaining full 
mobilization for more than several weeks would prove disastrous 
to the economy, and stockpiling sufficient supplies for a long war 
would be difficult and very costly. Experience from past wars also 
showed Israel that prolonged hostilities invited superpower inter- 
vention. As a result. Israeli strategists stressed the need to create 
a clear margin of victory before a cease-fire was imposed from the 
outside. This concept was extended in the 1980s, when Israeli mili- 
tarv leaders formulated the strategy- of engaging m a "war of an- 
nihilation" in the event of a new round of all-out warfare. Israel's 
goal would be to destroy the .Arab armies so completely as to 
preclude a military threat for ten years . Such a scenario might prove 
elusive, however, because destroyed equipment could be quickly 
replaced, and the .Arab countries had sufficient manpower to rebuild 
shattered forces. 

Nuclear and Conventional Deterrents 

The concept of deterrence assumed a new dimension with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation. In December 
1974. President Ephraim Katzir announced that "'it has always 
been our intention to develop a nuclear potential . We now have 
that potential. ' ' -.Ambiguously. Israeli officials maintained that Israel 
would not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into 
the Middle East. Experts assumed that Israel had a rudimentary 
nuclear capability. In September 1986. the testimony and photo- 
graphs provided by Mordechai Yanunu. a technician who had 
worked at Israel's Dimona nuclear facility in the Xegev Desert, 
led experts to conclude that Israel had a nuclear capability far greater 
than previously thought i see Nuclear Weapons Potential, this ch. i. 



27( 



National Security 



Although viewed as its ultimate guarantor of security, the nuclear 
option did not lead Israel to complacency about national security. 
On the contrary, it impelled Israel to seek unquestioned superi- 
ority in conventional capability over the Arab armies to forestall 
use of nuclear weapons as a last resort. The IDF sought to lever- 
age its conventional power to the maximum extent. IDF doctrine 
and tactics stressed quality of weapons versus quantity; integra- 
tion of the combined firepower of the three branches of the armed 
forces; effective battlefield command, communications, and real- 
time intelligence; use of precision-guided munitions and stand-off 
firepower; and high mobility. 

The debate over secure borders rested at the heart of the con- 
troversy over Israel's national security. Some strategists contended 
that only a negotiated settlement with the Arabs would bring peace 
and ensure Israel's ultimate security. Such a settlement would en- 
tail territorial concessions in the occupied territories. Proponents 
of exchanging land for peace tended to be skeptical that any bor- 
der was militarily defensible in the age of modern warfare. In their 
eyes, the occupied territories were a liability in that they gave Israel 
a false sense of security and gave the Arabs reason to go to war. 

Others believed Israel's conflict with the Arab states was fun- 
damentally irreconcilable and that Israeli and Arab territorial im- 
peratives were mutually exclusive. They held that ceding control 
of the occupied territories would bring at best a temporary peace 
and feared that the Arabs would use the territories as a springboard 
to attack Israel proper. Israeli military positions along the Golan 
Heights and the Jordan Rift Valley were said to be ideal geographi- 
cally defensible borders. Others viewed the occupied territories as 
an integral part of Israel and Israeli withdrawal as too high a price 
to pay for peace. Extending beyond national security, the con- 
troversy was enmeshed with political, social, and religious issues — 
particularly the concept of exchanging "land for peace" that formed 
the basis of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. 

Autonomy 

Autonomy was another cornerstone of Israeli strategic doctrine, 
but autonomy did not mean independence. The Israeli military 
acknowledged a heavy dependence on the United States as a sup- 
plier of military materiel and as a deterrent to possible Soviet in- 
tervention on the side of the Arabs during times of war. Precisely 
because of this dependence, however, Israel felt it necessary to take 
autonomous action — often in defiance of strong United States ob- 
jections. In numerous actions, such as the 1973 encirclement of 
the Egyptian Third Army and the 1982 siege of West Beirut, Israel 



271 



Israel: A Country Study 

signaled to Washington that its national interests were not always 
congruent with those of the United States. More important, Israel 
proved to its Arab adversaries that despite any political pressure 
they exerted on Washington, the United States could not extract 
concessions from Israel. Another dimension of autonomy was that 
Israel would not make a settlement with the Arabs by placing it- 
self in an indefensible position in return for security guarantees 
from the United States. In general, foreign policy was subservient 
to defense policy, and Israeli policy makers felt that Israel should 
never sacrifice its strategic strength for improved foreign relations 
with the United States, the Arab states, or other countries, even 
if such improved relations made war less likely. As Day an said, 
"Israel has no foreign policy — only a defense policy." 

International and Domestic Security Concerns 

The Arab Military Threat 

As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any combi- 
nation of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it in a 
future conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could be 
directed against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources that 
Israel could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership, troop 
proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be deci- 
sive, as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations remained 
deeply divided over a host of issues in mid- 1988, including their 
postures toward Israel. Although the Camp David peace process 
between Egypt and Israel failed to achieve normalization of rela- 
tions, Israel no longer considered Egypt part of the circle of hostile 
states. Nevertheless, Israeli planners did not rule out an upheaval 
in Egyptian politics that would renew the risk of military confron- 
tation. With the Sinai region effectively demilitarized, the element 
of surprise that had initially worked in Egypt's favor in the Oc- 
tober 1973 War would not be available. In any future conflict, Egyp- 
tian forces would have to cross 130 kilometers of desert exposed 
to Israeli air power. Jordan's military weakness vis-a-vis Israel and 
its exposure to Israeli retaliation seemed to rule out military ac- 
tion except as a reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition. The modern- 
ization of Jordan's army and air force was continuing, however, 
with the help of the United States and France. Many important 
Israeli targets were within the range of Jordanian artillery and 
rockets. 

Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had 
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower 
and equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although 



272 



National Security 



the inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing 
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to 
be skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict. The 
concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights proba- 
bly could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would 
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a coun- 
terattack. 

Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and 
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and con- 
trol activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook and stra- 
tegic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary objective 
was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger to its oil 
facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless, from Israel's 
perspective, that country had the potential to undertake offensive 
air operations in conjunction with other Arab air forces. In the eyes 
of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988 purchase of long-range 
missiles from China and its acquisition of Tornado fighter-bombers 
from Britain enhanced its role in a future conflict. 

The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars. 
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly 
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again at- 
tempted to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they 
would, like those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. 
Nevertheless, as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident 
of their ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war 
with Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divi- 
sions and had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of 
sophisticated weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity 
and willingness to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, 
Iraq was economically drained and presumably tired of fighting 
after the eight-year struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt, 
moreover, that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that 
Iraq's armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military involve- 
ment elsewhere. 

The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War 
and the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, 
Syria, and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from 
twenty to twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of 
armored and mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. 
Israeli planners estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divi- 
sions, increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more (see fig. 13). 

The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western powers, 
combined with the increased resources at the disposal of oil- 
exporting countries, enabled the Arab powers vastiy to expand their 



273 



Israel: A Country Study 







-TURKEY/ 



CY 



Mediterranean 
Sea 



ISRAEL 

TAF 141,000 
AFV 14,200 
CA 752 





SYRIA 


TAF 


407,500 


AFV 


7,900 


CA 


588 



r' 



GAZA STRIP 2 



)~ -Jjf (Israeli oc£upie< 
' J__JV£5T 2 



< 





IRAQ 


TAF 


1,000,000 


AFV 


8,500 


CA 


650 





EGYPT 


TAF 


445,000 


AFV 


5,518 


CA 


494 



/ 



JORDAN 

TAF 80,300 
AFV 2,356 
CA 133 



Kuw£rm 



SAUDI ARABIA 

TAF 73,500 
2,260 
226 



AFV 
CA 



Iraq-Saudi Arabia 



1 In 1987 Lebanon's national armed 
forces did not present a threat to 
Israel. Since the late 1960s, however, 
Israel has clashed with various Palestinian,' 
Lebanese, and Syrian forces in Lebanon. 

2 The status of the Israeli-occupied West 
Bank and Gaza Strip is to be determined. 

/ 

*■ '* \./" 



Boundary representation 
not necessariiy authoritative 



SUDAN 



— .. — International boundary 




-- Armistice line 


TAF 


Total armed forces 
(excluding reserves and 
paramilitary units) 


AFV 


Armored fighting vehicles 
(including tanks) 


CA 


Combat aircraft 
(including attack 
helicopters) 


100 

I ' 


200 Kilometers 





100 200 Nautical miles 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987, 96-114. 



Figure 13. Comparison of Military Forces of Israel and Neighboring Coun- 
tries, 1987 

sophisticated weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank inven- 
tories of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while their 
stocks of aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers 
roughly doubled. Both Syria and Iraq had acquired high perfor- 
mance aircraft of Soviet design. To the Arab countries' primary 
land weapons had been added more self-propelled artillery, guided 
antitank missiles, new munitions — including cluster and homing 
shells — improved fire-control systems, and laser rangefinders. Previ- 
ously vulnerable air defenses now could be shielded using advanced 
mobile missile systems acquired from both East and West. Most 
of the strategic sites in Israel were exposed to Syrian striking power 
in the form of Soviet-supplied SS-21 SSMs, with a range of 120 
kilometers and far greater accuracy than the earlier generation 
FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B (300 kilometers). 



274 



National Security 



Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the im- 
provement in Arab military leadership and manpower resources. 
Arab field commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful 
adaptation of modern command and control systems to battlefield 
situations. Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness 
in static defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity 
of qualified technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to 
deficiencies in education and training, continued to detract from 
the ability of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry 
with full efficiency. The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been 
decisive in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier engage- 
ments. Although the rising level of weapons technology presented 
more of a problem to the Arab nations than to Israel, the Arabs' 
Soviet systems were simpler to use and maintain than their more 
sophisticated United States counterparts. The improved perfor- 
mance of the Iraqi air force against Iran after 1985 offered some 
evidence that the disparity in pilot skills and experience might be 
narrowing. 

Palestinian Terrorist Groups 

The PLO was formed in 1964 as an umbrella body for a num- 
ber of elements of the Palestinian resistance movement. Its main 
constituent force was Al Fatah (Movement for the Liberation of 
Palestine), whose head, Yasir Arafat, assumed control of the PLO 
in 1968. At the outbreak of the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Al 
Fatah numbered 6,500 armed men organized into regular units. 
Another PLO faction was the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), ideologically close to the Soviet Union and led 
by a Christian, George Habash. The PFLP was bitterly opposed 
to compromise with Israel. Numbering about 1,500 adherents in 
1982, it was responsible for some of the most deadly international 
terrorist actions against Israel and its supporters. Other leftist groups 
had splintered from the PFLP, including the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liber- 
ation of Palestine-General Command (with ties to Syria and Libya), 
and the Palestine Liberation Front (Iraq- supported). The Pales- 
tine Liberation Army (PLA), numbering nearly 4,000 men in 1982, 
was established in 1964 as the military arm of the PLO. In prac- 
tice, however, the Syrian general staff controlled the PLA's con- 
tingents of Palestinian troops and the Jordanian army controlled 
one brigade in Jordan. The Abu Nidal organization, an anti- Arafat 
group supported by Libya and Syria, was responsible for many 
terrorist actions in Western Europe and against pro-Arafat Pales- 
tinians. 



275 



Israel: A Country Study 

Initially linked to Syria, Al Fatah came into its own after the 
June 1967 War, when the West Bank and the Gaza Strip fell under 
Israeli control. Palestinian refugees poured into Jordan, where the 
PLO established virtually autonomous enclaves, and from which 
it launched guerrilla raids. Israel's retaliation inflicted heavy damage 
within Jordan. The PLO refused demands from King Hussein that 
it cease operations and, in a sharp conflict with Jordanian forces 
in 1970 and 1971 , was driven out of Jordan. Shifting its headquar- 
ters to Lebanon, the PLO adopted a more formal military struc- 
ture, benefiting from an abundant flow of arms from other Arab 
nations. In spite of the danger of Israeli reprisals, the Lebanese 
government was forced to accept the independent political and mili- 
tary presence of the PLO in Lebanon. 

Airliner hijackings had been an element in the PLO's strategy 
since 1967. In retaliation against an attack on an El Al airliner in 
Athens in 1968, Israel mounted a helicopter raid against the Beirut 
International Airport, destroying thirteen Arab-owned aircraft. A 
number of deadly terrorist incidents and guerrilla attacks against 
Israeli West Bank settlements occurred during the 1970s. In an 
attempt at hostage-taking, the Black September group, an extremist 
faction of Al Fatah, killed eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympics in 1972. A climax in the terrorist campaign occurred in 
March 1978, when Al Fatah raiders landed on the Israeli coast south 
of Haifa, attacking a bus and cars on the Tel Aviv-Haifa high- 
way. Thirty-five Israelis were killed and at least seventy-four were 
wounded. In reaction to the highway attack, the IDF launched 
Operation Litani in April 1978, a three-month expedition to clear 
the PLO guerrillas from Lebanese border areas. Within one week, 
the strong IDF force had driven back the PLO and established com- 
plete control in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. 

Nevertheless, the PLO had not been dealt a decisive blow. With 
Soviet help, it began to accumulate substantial numbers of heavy 
weapons, including long-range artillery, rocket launchers, antiair- 
craft weapons, and missiles. Between 1978 and 1981, numerous 
IDF raids against PLO installations in southern Lebanon were an- 
swered within hours by random artillery and rocket attacks on Israeli 
border settlements. By mid- 1981, the reciprocal attacks were ap- 
proaching the intensity of full-scale hostilities. Punishing bomb- 
ing raids by the Israeli air force included an attack aimed at PLO 
headquarters in Beirut that caused many civilian casualties. 
Although a truce was arranged with the help of United States am- 
bassador Philip Habib on July 24, 1981, acts of PLO terror did 
not abate inside Israel, in the West Bank, and in foreign coun- 
tries. Israel considered the continued presence of long-range 



276 




Israeli forces withdrawing from 
occupied area of southern Lebanon, June 1978 
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata) 

weapons threatening its northern population centers an unaccept- 
able threat. In June 1982, Israel justified its invasion of Lebanon 
as the response to an assassination attempt against its ambassador 
in London by the Abu Nidal group. At the outset of the war, the 
PLO had approximately 15,000 organized forces and about 18,000 
militia recruited among Palestinian refugees. In spite of the large 
quantity of weapons and armor it had acquired, it never reached 
the level of military competence needed to meet the IDF in regu- 
lar combat. When three division-size IDF armored columns bore 
down on the 6,000 PLO fighters defending the coastal plain below 
Beirut, the Palestinians fought tenaciously even though they were 
poorly led and even abandoned by many senior officers. Effective 
resistance ended within a week when the IDF closed in on the Beirut 
suburbs (see 1982 Invasion of Lebanon, this ch.). 

To avoid the domestic and international repercussions of the 
bloody street fighting that an attack on the PLO headquarters in 
West Beirut would have entailed, an agreement was negotiated 
whereby the PLO troops and command would evacuate Lebanon 
and withdraw to other Arab states willing to receive them. By 
September 1982, more than 14,000 PLO combatants had with- 
drawn. About 6,500 Al Fatah fighters sailed from Beirut. Most 
of the others crossed into Syria, and smaller contingents went to 



277 



Israel: A Country Study 

other Arab countries. As of 1987, it was believed that between 2,000 
and 3,700 guerrillas were still in Syria, 2,000 were in Jordan, and 
smaller groups were quartered in Algeria, the Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic (North Yemen), the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(South Yemen), Iraq, Sudan, and Tunisia. By 1988, however, 
many PLO fighters had filtered back into Lebanon. About 3,000 
armed men aligned with Al Fatah were located in two camps near 
Sidon, forty kilometers south of Beirut, and an additional 7,000 
fighters aligned with Syria reportedly were deployed in bases and 
refugee camps in eastern and northern Lebanon. 

Much of the Arab terrorism directed against Israel during the 
mid-to-late 1980s was conducted by Syrian-sponsored Palestinian 
groups that rejected Arafat. To a lesser extent, terrorist threats 
resulted from Libyan involvement or from Al Fatah and its Force 
1 7 . Terrorists made a number of attempts to infiltrate the Israeli 
coast by sea and the anti-Arafat Abu Musa faction mounted several 
terrorist attacks in Jerusalem. The Damascus-based PFLP waged 
a relentless campaign to inhibit the development of moderate Pales- 
tinian leadership in the occupied territories. The shadowy Abu 
Nidal was believed responsible for a number of actions in which 
Israel was not necessarily the primary target. These included the 
hijacking of an Egyptian airliner with the loss of many lives in late 
1985, and shooting and grenade attacks at the El Al counters of 
the Rome and Vienna airports a few months later. 

The Shia population of southern Lebanon had initially welcomed 
the IDF as adversaries of the PLO. By 1984, however, they had 
turned against the Israelis because of the dislocation caused by the 
Israeli occupation. Protests turned to violence in the form of 
hundreds of hit-and-run attacks by Shia gunmen against Israeli 
troops. The situation eased with the end of the Israeli occupation 
in mid- 1985. 

Southern Lebanon continued to be a potentially dangerous base 
for guerrilla attacks in 1988, following the partial reorganization 
of PLO elements in Lebanon and the introduction of hundreds 
of Shia radicals of the Hizballah (Party of God) movement 
supported by Iran. Numerous attempts had been made by terrorist 
squads to penetrate Israel's border defenses. A zone inside Lebanese 
territory eighty kilometers long and averaging ten kilometers 
in depth was patrolled by 1 ,000 IDF troops backed by 2,000 SLA 
militiamen recruited among Christian Maronites. The IDF con- 
ducted periodic sweeps of this zone to discourage cross-border 
infiltration and shelling by the PLO. The frontier itself was 
protected by antipersonnel mines, an electronic fence, acoustic, 



278 



National Security 



radar and night- vision systems, fortified positions, and mobile 
patrols. 

The Palestinian uprising (intifadah) that broke out in December 
1987 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip apparently was launched 
spontaneously and was not direcdy controlled by the PLO. Bury- 
ing their longstanding rivalries, local members of Al Fatah, PFLP, 
DFLP, the Palestinian Communist Party, and fundamentalists of 
the Islamic Holy War faction provided leadership through "popular 
committees" in camps and villages. A loose coordinating body, 
the Unified National Command of the Uprising, distributed leaflets 
with guidance on the general lines of resistance. By August 1988, 
a separate Islamic fundamentalist organization had emerged. 
Known as Hamas, the Arabic acronym for a name that translates 
as the Islamic Resistance Movement, it rejected any political set- 
tlement with Israel, insisting that a solution would come only 
through a holy war (see Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- , 
this ch.). 

Jewish Terrorist Organizations 

Several small Jewish groups had been linked with terrorist at- 
tacks against Arabs in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. None 
of these presented a significant security problem to the IDF as of 
1988. The best known of these organizations, the Gush Emunim 
Underground (sometimes called the Jewish Terror Organization), 
was formed in 1979 by prominent members of Gush Emunim, a 
group of religious zealots who had used squatter tactics to carry 
on a campaign to settle the West Bank after the October 1973 War. 
The underground perceived the 1978 Camp David Accords and 
the 1979 Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel as betraying 
the Begin government's policy of retaining the territories conquered 
by Israel. 

The principal terrorist actions of the Gush Emunim Underground 
were carried out between 1980 and 1984. In 1980 car bombings 
of five West Bank Arab mayors resulted in crippling two of the 
mayors. In 1983, the Hebron Islamic College was the target of a 
machinegun and grenade attack that killed three Arab students and 
wounded thirty-three others. In 1984 an attempt was made to place 
explosive charges on five Arab buses in East Jerusalem. This plot 
was foiled by agents of Israel's internal security force, Shin Bet, 
leading to arrest and prison sentences for eighteen members of the 
underground. The security services also uncovered a well-developed 
plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock, one of Islam's most sacred 
shrines, on Jerusalem's Temple Mount. 



279 



Israel: A Country Study 

Another anti-Arab terrorist group, Terror Against Terror (known 
as TNT) was established by Kach, the right-wing extremist politi- 
cal movement of Rabbi Meir Kahane. TNT was responsible for 
numerous beatings and bombings and several murders of Arabs, 
beginning in 1975. Defending Shield (Egrof Magen), a Jewish 
vigilante group of West Bank settlers formed in 1983, was respon- 
sible for a number of attacks and vandalization of Arab property 
on the West Bank. During the intifadah, beginning in late 1987, 
there were many reports of Jewish vigilantism, including shoot- 
ings, punitive raids on refugee camps, and assaults on Arab 
motorists in retaliation for rock-throwing attacks by Arab youths. 
Most of these appeared to be spontaneous actions by settlers of in- 
dividual communities. 

The Israel Defense Forces 
Command Structure 

The IDF had no commander in chief designated as such. The 
Basic Law: The Army, 1976, vested command in the government. 
In fact, the minister of defense acted as the highest authority over 
the IDF and was its link to civilian political authorities. The minister 
of defense was a civilian (although usually a retired military officer). 
The cabinet was required to give prior approval to major military 
policies and operations. Under normal circumstances, the stand- 
ing Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the cabinet exer- 
cised this responsibility. The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 
demonstrated, however, that a domineering minister of defense 
could, by misleading the cabinet or withholding information, act 
contrary to the government's wishes. Periodic reports on the sta- 
tus of the military were provided to the Israeli parliament, the Knes- 
set, through its Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee 
and on budgetary matters through the Finance Committee. 

The highest ranking IDF officer, the only officer to hold the rank 
of lieutenant general, was the chief of staff, who was chairman of 
the general staff and was responsible to the minister of defense. 
The general staff was in charge of "professional" matters, such 
as organization, training, and the planning and execution of mili- 
tary operations. The chief of staff in late 1988, Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Dan Shomron, had held the position since April 1987. He was 
appointed by the minister of defense for a term that was nominally 
three years but that could be shortened or extended. Within the 
Ministry of Defense, the senior civilian officer beneath the minister 
was the director general, who supervised defense production, 
infrastructure, the budget, and other administrative and technical 



280 



National Security 



matters. As the supreme commander of the IDF, however, the 
minister of defense could intervene in all IDF matters (see fig. 14). 

The general staff had as its members the chief of general staff 
branch (operations), the chiefs of manpower, logistics, and intelli- 
gence; the three area commanders; and the commanding officers 
of the air force, navy, and ground corps. The ground corps com- 
mander was responsible for training, doctrine, and development 
of equipment for the four combat corps of paratroop/infantry, 
armor, artillery, and engineers. Operational control of the ground 
forces went through a separate chain of command from the chief 
of staff directly to the three area commanders — Northern (forces 
facing Syria and Lebanon); Central (forces facing Jordan); and 
Southern (forces facing Egypt) — who in turn exercised command 
over divisions and brigades. 

The navy and air force were not, nor had ever been, designated 
as separate services. Officially known as the Sea Corps (Hel Yam) 
and the Air Corps (Hel Avir), the navy and air force, however, 
enjoyed more autonomy within the IDF structure than their offi- 
cial designations would suggest. Their commanders had the sta- 
tus of senior advisers to the chief of staff. Along with the ground 
force area commanders, the commanders of the air force and navy 
held two-star rank. 

Ground Forces 

The Israeli government did not disclose information on the overall 
size of the IDF, or the identity, location, and strength of units. 
In 1988 the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Lon- 
don estimated the strength of the ground forces at 104,000 troops, 
including 16,000 career soldiers and 88,000 conscripts. An addi- 
tional 494,000 men and women were regularly trained reserves who 
could be mobilized within seventy-two hours. The staffs of each 
of the ground forces' three area commanders were divided into 
branches responsible for manpower, operations, training, and sup- 
ply. The authority of the area commanders extended to the com- 
bat units and ground force bases and installations located within 
their districts, as well as area defense, including the protection of 
villages, especially those near the frontier. During combat, area 
commanders also coordinated activities of naval and air force units 
operating on fronts within their areas. 

The army was organized into three armored divisions, each com- 
posed of two armored and one artillery brigade, plus one armored 
and one mechanized infantry brigade upon mobilization. An ad- 
ditional five independent mechanized infantry brigades were avail- 
able. The reserves consisted of nine armored divisions, one 



281 



Israel: A Country Study 







< 








0) 


<co 






O 




Ll_ 


Mil 


UJ 




I 


< i 


o 


o 







Q in 








SET 




:ign 

S AN 
RITY 
ITTEI 






,</> 

II 


NES 




FORE 
AFFAIR 
SECU 
COMM 






OS 








£0 




CO 



53 
K 

1 
ft 



282 



National Security 



airmobile mechanized division, and ten regional infantry brigades 
for border defense. In practice, unit composition was extremely 
fluid and it was common for subunits to be transferred, especially 
when a particular battalion or brigade was needed in a combat zone 
far from its regular divisional station. 

The IDF did not organize permanent divisions until after the 
June 1967 War. As of 1988, their composition remained flexible, 
leading military analysts to regard the brigade as the basic combat 
unit of the IDF. Brigade commanders exercised considerable 
autonomy, particularly during battle, following the IDF axiom that 
the command echelon must serve the assault echelon. 

Between 1977 and 1987, the IDF reconfigured its units as its 
tank inventory grew, reducing the number of infantry brigades 
while increasing the number of armored brigades from twenty to 
thirty-three upon mobilization. Although maintained with a full 
complement of equipment, most of the armored brigades were only 
at cadre strength. 

The Israeli ground forces were highly mechanized. Their equip- 
ment inventory included nearly 4,000 tanks and nearly 1 1 ,000 other 
armored vehicles (see table 12, Appendix A). Their armored per- 
sonnel vehicles almost equaled in number those of the combined 
armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The offensive profile of the 
army was bolstered significantly by the artillery forces (principally 
self-propelled and equipped with advanced fire control systems and 
high-performance munitions). Antitank capabilities had been up- 
graded with modern rocket launchers and guided missile systems. 

As of 1988, most Israeli ground forces were positioned on the 
northern and eastern border areas facing Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon. After the Syrian army shifted most of its troops out of 
Lebanon following the IDF withdrawal in June 1985, more than 
six Syrian divisions were concentrated in the Golan-Damascus area. 
The IDF responded by constructing several defensive lines of mines 
and antitank obstacles in the Golan Heights, and by reinforcing 
its troop strength there, mainly with regular armored and infan- 
try units. Reserve units training in the vicinity also could be mobi- 
lized in case of need. Other ground forces were deployed in 
defending the Lebanese border against infiltration. 

Navy 

By far the smallest arm of the IDF, the navy in 1987 consisted 
of about 1,000 officers and 8,000 enlisted personnel, including 3,200 
conscripts. An additional 1,000 reserve personnel would be avail- 
able on mobilization. Long neglected, the navy won acclaim for 
its successful engagements with the Syrian and Egyptian navies 



283 



Israel: A Country Study 



during the October 1973 War, when it sank eight Arab missile boats 
without the loss of a single Israeli vessel. The Soviet Union replaced 
Syria's wartime losses and provided an additional nine missile boats. 
The Egyptian fleet also introduced new and more advanced equip- 
ment after the 1973 conflict. With more than 140 units as of 1988, 
the Egyptian fleet was larger than that of Israel. Nevertheless, for- 
eign observers believed that the balance of naval power still rested 
with Israel because of its technological and tactical superiority. 

During the 1980s, sea infiltration by PLO terrorists presented 
the most immediate naval threat. With few exceptions the navy 
succeeded in thwarting such attacks, using missile boats to detect 
mother ships on the high seas, fast patrol craft for inshore patrol- 
ling, and offshore patrol aircraft for visual or radar detection of 
hostile activity. Nevertheless, Israeli defense planners accorded the 
navy the lowest priority among the IDF's three arms and, although 
it had been expanded, some Israeli defense experts warned that 
modernization was lagging behind that of the navies of the Arab 
states. 

Although reduced in scope from earlier plans, a modernization 
program for the navy approved in 1988 included the acquisition 
of three Saar 5 -class corvettes to be built in the United States and 
three Dolphin-class diesel submarines to be built in West Germany, 
and the upgrading of existing patrol boats. The 1 , 000-ton Saar 5s, 
which would be the most potent surface vessels in the fleet, would 
each be equipped with Harpoon and Gabriel missiles, as well as 
a helicopter. They would considerably enhance the navy's range 
and offensive capability. 

In 1988 the fleet contained approximately seventy combat ves- 
sels, including three submarines, three missile-armed hydrofoils, 
twenty-two fast attack craft equipped with Israeli-built Gabriel mis- 
siles, and thirty-two coastal patrol boats (see table 13, Appendix A). 
In assembling its fleet, the navy had shunned large vessels, prefer- 
ring small ships with high firepower, speed, and maneuverability. 
The Reshef-class fast attack craft, the heart of the Israeli fleet, had 
a range of about 2,400 kilometers. The fleet operated in two un- 
connected bodies of water — on the Mediterranean Sea, where major 
naval ports were located at Haifa and Ashdod, and on the Gulf 
of Aqaba, with a naval facility at Elat. The first Reshefs were sta- 
tioned in the Red Sea but were redeployed to the Mediterranean, 
via the Cape of Good Hope, after the return of the Sinai Penin- 
sula to Egypt. As of 1988, the naval units protecting shipping on 
the Gulf of Aqaba were primarily Dabur-class coastal patrol boats. 

The navy had not established a marine corps, although it had 
created an elite unit of about 300 underwater commandos who had 



284 



National Security 



proved to be highly successful in amphibious assault and sabotage 
operations. Its naval air arm was limited to maritime reconnais- 
sance conducted with Israeli-produced Seascan aircraft and res- 
cue and surveillance missions performed with Bell helicopters. With 
a moderate number of landing craft, Israel could deliver small forces 
of troops and armored equipment for beach landings in the eastern 
Mediterranean. This capability was demonstrated in June 1982, 
when these amphibious units successfully landed an assault force 
of tanks, armored personnel carriers, engineering equipment, and 
paratroops behind PLO positions near Sidon on the Lebanese coast. 

Air Force 

By a tremendous effort, Israel assembled a motley group of com- 
bat aircraft when Arab air forces attacked it after the declaration 
of independence in 1948. The first airplanes came from Czecho- 
slovakia, which furnished propeller-driven Messerschmitts and 
reconditioned Spitfires from World War II. Czechoslovakia also 
trained the first Israeli pilots, although these few were quickly sup- 
plemented by hundreds of experienced volunteers from a number 
of countries. The prestige of the air force was enhanced after its 
spectacular success during the June 1967 War, and the subsequent 
decade saw an unprecedented increase in its manpower and equip- 
ment resources. Since 1971 the air force has also assumed full 
responsibility for air defense. 

In 1988 the air force consisted of about 28,000 men, of whom 
approximately 9,000 were career professionals, and 19,000 were 
conscripts assigned primarily to air defense units. An additional 
50,000 reserve members were available for mobilization. 

The air force commander, who was directly responsible to the 
chief of staff, supervised a small staff consisting of operations, train- 
ing, intelligence, quartermaster, and manpower branches, at air 
force headquarters in Tel Aviv. Orders went directly from the air 
force commander to base commanders, each of whom controlled 
a wing of several squadrons. As of 1988, Israel had nineteen com- 
bat squadrons, including twelve fighter-interceptor squadrons, six 
fighter squadrons, and one reconnaissance squadron. 

The mainstays of the combat element of 524 aircraft were of four 
types: the F-16 multirole tactical fighter, the first of which became 
operational in Israel in 1980; the larger and heavier F-15 fighter 
designed to maintain air superiority, first delivered in 1976; the 
F-4 Phantom, a two-seater fighter and attack aircraft, delivered 
to Israel between 1969 and 1977; and the Kfir, an Israeli- 
manufactured fighter plane first delivered to the air force in 1975, 
and based on the French-designed Mirage III. The air force also 



285 



Israel: A Country Study 

kept in service as a reserve older A-4 Skyhawks first acqui 
1966. All of these models were expected to be retained in thv 
ventory into the next century, although the Skyhawks would 
used primarily for training and as auxiliary aircraft. 

Israel's project to design and build a second-generation in- 
digenous jet fighter, the Lavi (lion cub), was cancelled in 1987 
because of expense. Instead, Israel was to take delivery of seventy- 
five advanced F-16C and F-16D fighters produced in the United 
States. The air force inventory also included a large number of 
electronic countermeasure and airborne early warning aircraft, 
cargo transports and utility aircraft, trainers, and helicopters. 
Boeing 707s had been converted for in-flight refueling of F- 15s and 
F-16s (see table 14, Appendix A). 

Israeli air force commanders pointed out that the ratio of com- 
bat aircraft available to Israel and the total of all Arab air forces, 
including Egypt and Libya, was on the order of 1:4 in 1987. 
Nevertheless, Israel's superior maintenance standards and higher 
pilot-to-aircraft ratio meant that it could fly more sorties per air- 
craft per day. Israel also enjoyed an advantage in precision weapons 
delivery systems and in its ability to suppress Arab air defense mis- 
sile systems. 

With little expansion of the air force contemplated, emphasis was 
placed on motivating and training pilots and relying on versatile, 
high performance aircraft. The Israeli air force repeatedly demon- 
strated its superior combat performance. During the June 1967 
War, waves of successive bombings of Egyptian and Syrian air- 
fields caused tremendous damage. The Arab air forces lost 469 air- 
craft, nearly 400 of them on the ground. Only forty-six Israeli planes 
were destroyed. The October 1973 War was marked by a large 
number of dogfights in which the Israelis prevailed, claiming the 
destruction of 227 enemy airplanes at a cost of 15 Israeli aircraft. 
On the other hand, sixty Israeli airplanes were lost in missions in 
support of ground forces. In the Lebanon fighting in 1982, Israeli 
airplanes destroyed most of the Syrian missile sites in the Biqa 
Valley. The Israeli air force also dominated the air battle, bring- 
ing down ninety Syrian aircraft without a loss. 

The air force had demonstrated its ability to bring Israel's mili- 
tary power to bear at distant points and in unconventional opera- 
tions. In 1976 its transport aircraft ferried troops to the Entebbe 
airport in Uganda to rescue passengers on a commercial airplane 
hijacked by Arab terrorists. In June 1981, F-16 fighter-bombers 
destroyed the Osiraq (Osiris-Iraq) nuclear research reactor near 
Baghdad, Iraq, flying at low levels over Saudi Arabian and Iraqi 
territory to evade radar detection. In 1985 Israeli F-15s refueled 



286 



National Security 



in flight and bombed the headquarters of the PLO near Tunis, 
Tunisia, at a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers from their 
bases. 

Nahal 

The Pioneer Fighting Youth (Noar Halutzi Lohem — Nahal) was 
an organization that combined military service with agricultural 
training in a tradition that recalled the vision of the original Zionist 
pioneers. The primary activity of Nahal, one of the "functional 
commands" within the IDF organizational structure, was the es- 
tablishment and maintenance of military and agricultural outposts 
or settlements. Nahal' s military missions were to provide advance 
warning, to serve as a first line of defense against ground attack 
along the borders, to prevent infiltration, and to assist and sup- 
port Israeli occupation authorities in the territories. Its non- 
military missions were to develop previously unused land for 
agriculture, to assist in the socialization of immigrant and delin- 
quent youth, and, since 1967, to assert Israeli rule in the immedi- 
ate area surrounding new settlements. Many military commanders, 
however, felt that the program siphoned off some of the best qual- 
ity recruits for lower priority duty. Under pressure from the army, 
the system was altered so that only about one-third of a conscript's 
service was in agricultural training and on a kibbutz, the remain- 
ing time being devoted to regular military activities. 

In 1988 Nahal had an estimated total strength of 5,000 men and 
women who had volunteered upon call-up. The basic unit was the 
platoon, which ranged from about twenty to eighty young people 
depending on assignment. A small headquarters served as a com- 
mand element for a number of platoons located in the same general 
area. Platoons were assigned either to reinforce existing frontier 
settlements or to establish new ones in areas unsuitable for develop- 
ment by the civilian population. Strategic considerations were fun- 
damental in selecting locations for Nahal units. Some sites were 
later abandoned as no longer useful; others became permanent 
civilian settlements. 

Gadna 

The Youth Corps (Gdudei Noar — Gadna), another IDF "func- 
tional command," consisted in 1988 of more than 30,000 young 
men and women aged fourteen to seventeen, who were formed into 
battalions, each under the command of an IDF captain. One of 
numerous youth groups, Gadna was administered by the Minis- 
try of Education and Culture, with IDF officers serving as advisers 
to the ministry. Obligatory for most secondary- school students, 



287 



Israel: A Country Study 

Gadna introduced them to the common Israeli experience of army 
life and indoctrinated them as to Israel's special security situation. 
Time spent in training increased from fifteen days yearly plus one 
hour per week during the ninth year of school to roughly forty days 
a year in the twelfth year of school. Over the years, its emphasis 
had shifted from weapons familiarity and drilling to sports, physi- 
cal fitness, and camping. Gadna also participated in the socializa- 
tion of recent immigrants and the rehabilitation of juvenile 
delinquents to qualify them for military service. It had not been 
mobilized for military tasks since the War of Independence in 1 948 , 
although Gadna members had performed support services during 
later emergencies. 

Conscription 

Military service in Israel was mandatory, beginning at age eigh- 
teen, for male and female citizens and resident aliens. The length 
of compulsory military service has varied according to IDF per- 
sonnel needs. In 1988 male conscripts served three years and females 
twenty months. New immigrants, if younger than eighteen years 
of age upon arrival, were subject to the same terms of conscrip- 
tion when they reached eighteen. Male immigrants aged nineteen 
to twenty-three served for progressively reduced periods, and those 
twenty-four or older were conscripted for only 120 days. Female 
immigrants over the age of nineteen were exempted from compul- 
sory service. Immigrants who had served in the armed forces of 
their countries of origin had the length of their compulsory service 
in Israel reduced. 

Exemptions for Jewish males were rare, and about 90 percent 
of the approximately 30,000 men who reached age eighteen each 
year were drafted. Several hundred ultra-Orthodox students study- 
ing at religious schools, yeshivot (sing., yeshiva — see Glossary) fol- 
lowed a special four-year program combining studies and military 
duty. The Ministry of Defense estimated, however, that in 1988 
about 20,000 of the most rigidly Orthodox yeshiva students, who 
felt little allegiance to Zionism and the Israeli state, were escaping 
the draft through an endless series of deferments. From a strictly 
military point of view, their value to the IDF would be limited be- 
cause of restrictions on the jobs they would be able or willing to 
perform. Although the military served kosher food and adhered 
to laws of the Jewish sabbath and holidays, secular soldiers were 
lax in their observance. 

An academic reserve enabled students to earn a bachelor's degree 
before service, usually in a specialized capacity, following basic 
training; such students reported for reserve duty during summer 



288 



National Security 



vacations. Conscientious objectors were not excused from service, 
although an effort was made to find a noncombatant role for them. 
The minimum physical and educational standards for induction 
were very low to insure that a maximum number of Jewish males 
performed some form of service in the IDF. Conscripts were 
screened on the basis of careful medical and psychological tests. 
Those with better education and physical condition were more likely 
to be assigned to combat units. Sons and brothers of soldiers who 
had died in service were not accepted for service in combat units 
unless a parental waiver was obtained. 

Several elite units were composed exclusively of volunteers. They 
included air force pilots, paratroops, the submarine service, naval 
commandos, and certain army reconnaissance units. Because of 
the large number of candidates, these units were able to impose 
their own demanding selection procedures. The air force enjoyed 
first priority, enabling it to select for its pilot candidates the prime 
volunteers of each conscript class. Conscripts also could express 
preferences for service in one of the regular combat units. The 
Golani Infantry Brigade, which had acquired an image as a gal- 
lant frontline force in the 1973 and 1982 conflicts, and the armored 
corps were among the preferred regular units. 

Women in the IDF 

Standards for admission to the IDF were considerably higher 
for women, and exemptions were given much more freely. Only 
about 50 percent of the approximately 30,000 females eligible an- 
nually were inducted. Nearly 20 percent of eligible women were 
exempted for "religious reasons"; nearly 10 percent because they 
were married; and most of the remaining 20 percent were rejected 
as not meeting minimum educational standards (eighth grade dur- 
ing the 1980s). A law passed in 1978 made exemptions for women 
on religious grounds automatic upon the signing of a simple decla- 
ration attesting to the observance of orthodox religious practices. 
This legislation raised considerable controversy, and IDF officials 
feared that the exemption could be abused by any nonreligious 
woman who did not wish to serve and thus further exacerbate the 
already strained personnel resources of the IDF. Women exempted 
on religious grounds were legally obliged to fulfill a period of alter- 
native service doing social or educational work assigned to them. 
In practice, however, women performed such service only on a 
voluntary basis. 

Female conscripts served in the Women's Army Corps, com- 
monly known by its Hebrew acronym, Chen. After a five- week 
period of basic training, women served as clerks, drivers, welfare 



289 



Israel: A Country Study 

workers, nurses, radio operators, flight controllers, ordnance per- 
sonnel, and course instructors. Women had not engaged in direct 
combat since the War of Independence. 

Reserve Duty 

The Defense Service Law required that each male conscript, upon 
completion of his active-duty service, had an obligation to perform 
reserve duty (miluirri) and continue to train on a regular basis until 
age fifty-four. Very few women were required to do reserve duty 
but were subject to call-up until the age of thirty-four if they had 
no children. The duration of annual reserve duty depended on secu- 
rity and budgetary factors, as well as specialty and rank. After 1967 
reserve duty generally lengthened as the IDF experienced a grow- 
ing manpower need. The average length of reserve duty was tem- 
porarily increased from thirty to sixty days in early 1988 to help 
deal with the Palestinian uprising. After about age thirty-nine, reser- 
vists no longer served in combat units. 

This comprehensive reserve system, the most demanding of any 
in the world, was vital to Israel's defense posture. It allowed the 
country to limit the full-time manpower within the IDF, thus free- 
ing vitally needed people for civilian tasks during most of the year. 
Because of the reserve system, the IDF could triple in size within 
forty-eight to seventy-two hours of the announcement of a full 
mobilization. The system was burdensome for most Israeli citizens 
but provided a source of escape from everyday routine for some. 
Most Israelis regarded reserve duty as a positive social phenome- 
non, making an important contribution to democracy by reduc- 
ing class distinctions. Nevertheless, it was undeniably a source of 
discontent to many, especially those assigned to dangerous and dis- 
agreeable patrol and policing duties in southern Lebanon and in 
the occupied territories. In the past, evasion of reserve duty had 
been regarded as a violation of the individual's duty to the nation, 
verging on treasonous behavior. In September 1988, however, the 
media revealed the existence of a bribery ring of doctors and senior 
IDF personnel officers that sold medical exemptions for sums rang- 
ing from US$300 to US$500. The lengthy military obligation was 
also believed to be a major cause of emigration, although the num- 
ber who had left Israel for this reason could not be accurately esti- 
mated. The IDF required Israeli citizens of military age to obtain 
the permission of their reserve unit before traveling abroad. 

Training 

Upon induction at the age of eighteen, conscripts were assigned 
to one of three types of basic training: generalized, for women and 



290 




Israel Defense Forces members training in amphibious operations 
Courtesy Embassy of Israel, Washington 
Soldier operating antiaircraft gun 
Courtesy Israel Defense Forces 



291 



Israel: A Country Study 



for men with some physical limitation; corps, for conscripts assigned 
to noninfantry units, such as armor or artillery; and brigade, for 
all infantry recruits. Generalized basic training, which was an orien- 
tation program including the use of basic military weapons, lasted 
one month. Corps training lasted from three to four months, en- 
compassing infantry-type training and indoctrination into the 
recruits' assigned corps. It was followed by advanced training of 
a more specialized nature, after which trainees were assigned to 
their permanent corps units. Brigade basic training, the most ardu- 
ous, lasted from four to five months. It was conducted at training 
bases of the individual infantry and airborne brigades and, upon 
completion, the company created at the beginning of basic train- 
ing remained together as a company in the brigade. 

Basic training was an extremely strenuous indoctrination into 
the IDF, involving forced marches, bivouacs, night exercises, and 
obstacle courses, focused on operations at the squad and platoon 
level. It also stressed strengthening the recruits' knowledge of the 
country's origins and traditions, and identification with national 
ideals and goals. Visits were made to kibbutzim, moshavim (sing., 
moshav — see Glossary), and places venerated in Jewish or IDF his- 
tory. Basic training also served as a melting pot, bringing together 
different ethnic groups and individuals from a variety of socio- 
economic backgrounds. The IDF played an especially important 
role in the education and assimilation of new immigrants. 

After about five months of service with their field units, all sol- 
diers were evaluated for their leadership potential. About half quali- 
fied for further training as squad leaders, tank commanders, and 
other types of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Those selected 
were assigned to a junior command course of three to four months. 
Considered exceptionally demanding, the course was conducted 
mostly in the field, where the students acted in rotating command 
roles in daytime and nighttime exercises. Those successfully com- 
pleting the course either returned to their original units as junior 
NCOs for a further six to ten months or were assigned as basic 
training instructors. During this phase, they were further evaluated 
for their potential as officers. This evaluation included ratings by 
their fellow soldiers, recommendations by commanders, and screen- 
ings by military psychologists. Those who were not selected or who 
rejected officer training (often because they were reluctant to serve 
the necessary additional year), remained as NCOs until they had 
completed their three-year tour of active service. 

All officer candidates were selected from among conscripts who 
had distinguished themselves in their initial period of service; Israel 
had no military academy as a source of officers. Three secondary 



292 



National Security 



schools stressed military training, however, and assigned students 
to military camps during summer vacations. Graduates of these 
high schools were given the rank of corporal on enlistment and most 
went on to become officers. After junior officers completed their 
obligatory service, they either shifted to reserve officer status or 
signed contracts (renewable every three to five years) as career sol- 
diers within the standing ranks of the IDF. A wide variety of Jew- 
ish social and economic backgrounds were represented in the officer 
corps, although sabras (see Glossary), Ashkenazim (see Glossary), 
and members of kibbutzim and moshavim were represented well 
beyond their respective percentages in the society as a whole. 

The IDF course for officer candidates was conducted at a single 
base but was divided into three types: the six-month infantry course 
for infantry and paratroop units; the two-month combat arms course 
for officers in armor, artillery, engineering, and air defense; and 
the two-month basic officer course for all candidates for the sup- 
port services. The latter two courses were each followed by special- 
ized three-month courses given by the corps to which the officer 
was assigned. Those who completed the course (the failure rate was 
as high as 50 percent) returned to their units commissioned as sec- 
ond lieutenants to be assigned as platoon commanders. Such officers 
generally served for two further years of active duty, followed by 
many years of reserve officer status. 

About 10 percent of junior officers joined the permanent ser- 
vice corps after their national service, signing up for an initial period 
of two to three years. They usually were assigned as company com- 
manders, sometimes after filling a staff or training position. Some 
of the young officers attended the company commanders' course 
run by their corps, although the bulk of those officers in the course 
tended to be reservists. Those men opting for longer careers in the 
military were later assigned to the Command and Staff School, a 
year-long course designed primarily for majors as a prerequisite 
to promotion to lieutenant colonel. A small number of brigadier 
generals and promotable colonels, along with senior civilian offi- 
cials, attended a one-year course at the National Defense College 
dealing with military, strategic, and management subjects. A few 
senior IDF officers attended staff colleges abroad, mainly in Brit- 
ain, France, and the United States. 

Promotions for regular officers were rapid. Company com- 
manders were generally about twenty-five years of age, battalion 
commanders thirty, and brigade commanders thirty-five to forty. 
Retirement was obligatory at age fifty-five, although most offi- 
cers left the service between forty and forty-five years of age, in 



293 



Israel: A Country Study 

accordance with a "two career" policy that encouraged and as- 
sisted officers to move into responsible civilian jobs. 

Minorities in the IDF 

Christian and Muslim Arabs were exempted from obligatory 
service and, although they could volunteer, were often screened 
out by security checks. Beginning in 1987, however, the IDF made 
efforts to boost recruitment of Christian Arabs and beduins. It was 
believed that this policy portended the ultimate introduction of com- 
pulsory service in these two communities, although there was cer- 
tain to be resistance by both the IDF and the minority communities. 
As of 1988, Israel's Druze and Muslim Circassian minorities were 
subject to conscription (see Minority Groups, ch. 2). 

In 1956 Druze leaders, feeling that being exempted from mili- 
tary service denied them full rights of citizenship, requested that 
their constituency be drafted. During the 1980s, however, resent- 
ment grew within the Druze community because they were drafted 
while other Arabs were exempt. In 1987 the IDF appointed its first 
Druze general. 

Minorities tended to serve in one of several special units: the 
Minorities Unit, also known as Unit 300; the Druze Reconnais- 
sance Unit; and the Trackers Unit, which comprised mostly be- 
duins. In 1982 the IDF general staff decided to integrate the armed 
forces by opening up other units to minorities, while placing some 
Jewish conscripts in the Minorities Unit. In 1988 the intelligence 
corps and the air force remained closed to minorities. 

Pay and Benefits 

Traditionally, conditions of service in the IDF were Spartan; 
Israeli soldiers served out of a patriotic desire to defend the 
homeland rather than for material benefits. During the 1980s, 
however, as manpower needs of the IDF grew substantially — 
particularly the requirement to attract skilled technicians from the 
civilian sector — material considerations became more important. 
The nearly continual cycle of increases in pay and benefits were 
meant to attract additional manpower and to compensate for the 
ever-rising cost of living. 

Salaries for career soldiers were linked to salaries in the civilian 
sector; thus, compensation for education, skills, and responsibili- 
ties in the IDF was at least commensurate with that in the civilian 
sector, where wages were largely standardized. In spite of the rela- 
tively high pay and allowances, conditions of service were often 
onerous and comforts were few. Accommodations within units were 
austere. Extended separations from family and frequent relocations 



294 



National Security 



were common. Career soldiers received supplements and benefits 
unavailable to civilians, but it was difficult, if not impossible, for 
a career soldier to moonlight, a practice prevalent among civilians. 

Basic pay was low and, because it changed more slowly than other 
salary components, had become progressively less significant in the 
soldier's total pay. Supplements were added for cost of living and 
families, based on size. Costs of higher education and free medi- 
cal care were provided for all family members, and exchange and 
commissary facilities offered substantial discounts on purchases. 
The IDF subsidized housing in three ways: the IDF could provide 
base quarters at minimal rents, long-term, low-interest loans for 
purchase of homes, or assisted rentals in the civilian market. A 
generous retirement program covered those who had completed 
ten years of service and reached the age of forty. Every officer with 
the rank of lieutenant colonel or above had a car for both official 
and private use; lower-ranking officers had the use of cars on a 
shared basis. During annual leave, an officer could go to one of 
several seaside family resorts operated by the IDF. 

Conscript soldiers received pay and benefits far below those of 
the career soldier. Pay was minimal, amounting to about US$25 
a month for a private in 1986. Married soldiers received a monthly 
family allowance based on family income, as well as a rent and 
utility allowance. A demobilization grant was paid upon discharge, 
and unemployment compensation and a partial income tax exemp- 
tion were available for up to one year. Discharged soldiers theo- 
retically received preference in hiring. Former conscripts choosing 
to settle in development areas could obtain loans to purchase 
apartments. 

Pay and benefits for the reservist while on active duty also were 
less than for the career soldier. Reservist pay was supplemented 
by pay from civilian employment. Employers regularly contrib- 
uted a small percentage of the employee's salary to the National 
Security Fund, from which the employer then drew to pay the 
reservist while he or she was on active duty. Self-employed reserv- 
ists could put money into the fund to receive a salary while on duty; 
if they chose not to contribute they received only subsistence pay 
while on active duty. Reservists could use the post exchange only 
while on active duty. 

Retired officers received from 2 to 4 percent of their final pay 
for each year of service, depending on their job. Retired pilots, 
for example, received 4 percent and were said to live quite com- 
fortably in retirement. In addition, retired officers and NCOs con- 
tinued to receive a reduced portion of their in-service benefits. 
Disabled veterans received extra allowances and benefits. Retiring 



295 



Israel: A Country Study 



officers usually sought a second career; the IDF helped the transi- 
tion into civilian life by offering occupational training (a course 
in business management, for example) and by paying the retired 
officer's full salary for up to one year depending on rank and senior- 
ity, while the officer searched for satisfactory civilian employment. 

Rank, Insignia, and Uniforms 

Three basic commissioned officer ranks existed in the IDF: com- 
mander of tens (segen); commander of hundreds (seren); and com- 
mander of thousands (aluf). All other ranks were variations of these, 
with prefixes and suffixes to indicate relative seniority. Thus, a lieu- 
tenant general was rav aluf, a major general was aluf, a brigadier 
general was tat aluf, and a colonel was aluf mishne. A captain was 
seren and a major was rav seren. Rank titles were the same for the 
ground forces, the navy, and the air force. The rank of lieutenant 
general was held by only one officer serving on active duty, the 
chief of staff. Major generals included each of the three area com- 
manders, the commander of the ground corps, the chiefs of the 
five branches of the general staff, and the commanders of the navy 
and air force. 

United States equivalents for enlisted ranks were less exact than 
for officers. The three senior NCO grades were often equated to 
warrant officer rank; status and function were much alike. The 
lowest career NCO rank was sergeant (samal). 

For ground forces' officers, rank insignia were brass on a red 
background; for the air force, silver on a blue background; and 
for the navy, the standard gold worn on the sleeve. Officer insig- 
nia were worn on epaulets on top of both shoulders. Insignia dis- 
tinctive to each service were worn on the cap (see fig. 15). 

Enlisted grades wore rank insignia on the sleeve, halfway be- 
tween the shoulder and the elbow. For the army and air force, the 
insignia were white with blue interwoven threads backed with the 
appropriate corps color. Navy personnel wore gold-colored rank 
insignia sewn on navy blue material. 

The service uniform for all ground forces personnel was olive 
green; navy and air force uniforms were beige. The uniforms con- 
sisted of shirt, trousers, sweater, jacket or blouse, and shoes. The 
navy had an all white dress uniform. Green fatigues were the same 
for winter and summer. Heavy winter gear was issued as needed. 
Women's dress paralleled that of men but consisted of a skirt, a 
blouse, and a garrison cap. Headgear included a service cap for 
dress and semi-dress and a field cap worn with fatigues. Army and 
air force personnel also had berets, usually worn in lieu of the service 
cap. The color of the air force beret was blue- gray; for armored 



296 



National Security 



corps, mechanized infantry, and artillery personnel, it was black; 
for infantry, olive drab; for paratroopers, red; for combat engineers, 
gray; and for the Golani Infantry Brigade, purple. For all other 
army personnel, except combat units, the beret for men was green 
and for women, black. Women in the navy wore a black beret with 
gold insignia. 

Awards and Decorations 

Awards and decorations carried considerable prestige in the IDF 
simply because so few were given. Scarcely 1 ,000 had been awarded 
from the War of Independence through the Lebanon invasion of 
1982. Under a revised system of military decorations instituted in 
1973, all soldiers decorated since 1948 received one of three medals 
that would be used subsequentiy to honor those who acquitted them- 
selves in an outstanding manner while serving in the IDF. Each 
medal was accompanied by a ribbon worn above the left breast 
pocket. The least prestigious, Etour HaMofet, awarded for exem- 
plary conduct, was accompanied by a blue ribbon. Etour HaOz, 
awarded for bravery, was accompanied by a red ribbon. The highest 
medal, Etour HaGevora, awarded for heroism, had been presented 
to fewer than thirty IDF soldiers as of 1988. Its color was yellow 
in commemoration of those Jews who had committed acts of hero- 
ism while forced to wear the yellow Star of David during the Nazi 
era and during the Middle Ages. 

Campaign ribbons were awarded for service in the War of In- 
dependence (1948-49), the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the wars of 1967 
and 1973, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Badges could be worn 
by those who served in the Palmach and in the Jewish Brigade be- 
fore the formation of the IDF. In addition, soldiers were awarded 
a special emblem representing six months of service in a front-line 
combat unit. Each independence day, the president of Israel 
awarded certificates to 100 outstanding soldiers, both conscripts 
and careerists, for exceptional soldierly attributes. 

Discipline and Military Justice 

Military discipline was characterized by informality in relations 
between officers and enlisted men and apparent lack of concern 
for such exterior symbols as smartness on the parade ground and 
military appearance and bearing. Little attention was devoted to 
military drills and ceremonies, and uniform regulations were not 
always strictly enforced. Although the IDF historically viewed such 
visible manifestations of traditional military discipline as unimpor- 
tant as long as the level of performance in combat remained high, 
shortcomings revealed during the October 1973 War resulted in 



297 



Israel: A Country Study 




298 



National Security 



a renewed concern with discipline. The Agranat Commission, which 
studied the failures of the October 1973 War, criticized the casual- 
ness of relations between ranks and suggested that lax discipline 
had led to deficiencies in such vital areas as the maintenance of 
weapons. After 1973 there was some tightening up, but the gen- 
eral feeling was that stringent spit-and-polish style disciplinary mea- 
sures were unnecessary and would run counter to the egalitarian 
traditions of Zionism. Veteran commanders feared that too much 
emphasis on formal discipline risked weakening the reliance on per- 
sonal commitment, bravery, and unit pride that had repeatedly 
brought victory to the IDF. 

The predominance of reserves in the IDF also made it difficult 
to enforce rigid military discipline. Relations between enlisted 
reservists and their officers were informal. Because of intermix- 
ing, this attitude tended to be transferred to regular troops as well. 
In some of the most elite units, saluting was scorned and officers 
and enlisted men addressed each other by first names. To argue 
with an officer as an equal was not uncommon. 

During the 1970s, certain kinds of unlawful activities — 
particularly drug abuse, but also thefts and violent behavior — 
increased markedly within the IDF. Most commentators attributed 
the problem to the post- 1973 policy of conscripting former crimi- 
nal offenders. The increase in drug abuse, particularly hashish, 
also was attributed to increased availability of illegal drugs in soci- 
ety as a whole. Career soldiers convicted of possession of illegal 
drugs risked dismissal. Most of those who did not adjust well to 
military life were assigned to service support units where they would 
not affect the overall motivation and readiness of the IDF. 

The IDF took pride in promoting a humanistic spirit among its 
members and in seeking to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and civilian 
casualties whenever possible, a concept known as "purity of arms." 
But with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, a degree of indifference 
and brutalization set in. The difficulty of fighting hidden guerril- 
las in a complex but generally hostile environment, plus the ab- 
sence of well-defined political and military goals, eroded standards 
of conduct and morale. Troops often acted with contempt for civilian 
life and property. Whereas previously it had been unheard of, es- 
pecially among elite units, for reservists to try to evade duty, com- 
manders now struggled against reservist efforts to avoid service 
based on medical or other pretexts. 

As the uprising in the occupied territories intensified during 1988, 
Israeli psychologists noted further evidence of these tendencies. The 
policy of placing esprit de corps above tight discipline militated 
against effective policing operations to contain violence. Excesses 



299 



Israel: A Country Study 

resulted when immature soldiers were ordered to administer beat- 
ings, break bones, or damage Arab property. Junior officers found 
it difficult to interpret orders flexibly or to contain emotionally 
charged troops who regarded Arab protesters as inferior beings (see 
Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-, this ch.). 

The Military Justice Law of 1955, which embraced the entire 
range of legal matters affecting the military establishment, governed 
the conduct of IDF personnel. Under its provisions, a separate and 
independent system of military courts was established; military 
offenses were defined and maximum authorized punishments were 
specified in each case; and pretrial, trial, and appeal procedures 
and rules of evidence were described in detail. Military law ap- 
plied to all military personnel, including reservists on active duty, 
civilian employees of the IDF, and certain other civilians engaged 
in defense-related activities. Punishments included confinement to 
camp, loss of pay, reprimand, fine, reduction in rank, imprison- 
ment up to life, and death (although as of 1988 neither life im- 
prisonment nor the death penalty had ever been imposed on IDF 
personnel). 

Courts-martial of the first instance included district courts, naval 
courts, field courts, and special courts with jurisdiction over officers 
above the rank of lieutenant colonel. All courts except the special 
court were composed of three members, at least one of whom had 
to be a legally qualified military judge. The special court could have 
three or five members. No member could be of lower rank than 
the accused. The district court was the basic court-martial of first 
instance. The minister of defense could authorize the establishment 
of field courts in times of fighting. 

The accused could act as his or her own defense counsel or elect 
to be represented by another military person or by a civilian law- 
yer authorized to practice before courts-martial. A three-member 
court-martial empaneled from members of the Military Court of 
Appeal decided appeals. 

The IDF in the Occupied Territories 

In the course of the June 1967 War, Israel occupied the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the 
Sinai Peninsula. As a result of the 1979 Treaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel, the Sinai Peninsula was restored to Egypt. Israel 
unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem soon after the June 1967 War, 
reasserting this fact in July 1980, and in 1981 it annexed the Golan 
Heights (see fig. 16). As of 1988, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
with a combined population of at least 1,400,000 Arabs, remained 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The 57,000 Jews 



300 



National Security 



residing in settlements in the two territories in 1988 came under 
the central government of Israel proper (see figs. 17 and 18). 

The primary mission of the military government was to main- 
tain internal security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
Border Police, the Shin Bet, the Israel Police, and the IDF all shared 
in the task of maintaining order. Immediately upon occupation of 
the territories in June 1967, Israel launched an intense pacifica- 
tion program. Harsh measures were used to suppress local non- 
cooperation campaigns, strikes, and especially terrorist activities. 
Local residents whom Israeli officials deemed subversive were 
deported, Arab homes believed to house anti-Israeli activists and 
their supporters were destroyed, and dissenters could be placed in 
administrative detention for up to six months. These and other 
repressive measures derived from the emergency regulations of the 
British Mandate period. 

Military Government 

The minister of defense held responsibility for administration 
and security of the Arab population of the occupied territories. Until 
1981, actual command passed from the minister of defense to the 
Department of Military Government, a functional command within 
the general staff, and from this department to the regional com- 
manders of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in their roles as mili- 
tary governors. The military governors exercised primarily a 
coordinating function because day-to-day operations in the terri- 
tories were carried out not by military officers, but by civilian 
representatives of the various ministries. 

In 1981 Israel established a separate civilian administration in 
the territories to exercise the civil powers of the military govern- 
ment. This administration lacked authority to enact legislation. The 
civilian officials who carried out these executive functions nomi- 
nally drew their authority from the military government; in fact, 
they were part of the permanent staff of Israeli ministries and 
received directives from their ministerial superiors. This relinquish- 
ment of responsibility by the Ministry of Defense and its assump- 
tion by Israeli civil authorities gathered momentum under 
governments controlled by the right-wing Likud Bloc, whose poli- 
cies sought to achieve de facto annexation by subordinating all 
civilian matters in the occupied territories to ministries of the 
government in Jerusalem. 

A civilian "coordinator of activities" in the Ministry of Defense 
acted in the name of the minister of defense to advise, guide, coor- 
dinate, and supervise all government ministries, state institutions, 
and public authorities in the occupied territories. In 1988 the 



301 




302 



National Security 



coordinator was Shmuel Goren. Neither the minister of defense 
nor the coordinator of activities, however, had veto powers over 
officials answerable to civilian ministries in Jerusalem. 

Local government in areas of the West Bank occupied by Pales- 
tinians consisted of twenty-five towns having municipal status and 
eighty-two village councils operating under the Jordanian Village 
Management Law. After 1981, when the Israeli civil administration 
deposed nine West Bank mayors, Israeli officials ran most munic- 
ipalities. Under them, Arabs held the vast majority of government 
administrative and staff positions. Until the latter part of 1988, 
when King Hussein cut off all funds to the West Bank, Jordan paid 
the salaries of about 5,000 of these civil servants. The remaining 
16,000, who were mostly teachers, had their Israeli salaries sup- 
plemented by a Jordanian bonus averaging US$100 monthly. 

Jewish settlements in the West Bank were incorporated into four- 
teen local authorities. These authorities functioned under special 
military government legislation identical to the local authorities 
legislation that applied in Israel. The Ministry of Interior super- 
vised their budgets and in general the West Bank settlements func- 
tioned as though they were in Israel proper. 

Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- 

During the first twenty years of Israeli occupation, security in 
the territories fluctuated between periods of calm and periods of 
unrest. Discontent was chronic, however, especially among the 
younger Palestinians in refugee camps. Nearly half the Arab popu- 
lation of the occupied territories lived in twenty camps in the West 
Bank and eight camps in the Gaza Strip, in overcrowded and un- 
sanitary conditions. The camps had existed since the flight of Arabs 
displaced after the partition of Palestine in 1948. Communal con- 
flict was liable to break out at any time between Palestinians and 
Israeli settlers. Friction also arose from security measures taken 
by Israeli authorities to counter perceived threats to order. 

An upsurge of instability and violence in 1987 resulted partly 
from deliberate provocations by PLO factions and PLO dissident 
groups, but much of it generated spontaneously. Violence by Israeli 
settlers increased, including the initiation of unauthorized armed 
patrols and physical harassment of Palestinians. Although some 
settlers were arrested, the Palestinians asserted that the authori- 
ties were lenient with Israelis who violated security regulations. 

The escalating level of Palestinian unrest precipitated a series 
of protests and violent demonstrations that began on December 9, 
1987, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and later spread to 
Arab communities in Jerusalem and Israel itself. Thousands of 



303 



Israel: A Country Study 




^Cease-fire tine, 1967 



WEST BANK 

• (Israeli occupied, status 
to be determined) 



i , Ram Allah 
No man's land 1 / • 

\ J *. * 

ISRAEL J°™*!e"h \j . 

The 1 950 Israeli proclamation thai - ) 
Jerusalem be the national capital /*/ • 
3ffi«!£&&* r . ^thlehem 



• > 

ti 

• Jj 

Jericho • 2 



JORDAN 



Hebron 



/ 

/ 




— International 
boundary 

Armistice line, 1949 



Town 
10 15 Kilometers 



Figure 17. Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, October 1986 



mostly teen-aged Palestinians banded together, setting up barri- 
cades in refugee camps, confronting soldiers and Border Police, 
and attacking road traffic with rocks. Unlike previous demonstra- 
tions, the violence did not appear to be directed or coordinated 
by the PLO and continued almost unabated for many months. 
By October 1988, more than 250 Palestinians had been killed 
and 5 Israeli deaths had occurred. Although mass violence had 



304 



National Security 



diminished, many individual incidents of rock- throwing and the 
tossing of gasoline bombs by small roving bands continued to occur. 
The army's retaliation was tougher and more rapid, with aggres- 
sive use of clubs and plastic bullets, demolition of houses, orchards, 
wells, and gardens, and economic sanctions against recalcitrant 
villages. 

The young IDF conscripts called upon to impose order at first 
responded erratically, in some cases with restraint and in other cases 
with brutality. Lacking proper equipment and training in riot 
control, the soldiers often fired indiscriminately at Arab protesters, 
causing many casualties. Later, after troops were ordered to use 
batons and rifle butts, demonstrators were often badly beaten both 
before and after arrest, suffering fractured bones. There were 
reports of soldiers entering Arab houses to administer collective 
punishment and beating and harassing doctors and nurses in hospi- 
tals where wounded Arabs were being treated. Under mounting 
international criticism for the harsh and undisciplined behavior of 
the IDF, the military authorities acquired additional riot control 
equipment, including rubber and plastic bullets, tear gas, and 
specially-equipped command cars. New tactics were introduced, 
notably the deployment of large forces to snuff out riots as soon 
as they began. The IDF instituted a code of conduct and a special 
one- week training program in internal security. 

The uprising forced the IDF to cancel normal troop training and 
exercises. About 15,000 soldiers — several times the normal num- 
ber — were assigned to maintain security in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. The military authorities later replaced most of the con- 
scripts with reservists who had demonstrated greater restraint when 
confronted by rock- throwing demonstrators. Nonetheless, several 
hundred reservists, disagreeing with Israeli policy, refused to serve 
in the occupied territories. 

As of mid- 1988, fifteen soldiers had been court-martialed for some 
of the most serious offenses, including a widely publicized case in 
which four Arab demonstrators had been severely beaten and then 
buried under a load of sand. Other soldiers had faced lower-level 
disciplinary proceedings. There was growing evidence that the 
morale of the IDF was eroding as a result of the stress of daily con- 
frontations with hostile demonstrators. Senior officers contended 
that the riot control mission had induced a crisis of confidence that 
would affect the army's performance in orthodox conflict. The 
IDF's reputation as a humane, superbly trained, and motivated 
force had clearly been tarnished. 

IDF commanders said that they had reduced the number of sol- 
diers assigned to riot control duty by nearly one-third since the 
mass demonstrations had tapered off but feared that the cost of 



305 



Israel: A Country Study 




not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 18. Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip, January 1988 

controlling the uprising (estimated at US$300 million) would neces- 
sitate curtailing IDF equipment purchases. Although they foresaw 
that the violence might continue indefinitely, they did not regard 
it as a serious threat in strategic terms. 

Armed Forces and Society 
Economic Impact 

The burden of maintaining a large, modern national security 



306 



National Security 



establishment has always weighed heavily on the vulnerable Israeli 
economy. The total defense budget for Israeli fiscal year (FY — see 
Glossary) 1988, including United States assistance of US$1.8 bil- 
lion, amounted to US$5.59 billion. Its principal components were 
local spending on equipment, supplies, and construction worth 
US$2.05 billion, personnel costs equivalent to US$1 .25 billion, and 
purchases abroad of US$1.87 billion. 

The defense budgets for FY 1987 and FY 1986 totaled US$5.6 
billion and US$4.98 billion, respectively. The budget submission 
to the Knesset indicated that the objective was to maintain overall 
local costs — i.e., those items not supported by United States 
assistance — at the same level in both FY 1987 and FY 1988. Several 
factors made it difficult to compare the defense effort on a year-to- 
year basis. For example, defense budgets were affected by the im- 
mediate costs and later savings associated with cancellation of the 
Lavi fighter aircraft project. The additional wages needed for the 
extended call-up of reservists in 1988 to help contain the uprising 
in the occupied territories also depleted resources available for nor- 
mal defense requirements. 

As the largest single item in the government budget, defense 
spending absorbed a major share of the budgetary cuts within the 
Economic Stabilization Program of July 1985. The cumulative 
reductions in domestic defense spending from FY 1983 through 
FY 1986 were estimated at US$2.5 billion, representing a 20 per- 
cent decrease in total domestically financed military expenditures. 
The defense burden as a ratio of GNP had averaged about 9 per- 
cent until 1966. Real defense expenditures increased dramatically 
as a result of the June 1967 War and the October 1973 War. They 
subsequently remained steady at about 10 to 15 percent of GNP, 
excluding foreign military purchases, and accounted for 20 to 25 
percent of GNP when foreign military purchases (almost entirely 
funded by the United States) were included. 

The Israeli government estimated the defense-related foreign ex- 
change burden at US$2.1 billion in FY 1985 and predicted that 
it would remain at about that level during the foreseeable future. 
This included self-financed military imports, indirect imports (such 
as fuel and materials for the defense industry), and debt servicing 
of defense-related loans. The Ministry of Finance estimated that 
these expenditures contributed 53 percent of Israel's total deficit 
in the balance of payments in 1985. According to the ministry, the 
share of defense expenditures in the national budget, exclusive of 
debt servicing, was 43 percent in FY 1984, falling to 39 percent 
in FY 1985 and FY 1986 (see Provision of Defense Services, ch. 3). 

According to an analysis by the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Israel ranked among the five or six highest 



307 



Israel: A Country Study 

countries in the world in terms of military expenditures as a ratio 
of GNP. It ranked eighth in terms of military expenditures per cap- 
ita (US$875 in 1985) and second after Iraq in relative size of the 
armed forces (47.9 uniformed personnel per 1,000 population). 
Israel ranked about twenty-fifth in the world, below a number of 
Arab and communist countries, in terms of military expenditures 
as a ratio of total central government expenditures, based on 1985 
defense budgets. 

The economic burden of national security was perhaps most ap- 
parent in terms of manpower, a vital resource in an industrialized 
nation of only about 4.4 million people. The proportion of soldiers 
to civilians at any given time was eight times higher than the world 
average and historically had been far higher than in any other coun- 
try. This impact was magnified during mobilization of the reserves, 
which has been increasingly frequent since 1973, when the failure 
to mobilize promptly proved to be a costly mistake. A full mobili- 
zation of the nation's nearly 500,000 reserves acted as a sudden 
brake on virtually all economic activity. Even partial mobilizations, 
which regularly occurred several times annually, had a profound 
impact on national production, as did the yearly periods of active 
duty served by each reservist. Such economic disruption was a 
principal reason why Israeli strategists emphasized that wars must 
be of brief duration (see Israeli Concepts of National Security, this 
ch.). 

The IDF as a Socializing Factor 

The tradition of the IDF as a social service institution dates from 
1949, when it played a major role in tackling sudden and widespread 
epidemics in transit camps for the flood of immigrants to the new 
nation. In the same year, Ben-Gurion envisioned a vital educa- 
tional mission for the military. The IDF has fulfilled this mission 
both indirectly and directly. The common experience of conscrip- 
tion for about 90 percent of Jewish males and 50 percent of Jewish 
females has itself fostered the homogenization of disparate elements 
of Israeli society. The IDF made a concerted effort to integrate 
within its various units persons from different social backgrounds. 
Sephardim and Ashkenazim, men and women from kibbutzim and 
cities, and sabra and immigrant Jewish youth often mixed for the 
first time in their lives in the IDF. 

More specifically, the IDF administered an educational program 
that helped immigrant Sephardic youth, many of whom had been 
deprived of basic education as children, to integrate into the 
Ashkenazi-dominated society of Israel. Perhaps the most impor- 
tant educational function of the IDF was the teaching of the national 



308 



A street demonstration in the occupied territories; 
Palestinians are carrying the Palestinian flag, which is forbidden. 

Courtesy Palestine Perspectives 

language, Hebrew. Young immigrants could defer their entry un- 
til they had an adequate grasp of the language and if needed could 
be assigned to a three-month intensive course in Hebrew at the 
beginning of their service. 

Conscripts who had failed to complete grade school attended a 
special school prior to discharge in order to bring them to junior 
high school level. In 1981 , 60 percent of conscripts had the equiva- 
lent of a high school education. It was estimated that by 1990 this 
percentage would increase to 80 percent, while those insufficiently 
educated for military service would diminish to almost none. A 
variety of other educational opportunities, including secondary and 
vocational school courses, was available to soldiers. The IDF educa- 
tional system also extended to civilians. Gadna and Nahal mem- 
bers were deployed in rural settlements of recent immigrants, where 
they taught material similar to that taught immigrant soldiers and 
informed the new arrivals of state services available to them (see 
Nahal; Gadna, this ch.). 

Some Israeli sociologists, however, have criticized the IDF's treat- 
ment of immigrant Sephardim. A 1984 study found that new Orien- 
tal Jewish immigrants held lower ranks than did sabra Ashkenazim 
of similar qualifications. Oriental immigrants also tended to be as- 
signed to the least prestigious IDF corps. A disproportionate number 



309 



Israel: A Country Study 

of new immigrants served in peripheral support corps, such as the 
Civil Defense Corps, the Guard Corps, and the General Service 
Corps. Oriental immigrants were underrepresented in the air force 
and in glamorous elite units, and those who served in combat in- 
stead of support corps were overrepresented in the Artillery Corps 
and the Combat Engineering Corps, where they were relegated 
to the most dangerous and physically laborious positions. These 
newer immigrants also were more liable to serve in units posted 
far from their homes and to be taught skills that could not be trans- 
ferred to the civilian job market. The study concluded, however, 
that this situation was caused not by prejudice in the IDF but. on 
the contrary, by regulations permitting a shorter period of service 
for those who were beyond the regular recruitment age of eigh- 
teen or who were married and had children. The majority of newer 
immigrants served less than one-third the time that nonimmigrants 
did, and most remained at the rank of private. The brief service 
experience limited their absorption into military life and mobility 
within the defense organization. Their immigrant status and their 
adjustment to Israeli society were thus prolonged and the likeli- 
hood of improving their status later as civilians was reduced. 

A newer aspect of the social impact of the IDF was its role in 
the socialization of delinquent and formerly delinquent youth. In 
the early 1970s, the IDF reversed its previous policy and began 
conscripting all but the most serious offenders among delinquent 
youth in an attempt both to increase its manpower pool and to pro- 
vide remedial socialization in the context of military discipline. By 
1978 it was clear that the policy was only partially successful. Ap- 
proximately half the youths (generally the less serious offenders) 
released from detention to join the IDF had adjusted successfully; 
the other half had been less successful. Many returned to criminal 
activity and contributed to growing disciplinary problems within 
the IDF that included rising drug use among soldiers and thefts 
and violent crimes within IDF units. Others could not adjust to 
army life and simply left or were expelled from the IDF. Despite 
the problems associated with the new policy, IDF officials were 
proud of their role in youth rehabilitation and felt that the oppor- 
tunity afforded delinquent youth to be reintegrated into society out- 
weighed the associated disciplinary problems. 

The Military in Political Life 

The Jewish military organizations of Palestine before Israeli 
independence were Fiercely political. The Haganah and Palmach 
were closely associated with socialist-labor Mapai (see Appendix 
B) and the kibbutz programs, whereas the Irgun was intimately 



310 



National Security 



connected with the right-wing Revisionist Zionism of Vladimir 
Jabotinsky and his disciple, Begin (see Revisionist Zionism, ch. 1). 
As the chief architect of the IDF, Ben-Gurion was determined to 
eliminate all political overtones from Israel's unified, national army 
and to establish clear civilian supremacy over the military. He was 
extraordinarily successful in his efforts in that during the first forty 
years of its history the IDF never overtly challenged the authority 
of the civilian government. This did not mean, however, that the 
IDF was a nonpolitical institution. On the contrary, in the late 1980s 
the political impact of the armed forces remained pervasive and 
profound. IDF officers influenced government foreign affairs and 
national security policy through official and unofficial channels. 
Under Ben-Gurion 's successor, Levi Eshkol, the political system 
was opened to permit greater interaction between the civilian leader- 
ship and the military high command. The shift permitted the chief 
of staff to advance the views of the IDF directly to the cabinet and 
Knesset committees. The growing number of former officers in po- 
litical life also helped to legitimate the involvement of the military 
in strategic policy debates. 

Under Israeli law, the cabinet, which could be convened as the 
Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs in order to enforce the 
secrecy of its proceedings, set policy relating to national security. 
The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset ap- 
proved national security policy. The minister of defense often was 
the principal policy formulator (although this depended on his per- 
sonality and the personalities of the prime minister and the chief 
of staff) and could make decisions without consulting fellow cabi- 
net members if an urgent need arose. During the first twenty years 
of Israel's existence, membership in the ruling Labor Party often 
was a prerequisite for appointment to a high level staff position. 
Political qualifications for top assignments gradually declined in 
importance during the 1970s, although the chief of staff's percep- 
tions of Israel's security were necessarily consonant with the aims 
of the government. 

When Prime Minister Begin served as his own minister of defense 
from 1980 to 1981, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael 
Eitan, could assert the IDF position not only on defense matters 
but also on foreign policy and economic questions. When Sharon— a 
retired major general highly respected within the officer corps — 
became defense minister in 1981, the focus of decision making in 
both defense and foreign policy shifted to him. The minister of 
defense after 1984, Rabin, also was a retired officer. Under him, 
the balance of authority continued to rest with the Ministry of 
Defense as opposed to the military establishment; however, Rabin 



311 



Israel: A Country Study 

did not exercise the monopoly of control that had existed under 
Sharon. 

Although considered primarily the implementer of policy, the 
IDF influenced many sectors of society. It had a major voice in 
strategic planning, in such social matters as education and the inte- 
gration of immigrants, and in the government's role in the occupied 
territories. Moreover, the enormous impact of the defense estab- 
lishment on the economy made its claims on the nation's resources 
of major political significance. 

The high command had ample opportunity to convey its views 
to the civilian leadership. The chief of staff and the chief of mili- 
tary intelligence met regularly with the Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs and Security and the Finance Committee of the Knesset. The 
chief of staff participated regularly in cabinet meetings and gave 
opinions on government security policy. The setbacks at the out- 
set of the October 1973 War gave rise to an exceptional period when 
senior officers influenced political decisions through their contacts 
with members of the cabinet and the Knesset. The situation was 
complicated by the involvement of former senior officers who had 
entered political life and who served as reserve officers in the war. 
A committee created to investigate the errors committed during 
the first days of the war led to the enactment in 1976 of the new 
Basic Law: the Army governing the IDF. The government ex- 
pended much effort to redefine the roles of the prime minister, 
minister of defense, and chief of staff. The new legal requirements, 
however, proved less important than the personalities of the in- 
dividuals holding those positions at any given time. 

Private consultations with the high command were viewed as 
essential in light of the cabinet's need to be informed on security 
issues. Public statements of opinion concerning Israel's defense pol- 
icy (such as when and where to go to war, or when, how, or with 
whom to make peace) were generally considered to be in the realm 
of politics and improper for active-duty personnel. It became clear 
that many senior officers had moral and political reservations over 
the scope and tactics employed in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, 
but their dissent did not escalate into open protest. One exception 
was the highly controversial case of Colonel Eli Geva, who asked 
to be relieved of his command when his brigade was given the mis- 
sion of leading the army's entry into Beirut, an act that was bound 
to cause many civilian casualties. Many officers regarded Geva's 
conduct as outright insubordination. Others agreed that it was 
proper for him to decline the performance of his military obliga- 
tions when they conflicted with his conscience. In spite of his 



312 



National Security 



outstanding record as a combat leader, Geva was released from 
further service. 

Members of the IDF could vote and engage in normal political 
activity, albeit with certain restraints. They could join political par- 
ties or politically oriented groups and attend meetings, but they 
were barred from taking an active role as spokespersons either for 
the IDF or for a political group. Analysts found littie difference 
between the political orientation of military personnel and of 
civilians. Retired officers entering politics were not concentrated 
in a particular part of the political spectrum. Few officers were as- 
sociated with the small minority of groups upholding autocratic 
political values. Most appeared to accept unreservedly the prevailing 
democratic political culture. Compared with most countries, Israel 
had far less separatism, distinction between life styles, or social dis- 
tance between civilians and the officer corps. 

The vast majority of the citizenry did not regard the practice 
of retired officers "parachuting into politics" as threatening to 
civilian control of the military. No ex-IDF officer had assumed a 
cabinet position until 1955, and not until after the June 1967 War 
did it become a common practice. Israeli law prohibited retired 
officers from running for the Knesset until 100 days after their retire- 
ment, but no such law existed regarding cabinet positions. 

Retired officers pursuing political careers were likely to be called 
back to active duty because retired officers remained reserve officers 
until age fifty-five. The problems that eventually could arise be- 
came apparent in 1973, when Major General Sharon retired in 
July to join the opposition Likud Party only to be recalled to ac- 
tive duty during the October 1973 War. Sharon was highly criti- 
cal of the conduct of the war, becoming the most vocal participant 
in the so-called War of the Generals, in which a number of active, 
retired, and reserve general officers engaged in a public debate over 
the management of the war for several months during and after 
the hostilities. Sharon was elected to the Knesset in the December 
1973 elections. Once there, he continued to criticize government 
policy while he remained a senior reserve officer. As a result of 
this situation, the government barred Knesset members from hold- 
ing senior reserve appointments. 

Despite the prominence and visibility of former military officers 
at the highest level of government, former officers have not formed 
a cohesive and ideologically united group. Although two of the most 
prominent military figures of the period, Sharon and Eitan (chief 
of staff from 1978 to 83) were regarded as right wing on Arab- 
Israeli issues, many more senior officers were moderates, less 



313 



Israel: A Country Study 

persuaded than the Likud government or the public that military 
force was the answer. 

There has been little evidence of an identifiable military or officer 
caste dedicated to protecting the army's own interests. Militarism 
was deeply antithetical to the democratic, civilian-oriented concept 
of Israeli society held by the vast majority of Israelis. Society has, 
however, held prominent military personalities in high esteem and 
treated them as national heroes. This was particularly true after 
the stunning victory of the June 1967 War. After the near disaster 
in 1973 and the controversies surrounding operations in Lebanon 
in 1982, however, the prestige of the professional military suffered. 
The Lebanon experience raised in its most acute form the ques- 
tion of how effectively the civilian government could control the 
military establishment. IDF operations ordered by Sharon and Eitan 
often had been contrary to the government's decisions and the cabi- 
net had been kept ignorant of the military situation. The cabinet's 
inability to oppose effectively Sharon and Eitan was made possi- 
ble by the passive attitude of Prime Minister Begin, the relative 
lack of operational military experience among other cabinet 
ministers, and the deliberate manipulation of reports on the fight- 
ing. For a time, the checks and balances that had previously pre- 
vented the defense establishment from dominating the civilian 
decision-making authority seemed in jeopardy. Political protest 
arose in the government, among the public, in the news media, 
and even in sectors of the army that forced a reassessment of the 
actions of the military leadership. Although no structural changes 
were introduced, Sharon was removed from the Ministry of Defense 
and a more normal pattern of military-civilian relations was re- 
stored. In 1988, Chief of Staff Shomron, Deputy Chief of Staff 
Major General Ehud Barak, and West Bank Commander Major 
General Amran Mitzna, all were perceived to be political liberals. 
They were, however, careful not to draw attention in public to pos- 
sible differences with the government over its handling of the up- 
rising in the occupied territories. 

Defense Production and Sales 

The manufacture of small weapons and explosives for the fore- 
runners of the IDF had begun in secret arms factories during the 
1930s. The War of Independence was fought with Sten guns, 
grenades, light mortars, antitank guns, flamethrowers, and light 
ammunition, much of it produced in Israel with surplus United 
States machinery acquired as scrap after World War II. After in- 
dependence and the departure of the British, massive imports of 
wartime surplus aircraft, tanks, and artillery were possible. The 



314 



National Security 



Israeli arms industry made a specialty of upgrading and overhaul- 
ing such equipment. The Israeli-designed Uzi submachine gun, 
adopted by the security forces of many nations, was a major ex- 
port success, providing needed revenue for the arms industry. The 
Czechoslovak arms agreement with Egypt in 1955 and the 1956 
War gave further impetus to weapons production. The decision 
to become a major producer of armaments was inspired by the arms 
embargo imposed by France — then Israel's main supplier of 
arms — just before the outbreak of the June 1967 War. By the mid- 
to late 1970s, indigenous suppliers were delivering an increasing 
share of the IDF's major weapons systems. These systems included 
the Reshef missile boat, the Kfir fighter plane, the Gabriel mis- 
sile, and the Merkava tank. The Kfir, based on plans of the French 
Mirage III acquired clandestinely through a Swiss source, was 
powered with a United States General Electric J 79 engine, but em- 
bodied Israeli-designed and Israeli-produced components for the 
flight control and weapons delivery systems. 

Domestic production reduced foreign exchange costs for imports, 
provided a degree of self-sufficiency against the risk of arms em- 
bargoes, and facilitated the adaptation of foreign equipment designs 
to meet Israeli requirements. A high concentration of well-qualified 
scientists, engineers, and technicians, a growing industrial base, 
and a flow of government resources toward military research and 
development facilitated the rapid expansion of locally produced mili- 
tary equipment. Officials asserted that spinoffs from the arms in- 
dustry, especially in electronics, had stimulated the civilian high 
technology sector, thus contributing indirectly to export earnings. 
This claim has been disputed by Israeli economists who concluded 
that the US$700 million spent annually on military research and 
development would have produced five times the value in export 
earnings had it been spent direcdy on civilian research and develop- 
ment. Even among government leaders, there was growing reali- 
zation that the defense industry had become too large and that the 
government should not be obliged to come to the rescue of large 
defense firms in financial difficulty. 

Defense Industries 

Israel's more than 150 defense and defense-related firms (thou- 
sands of other firms were engaged in subcontracting) fell into one 
of three ownership categories: state-owned enterprises, privately 
owned firms, and firms with mixed state and private ownership. 
One firm, Armament Development Authority, commonly known 
as Rafael, was the main military research and development agency 
responsible for translating the ordnance requirements of IDF field 



315 



Israel: A Country Study 

units into development projects. Rafael had a unique status under 
the direct supervision of the Ministry of Defense. 

Total employment in the defense sector reached a peak of 65,000 
persons in the mid-1980s, more than 20 percent of the industrial 
work force. By 1988, however, retrenchment of the defense budget 
and shrinkage of the world arms market had exposed the defense 
industry to severe financial losses and layoffs that reduced the work 
force to about 50,000 employees. 

The largest of the defense firms was the government-owned con- 
glomerate, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) that manufactured the 
Kfir and Arava aircraft, the Ramta light armored car, Gabriel anti- 
ship missiles, and high-speed patrol boats. IAI began in 1933 as 
a small machine shop, later catering to the maintenance and up- 
grading of the motley collection of aircraft acquired during the War 
of Independence. It continued to specialize in the overhaul and 
retrofitting of the whole range of aircraft in the air force inven- 
tory. Until the cancellation of the Lavi project in 1987, IAI had 
been entrusted with the development of the advanced fighter 
aircraft. 

The factories of Israel Military Industries (IMI), another 
government-owned conglomerate, produced the Uzi submachine- 
gun, the Galil rifle, explosives, propellants, artillery shells, and light 
ammunition. IMI also specialized in the upgrading and conver- 
sion of tanks and other armored vehicles. Tadiran Electronic In- 
dustries was the largest private firm engaged in defense production, 
notably communications, electronic warfare, and command and 
control systems, as well as the pilotless reconnaissance aircraft of 
which Israel had become a leading manufacturer. Soltam, another 
private firm, specialized in mortars and artillery munitions. 

Growth of the defense industry was achieved by a mixture of 
imported technology and Israeli innovation. Israeli firms purchased 
production rights and entered into joint ventures with foreign com- 
panies to manufacture both end products and components. Nearly 
every electronics firm had links of some sort with United States 
producers. Purchase agreements for foreign military equipment fre- 
quently specified that production data and design information, 
together with coproduction rights, be accorded to Israel. Neverthe- 
less, American firms often were reluctant to supply advanced tech- 
nology because of fears that Israel would adapt the technology for 
use in items to be exported to third countries on an unrestricted 
basis. Some American firms also feared that collaboration would 
encourage Israeli competition in already saturated world mar- 
kets. 



316 



National Security 



Nuclear Weapons Potential 

Israel had been involved in nuclear research since the country's 
inception. With French assistance that began about 1957, Israel 
constructed a natural uranium research reactor that went into oper- 
ation at Dimona, in the Negev Desert in 1964. Dimona's opera- 
tions were conducted in secret, and it was not brought under 
international inspection. According to a 1982 UN study, Israel could 
have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium at Dimona for 
a number of explosive devices. Under an agreement with the United 
States in 1955, a research reactor also was established at Nahal 
Soreq, west of Beersheba. This reactor was placed under United 
States and subsequently International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspection. The Nahal Soreq facility was not suspected of 
involvement in a weapons program. 

American and other Western specialists considered it possible 
that Israel had developed a nuclear weapons capability incorporating 
enriched uranium as an alternative to plutonium. The United States 
suspected that up to 100 kilograms of enriched uranium missing 
from a facility at Apollo, Pennsylvania, had been taken in a con- 
spiracy between the plant's managers and the Israeli government. 
In 1968, 200 tons of ore that disappeared from a ship in the Mediter- 
ranean probably were also diverted to Israel. Foreign experts found 
indications that Israel was pursuing research in a laser enrichment 
process although no firm evidence had been adduced that Israel 
had achieved a capability to enrich uranium. In a 1974 analysis, 
the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expressed the 
belief that Israel had already produced nuclear weapons. Among 
the factors leading to this conclusion were the two incidents of dis- 
appearance of enriched uranium and Israel's costly investment in 
the Jericho missile system. 

Officially, Israel neither acknowledged nor denied that nuclear 
weapons were being produced. The government held to the un- 
varying formulation that "Israel will not be the first to introduce 
nuclear weapons into the Middle East." As of 1988, Israel had 
not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (1968). It was, however, a party to the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water (1963). There was no evidence that Israel had ever 
carried out a nuclear test, although some observers speculated that 
a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 
was a joint South African-Israeli test. 

In 1986 descriptions and photographs were published in the 
London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory. 



317 



Israel: A Country Study 

The photographs were taken by a dismissed Israeli nuclear tech- 
nician, Mordechai Vanunu. His information led experts to con- 
clude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices, a 
far greater nuclear capability than had been previously estimated. 

A nuclear attack directed against targets almost anywhere in the 
Middle East would be well within Israel's capacities. Fighter- 
bombers of the Israeli air force could be adapted to carry nuclear 
bombs with little difficulty. The Jericho missile, developed in the 
late 1960s, was believed to have achieved a range of 450 kilometers. 
An advanced version, the Jericho II, with a range of nearly 1,500 
kilometers, was reported to have been test-flown in 1987. 

Foreign Military Sales and Assistance 

By the late 1980s, Israel had become one of the world's leading 
suppliers of arms and security services, producing foreign exchange 
earnings estimated at US$1.5 billion annually, which represented 
one-third of the country's industrial exports. Because the defense 
industry was not subsidized by the government, it was indispens- 
able for major arms manufacturers to develop export markets, which 
accounted in some cases for as much as 65 percent of total output. 
Foreign military sales at first consisted primarily of the transfer 
of surplus and rehabilitated equipment stocks and the administra- 
tion of training and advisory missions. Particularly after the Oc- 
tober 1973 War, however, foreign sales of surplus IDF stocks and 
weapons systems from newly developed production lines increased 
dramatically. Rehabilitated tanks and other Soviet equipment cap- 
tured from Egypt and Syria were among the products marketed 
abroad. In addition to its economic and trade value, the expan- 
sion of the arms industry assured Israel of the availability of a higher 
production capacity to supply the IDF at wartime levels. It also 
provided Israel with opportunities to develop common interests with 
countries with which it did not maintain diplomatic relations and 
to cultivate politically useful contacts with foreign military leaders. 

Initially, most of Israel's arms sales were to Third World coun- 
tries, but, owing to financial difficulties faced by these clients and 
to competition from new Third World arms producers such as Brazil 
and Taiwan, different sales strategies had to be adopted. In part 
through joint ventures and coproduction, Israel succeeded in break- 
ing into the more lucrative American and West European mar- 
kets. By the early 1980s, more than fifty countries on five continents 
had become customers for Israeli military equipment. Among 
Israel's clients were communist states (China and Romania), Mus- 
lim states (Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and so- 
called pariah states (South Africa and Iran). To some degree, Israel 



318 



National Security 



was restricted in its marketing by United States controls over arms 
transactions involving the transfer of components or technology 
of United States origin. In one well-publicized case, the United 
States vetoed the sale of twelve Kfir fighters to Uruguay in 1978. 
Intimidation of potential buyers by Arab states also presented a 
problem. Observers believed that Arab pressure played a part in 
decisions by Austria and Taiwan not to purchase the Kfir and in 
Brazil's decision not to choose the Gabriel missile for its navy. 

The broader issues of Israel's foreign military sales program were 
decided by a cabinet committee on weapons transfers. Routine ap- 
plications to sell arms to countries approved by this committee were 
reviewed by the Defense Sales Office of the Ministry of Defense. 
The primary concerns were that arms supplied by Israel not fall 
into the hands of its enemies and that secret design innovations 
not be compromised. After 1982, however, security restrictions were 
relaxed to permit export of high technology weapons and electronics. 

South Africa was believed to be one of Israel's principal trade 
partners in spite of the mandatory UN resolution of 1977 against 
arms shipments to the Pretoria government. South Africa was 
known to have acquired 6 Reshef missile boats, more than 100 
Gabriel missiles, and radar and communications systems, and to 
have obtained Israel's assistance in upgrading its British-built Cen- 
turion tanks. The South African-manufactured Cheetah fighter air- 
plane unveiled in 1986 was a copy of the Kfir C-2 produced in 
collaboration with IAI. Subsequent to the passage of the Compre- 
hensive Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986 in the United States, which 
mandated a cut-off of military aid to countries selling arms to South 
Africa, Israel announced that it would not enter into any new arms 
contracts with Pretoria. Existing contracts, however, which would 
not be canceled, were reported to be valued at between US$400 
and US$800 million. 

Military cooperation between Israel and Iran had been exten- 
sive since the 1960s, under the shah's regime. After a brief rup- 
ture of relations when Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini 
came to power in 1979, cooperation resumed. The Israeli minister 
of defense in 1982 acknowledged the negotiation of an arrange- 
ment worth US$28 million, including spare parts for United States- 
manufactured airplanes and tanks in the early 1980s. The Israeli 
motivating factor was the belief that it was to Israel's strategic ad- 
vantage to help Iran in its war against Iraq, an Arab state bitterly 
hostile to Israel. Although Israel announced an embargo of arms 
transactions after disclosure of its involvement in the plan to trade 
arms for the release of United States hostages in Lebanon, a 
stricter directive had to be issued in November 1987, following 



319 



Israel: A Country Study 

reports that weapons of Israeli origin continued to reach the 
Iranians. 

Prior to the mass severance of diplomatic relations with Israel 
after the October 1973 War, Israel had actively promoted military 
collaboration with a number of African countries . Training or ad- 
visory missions had been established in at least ten African states. 
During the 1980s, Israel quietly resumed these activities in sev- 
eral places, most notably Zaire. Israel dispatched teams there to 
train elite units and to help reorganize and rearm a division 
deployed in Shaba Region. Israel also equipped and trained Came- 
roon's presidential guard unit. Limited pilot training programs were 
extended to Liberia and to Ciskei, a South African homeland (see 
Relations with African States, ch. 4). 

Military Cooperation with the United States 

The military partnership between the United States and Israel 
was by 1988 a flourishing relationship that encompassed not only 
military assistance but also intelligence sharing, joint weapons 
research, and purchases of Israeli equipment by the United States 
armed forces. During the early years of Israeli independence, the 
United States had been reluctant to become a major source of arms, 
a position dictated by the view that the United States could best 
contribute to resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute by avoiding iden- 
tification with either party to the conflict. The United States con- 
tinued to deal with Israeli arms requests on a case-by-case basis 
until the October 1973 War, when it became virtually the sole out- 
side source of sophisticated weaponry. The high level of United 
States aid was intended to insure that Israel maintained the capa- 
bility to defend itself against any potential combination of aggres- 
sors and to give Israel the confidence to enter into negotiations with 
its Arab neighbors. 

Israel had great difficulty in obtaining the modern arms it needed 
until the mid-1950s, when France became its main supplier. Even 
after the announcement of a major arms agreement between Egypt 
and Czechoslovakia in 1955, the United States was unmoved by 
the argument that this development justified deliveries to Israel to 
maintain a balance of forces in the Middle East. It did, however, 
relax its stance by authorizing the transfer to Israel of Mystere IV 
fighter planes manufactured in France with United States assistance 
and F-86 Sabre jets manufactured in Canada under United States 
license. In 1958 the United States consented to a modest sale of 
100 recoilless rifles to help Israel defend itself from neighbors receiv- 
ing shipments of both Soviet- and Western-made tanks. 



320 



National Security 



Sales of Hawk antiaircraft missiles in 1962 and M-48 Patton 
tanks in 1966 represented a shift in policy, but were justified as 
"occasional, selective sales" to balance the large shipments of 
sophisticated Soviet arms to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. A more deci- 
sive turn in United States policy occurred in 1968 when, follow- 
ing the failure of efforts to reach an understanding with the Soviet 
Union on limiting the supply of arms to the Middle East and the 
imposition of a complete embargo by France on arms sales to Israel, 
Washington approved the sale of fifty F-4 Phantom jets. 

By the early 1970s, the flow of United States military supplies 
to Israel had acquired considerable momentum, although it was 
not always considered sufficient by Israeli leaders concerned with 
Egypt's aggressive actions along the Suez Canal. In 1972 and 1973, 
the Israeli air force was bolstered by additional deliveries of F-4 
aircraft as well as A-4 Skyhawks. After the outbreak of the Octo- 
ber 1973 War, President Richard M. Nixon ordered the airlift of 
urgently needed military supplies to Israel. President Nixon fol- 
lowed this action by seeking from Congress US$2.2 billion in emer- 
gency security assistance including, for the first time, direct aid 
grants. By 1975 a steady flow of aircraft, Hawk missiles, self- 
propelled artillery, M-48 and M-60 tanks, armored personnel car- 
riers, helicopters, and antitank missiles enabled Israel to recover 
from the heavy equipment losses suffered during the war. For the 
first time, the United States government approved the sale to Israel 
of more advanced F-15 and F-16 interceptor aircraft. 

In conjunction with the IDF redeployment following the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, the United States provided 
US$3.2 billion in special aid. More than one-third of this amount 
was used to finance the construction of two airbases in the Negev, 
replacing three bases evacuated in the Sinai. Egypt also benefited 
from a vastly increased level of aid; but Israel sharply disputed 
Washington's later package proposal to sell US$4.8 billion worth 
of aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Israel's objections 
to the delivery of sophisticated fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia grew 
stronger when the United States decided in 1981 to allow Saudi 
Arabia to purchase airborne warning and control system (AWACS) 
aircraft. 

In 1983 the United States and Israel established the Joint Political- 
Military Group (JPMG) to address the threat to American and 
Israeli military interests in the Middle East posed by the Soviet 
Union. The JPMG contemplated joint military planning, combined 
exercises, and the prepositioning of United States military equip- 
ment in Israel. In the same year, the United States agreed to as- 
sist Israel in constructing its own Lavi fighter aircraft by furnishing 



321 



Israel: A Country Study 

technology, engines, flight controls, and other components. 
Although the United States was committed to contribute US$1 .75 
billion to the Lavi, the project was cancelled in 1987 under United 
States pressure (with considerable support from senior Israeli 
officers) because of cost overruns that were causing unacceptable 
strains to the entire Israeli defense program. 

As part of the growing military partnership, aircraft from United 
States Navy aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean used Israeli 
bombing ranges in the Negev; Israel loaned the United States older 
Kfir fighters with characteristics similar to the Soviet MiG-21 to 
use for combat training; antiterrorist teams from the two coun- 
tries trained together; and joint submarine exercises were held. 
Israel also participated in advanced weapons research programs. 
In 1986 the United States granted Israel the right, along with Brit- 
ain and West Germany, to compete for subcontracts for the Stra- 
tegic Defense Initiative. In 1988 the United States announced that 
it would provide Israel US$120 million to continue research on the 
Hetz antiballistic missile system. Purchases of Israeli products by 
the United States Department of Defense (including bridge-laying 
equipment, mine-laying and mine-clearing systems, and electronic 
and communications items) amounted to more than US$200 mil- 
lion in 1986. 

Israel benefited more than any other country from United States 
military assistance, at a level of approximately US$1.8 billion an- 
nually in the mid- and late 1980s. Only Egypt (US$1.3 billion in 
1988) approached this sum. Military aid to Israel, which had been 
in the form of both grant aid and military sales on concessional 
credit terms, changed to an all-grant form beginning in United 
States fiscal year (FY) 1985 (see table 15, Appendix A). The US$1.2 
billion provided each year in economic aid enabled Israel to ser- 
vice the foreign debt incurred by past purchases of military materiel. 
United States assistance accounted for more than one-third of all 
Israeli defense spending during this period. Nevertheless, in terms 
of purchasing power, the level of direct military aid was less than 
the US$1 billion received in 1977. 

In spite of the intimate degree of cooperation in the military 
sphere, discord occasionally arose over the purposes to which United 
States equipment had been applied. Under the terms of military 
assistance agreements, Israel could use the equipment only for pur- 
poses of internal security, for legitimate self-defense, or to partici- 
pate in regional defense, or in UN collective security measures. 
Israel also agreed not to undertake aggression against any other 
state. The United States condemned the Israeli air strike against 
Iraq's Osiraq (acronym for Osiris-Iraq) nuclear research installation 



322 



National Security 



near Baghdad in 1981 using F-16 aircraft escorted by F-15s. A 
pending shipment of F- 16s was suspended for a time and the sus- 
pension was extended when the Israeli air force bombed PLO tar- 
gets in West Beirut, resulting in significant civilian casualties. The 
United States lifted the ban after a few months without a formal 
finding as to whether Israel had violated its commitments by using 
United States-supplied aircraft on the two raids. 

The United States objected to Israel's use of cluster bombs dur- 
ing Operation Litani, its incursion into Lebanon in 1978. A com- 
mitment was obtained from Israel that it would restrict the use of 
cluster bombs that cast lethal projectiles over a wide area to "hard" 
targets. In 1982, however, the United States held up further deliv- 
eries of the bombs when it learned that they were being used in 
the invasion of Lebanon. In 1986, with the embargo still in force, 
the United States launched an investigation into the unapproved 
sale of equipment by private American firms enabling Israel to 
manufacture the bombs. 

In addition to cooperation on materiel, cooperation between the 
two countries on intelligence matters had begun in the early 1960s, 
when Israel furnished the United States with captured Soviet mis- 
siles, antitank weapons, and artillery shells for evaluation and test- 
ing. The United States shared reconnaissance satellite data with 
Israel, although after Israel apparently used satellite photographs 
to aid in targeting the Osiraq reactor, the data reportedly were lim- 
ited to information useful only for defensive purposes relating to 
Arab military deployments on or near Israel's borders. In Septem- 
ber 1988, however, Israel announced that it had launched its own 
scientific satellite which was to be followed by other satellites in 
orbits characteristic of observation satellites. 

The Israel Police 

Law enforcement was entrusted to a single national police force, 
called simply the Israel Police, which had a personnel strength of 
20,874 men and women in 1986. The Israel Police had responsi- 
bility for preventing and detecting crime; apprehending suspects, 
charging them, and bringing them to trial; keeping law and order; 
and traffic control. Since 1974 the police had also controlled inter- 
nal security, especially the prevention of border infiltration and 
terrorism. With the abolition of the Ministry of Police in 1977, 
the Israel Police came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of In- 
terior. The minister of interior appointed the police commanding 
officer, the inspector general. Since 1967 Israeli police have func- 
tioned in the occupied territories under the authority of the mili- 
tary governors. In March 1988, after the murder of one Arab 



323 



Israel: A Country Study 

policeman, at least half of the 1,000 Palestinian police in the oc- 
cupied territories heeded leaflets and radio broadcasts calling upon 
them to resign. 

The country was divided into four police districts and a num- 
ber of subdistricts. The heavily populated metropolitan area of Tel 
Aviv constituted one district that was divided into three subdis- 
tricts. The Southern District, with six subdistricts, comprised central 
and southern Israel down to the Negev Desert. The Northern Dis- 
trict, with five subdistricts, included Haifa, Galilee, and the coastal 
area north of Tel Aviv. A fourth district was formed in the Negev 
following the return to Egypt of the Sinai Peninsula as part of the 
Camp David Accords in 1979. The occupied territories were divided 
between the northern and southern districts. 

The subdistricts exercised authority over individual police sta- 
tions. Most operations, including the investigation of crimes, were 
carried out at the police station level, subject to guidance from the 
appropriate functional bureau of the national headquarters in 
Jerusalem. The principal bureaus of national headquarters were 
Operations (patrolling, traffic, and internal security); Investiga- 
tion (criminal investigation, intelligence, criminal identification, 
fraud); and Administration (personnel, training, communications, 
finance). These bureaus had counterparts at the district level. 

Subordinate Forces 

The Border Police, a paramilitary force of about 5,000 men, was 
part of the Israel Police and reported directiy to the inspector gen- 
eral. Its primary mission was to patrol the northern border and 
the occupied territories to guard against infiltration and guerrilla 
attacks. It also provided security to ports and airports. Border Police 
units were available to assist regular police in controlling demon- 
strations and strikes. With a reputation for rigorous enforcement 
of the law, the Border Police often behaved in a manner that caused 
resentment among the Arab population. The Border Police re- 
cruited among Druze and Arab Christian minorities for operations 
in Arab areas. The Special Operational Unit of the Border Police 
was intensively trained and equipped to deal with major terrorist 
attacks but was reportedly underused because the army continued 
to handle this mission in spite of the formal transfer of the internal 
security function to the police. 

Civil defense units of the army reserve also formed an auxiliary 
force that through daytime foot patrols assisted the police in crime 
prevention, surveillance against sabotage, and public order. The 
Civil Guard, founded after the October 1973 War, was a force of 
more than 100,000 volunteers, including women and high school 



324 



National Security 



students. Its primary activities were nighttime patrolling of residen- 
tial areas, keeping watch on the coastline, manning roadblocks, 
and assisting the police during public events. Civil Guard patrols 
were armed with rifles. 

Recruitment and training criteria for police resembled those for 
military service. The minimal education requirement for consta- 
bles was ten years of schooling, although, with the rising level of 
education and increasingly sophisticated nature of police work, most 
recruits met more than the minimum standards. Low police wages 
in relation to other employment opportunities and the poor public 
image of the police contributed to the force's chronic inability to 
fill its ranks. Since new immigrants tended to be available as poten- 
tial recruits, fluency in Hebrew was not a condition for employ- 
ment, although a special course helped such recruits achieve a 
working knowledge of the language. Somewhat more than 15 per- 
cent of the Israel Police were women, most of whom were assigned 
to clerical work, juvenile and family matters, and traffic control. 
Women were not assigned to patrol work. 

It was possible to enter the police force at any one of four levels — 
senior officer, officer, noncommissioned officer, or constable — 
depending on education and experience. Except for certain special- 
ized professionals, such as lawyers and accountants who dealt with 
white collar offenses, most police entering as officers had relevant 
military experience and had held equivalent military ranks. 

Advancement was based principally on success in training 
courses, and to a lesser degree on seniority and the recommenda- 
tion of the immediate superior officer. Assignment to the officers' 
training course was preceded by a rigorous selection board in- 
terview. 

The National Police School at Shefaraam, southwest of Nazareth, 
offered courses on three levels: basic training, command training, 
and technical training. The six-month basic training course covered 
language and cultural studies, the laws of the country, investiga- 
tion, traffic control, and other aspects of police work. Command 
training for sergeants (six months) and officers (ten months) in- 
cluded seminar-type work and on-the-job experience in investiga- 
tion, traffic, patrolling, and administration. The Senior Officers' 
College offered an eight-month program in national policy, staff 
operations, criminology, sociology, and internal security. Tech- 
nical courses of varying duration covered such specialized areas 
as investigations, intelligence, narcotics, and traffic. 

The Israel Police traditionally has placed less emphasis on physical 
fitness, self-defense, and marksmanship than police organizations 
in other countries. A special school for physical fitness, however, 



325 



Israel: A Country Study 



was introduced in the 1980s. Another innovation during this pe- 
riod was the postponement of the six-month basic course until after 
a recruit completed a six-month internship with several experienced 
partners. The only preparation for the initial field experience was 
a ten-day introductory course on police jurisdiction. The intern- 
ship phase weeded out recruits who could not adapt to police work. 
Moreover, the recruit then had the option of choosing one of the 
two areas of concentration into which the basic course was 
divided — patrol, traffic, and internal security, or investigation and 
intelligence. 

Police Reform 

In an attempt to analyze the growth of organized crime and the 
degree of effectiveness of the police, in 1977 the government ap- 
pointed a Commission to Examine the Topic of Crime in Israel, 
known as the Shimron Commission. The group's report cited many 
shortcomings in the Israel Police, including the neglect of train- 
ing, especially of investigators, high turnover, weak enforcement 
of traffic laws, a need for improved community relations, lack of 
communications and transportation equipment, poor supervision 
of precinct operations, and duplication of activities between na- 
tional and district headquarters. Many of the administrative reor- 
ganizations recommended by the Shimron Commission were 
adopted, but implementation of major reforms lagged. In early 
1980, the unusual step was taken of introducing an outsider, Gen- 
eral Herzl Shafir, a recentiy retired IDF officer, as inspector general. 
Following an intensive six-month study of police problems, Shafir 
developed a five-year strategy to reorganize the police. Known as 
Tirosh (new wine), the strategy included plans for the expanded 
use of computers to determine the most efficient employment of 
manpower and resources; innovative approaches to community re- 
lations; the routine rotation of personnel to counter staleness and 
petty corruption; major redeployment of police resources, includ- 
ing 2,000 new policemen to patrol 800 new local beats; the estab- 
lishment of forty-five new police stations, many of them in Arab 
communities of Israel; and a 40 percent cutback in administrative 
personnel. 

After one year in office, Shafir was dismissed on the ground of 
inability to accept civilian control. He had demonstrated political 
insensitivity by ordering a police raid on the files of the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs to investigate suspicions of fraud and bribery 
involving the minister. Despite the institution of many aspects 
of the Tirosh program, the lack of strong leadership after 
Shafir' s departure thwarted the comprehensive reforms that he had 



326 



National Security 



advocated. In particular, Shafir's vision of transplanting the high 
esprit de corps of the IDF to the Israel Police failed; morale, which 
had surged as a result of his efforts, reportedly sank back to its 
previous low state. 

Intelligence Services 

Many observers regarded Israel's intelligence community as 
among the most professional and effective in the world and as a 
leading factor in Israel's success in the conflict with the Arab states. 
Its missions encompassed not only the main task of ascertaining 
plans and strengths of the Arab military forces opposing Israel but 
also the work of combating Arab terrorism abroad, collecting sen- 
sitive technical data, and conducting political liaison and propa- 
ganda operations. 

The intelligence community had four separate components, each 
with distinct objectives. The Central Institute for Intelligence 
and Special Missions (Mossad Merkazi Le Modiin Uletafkidim 
Meyuhadim — commonly known as Mossad) had a mission analo- 
gous to that of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, being 
responsible for intelligence gathering and operations in foreign coun- 
tries. The General Security Service (Sherut Bitahon Kelali — com- 
monly known as Shin Bet or Shabak) controlled internal security 
and, after 1967, intelligence within the occupied territories. The 
prime minister supervised Mossad and Shin Bet. Military intelli- 
gence, the Intelligence Branch of the general staff (Agaf Modiin — 
known as Aman), had responsibility for collection of military, 
geographic, and economic intelligence, particularly within the Arab 
world and along Israel's borders. Military intelligence was under 
the jurisdiction of the minister of defense, acting through the chief 
of staff. The Center for Research and Strategic Planning, formerly 
the Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prepared 
analyses for government policy makers based on raw intelligence 
as well as longer analytical papers. 

Mossad 

Mossad, with a staff of 1,500 to 2,000 personnel, had responsi- 
bility for human intelligence collection, covert action, and counter- 
terrorism. Its focus was on Arab nations and organizations 
throughout the world. Mossad also was responsible for the clan- 
destine movement of Jewish refugees out of Syria, Iran, and Ethio- 
pia. Mossad agents were active in the communist countries, in the 
West, and at the UN. Mossad had eight departments, the largest 
of which, the Collections Department, had responsibility for espi- 
onage operations, with offices abroad under both diplomatic and 



327 



Israel: A Country Study 

unofficial cover. The Political Action and Liaison Department con- 
ducted political activities and relations with friendly foreign intel- 
ligence services and with nations with which Israel did not have 
normal diplomatic relations. In larger stations, such as Paris, 
Mossad customarily had under embassy cover two regional con- 
trollers: one to serve the Collections Department and the other the 
Political Action and Liaison Department. A Special Operations 
Division, believed to be subordinate to the latter department, con- 
ducted highly sensitive sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological 
warfare projects. 

Israel's most celebrated spy, Eli Cohen, was recruited by Mossad 
during the 1960s to infiltrate the top echelons of the Syrian govern- 
ment. Cohen radioed information to Israel for two years before 
he was discovered and publicly hanged in Damascus Square. 
Another Mossad agent, Wolfgang Lotz, established himself in 
Cairo, became acquainted with high-ranking Egyptian military and 
police officers, and obtained information on missile sites and on 
German scientists working on the Egyptian rocket program. In 1962 
and 1963, in a successful effort to intimidate the Germans, several 
key scientists in that program were targets of assassination attempts. 
Mossad also succeeded in seizing eight missile boats under con- 
struction for Israel in France, but which had been embargoed by 
French president Charles de Gaulle in December 1968. In 1960, 
Mossad carried out one of its most celebrated operations, the kid- 
napping of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina. 
Another kidnapping, in 1986, brought to Israel for prosecution the 
nuclear technician, Mordechai Vanunu, who had revealed details 
of the Israeli nuclear weapons program to a London newspaper. 
During the 1970s, Mossad assassinated several Arabs connected 
with the Black September terrorist group. Mossad inflicted a severe 
blow on the PLO in April 1988, when an assassination team in- 
vaded a well-guarded residence in Tunis to murder Arafat's deputy, 
Abu Jihad, considered to be the principal PLO planner of mili- 
tary and terrorist operations against Israel. 

Aman 

Military intelligence, or Aman, with an estimated staff of 7,000 
personnel, produced comprehensive national intelligence estimates 
for the prime minister and cabinet, daily intelligence reports, risk 
of war estimates, target studies on nearby Arab countries, and com- 
munications intercepts. Aman also conducted across-border agent 
operations. Aman's Foreign Relations Department was responsi- 
ble for liaison with foreign intelligence services and the activities 
of Israeli military attaches abroad. Aman was held responsible for 



328 



National Security 



the failure to obtain adequate warning of the Egyptian- Syrian attack 
that launched the October 1973 War. Many indications of the attack 
were received but faulty assessments at higher levels permitted major 
Arab gains before the IDF could mobilize and stabilize the situation. 

During preparations for the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Aman 
correctly assessed the weaknesses of the Christian militia on which 
Israel was depending and correctly predicted that a clash with the 
Syrian garrison in Lebanon was inevitable. The chief of intelli- 
gence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, made these points to the 
general staff and privately to the prime minister. But, although 
he was present at cabinet meetings, he failed to make his doubts 
known to avoid differing openly with Begin and Sharon. Saguy 
was forced to retire after the Kahan Commission found that he 
had been delinquent in his duties regarding the massacres at the 
Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps (see The Siege of Beirut 
and its Aftermath, this ch.). 

Small air force and naval intelligence units operated as semi- 
autonomous branches of Aman. Air force intelligence primarily 
used aerial reconnaissance and radio intercepts to collect informa- 
tion on strength levels of Arab air forces and for target compila- 
tion. In addition to reconnaissance aircraft, pilotless drones were 
used extensively to observe enemy installations. Naval intelligence 
collected data on Arab and Soviet naval activities in the Mediter- 
ranean and prepared coastal studies for naval gunfire missions and 
beach assaults. 

Shin Bet 

Shin Bet, the counterespionage and internal security service, was 
believed to have three operational departments and five support 
departments. The Arab Affairs Department had responsibility for 
antiterrorist operations, political subversion, and maintenance of 
an index on Arab terrorists. The Non-Arab Affairs Department, 
divided into communist and noncommunist sections, concerned 
itself with all other countries, including penetrating foreign intel- 
ligence services and diplomatic missions in Israel and interrogat- 
ing immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The 
Protective Security Department had responsibility for protecting 
Israeli government buildings and embassies, defense industries, 
scientific installations, industrial plants, and El Al. 

Shin Bet monitored the activities of and personalities in domes- 
tic right-wing fringe groups and subversive leftist movements. It 
was believed to have infiltrated agents into the ranks of the parties 
of the far left and had uncovered a number of foreign technicians 
spying for neighboring Arab countries or the Soviet Union. All 



329 



Israel: A Country Study 

foreigners, regardless of religion or nationality, were liable to come 
under surveillance through an extensive network of informants who 
regularly came into contact with visitors to Israel. Shin Bet's net- 
work of agents and informers in the occupied territories destroyed 
the PLO's effectiveness there after 1967, forcing the PLO to with- 
draw to bases in Jordan. 

Shin Bet's reputation as a highly proficient internal security 
agency was tarnished severely by two public scandals in the 
mid-1980s. In April 1984, Israeli troops stormed a bus hijacked 
by four Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Although two of the hijackers 
survived, they were later beaten to death by Shin Bet agents. It 
appeared that the agents were acting under orders of Avraham 
Shalom, the head of Shin Bet. Shalom falsified evidence and in- 
structed Shin Bet witnesses to lie to investigators to cover up Shin 
Bet's role. In the ensuing controversy, the attorney general was 
removed from his post for refusing to abandon his investigation. 
The president granted pardons to Shalom, his deputies who had 
joined in the cover-up, and the agents implicated in the killings. 

In 1987 Izat Nafsu, a former IDF army lieutenant and member 
of the Circassian minority, was released after his 1980 conviction 
for treason (espionage on behalf of Syria) was overturned by the 
Supreme Court. The court ruled that Shin Bet had used unethical 
interrogation methods to obtain Nafsu 's confession and that Shin 
Bet officers had presented false testimony to the military tribunal 
that had convicted him. A judicial commission set up to report on 
the methods and practices of Shin Bet found that for the previous 
seventeen years it had been the accepted norm for Shin Bet inter- 
rogators to lie to the courts about their interrogation methods (see 
Judicial System, this ch.). 

Lekem 

Until officially disbanded in 1986, the Bureau of Scientific 
Relations (Leshkat Kesher Madao — Lekem) collected scientific and 
technical intelligence abroad from both open and covert sources. 
Lekem was dismantled following the scandal aroused in the United 
States by the arrest of Jonathan Jay Pollard for espionage on be- 
half of Israel. Pollard, a United States naval intelligence employee 
in Washington, received considerable sums for delivering vast quan- 
tities of classified documents to the scientific officers (Lekem agents) 
at the Israeli embassy. Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Although the Israeli government asserted that the operation was 
an unauthorized deviation from its policy of not conducting espi- 
onage against the United States, statements by the Israeli par- 
ticipants and by Pollard himself cast doubt on these claims. 



330 



National Security 



Criminal Justice 

A three-tiered court system of magistrate courts, district courts, 
and Supreme Court applied Israeli law to all persons within Israel's 
borders. Municipal courts, with a more limited sentencing power 
than magistrate courts, enforced municipal ordinances and bylaws. 
Juvenile matters were heard by juvenile court judges assigned to 
magistrate and district courts. The judiciary was independent and 
the right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal, with representa- 
tion by counsel, was guaranteed by law. All trials were open, with 
the exception of security cases. 

A separate Palestinian court system operated in the occupied ter- 
ritories, supplemented by military courts that tried security cases. 
A mixture of military regulations and laws dating back to the 
Ottoman and the Mandate periods were applied. Israeli citizens 
and foreign visitors were not subject to the local courts of the oc- 
cupied territories. The quality of judicial standards in the military 
courts and the absence of any appeal system from the verdicts of 
Israeli military judges were widely criticized in Israel and abroad. 
Some questionable practices regarding the treatment of Palestini- 
ans in such courts are mentioned in the country reports on human 
rights compiled by the United States Department of State. 

Judicial System 

Israeli law provided normal guarantees for its citizens against 
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Writs of habeas corpus and other 
safeguards against violations of due process existed. Confessions 
extracted by torture and other forms of duress were inadmissible 
as evidence in court. The Criminal Procedure Law of 1965 
described general provisions with regard to application of law, 
pretrial and trial procedure, and appeal. It supplemented the Courts 
Law of 1957, which prescribed the composition, jurisdiction, and 
functioning of the court system and provided details of appellate 
remedies and procedures. 

All secular courts in Israel dealt with criminal as well as civil 
matters. The magistrate courts decided about 150,000 criminal cases 
in 1985. The district courts decided about 12,500 criminal cases 
in the first instance and 3,700 as appeal cases. The Supreme Court 
decided approximately 2,000 criminal cases of all kinds. The average 
lapse of time between committing an offense and conviction was 
nineteen months in magistrate courts and eleven months in dis- 
trict courts. 

Punishments for convicted criminals included suspended 
sentences, fines, a choice of imprisonment or fine, imprisonment 
and fine, or imprisonment. The death penalty could be imposed 
for treason or for conviction for Nazi war crimes but, as of 1988, 



331 



Israel: A Country Study 



Eichmann was the only person to be executed as the result of a 
judicial process. Prison sentences were mandatory only for excep- 
tional crimes, such as attacking a policeman. Only a small per- 
centage of criminal convictions actually resulted in incarceration, 
and sentences were relatively short. In 1986 more than half of the 
prison terms were for one year or less and 96 percent were for fewer 
than five years. Sentences by military tribunals were more harsh; 
terms of fifteen years to life imprisonment were not unusual. 

Warrants generally were required for arrests and searches, 
although a person could be arrested without a warrant if there were 
reason to suspect that he or she had committed a felony, was a fugi- 
tive from justice, or was apprehended in the act of committing an 
offense. A person so arrested had to be brought before a judge within 
forty-eight hours; the judge could order the prisoner's release, with 
or without bail, or could authorize further detention for a period 
up to fifteen days. Authorization for detention could be renewed 
for an additional fifteen-day period, but any further extension re- 
quired the approval of the attorney general. Administrative deten- 
tion could be used in security-related cases when formally charging 
a person would compromise sensitive sources of information. 

Unless detained for an offense punishable by death or life im- 
prisonment, an arrested person could be released on bail, which 
could take the form of personal recognizance, cash deposit, surety 
bond, or any combination thereof. A person held in custody must 
be released unconditionally if trial had not commenced within sixty 
days or if it had not ended within one year from the date on which 
a statement of charge had been filed. Only a judge of the Supreme 
Court could order an extension of these time limitations. 

Any person arrested was entitled to communicate with a friend 
or relative and a lawyer as soon as possible. In felony cases, ar- 
rests could be kept secret for reasons of national security upon re- 
quest of the minister of defense. Representation by counsel in such 
cases could be delayed up to seven days and up to fifteen days in 
terrorist-related cases. Offenses committed by civilians against emer- 
gency regulations (which had been in effect since the state of emer- 
gency in force at the founding of the nation in 1948) were tried 
by military courts composed of three commissioned officers. Until 
1963 the judgments of such courts were final, but at that time the 
right of appeal was granted under an amendment to the Military 
Justice Law. Individuals charged with offenses against the Preven- 
tion of Infiltration Law were tried by a military court consisting 
of a single officer; appeals were heard by a court composed of three 
officers. 



332 



National Security 



Magistrate court cases generally were tried before a single judge. 
Cases in the Supreme Court were heard by panels of three judges 
as were appeals cases in district courts and cases where the maxi- 
mum sentence was ten years or more. There were no juries in Israeli 
courts. Persons accused of crimes punishable by imprisonment of 
ten years or more, juveniles, and persons unable to afford private 
counsel could be represented by a lawyer appointed by the court. 
In pleading, defendants could remain silent or could testify under 
oath in their own behalf, in which case they were subject to cross- 
examination. They could also make statements upon which they 
could not be examined. 

A special judicial commission headed by the former president 
of the Supreme Court, Moshe Landau, reported in 1987 that, since 
1971 , internal security agents of Shin Bet had routinely used phys- 
ical and psychological mistreatment to obtain confessions. The 
Landau Commission found that Shin Bet interrogators had, under 
orders, systematically perjured themselves when accused persons 
tried to retract their confessions. According to the United States 
Department of States' s Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1987, the commission set out in a secret annex to the report 
what it regarded as acceptable physical-and psychological pressures 
that might be exerted in the interrogation of terrorism suspects. 

Criminal Justice in the Occupied Territories 

Local law in the occupied territories combined Jordanian and 
Ottoman legislation and regulations from the Mandate period, 
greatly extended by Israeli military orders affecting a broad range 
of political and social activities. The law applied to most criminal 
and civil matters in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, local law 
was based mainly on British mandatory law, as modified by Israel. 
Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses were tried in the local 
Arab court system, which consisted of nine magistrate courts, three 
district courts, and the one Court of Appeal in Ram Allah in the 
West Bank. In 1985 the magistrate courts decided more than 36,000 
cases, the district courts more than 1,300 cases, and the Court of 
Appeal 1,600 cases. Local courts had no power in cases involving 
land, and Israeli residents could not be brought to trial or sued 
in them. Any judicial proceeding could be halted and transferred 
to a military court by the military government. The local courts 
had low standing, lacking the means to execute court decisions, 
with the result that in many cases judgments were not implemented. 

The Israeli court system was empowered, under emergency regu- 
lations enacted by the Knesset, to try offenses committed in the 
occupied territories by Israelis and foreign visitors. Israeli citizens 



333 



Israel: A Country Study 

were tried under Israeli law, and were immune from charges based 
on local law. Military courts were empowered to try residents of 
the occupied territories for criminal offenses based on local law and 
security offenses as defined in military government regulations. Mili- 
tary courts were generally composed of three judges, one of whom 
must be a lawyer. Occasionally, a single military judge tried cases 
in which the maximum sentence did not exceed five years. There 
was no appeal from judgments of the military courts. In early 1988, 
the Supreme Court urged that an appeal system be established, 
although it did not have the power to impose such a change. This 
recommendation was rejected by the government as a budgetary 
burden and a sign of weakness in the campaign against terrorism. 

Persons held on security grounds were not granted bail and were 
denied access to counsel or other outside contacts for a period of 
eighteen days, during which they could be held in custody without 
formal charges. Access could be denied indefinitely if the authori- 
ties believed access would impede the investigation. Many secu- 
rity cases involved secret evidence, access to which was denied to 
the accused and to his attorney. Convictions often were based on 
confessions recorded in Hebrew, which most prisoners did not 
understand. 

International human rights organizations complained of system- 
atic mistreatment of prisoners held on security grounds. Amnesty 
International reported that agents of Shin Bet extracted confessions 
by beatings, extended solitary confinement, immersion in cold 
water, and "hoodings." In most security cases, confessions were 
the only evidence leading to conviction. 

The military authorities also could impose administrative deten- 
tions and deportations. Administrative detentions normally had re- 
quired confirmation by a military judge, but this step was abolished 
in 1988. During 1987, 120 Palestinians were subjected to adminis- 
trative detention and 9 were deported. As a result of the violence 
during 1988, however, these measures were applied on a large scale. 
During the first six months of 1988, at least 18,000 Palestinians 
were taken into custody at various times; of about 5,000 Palestini- 
ans being held at mid-year, nearly half were administrative de- 
tainees. A further thirty-five had been deported. It was often difficult 
for relatives or lawyers to obtain confirmation of the detention or 
learn where the detainee was being held. Detentions could be ap- 
pealed before a military judge whose decision was final. The brief 
appeal hearing was described as little more than a ritual. 

Penal System 

The penal system of both Israel and the occupied territories was 
administered by the Israel Prison Service, a branch of the Ministry 



334 



National Security 



of Interior independent of the Israel Police. It was headed by the 
commissioner of prisons. The prison system was originally set up 
in 1926 as part of the British Mandate police force. Many of the 
prisons still in use in 1988 were built in the 1930s by the British 
authorities. Outside the authority of the Prison Service were police 
lockups located in every major town and military detention centers 
in Israel and the occupied territories. 

As of January 1, 1987, the Prison Service operated thirteen pris- 
ons and detention centers in Israel and eight penitentiaries in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinians of the occupied terri- 
tories serving sentences of more than five years were incarcerated 
in maximum security prisons within Israel. The prison population 
in Israel was 3,837 and in the occupied territories was 4,527. Neve 
Tirza, the sole facility for women, had ninety-seven inmates. 

These totals did not include the sizable numbers of Palestinians 
who were being held in military detention centers. As of mid- 1988 
about half of the detainees were confined at Ketziot, a tent camp 
in the Negev Desert close to the Egyptian border, which held at 
least 2,500 prisoners. A large number of rock-throwing juveniles 
were held at Ansar 2, a camp in the Gaza Strip. As described in 
the Israeli press and by visiting human rights officials, tension 
among the detainees at Ketziot — many of them business and profes- 
sional people — was high owing to petty humiliations, boredom, 
severe climatic conditions, overcrowding, and isolation. No radios, 
watches, or books were permitted. Punishment included periods 
of exposure to the fierce desert sun, but beatings and brutality were 
said to be rare. 

Israeli prisons were chronically overcrowded; violence and abuse 
on the part of the staff were common. As of the early 1980s, an 
American specialist described the available occupational and re- 
habilitation facilities as only nominal. An investigative commis- 
sion appointed by the Supreme Court reported in 1981 that "the 
condition of the prisons is so serious, subhuman, and on the verge 
of explosion that it calls for a revolutionary change in the way pri- 
sons are run." Conditions were especially bad in two of the four 
maximum security penitentiaries, Beersheba, the largest prison in 
Israel, and Ram Allah. At Beersheba the commission found se- 
vere lack of sanitation, drug smuggling, and close confinement with 
almost no opportunity for exercise. The commission recommended 
the demolition of the Ram Allah penitentiary as unfit for human 
habitation. 

Palestinian and international human rights groups have com- 
plained of widespread and systematic mistreatment of Arab 
prisoners. Periodic hunger strikes have been undertaken by 



335 



Israel: A Country Study 



Palestinian prisoners demanding the same basic privileges as Jew- 
ish inmates. 

A number of new prisons were completed during the early 1980s 
and, as of 1987, construction of a new prison hospital was under- 
way, as were new wings at several existing prisons. The increased 
accommodation would, however, do little more than provide space 
for a rising prison population. During 1986 the total number of 
inmates had risen by 587 while new construction added 670 spaces 
in the prison system. 

Supplementary courses to enable prisoners to complete elemen- 
tary or secondary education were available and completed success- 
fully by nearly 1,000 inmates in 1986. In some prisons, employment 
was available in small-scale enterprises operated by the prison ser- 
vice or by private entrepreneurs. About 2,700 prisoners were em- 
ployed in some fashion. A total of 500 inmates participated in 
vocational training in 1986 in a variety of trades, including car- 
pentry, bookbinding, printing, tailoring, and shoemaking. 

Furloughs were granted for good behavior; 15,000 permits for 
home leave were issued in 1986. A temporary parole often was al- 
lowed non-security prisoners after serving one-third of their sen- 
tences. After completing two- thirds of their sentences, such prisoners 
could earn a permanent parole for good behavior. Although parole 
privileges were not extended to those convicted of security offenses, 
the president had the power to grant pardons and, on occasion, 
group amnesties were offered to security prisoners. 

During 1986 about 40 percent of the prisoners in Israel were 
serving sentences for crimes against property and a further 19 per- 
cent for drug trafficking or possession. In the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, nearly 36 percent had been convicted of terrorist or 
hostile activity, although many others were serving sentences for 
related crimes, such as use of explosives and Molotov cocktails, 
armed infiltration, and endangering state security. Less than 6 per- 
cent had been convicted of property offenses. 

* * * 

Among general studies on the IDF, one important work is The 
Israeli Army by Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, which pro- 
vides both a historical and a contemporary perspective up to the 
mid-1970s. Additional material can be found in Zeev Schiff s A 
History of the Israeli Army, 1874 to the Present, published in 1985, and 
Reuven Gal's A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, published in 1986. 

A vast amount of writing on the Israeli national security estab- 
lishment resulted from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Perhaps the 



336 



National Security 



work with the greatest impact was Israel's Lebanon War by Zeev Schiff 
and Ehud Yaari. This highly critical account, with considerable 
detail on the personal interaction among leading political and mili- 
tary figures, caused an uproar when it was published in Israel. 
Flawed Victory, by Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Mart ell, recounts 
Israel's military involvement in Lebanon over a somewhat longer 
period and provides a detached appraisal of the performance of 
the IDF. 

The Middle East Military Balance, 1986, by Aharon Levran and 
Zeev Eytan, includes country-by-country analyses of the compet- 
ing forces in the region. The study assesses the growing external 
security threat to Israel posed by the Arab military build-up be- 
tween the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s and the budget restric- 
tions affecting the IDF beginning in 1984. The capabilities of the 
IDF vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors are also examined in briefer com- 
mentaries by Kenneth S, Brower and Drew Middleton. 

Since limited data are available from official sources on the units, 
personnel strengths, and equipment of the IDF, much of the dis- 
cussion in this chapter is based on estimates published in The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1987-1988, by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London. Israel's links with many other countries in the 
form of military sales and training assistance are traced in Benja- 
min Beit-Hallahmi's The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why. 
A fuller, more scholarly treatment of the same subject is Israel's 
Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy by Aaron S. Kleiman. One 
chapter of Bernard Reich's The United States and Israel: Influence in 
the Special Relationship is devoted to the military aspects of coopera- 
tion between the two countries. Mordechai Gazit's article, "Israeli 
Military Procurement from the United States," provides additional 
details on the subject. 

An overview of the first six months of the uprising that began 
in the occupied territories in December 1987 can be found in Don 
Peretz's "Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising" in the summer 1988 
issue of Foreign Affairs. Israeli punishment and legal sanctions against 
the Arab population are assessed in the United States Department 
of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



337 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Sources of Jewish Population Growth, 1948-86 

3 Students in Education Institutions, Selected Years, 1948-87 

4 Hospital Beds and Hospitals, 1986 

5 Government Revenues, Fiscal Years (FY) 1983-86 

6 Government Expenditures, Fiscal Years (FY) 1983-86 

7 United States Government Aid, 1982-86 

8 Structure of Industry, 1984-85 

9 Agricultural Production, 1980-85 

10 Major Trading Partners, Selected Years, 1970-86 

11 Balance of Payments Indicators, 1982-86 

12 Major Israel Defense Forces Equipment, Ground Forces, 1988 

13 Major Israel Defense Forces Equipment, Navy, 1988 

14 Major Israel Defense Forces Equipment, Air Force, 1988 

15 United States Military Aid to Israel, 1979-89 



339 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters ' 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Sources of Jewish Population Growth, 1948-86 
(in thousands) 





1948-60 


1961-71 


1972-82 


1983-86 


Population at beginning of 
period 


649.6 


1,911.2 


2,662.0 


3,363.8 




392.3 


412.9 


523.3 


198.4 


Immigration 


869.3 


337.9 


178.5 


13.4 




1,261.6 


750.8 


701.8 


211.8 


Annual percentage increase . . 


9.6 


3.0 


2.1 


1.5 


Immigration as percentage . . . 


68.9 


45.0 


25.1 


6.3 



Source: Based on information from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel, 1987, No. 38, Jerusalem, 1987, 31. 



341 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 3. Students in Education Institutions, Selected Years, 1948-87 





1948-49 


1969-70 


1986-87 


Hebrew education 










25,406 


107,668 


260,500 


Primary schools 


91,133 


375,534 


468,545 


Schools for handicapped 


n.a. 


18,820 


12,071 


Total primary education 


91,133 


394,354 


480,616 




n.a. 


7,908 


109,365 




7 1 £R 
/ , 1 Oo 


7^1 


Q£ Q. 1 3 
OO.O 1 J 




1,048 


8,508 


8,303 




2,002 


49,556 


91,720 




n.a. 


7,641 


4,683 


Total secondary schools 


10,218 


129,436 


191,519 


Teacher colleges 


713 


4,994 


11,006 


Other post-secondary education .... 


583 


6,900 


20,073 




1,635 


36,239 


67,160 


Other institutions 


n.a. 


26,300 


40,500 


TOTAL 


129,688 


713,799 


1,180,739 


Arab education 










1,124 


14,211 


20,100 




9,991 


85,094 


139,515 




n.a. 






Total primary education 


9,991 


85,449 


140,777 


Intermediate schools 


n.a. 


2,457 


23,393 


General academic 


14 


6,198 


29,469 


Vocational 


n.a. 


1,462 


5,696 




n.a. 


390 


640 


Total secondary schools 


14 


8,050 


35,805 


Teacher colleges 


n.a. 


370 


451 


Other post-secondary education .... 


n.a. 




131 


TOTAL 


11,129 


110,537 


220,657 



— means negligible, 
n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel, 1987, No. 38, Jerusalem, 1987, 582-83. 



342 



Appendix A 

Table 4. Hospital Beds and Hospitals, 1986 

Hospitals Beds 



Type 

General care 44 11,927 

Mental diseases 29 7,672 

Chronic diseases 75 7,285 

Rehabilitation 2 495 

Tuberculosis 20 

TOTAL 150 27,399 

Ownership 

Government 29 9,649 

Municipality 2 1,329 

Kupat Holim (Histadrut Sick Fund) 14 5,006 

Hadassah 1 869 

Missions 7 636 

Other nonprofit 37 3,574 

Private hospitals 60 6,336 

TOTAL 150 27,399 



Source: Based on information from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel, 1987, No. 38, Jerusalem, 1987, 653-54. 



343 



Israel: A Country Study 



] 



v 
> 



I 



I 



1 



!N r-, C — Ol 



m cr. m m ic iO 'r 



cm r- so •<*• t}> co ^ en 

CO o CsJ CO d ~ o O CN 



M C N ^. — 

SO — CO — — 



cm lO lO co — IC 
cd cm cm d — in 



r- cm m co — o m (N 



C n n - x - — 



i£> cr> co 
5^ 



C ^ X ^ VC 



spsii in isss s 



15! 



t*- to CO r- 

5g c £ 



CM vO CO Ol 

5 



to CO CO 

1 2 s i 



*o lo lo 



m to io m cm — co co — <^ o 



CM CM CO — CTl 



o co m to co o n io m iO O CM CM m 

vd co cm cm o — cr. co co co cri oi co — 



o o — r» io 



SlSS 5 * Sl| 1111 S 



K! nil 



344 



Appendix A 



cm m r-^ cm ^ '-i en 
in *-i <~o © © © cri 



— h CM 



^eninr^cdad^-^CMcri 
cm ai m « i-H 



en — m' © © © co in id cm 



^■^©©©CM^cncn 



^O^OCM^noOOin 

aico'iric^md^cddio 
coocfiN«cM«ocno 
m cm co m a yD co 



cocomN««mcn'H 
(Ort'*d6d«io'n 



co m 
m <£> 



t>. © 

^ in 

en 



m o 
^' m' 



cm m 



m 


m 


m 


00 




X 


m 


X 






m 


-* 


C7> 


O 


~ 



c 

CM 




en 


m 


x 


X 

IC 

°°. 


O 


in 
t>- 

m 


O 

m 


a> 

CM 


cm 
O 
O 


r- 

CM 


CM 
CM 


en 












cm" 




CM 




en 




"*< 


m 



© 


3 


O 






m 


in 




X 


m 


m 


O 


m 


O 






X 




en 












en 


O 


en 


en 

























en 




CO 






CM 










CM 


m 






CM 




m 




















CM 











<u C 

s is -2 

li 03 o 

-° — , 



a, ""3 
W O 



™ 03 C 

~ Oh h a 

c u « o 

I u "2 « 

1-5 5 

> S 

u o 

Q H 



o m 



345 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 7. United States Government Aid, 1982-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 1 

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 



Aid 

Grants 1 1,259 1,618 2,271 3,885 3,817 

Long- and medium-term loans 1,081 1,092 950 405 

Total gross aid 2,341 2 2,711 2 3,221 3,885 4,222 

Payments 

Loan repayments 

Principal 177 155 174 109 135 

Interest 569 750 873 946 946 

Total loan repayments .. . 746 905 1,047 1,055 1,081 

Total net aid 1,595 1,805 2,174 2,830 3,141 



1 Includes military and some economic grants. 

2 Figures may not add because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1986, Jerusalem, May 
1987, 126; Annual Report, 1987, Jerusalem, May 1988, 202. 



346 



Appendix A 



CO 

i 

to 

e 

CO 



IP'S 1 
v r* > 



iococooctio^o— icooocor-eooo^r^m 



OMMNCO'iOIOOmOlNN^'HiIin 

Tt«^ocor^~Hmmmcoc?>(£5'«*<c7>mcMC7>-^ 



o ~ 

* M IX) (J) 

-i cn m * 



(NMCONtNOiONaiCTlOfM^ailDCOO 

' cm cm m" cm 



a> cm l£> 



comiNTHCooiocnN 



l£> CM CO 
CM 



nNOiomN'tmiCQairtiocflOO 



to ■* 



ictNOiascocoorNiNtocoinnufficoff) 
OeocMCMmcMCTimcM-^-^eocM'*' co 



O 

be w 



1 > 

bo-° 



"8 



bo 



U GO 

S -5 

T1 O, 



o 0.3. 



o e 
IS 



S C 



tJ as o « -j 

S JS =3 3 o 

15 "3 (5 U L 



^3 3 



M « « ¥ H 

x o c3 § a.S -S^S 



1 1 



" o • - 
o rs 3 

•£6 5. 



347 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 9. Agricultural Production, 1980-85 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise stated) 





1980-81 


1981-82 


1982-83 


1983-84 


1984-85 


Citrus fruit 


1,416 


1,804 


1,530 


1,547 


1,487 


Annlps anH othpr fniit 


227 


201 


239 


181 


161 




84 


88 


95 


Q9 


80 


Bananas 


66 


73 


67 


68 


81 


Avocados 


8 


40 


62 


52 


77 


Wheat 


215 


147 


335 


130 


128 


Hay 


112 


115 


120 


95 


100 


Cotton fiber 


92 


88 


93 


88 


99 




26 


26 


23 


22 


23 


Vegetables 


677 


771 


779 


778 


763 


Potatoes 


218 


207 


206 


198 


204 


Olives 


20 


37 


37 


17 


39 


Melons and pumpkins 


133 


118 


122 


131 


132 


Cattle (beef) 


56 


56 


58 


58 


61 


Fish 


23 


24 


22 


23 


25 


Poultry 


210 


229 


250 


269 


244 


Eggs (in millions) 


1,531 


1,740 


1,803 


2,026 


2,049 




682 


726 


756 


797 


788 



Source: Based on information from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel, 1986, No. 37, Jerusalem, 1986, 386-410. 



348 



Appendix A 



Table 10. Major Trading Partners, Selected Years, 1970-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year 


Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 


Britain 


France 


Italy 


Netherlands 


United 
States 


West 
Germany 


World 


Exports 


















1970 


40 


82 


39 


15 


46 


149 


67 


782 


1 Q79 




1 1 3 

113 


j j 


9Q 


O J 


994. 


1 03 

1 UJ 


1 1 4.Q 


1974 . . , 


92 


157 


91 


67 


136 


306 


135 


1,824 


1976 , , 


102 


180 


136 


73 


160 


437 


199 


2,415 


1978 


200 


282 


183 


94 


222 


688 


331 


3,911 


1980 . . . 


237 


466 


299 


285 


246 


886 


542 


5,543 


1982 


228 


404 


304 


202 


199 


1,119 


355 


5,287 


1984 . . . 


231 


482 


237 


212 


258 


1,645 


360 


5,809 


1986 


266 


512 


313 


275 


309 


2,347 


373 


7,168 


Imports 


















1970 


62 


223 


61 


76 


71 


323 


173 


2,079 


1972 


122 


365 


95 


166 


83 


373 


228 


2,472 


1974 


142 


543 


154 


225 


223 


754 


687 


5,440 


1976 


127 


609 


151 


172 


242 


888 


417 


5,669 


1978 


259 


542 


264 


283 


482 


1,126 


594 


7,403 


1980 


405 


673 


270 


315 


190 


1,549 


791 


9,685 


1982 


367 


619 


365 


442 


248 


1,542 


895 


9,025 


1984 


773 


698 


322 


403 


160 


1,772 


944 


9,800 


1986 . . . . 


1,265 


985 


386 


560 


302 


1,789 


1,214 


10,736 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statis- 
tics, 1987. 



349 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 11. Balance of Payments Indicators, 1982-86 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 



Exports, excluding capital services . . 
Civilian imports, excluding 

capital services 

Trade balance 


8,792 

10,896 
-2,104 


8,901 

11,634 
-2,733 


9,629 

11,209 
-1,580 


10,195 

10,575 
-380 


11,188 

12,341 
-1,153 


Current account 

Total goods and services (net) . . . 

Total unilateral transfers 

Current deficit(-) or surplus 
Net medium-term and long-term 


-4,570 
2,616 
-1,954 

1,133 


-4,861 
2,855 
-2,006 

2,349 


-4,816 
3,352 
-1,464 

1,276 


-3,945 
5,043 
1,098 

-35 


-3,966 
5,336 
1,370 

303 


Basic account deficit(-) 

or surplus 1 


-821 


343 


-188 


1,063 


1,673 


Additional balance of payments data 
Implied private capital imports 

Foreign reserves, end-of-year 2 . . . . 


883 
15,641 
4,317 


480 
18,270 
3,780 


-588 
19,686 
3,255 


-1,053 
19,315 
3,793 


-201 
18,998 
4,868 



1 Basic account = current account, plus medium-term and long-term capital movements. 

2 Held by central monetary authorities. 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1986, Jerusalem, May 
1987, 96-102; and Table VII-17, Annual Report, 1986 (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, May 
1987, 202. 



350 



Appendix A 



Table 12. Major Israel Defense Forces 
Equipment, Ground Forces, 1988 



Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 
Tanks 

Centurion . Britain 1,080 

M-48A5 United States 560 

M-60A1/-A3 -do- 1,300 

T-54/-55 Soviet Union 250 

T-62 -do- 115 

Merkava I/II Israel 550 

Armored fighting vehicles 

M-113 personnel carrier United States 4,000 

M-2/-3 halftrack United States 

(rebuilt) 4,400 

BTR-50P personnel carrier Soviet Union 1,900 

Ramta light armored car Israel 400 

Guns and howitzers 

M-101 105mm howitzer United States 70 

M-46 130mm gun -do- 110 

Soltam M-68/-71 and M-839P/-845P 

155mm howitzers Israel 300 

L-33 155mm howitzer self-propelled France, United 

States 180 

M-50 155mm howitzer self-propelled United States 75 

M-109 155mm howitzer self-propelled -do- 530 

M-107 175mm gun self-propelled -do- 140 

M-110 203mm howitzer self-propelled -do- 36 

Multiple rocket launchers 

BM-21 122mm Soviet Union n.a. 

LAR 160mm light artillery rocket Israel n.a. 

MB-24 240mm Soviet Union n.a. 

MAR-290 290mm self-propelled medium 

artillery rocket Israel n.a. 

Mortars 

120mm, 160mm, some self-propelled various n.a. 

Surface-to-surface missiles 

MGM-52C Lance United States n.a. 

Jericho I Israel n.a. 

Zeev -do- n.a. 

Antitank weapons 

106mm recoilless rifle United States 250 

Wire-guided weapons 

TOW -do- n.a. 

M-47 Dragon -do- n.a. 

Milan France n.a. 

Sagger Soviet Union n.a. 

Mapats (laser TOW) Israel n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1988-1989, London, 1988, 103. 



351 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 13. Major Israel Defense Forces Equipment, Navy, 1988 

Type and Description Origin Commissioned In Inventory 
Submarines 

IKL/Vickers type 540 Britain 1977 3 

Dolphin class West Germany ordered 3 

Corvettes 

Saar 5, 985 tons United States ordered 3 

Fast-attack craft 

Saar 4.5 Aliya, 500 tons Israel 1980-82 2 

Saar 4 Reshef, 415 tons -do- 1969 8 

Saar 3, 250 tons France 1969 6 

Saar 2, 250 tons -do- 1968 6 

Hydrofoils 

Shimrit (Flagstaff 2) United States, 

Israel 1982-85 3 

Coastal patrol craft 

Dvora Israel 1977 1 

Super Dvora Israel 1977 (5 ordered) 

Dabur Israel, 

United States n.a. 31 

Amphibious 

Landing craft (tank) Israel 1966-67 6 

Landing craft (personnel) United States 1976 3 

Aircraft 

Seascan 1124N Israel n.a. 7 

Bell 212 helicopter United States n.a. 25 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988-89, London, 1988, 279-82. 



352 



Appendix A 



Table 14. Major Israel Defense Forces 
Equipment, Air Force, 1988 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In Inventory 



Fighter-interceptors 

F- 15 Eagle United States 50 

F-4E Phantom -do- 113 

Kfir C2/C7 Israel 95 (75 more 

stored) 

F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon United States 145 

Fighter, ground attack 

A-4H/N Skyhawk -do- 121 

Reconnaissance 

RF-4E Phantom -do- 14 

Airborne early warning 

E-2C Hawkeye -do- 4 

Electronic warfare/command post 

Boeing 707 -do- 6 

Transports 

Boeing 707 -do- 2 

Hercules C-130E/H -do- 21 

C-47 -do- 19 

Boeing 707 (tankers) -do- 5 

KC-130H (tankers) -do- 2 

Arava Israel 10 

Training 

TA-4H/J Skyhawk United States 27 

Kfir TC2 Israel 10 

F-4E United States 16 

CM- 170 Magister/Tzugit France, Israel 94 

Attack helicopters 

Bell AH- IS Cobra United States 40 

Hughes 500 MD -do- 40 

Transport helicopters 

CH-53A/D (heavy) United States 33 

Super Frelon SA-321 (medium) France 9 

UH-1D (medium) United States 17 

Bell 206 A, 212 (light) -do- 104 

Electronic warfare/sea-air rescue 

helicopters Bell 206, 212 United States 20 

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1988-89, London 1988, 104 and Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to 
the Israeli Air Force, Tel Aviv, 1982, passim. 



353 



Israel: A Country Study 



Table 15. United States Military Aid to Israel, 1979-89 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year Grants Sales Total 



1979 1,300 2,700 4,000 

1980 500 500 1,000 

1981 500 900 1,400 

1982 550 850 1,400 

1983 750 950 1,700 

1984 850 850 1,700 

1985 1,400 1,400 

1986 1,723 1,723 

1987 1,800 1,800 

1988 1,800 1,800 

1989 1,800 (proposed) 1,800 (proposed) 



354 



Appendix B 



Political Parties and Organizations 

Agudat Israel (Society of Israel) — A clericalist political party of ultra- 
Orthodox Jews, founded in Poland in 1912 and established in 
Palestine in the early 1920s. In 1949 it formed part of the United 
Religious Front (q.v.); in 1955 and 1959 it joined Poalei Agudat 
Israel to form the Torah Religious Front (q. v.). Originally anti- 
Zionist and messianic, in the 1980s this non-Zionist party, 
together with its Council of Torah Sages, still favored a the- 
ocracy and increased state financial support for its religious insti- 
tutions. 

Ahdut HaAvoda (Unity of Labor) — The party, founded in 1919 
as successor to Poalei Tziyyon (q.v.), had three separate exis- 
tences: from 1919 to 1930, when it merged with HaPoel 
HaTzair (q. v. ) to form Mapai (q. v.); in 1944 its name was taken 
over by Siah B (Bet — Faction B), a faction that split from Mapai 
and formed a new party with HaKibbutz HaMeuhad (United 
Kibbutz Movement); and the last beginning in 1954 when 
Ahdut HaAvoda was reconstituted by the HaKibbutz 
HaMeuhad faction when it broke off from Mapam (q. v. ). Ahdut 
HaAvoda was aligned with Mapai from 1965 to 1968 when 
both were absorbed into the Labor Party. 

Arab Democratic Party — An Israeli Arab party founded in 1988 
by Abdel Wahab Daroushe, a former Labor Party Knesset 
member. 

Betar — A Revisionist Zionist youth organization founded in 1923 
in Riga, Latvia, under the influence of Jabotinsky; it later 
formed the nucleus for Herut. 

Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM)— Founded in 1973 by Shulamit 
Aloni, a former Labor Party Knesset member, the CRM ad- 
vocates strengthening civil rights in Israel and greater com- 
promise on Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

Degel HaTorah (Torah Flag) — Formed in 1988, the clericalist party 
is a Shas (q. v. )-led Ashkenazi spinoff among the ultra-Orthodox 
community. 

Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) — Founded in 1976 by 
Yigal Yadin and several other groups, of which the principal 
one was Shinui (q.v.). It broke up in 1979 when Shinui left 
over the issue of continued participation in the Likud 
government. 



355 



Israel: A Country Study 

Free Center — A faction that splintered from Herut (q.v.) in 1967. 
From 1967 to 1973, the Free Center was a party in its own 
right. It became a faction in Likud (q.v.) from 1973 to 1977 
and joined the Democratic Movement for Change in 1977. Its 
principal leader was Shmuel Tamir. 

Gahal (Acronym for Gush Herut- Liberalim, Freedom-Liberal Bloc; 
also known as Herut-Liberal Bloc) — A political coalition list 
created in 1965 by an electoral combination of the Liberal Party 
(q.v.) and Herut (q.v.) to compete against the 1965 and 1969 
Mapai (q.v.)-led electoral alignments. In 1967 on the eve of 
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War, Gahal joined a National 
Unity Government; in 1973 Gahal became part of the Likud 
Bloc (q.v.). 

Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) — A militant right-wing ex- 
tremist religio-nationalist settlement movement that seeks to 
impose Israeli sovereignty on the West Bank. 

HaPoel HaMizrahi (Spiritual Center Worker) — Orthodox religious 
workers' movement founded in Palestine in 1922 by a left-wing 
faction of Mizrahi (q.v.). In 1956 it joined Mizrahi to form the 
National Religious Party (q.v.). 

HaPoel HaTzair (The Young Worker) — A Labor Zionist politi- 
cal party founded and active in Palestine from 1905 to 1930. 

Herut (Abbreviation for Tnuat HaHerut, or Freedom Move- 
ment) — Right-wing political party founded by remnants of the 
Irgun (see Glossary), following its disbandment in 1948. It was 
led by former Irgun commander Menachem Begin and is the 
direct ideological descendant of Revisionist Zionism (q.v.). In 
the 1980s, Herut was the dominant component in the Likud 
Bloc (q.v.). 

Laam (For the Nation) — A party established in 1968 by remnants 
of Rafi (q.v.), which allied itself with Gahal. In 1973 it com- 
bined with the State List and followers of the Movement for 
Greater Israel to become a faction in Likud (q.v.). 

Labor Party — The Labor Party, founded in 1968, resulted from 
the merger of Mapai (q.v.), Ahdut HaAvoda (q.v.), and Rafi 
(q.v.). Representation in top Labor Party institutions was based 
on a proportion of 57.3 percent for Mapai and 21.3 percent 
for each of the other two. This factional system broke down 
following the ascension to power in June 1974 of the younger 
generation triumvirate of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and 
Yigal Allon, who were less tied to the former factions. Follow- 
ing the 1984 Knesset elections, the Labor Party assumed an 
independent existence upon the dissolution of the Maarakh 



356 



Appendix B 



(q. v. ) when it went into the National Unity Government with 
Likud. 

Labor Zionism — Zionist movements and parties committed to the 
development of a democratic-socialist political economy in 
Israel. 

Liberal Party — The second major component in the Likud Bloc; 
a middle-class party formed in 1961 from the merger of the 
Progressives and General Zionists. 

Likud or Likud Bloc (Union) — The Likud Bloc was founded in 
preparation for the 1973 elections when the Free Center (q.v.) 
and Laam (q.v.) joined Gahal (q.v.). In 1984 Likud formed the 
National Unity Government with the Labor Party (q.v.). 

Maarakh (Alignment) — An electoral and parliamentary alignment 
on the national and municipal levels between the Labor Party 
and Mapam, from 1969 to 1984. 

Maki (Acronym for Miflaga Kommunistit Yisraelit, or Communist 
Party of Israel) — The party was founded in 1949. In 1965 it 
broke into two factions: Maki and Rakah (q.v.). Maki continued 
to have as members primarily Jewish communists. The elec- 
toral list of Maki and Rakah, which joined in the 1973 elec- 
tions, was called Moked (Focus). In 1977 Maki joined with 
several other groups to create Shelli (acronym for Peace for 
Israel and Equality for Israel), a party that disbanded before 
the 1984 elections. 

Mapai (acronym for Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael-Israel Workers' 
Party) — Mapai resulted from the 1930 merger between the 
main prestate Labor Zionist parties, Ahdut HaAvoda (q.v.) and 
HaPoel HaTzair (q.v.). In 1920 the two parties together had 
founded the Histadrut. In 1944 a small left-wing kibbutz-based 
faction seceded from Mapai and reconstituted itself as Ahdut 
HaAvoda-Poalei Tziyyon (Unity of Labor- Workers of Zion). 
Nevertheless, Mapai became the dominant party in the Yishuv 
and later in Israel; after 1968 it was the dominant faction in 
the Labor Party. 

Mapam (Acronym for Mifleget Poalim Meuchedet-United 
Workers' Party) — Mapam resulted in January 1948 from the 
merger of two Labor Zionist kibbutz-based parties, HaShomer 
HaTzair (The Young Watchman, which had been founded in 
1913 as a youth movement and became a political party in 1946) 
and Ahdut HaAvoda-Poalei Tziyyon. The party also contained 
remnants of the former Poalei Tziyyon (q.v.). Mapam split in 
1954, with former members of HaShomer HaTzair remain- 
ing, while former members of Ahdut HaAvoda-Poalei Tziyyon 
left to form Ahdut HaAvoda (q. v.). The formation of the Labor 



357 



Israel: A Country Study 

Party in 1968 caused Mapam to reverse its previous opposi- 
tion to unity among Labor Zionist parties and to join an elec- 
toral alliance (Maarakh — Alignment) with the Labor Party in 
1969. There was much criticism within Mapam that, as the 
junior partner of the Alignment, the party seemed excessively 
subservient to Labor's status-quo oriented policies, particularly 
on the issue of the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Mapam broke away from the Alignment and resumed its in- 
dependent existence in the fall of 1984, when the Labor Party 
decided to join Likud (q. v. ) in forming the National Unity 
Government. 

Mizrahi (Spiritual Center) — Established in 1902 as an Orthodox 
religious Zionist party. In 1949 Mizrahi became part of the 
United Religious Front. In 1956 it joined HaPoel HaMizrahi 
(q.v.) to form the National Religious Party (q.v.). 

Moledet (Homeland) — An extremist right-wing ultranationalist 
party founded in 1988 by a retired Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
general, Rehavam (Gandhi) Zeevi. 

Morasha (Heritage) — A religio-nationalist party led by Rabbi 
Chaim Druckman that broke away from the National Religious 
Party (q.v.) in 1984. In 1986 it was reincorporated into the Na- 
tional Religious Party. 

National Religious Party (NRP) (also known as Mafdal — acronym 
for HaMiflagah HaDatit-Leumit)— The NRP was formed 
in 1956 with the merger of two Orthodox parties: HaPoel 
HaMizrahi (q. v. ) and Mizrahi (q. v.). From the founding of the 
state in 1948 to 1977, the NRP (or its predecessors) was the 
ally of the Labor Party (or its predecessors) in forming Labor- 
led coalition governments; in return the NRP was awarded con- 
trol of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 1981 the NRP's 
electoral support declined from its traditional twelve seats to 
six as a result of the formation of Tami (q. v. ) and Tehiya (q. v.). 
In 1984 the NRP suffered a further decline of two seats with 
the formation of Morasha (q.v.) by a former NRP faction. 

Peace Now — A movement established after the October 1973 War, 
advocating territorial compromise over the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip in order to achieve peaceful relations with the Pales- 
tinian Arabs and the Arab states. 

Poalei Tziyyon (Workers of Zion) — A Marxist Labor Zionist party 
founded in Palestine in 1906; in 1919 it was incorporated into 
the original Ahdut HaAvoda. 

Progressive National Movement (also known as Progressive List 
for Peace) — The joint Arab-Jewish party was established in 1984 



358 



Appendix B 



and advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state along- 
side Israel. 

Rafi (Israel Labor List) — The party was created in 1965 when 
David Ben-Gurion and some of his supporters broke away from 
Mapai. In 1968 most of the party's activists (except for Ben- 
Gurion) returned, and together with Mapai and Ahdut 
HaAvoda, formed the Labor Party. 

Rakah (New Communist List) — The communist party created by 
a faction that broke off in 1965 from Maki (q.v.) (Communist 
Party of Israel). In the 1973 elections Rakah and Maki created 
a joint electoral list called Moked (Focus). Rakah consisted 
primarily of Arab communists and participated in the 1988 
elections. 

Revisionist Zionism — A right-wing Zionist party and movement 
founded in 1925 by Vladimir Jabotinsky; it demanded a revi- 
sion of the conciliatory policy by the Zionist Executive toward 
the British mandatory government. 

Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) — A clericalist and theocratic 
party formed in 1984 by former Agudat Israel (q.v.) members 
to represent the interests of the ultra-Orthodox Sephardim. 

Shelli (Acronym for Peace for Israel and Equality for Israel) — A 
party created in 1977 by Maki (q.v.) and several other groups. 
It disbanded before the 1984 elections. 

Shinui (Change) — Founded by Amnon Rubenstein in 1973 as a 
protest movement against the October 1973 War. In 1976, in 
preparation for the May 1977 elections, Shinui joined with other 
groups to create the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), 
led by Yigal Yadin. In 1979 Shinui broke away from the DMC 
and created its own political party. In the 1988 elections its 
Knesset representation declined from three to two seats. 

Tami (Traditional Movement of Israel) — Established in 1981 by 
an Oriental faction within the National Religious Party (q. v. ) 
led by former Minister of Religious Affairs Aharon Abuhat- 
zeira to represent the interests of Sephardim. In 1988 Tami 
became a faction in the Likud Bloc (q.v.). 

Tehiya (Renaissance) — A right-wing religio-nationalist group that 
broke away from the National Religious Party (q.v.) in 1981. 
The party advocates the eventual imposition of Israeli sover- 
eignty over the West Bank, accompanied by the transfer to the 
Arab countries of its Palestinian Arab inhabitants. 

Torah Religious Front — Formed by Agudat Israel (q. v. ) and Poalei 
Agudat Israel (Workers' Society of Israel) to campaign in the 
1955 and 1959 elections. The front excluded the two Mizrahi 
religious parties, claiming they were insufficiently committed 



359 



Israel: A Country Study 



to the concept of a Torah state. The Torah Religious Front 
was dissolved prior to the 1961 elections. 

United Religious Front — Electoral alliance created in 1949 com- 
posed of the four religious parties: Mizrahi (q.v.), HaPoel 
HaMizrahi (q.v.), Poalei Agudat Israel (Workers' Society of 
Israel), and Agudat Israel (q.v.). As of 1951 the four parties 
campaigned separately. 

Yahad (Together) — An electoral list formed by Ezer Weizman in 
1981; in 1984 it joined the Labor Party as a faction. 



360 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Abu Lughod, Ibrahim (ed.). The Transformation of Palestine. Evan- 
ston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971. 

Allon, Yigal. "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign 
Affairs, 55, No. 1, 1976, 38-53. 

Alpher, Joseph. "Why Begin Should Invite Arafat to Jerusalem," 
Foreign Affairs, 60, No. 5, 1982, 1110-23. 

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. London: Hamish Hamil- 
ton, 1955. 

Arendt, Hannah. Antisemitism. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1951. 

Aronoff, Myron. "The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party: Causes 
and Significance." Pages 115-47 in Howard Penniman (ed.), 
Israel at the Polls, 1977. Washington: American Enterprise Insti- 
tute, 1979. 

Aronson, Geoffrey. "Israel's Policy of Military Occupation, " Jour- 
nal of Palestine Studies, 7, No. 4, 1978, 79-98. 

Avineri, Shlomo. "Beyond Camp David," Foreign Policy, 46, 1982, 
19-36. 

The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the 

Jewish State. New York: Basic Books, 1981. 

"Peacemaking: The Arab-Israel Conflict, ' ' Foreign Affairs, 

57, No. 1, 1978, 51-69. 

Avishai, Bernard. The Tragedy of Zionism: Revolution and Democracy 
in the Land of Israel. New York: Farrer Straus Giroux, 1985. 

Ball, George W. "The Coming Crisis in Israeli-American Rela- 
tions," Foreign Affairs, 58, No. 2, 1979-80, 231-56. 

Baron, S. A Social and Religious History of the Jews. (18 Vols.) New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1952-1983. 

Bar-Simon Tov, Yaacov. The Israeli- Egyptian War of Attrition, 
1969-70. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 

Begin, Menachem. The Revolt: The Dramatic Inside Story of the Irgun. 
Los Angeles: Nash, 1972. 

Ben-Gurion, David. Israel: A Personal History. New York: Funk and 
Wagnalls, 1971. 

Ben-Sasson, H. H. (ed.). A History of the Jewish People. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1976. 

Benvenisti, Meron. The West Bank and Gaza Data Base Project: In- 
terim Report, No. 1. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 
1982. 



361 



Israel: A Country Study 

. The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies. 

Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984. 
Brookings Institution. Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a 

Study Group. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975. 
Bullocks, John. The Making of a War: The Middle East from 1967 to 

1973. London: Longman, 1974. 
Cohen, Michael J. The Origins and Evolution of the Arab -Zionist Con- 
flict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 

1987. 

. Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 

1936-1945. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. 

"Sir Arthur Wanchope, the Army, and the Rebellion in 

Palestine, 1936," Middle Eastern Studies, 9, No. 1, January 1973, 
19-34. 

Dawidowicz, Lucy. "Toward a History of the Holocaust," Com- 
mentary, 47, No. 4, 1969, 51-58. 

Day an, Moshe. Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt- Israel Peace 
Negotiations. New York: Knopf, 1981. 

Dubnow, Simon. History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, III. Philadel- 
phia: Jewish Publication Society, 1946. 

Eban, Abba. Abba Eban: An Autobiography. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1978. 

"Camp David: the Unfinished Business," Foreign Affairs, 

57, No. 2, 1978-79, 343-54. 

Elazar, Daniel J. (ed.). Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Fu- 
ture. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981. 

Elon, Amos. Herzl. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976. 

The Israelis: Founders and Sons. New York: Penguin, 1983. 

Encyclopaedia Judaica. Jerusalem and New York: Macmillan, 
1971-72. 

Eytan, Walter. The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel. 

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. 
Fackenheim, Emil. The Jewish Return into History: Reflections in the 

Age of Auschwitz. New York: Schocken Books, 1978. 
Fein, Leonard. Israel: Politics and People. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 
Flapan, Simha. The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities. New York: 

Pantheon Books, 1987. 
Freedman, Robert (ed.). Israel in the Begin Era. New York: Praeger, 

1982. 

Goldman, Nahum. "Zionist Ideology and the Reality of Israel," 

Foreign Affairs, 57, No. 1, 1978, 70-82. 
Halabi, Rafik. West Bank Story. New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jovanovich, 1982. 



362 



Bibliography 



Halpern, Ben. The Idea of a Jewish State. (2d ed.). Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1976. 
Harkabi, Yehoshafat. Palestine and Israel. New York: Halsted Press, 

1974. 

Heller, Mark. " Begin 's False Autonomy," Foreign Policy, 37, 

1979-80, 111-32. 
Hertzberg, Arthur. The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. 

New York: Atheneum, 1969. 
Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Arms and Armour 

Press, 1982. 

Horowitz, Dan and Moshe Lissak. Origins of the Israeli Polity: Pales- 
tine under the Mandate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 

Hurewitz, J.C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Norton, 1950. 

Israel Pocket Library. Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1973-74. 

Jiryis, Sabri. The Arabs in Israel. (Trans., Inea Bushnaq.) New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976. 

"Secrets of State: An Analysis of the Diaries of Moshe 

Sharett," Journal of Palestine Studies, 10, No. 1, 1980, 35-57. 

Johnson, Paul. A History of the Jews. New York: Harper and Row, 
1987. 

Kedourie, Elie. "Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Pales- 
tine," Middle Eastern Studies [London], 5, No. 1, 1969, 44-68. 

. "Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine, 1915-1916," Middle 

Eastern Studies [London], 6, No. 3, 1970, 340-45. 

Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel. London: Cass, 

1982. 

Kedourie, Elie, and Sylvia Haim (eds.). Palestine and Israel in the 
19th and 20th Centuries. London: Cass, 1982. 

Khalidi, Walid (ed.). From Haven to Conquest. Beirut: Institute of 
Palestine Studies, 1971. 

Khouri, Fred J. The Arab -Israeli Dilemma. (2d ed.) Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1976. 

Kimche, David. The Sandstorm: The Arab- Israeli Wars of 1967. New 
York: Stein and Day, 1968. 

Klieman, Aaron S. Statecraft in the Dark. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1988. 

Laqueur, Walter. A History of Zionism. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1972. 

Lesch, Ann Mosley. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frus- 
tration of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1979. 

Lewis, Bernard. "The Arab-Israeli War: The Consequences of 
Defeat," Foreign Affairs, 46, No. 2, 1968, 321-35. 



363 



Israel: A Country Study 



. ' 'The Emergence of Modern Israel, ' ' Middle Eastern Studies 

[London], 8, No. 3, 1972, 421-27. 
Louis, William Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
Lucas, Noah. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfeld and 

Nicholson, 1974. 
Lustick, Ian. Arabs in the Jewish State. Austin: University of Texas 

Press, 1980. 

. For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. 

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 
. "Kill the Autonomy Talks,'' Foreign Policy, 41, 1980-81, 

21-43. 

Mandel, Neville J. The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I. Berke- 
ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976. 

Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East. London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1981. 

Morris, Benny. Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987. 

O'Brien, Connor Cruise. The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. 

Patai, Raphael (ed.). Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel. New York: 
Herzl Press, 1971. 

Peretz, Don, "The Arab Minority of Israel," Middle East Journal, 
8, No. 2, 1954, 139-54. 

. "The Earthquake: Israel's 9th Knesset Election," Mid- 
dle East Journal, 31, No. 3, 1977, 251-66. 

. "The War Election and Israel's 8th Knesset, ' ' Middle East 

Journal, 28, No. 2, 1974, 111-25. 

Peretz, Don, and Sammy Smooha. "Israel's 10th Knesset Elec- 
tions: Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of Ideology," Middle East 
Journal, 35, No. 4, 1981, 506-26. 

Peri, Yoram. Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 

Perlmutter, Amos. "Begin's Rhetoric and Sharon's Tactics," For- 
eign Affairs, 61, No. 1, 1982, 67-83. 

. "Begin's Strategy and Dayan's Tactics: The Conduct of 

Israeli Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs , 56, No. 4, 1978, 357-72. 

"Cleavage in Israel," Foreign Policy, 27, 1977, 136-57. 

. "A Race Against time: The Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations 

over the Future of Palestine," Foreign Affairs, 57, No. 5, 1979, 
987-1004. 

Porath, Yehoshua. The Emergence of the Palestine-Arab Nationalist Move- 
ment, 1918-1929. London: Cass, 1974. 



364 



Bibliography 



Quandt, William B. Decade of Decision: American Policy Toward the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1977. 

Quandt, William B., Fuad Jabber, and Ann Lesch. Politics of Pales- 
tinian Nationalism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1973. 

Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon: 1970-1983. Ithaca: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1984. 

Rafael, Gideon. Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy. 
New York: Stein and Day, 1981. 

Randal, Jonathan C. Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Ad- 
venturers, and the War in Lebanon. New York: Vintage Books, 1983. 

Reich, Bernard. "Israel Between War and Peace," Current History, 
66, No. 390, 1974, 49-52. 

Rodinson, Maxine. Israel and the Arabs. (2d ed.) London: Penguin, 
1982. 

Roth, Stephen J. (ed.). The Impact of the Six-Day War. New York: 
St. Martin's Press and Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1988. 

Sachar, Howard M. The Course of Modern Jewish History. New York: 
World, 1958L. 

. A History of Israel, I: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. 

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. 
. A History of Israel, II: From the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur 

War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New York: 

Harper and Row, 1978. 
Safran, Nadav. The Embattled Ally . Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1978. 
. From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967. 

New York: Pegasus, 1969. 
Said, Edward W. The Question of Palestine. London: Routledge and 

Kegan Paul, 1981. 
Sanders, Ronald. The High Walls of Jerusalem. New York: Holt, 

Rinehart, and Winston, 1983. 
Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1984. 
Segev, Tom. 1949: The First Israelis. New York: Free Press, 1986. 
Shapiro, Yonathan. The Formative Years of the Israeli Labor Party. Los 

Angeles: Sage, 1976. 
Shimoni, Yaacov, and Evyatar Levine (eds.). Political Dictionary of 

the Middle East in the 20th Century. New York: Quadrangle, 1974. 
Shlaim, Avi. Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionists, 

and the Partition of Palestine. New York: Columbia University Press, 

1988. 



365 



Israel: A Country Study 



Smooha, Sammy. Israel: Pluralism and Conflict. Berkeley and Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1978. 
Stein, Kenneth W. The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. Chapel 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. 
Sykes, Christopher. Crossroads to Israel. Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 1973. 
Teveth, Shabtai. Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to 

War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Tillman, Seth P. The United States in the Middle East: Interests and 

Obstacles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 
Vital, David. The Origins of Zionism. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1975. 

. Zionism, The Formative Years. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1982. 

Weizman, Ezer. The Battle for Peace. New York: Bantam Books, 
1981. 



Chapter 2 

Abramov, S. Zalman. Perpetual Dilemma: Jewish Religion in the Jew- 
ish State. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- 
sity Press, 1976. 

Al-Haj, Majid. "Ethnic Relations in an Arab Town in Israel." 
Pages 105-32 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israel's Ethnici- 
ty: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Aronoff, Myron J. Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building 
in Israel. Manchester (United Kingdom): Manchester Univer- 
sity Press, 1973. 

. "Political Polarization: Contradictory Interpretation of 

Israeli Reality." Pages 53-77 in Steven Heydemann (ed.), Issues 
in Contemporary Israel: The Begin Era. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1984. 

Aviad, Janet. Return to Jordan: Religious Renewal in Israel. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983. 

Avruch, Kevin. American Immigrants in Israel: Social Identities and 
Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 

"Gush Emunim: Politics, Religion, and Ideology in 

Israel," Middle East Review, 11, No. 2, 1978, 26-31. 

. "The Emergence of Ethnicity in Israel," American Ethnolo- 
gist, 14, No. 2, 1987, 327-39. 

"Traditionalizing Israel's Nationalism: The Development 

of Gush Emunim," Political Psychology, 1, No. 1, 1979, 47-57. 



366 



Bibliography 



Ben-Dor, Gabriel. The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study. Jerusalem: 

Hebrew University Press, 1979. 
Ben-Rafael, Eliezer. "Social Mobility and Ethnic Awareness: The 

Israeli Case." Pages 57-79 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in 

Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and 

Breach, 1985. 

Ben-Zadok, Efraim. "The Limits of the Politics of Planning." Pages 
141-52 in David Newman (ed.), The Impact of Gush Emunim: Poli- 
tics and Settlement in the West Bank. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1985. 

Benvenisti, Meron. The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's 
Policies. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984. 

. West Bank Data Project, 1986 Report: Demographic, Economic, 

Legal, Social, and Political Developments in the West Bank. Washing- 
ton: American Enterprise Institute, 1986. 

Bradley, C. Paul. Parliamentary Elections in Israel: Three Case Studies. 
Grantham, New Hampshire: Tompson and Rutter, 1985. 

Cohen, Erik. "The Black Panthers and Israeli Society," Jewish 
Journal of Sociology, 14, No. 1, 1972, 93-109. 

"Ethnicity and Legitimation in Contemporary Israel," 

Jerusalem Quarterly [Jerusalem], 28, 1983, 11-124. 

Deshen, Shlomo. "Israeli Judaism: Introduction to the Major Pat- 
terns," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, 1978, 141-69. 

Deshen, Shlomo, and Moshe Shokeid. The Predicament of Homecom- 
ing: Cultural and Social Life of North African Immigrants in Israel. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. 

Divine, Donna R. "Political Legitimacy in Israel: How Impor- 
tant is the State?" International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 
No. 2, 1979, 205-24. 

Don-Yehiya, Eliezer. "The Resolution of Religious Conflicts in 
Israel." Pages 203-18 in Stuart A. Cohen and Eliezer Don- 
Yehiya (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Public Life. Ramat 
Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1986. 

Eisenstadt, S. N. Israeli Society. New York: Basic Books, 1967. 

The Transformation of Israeli Society. Boulder, Colorado: 

Westview Press, 1985. 

Elazar, Daniel J. Israel: Building a New Society. Bloomington: Indi- 
ana University Press, 1986. 

Elon, Amos. The Israelis: Founders and Sons. New York: Penguin, 
1983. 

Friedman, Menachem. "The NRP in Transition — Behind the 
Party's Electoral Decline." Pages 141-68 in D. Caspi, A. Dis- 
kin, and E. Guttman (eds.), The Roots of Begin' s Success. Lon- 
don: Croom-Helm, 1983. 



367 



Israel: A Country Study 

Gitelman, Zvi. Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and 
American Immigrants. New York: Praeger, 1982. 

Goldberg, Harvey E. Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers: A Jewish Com- 
munity in Libya and Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972. 

"Historical and Cultural Dimensions of Ethnic Phenom- 
ena in Israel." Pages 179-200 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies 
in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and 
Breach, 1985. 

Goldstein, Judith L. "Iranian Ethnicity in Israel: The Performance 
of Identity." Pages 237-57 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in 
Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and 
Breach, 1985. 

Grose, Peter. A Changing Israel. New York: Vintage Books, 1985. 

Halpern, Ben. The Idea of the Jewish State. (2d ed.) Cambridge: Har- 
vard University Press, 1969. 

Heller, Mark. "Politics and Social Change in the West Bank since 
1967." Pages 185-21 1 in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), Palestinian Society 
and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 

Hodgson, Marshall GJ. The Venture of Islam: The Gunpowder Em- 
pires and Modern Times. (3 Vols.) Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974. 

Horowitz, Dan, and Moshe Lissak. Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine 
under the Mandate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 

Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 38. 
Jerusalem: 1987, 12. 

Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987. 

Jerusalem: 1987. 

Kushner, Gilbert. Immigrants from India in Israel. Tucson: Univer- 
sity of Arizona Press, 1973. 

Lewis, Arnold. "Phantom Ethnicity: 'Oriental Jews' in Israeli So- 
ciety." Pages 133-57 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli 
Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and Breach, 
1985. ' 

Power, Poverty, and Education: An Ethnography of Schooling in 

an Israeli Town. Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Publishing, 1979. 

Lewis, Herbert S. "Ethnicity, Culture, and Adaptation Among 
Yemenites in a Heterogenous Community." Pages 217-36 in 
Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingather- 
ing. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Liebman, Charles S. "The 'Who is a Jew?' Controversy — Political 
and Anthropological Perspectives." Pages 194-202 in Stuart A. 
Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in 



368 



Bibliography 



Jewish Public Life. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Dan University Press, 
1986. 

Liebman, Charles S., and Eliezer Don-Yehiya. Civil Religion in 
Israel. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1983. 

Religion and Politics in Israel. Bloomington: Indiana Univer- 
sity Press, 1984. 

Loeb, Lawrence D. "Folk Models of Habbani Ethnic Identity." 
Pages 201-15 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: 
After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Lotan, Givra. "Social Security and Welfare." Pages 218-22 in 
Israel Pocket Library: Society. Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1974. 

Lustick, Ian. Arabs in the Jewish State. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1980. 

. "The West Bank and Gaza in Israeli Politics." Pages 

79-98 in Steven Heydemann (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Israel: 
The Begin Era. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 

Marx, Emmanuel. The Social Context of Violent Behavior: A Social 
Anthropological Study in an Israeli Immigrant Town. London: Rout- 
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1976. 

Matras, Judah. "International Social Mobility and Ethnic Organi- 
zation in the Jewish Population of Israel." Pages 1-23 in Alex 
Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New 
York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Middle East Research Institute. The MERI Report: Israel. London: 
Croom-Helm, 1985. 

Migdal, Joel S. (ed.). Palestinian Society and Politics. Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press, 1980. 

Newman, David (ed.). The Impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Set- 
tlement in the West Bank. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 

"1987 Year-end Worldwide Reported AIDS Cases Top 74,000," 
AIDS Record, 2, No. 2, December 31, 1987, 9. 

Oppenheimer, Jonathan. "The Druze in Israel as Arabs and Non- 
Arabs." Pages 259-79 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli 
Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Orni, Efraim. "Human Geography." Pages 228-74 in Israel Pocket 
Library: Society. Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1974. 

Oz, Amos. In the Land of Israel. San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovitch, 1983. 

Reich, Bernard. Israel: Land of Tradition and Conflict. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. 

Rolef, Susan Hattis (ed.). Political Dictionary of the State of Israel. New 
York: Macmillan, 1987. 



369 



Israel: A Country Study 



Rosenfeld, Henry. "The Class Situation of the Arab Minority in 
Israel," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20, 1978, 
374-407. 

Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel, I: From the Rise of Zionism 

to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981. 
Schiff, Gary S. "The Politics of Fertility Policy in Israel." Pages 

255-78 in Paul Ritterbrand (ed.), Modern Jewish Fertility. Leiden, 

Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1981. 
Shokeid, Moshe. "Aggression and Social Relationships Among 

Moroccan Immigrants." Pages 281-96 in Alex Weingrod (ed.), 

Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering. New York: Gordon 

and Breach, 1985. 
The Dual Heritage: Immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in an 

Israeli Village. Manchester (United Kingdom): Manchester 

University Press, 1971. 
Shulewitz, M.H. "Health Services." Pages 199-217 in Israel Pocket 

Library: Society. Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1974. 
Smooha, Sammy. "Existing and Alternative Policy Towards the 

Arabs in Israel," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 5, No. 1, 1982, 72-98. 

. Israel: Pluralism and Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 

University of California Press, 1978. 
The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel. 

Haifa, Israel: Institute of Middle East Studies, 1980. 
Sobel, Zvi. Migrants from the Promised Land. New Brunswick, New 

Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986. 
Spilerman, Seymour, and Jack Habib. "Development Towns in 

Israel: The Role of Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities 

in Labor Force Characteristics," American Journal of Sociology, 81, 

No. 4, 1976, 781-812. 
Spiro, Melford E. Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia. (Augmented edition.) 

New York: Schocken Books, 1970. 
Sprinzak, Ehud. Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy: The Case 

of Gush Emunim Underground. Washington: Woodrow Wilson In- 
stitute, 1986. 

"Gush Emunim — The Iceberg Model of Political Extre- 
mism," State, Government, and International Relations [Israel], 14, 
25-52. 

Tabory, Ephraim. "Pluralism in the Jewish State: Reform and 
Conservative Judaism in Israel." Pages 170-93 in Stuart A. 
Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in 
Jewish Political Life. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 
1986. 

Talmon, Yonina. Family and Community in the Kibbutz. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972. 



370 



Bibliography 



Weingrod, Alex. "Recent Trends in Israeli Ethnicity," Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 2, No. 1, 1979, 55-65. 

Reluctant Pioneers: Village Development in Israel. Ithaca: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1966. 

Weingrod, Alex (ed.). Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingather- 
ing. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. 

Willner, Dorothy. Nation- Building and Community in Israel. Prince- 
ton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 

Wolffsohn, Michael. Israel: Polity, Society, and Economy, 1882-1986. 
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1987. 

Zucker, Norman I. The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public 
Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. 

Zureik, Elia. "Transformation of Class Structure Among Arabs 
in Israel: From Peasantry to Proletariat," Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 6, No. 1, 1976, 39-66. 



Chapter 3 

Ablin, Richard. "Forecasting Israel's Capital Flows — Some Econo- 
metric First Steps," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 
43, June 1976, 3-17. 

. "Israel's Foreign Trade — Demand and Prices: A Regres- 
sion Analysis of the Short Run," Bank of Israel Economic Review 
[Jerusalem], 45-46, February 1979, 23-62. 

. "A Last Decade of Israeli Growth? Economic Policy Since 

1973," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 48-49, May 
1980, 45-83. 

Amir, Shmuel. "Changes in the Wage Function for Israeli Jewish 
Male Employees Between 1968-69 and 1975-76," Bank of Israel 
Economic Review [Jerusalem], 52, August 1981, 5-29. 

- "Educational Structure and Wage Differentials of the 
Labor Force in the 1970s." Pages 137-52 in Yoram Ben-Porath 
(ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986. 

"The Effects of the Children's Allowance in Israel's Labor 

Supply," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 47, October 
1979, 1-45. 

Arian, A. (ed.). Israel: A Developing Society. Assen, Netherlands: Van 
Gorcum, 1980. 

Auerbach, Zvi. "The Income and Price Effects on the Computa- 
tion of Private Consumption, 1956-77," Bank of Israel Economic 
Review [Jerusalem], 52, August 1981, 30-45. 



371 



Israel: A Country Study 



. "Private Consumption Prices in Israel in 1964-77 by Main 

Cost Components," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 
50, February 1981, 33-63. 

Bank of Israel. Annual Report, 1983. Jerusalem, Israel: Ahva Print- 
ing, 1984. 

Annual Report, 1984. Jerusalem, Israel: Ahva Printing, 

1985. 

Annual Report, 1985. Jerusalem, Israel: Ahva Printing, 

1986. 

. Annual Report, 1986. Jerusalem, Israel: Ahva Printing, 

1987. 

. Annual Report, 1987. Jerusalem, Israel: Ahva Printing, 

1988. 

Bar-El, Raphael, and Ariela Nesher (eds.). Rural Industrialization 
in Israel. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

Barkai, Haim. "Defense Costs in Retrospect," Research Paper, 
No. 115 [Jerusalem], Hebrew University, 1980. 

. "The Energy Sector in the 1960s and 1970s." Pages 

245-75 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Matur- 
ing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Bar-Nathan, Moshe. "The Declining Productivity of Israel's Con- 
struction Industry," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 
58, September 1986, 68-82. 

"Effect of Rising Raw Materials Prices on the Produc- 
tivity and Profitability of Israeli Industry, 1965-80," Bank of Israel 
Economic Review [Jerusalem], 57, May 1985, 53-79. 

Baron, Malka. "Changes in the Age Structure of Israel's Popula- 
tion and Their Effect on the Labor Market, 1965-82," Bank of 
Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 58, September 1986, 1-28. 

Baruch, Joseph. "The New Economic Policy and Protection Levels 
on Industrial Import Substitutes and Exports," Bank of Israel Eco- 
nomic Review [Jerusalem], 48-49, May 1980, 84-91. 

"Protection Levels in Israel, 1968 and 1972-74," Bank 

of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 45-46, February 1979, 1-22. 

Ben-Bassat, A. "An Evaluation of Israel's Reserve Portfolio Per- 
formance," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 51, May 
1981, 5-35. 

. "Industrial Investment Behavior in Israel, 1955-68," Bank 

of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 42, June 1975, 72-106. 

Ben-Porath, Yoram. "Diversity in Population and in Labor Force." 
Pages 153-70 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: 
Maturing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986. 



372 



Bibliography 

. ''The Entwined Growth of Population and Production, 

1922-1982." Pages 27-41 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli 
Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1986. 

Ben-Porath, Yoram (ed.). The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Cri- 
sis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Berglas, Eitan. "Defense and the Economy." Pages 173-91 in 
Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through 
Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

. "Taxes and Transfers in an Inflationary Decade." Pages 

221-38 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Matur- 
ing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Bergman, Arie. "The Slowdown of Industrial Productivity — 
Causes, Explanations, and Surprises," Bank of Israel Economic 
Review [Jerusalem], 56, April 1985, 1-24. 

Bloom, Liora. "Israel's Demand Function for Imports of Goods, 
1968-1976," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 55, 
November 1983, 77-93. 

Brenner, Menahem, and Dan Gabai. "The Effect of Inflation on 
Stock Yields: 1965-1974," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 48-49, May 1980, 99-102. 

. "The Effect of Inflation on Stock Yields 1965-1979," Bank 

of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 53, May 1982, 81-86. 

Brezis, Elise A., Leo Leiderman, and Rafi Melnick. "The Inter- 
action Between Inflation and Monetary Aggregates in Israel," 
Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 55, November 1983, 
46-60. 

Bronfeld, Saul. "The Banking System in a Monetary Model of 
the Israeli Economy," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 
51, May 1981, 36-57. 

Bronfeld, Saul, and Reuven Brenner. "Inflation and the Liquidity 
of Index- Linked Bonds, ' ' Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 44, November 1977, 1-28. 

Bruno, Michael. "External Shocks and Domestic Response: 
Macroeconomics Performance, 1965-82." Pages 276-301 in 
Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through 
Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Bruno, Michael, and Stanley Fischer. "The Inflationary Process, 
Shocks and Accommodation." Pages 347-74 in Yoram Ben- 
Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Cukierman, A., E.A. Pazner, and A. Razin. "A Macroeconomic 
Model of the Israeli Economy, 1956-1974," Bank of Israel Eco- 
nomic Review [Jerusalem], 44, November 1977, 29-64. 



373 



Israel: A Country Study 



Cukierman, Alex, and Joseph Cohen. "The Free Credit Market 
in Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 50, February 
1981, 64-101. 

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Israel: 1986-87. Lon- 
don: 1986. 

. Country Profile: Israel: 1987-88. London: 1987. 

Elkayam, David. "Incorporation of Liquid Assets in a Dynamic 
Consumption Function for the 1970s," Bank of Israel Economic 
Review [Jerusalem], 58, September 1986, 29-52. 

Elkayam, David, and Rafi Melnick. "An Annual Model of the 
Consumption Function," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 56, April 1985, 25-54. 

Fischer, Stanley. "Inflation and Indexation: Israel." Pages 57-84 
in John Williamson (ed.), Inflation and Indexation: Argentina, Brazil, 
and Israel. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985. 

. "Monetary Policy in Israel, ' ' Bank of Israel Economic Review 

[Jerusalem], 53, May 1982, 5-30. 

Flanders, June M. , and Assaf Razin (eds.). Development in an Infla- 
tionary World. New York: Academic Press, 1981. 

Flink, Salomon J. Israel, Chaos and Challenge: Politics vs. Economics. 
Ramat Gan, Israel and Forest Grove, Oregon: Turtledove, 1979. 

Friedman, Benjamin M. "The Roles of Money and Credit in Mac- 
roeconomic Analysis," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 

55, November 1983, 1-7. 

Gaathon, A.L. Economic Productivity in Israel. New York: Praeger, 
1971. 

Geva, Yehuda, and Jack Habib. "The Development of the Transfer 
System and the Redistribution of Income." Pages 209-20 in 
Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through 
Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Ginor, Fanny. Socio- Economic Disparities in Israel. Tel Aviv: Trans- 
action Books, 1979. 

Gottlieb, Daniel, and Sylvia Piterman. "Inflationary Expectation 
in Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 57, May 
1985, 1-25. 

Greenwald, Carol Schwartz. Recession as a Policy Instrument: Israel, 
1965-69. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- 
sity Press, 1973. 

Gronau, Reuben, and Zvi Weiss. "Road User Charges and 
Automobile Taxation in Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review 
[Jerusalem], 55, November 1983, 8-47. 

Gross, Ephraim. "An Analysis of Family Expenditure by Con- 
sumption Category, ' ' Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem] , 

56, April 1985, 55-96. 



374 



Bibliography 



Halevi, Nadav. "Perspectives on the Balance of Payments. " Pages 
241-63 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Matur- 
ing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Halevi, Nadav, and Ruth Klinov-Malul. The Economic Development 
of Israel. New York: Praeger, 1968. 

Heth, Meir. Banking Institutions in Israel. Jerusalem: Maurice Falk 
Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1966. 

. The Flow of Funds in Israel. New York: Praeger, 1970. 

. The Legal Framework of Economic Activity in Israel. New York: 
Praeger, 1967. 

Horowitz, David. Enigma of Economic Growth: A Case Study of Israel. 
New York: Praeger, 1972. 

Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983. 
Jerusalem: 1983. 

. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1984. Jerusalem: 1984. 

. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1985. Jerusalem: 1985. 

. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986. Jerusalem: 1986. 

. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987. Jerusalem: 1987. 

Israel, Ministry of Finance. Budget in Brief. (Annuals, 1979-87.) 
Jerusalem: 1980-88. 

Justman, Moshe, and Morris Teubal. "Towards the Formulation 
and Implementation of an Explicit Industrial and Technologi- 
cal Policy for Israel," (unpublished paper), 1987. 

Kleiman, Ephraim. "Indexation in the Labor Market." Pages 
302-19 in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Matur- 
ing Through Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Kleiman, Ephraim, and T. Ophir. "The Effects of Changes in the 
Quantity of Money on Prices in Israel, 1955-1965," Bank of Israel 
Economic Review [Jerusalem], 42, January 1975, 15-45. 

. "Inflation in Israel, 1955-1965: The Wage Push on 

Prices," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 43, June 1976, 
18-28. 

Klinov, Ruth. "Changes in the Industrial Structure." Pages 119-36 
in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through 
Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Landau, Philip. Israel to 1991: Reform or Relapse? London: Economist 
Publications, 1987. 

Lavie, Yaakov. "Wage Dynamics in Israel 1963-1971," Bank of 
Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 44, November 1977, 65-99. 

Lerner, Abba, and Haim Ben-Shahar. The Economics of Efficiency 
and Growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 
1975. 

Lev, Nachum. "Gasoline Demand in Israel, 1960-1975," Bank 
of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 52, August 1981, 46-71. 



375 



Israel: A Country Study 

Levinson, Pinchas, and Pinchas Landau. Israel Economic and Busi- 
ness Review, 1985. Jerusalem: Israeli Economist, 1985. 

Levy, Haim. "Capital Structure, Inflation, and the Cost of Capi- 
tal in Israeli Industry, 1964-1978," Bank of Israel Economic Review 
[Jerusalem], 53, May 1982, 31-63. 

Levy, Haim and Marshall Sarnat. "Risk, Diversification, and the 
Composition of the Market Portfolio: An Analysis of the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 42, 
June 1975, 46-71. 

Litvin, Uri, and Leora Meridor. "The Grant Equivalent of Sub- 
sidized Investment in Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review 
[Jerusalem], 54, April 1983, 5-30. 

Liviatan, Nissan, and Sylvia Piterman. "Accelerating Inflation and 
Balance-of-Payments Crises, 1973-84." Pages 320-46 in Yoram 
Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Liviatan, Oded. "Frequency of Wage Indexation Adjustments," 
Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 57, May 1985, 37-52. 

. "Israeli External Debt," Bank of Israel Economic Review 

[Jerusalem], 48-49, May 1980, 1-44. 

Mayshar, Joram. "Investment Patterns." Pages 101-18 in Yoram 
Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Menzly, Yehuda. "Interest Rates on Nondirected Bank Credit, 
1965-1972," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 45-46, 
February 1979, 86-126. 

Meridor, Leora. "Deficit Neutrality: The Israeli Case," Bank of 
Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 57, May 1985, 26-36. 

Meron, Raphael. Economic Development in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza 
District: Economic Growth and Structural Change, 1970-80. Jerusa- 
lem: Bank of Israel, Ahva Press, 1983. 

Metzer, Jacob. "The Slowdown of Economic Growth: A Passing 
Phase or the End of the Big Spurt." Pages 75-100 in Yoram 
Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Michaely, Michael. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Israel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. 

Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System. Jerusalem: Maurice 

Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1971. 

Nachmany, Doron. "Price Equations for Israeli Manufacturing 
Industries, 1964-1977," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 53, May 1982, 64-80. 

Ofer, Gur. "A Cross-Country Comparison of Industrial Struc- 
ture." Chapter in Nadav Halevi and Y. Kop (eds.), Ikarot 



376 



Bibliography 



Bakalkala HaYisraelit (Issues in the Economy of Israel). Jerusa- 
lem: Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 
1976. 

. "Public Spending on Civilian Services." Pages 192-208 

in Yoram Ben-Porath (ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through 
Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Pack, Howard. Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 

Paroush, Jacob, and Malka Baron. "Employment Pressure in 
Israel, 1967-75," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 
45-46, February 1979, 63-85. 

Patinkin, Don. The Israeli Economy. Jerusalem: Maurice Falk Project 
for Economic Research in Israel, 1959. 

Pelzman, Joseph. "The Effect of the U.S. -Israel Free Trade Area 
Agreement on Israeli Trade and Employment." Pages 140-75 
in Bernard Reich and Gershon R. Kieval (eds.), Israel Faces the 
Future. New York: Praeger, 1986. 

. "The Impact of the U.S. -Israel Free Trade Area Agree- 
ment on Israeli Trade and Employment. " Jerusalem: Maurice 
Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1985. 

. "The U.S. -Israel Free Trade Area Agreement and Israeli 

Textile Exports to the United States." (Paper presented at 
Israel- American Trade Week, 1986.) Tel Aviv: 1986. 

Pines, David, Efraim Sadka, and Eytan Sheshinski. "Discrimina- 
tory Taxation of Owner-Occupied Housing: Its Effects on 
Resource Allocation and Income Distribution," Bank of Israel 
Economic Review [Jerusalem], 58, September 1986, 83-110. 

Piterman, Sylvia, and Ben-Zion Zilberfarb. "Financial Savings 
of the Private Sector in Israel, 1972-1977," Bank of Israel Eco- 
nomic Review [Jerusalem], 54, April 1983, 31-54. 

Sanbar, Marsh. "Israel's Major Goals and Problems," Bank of Israel 
Economic Review [Jerusalem], 44, November 1977, 134-42. 

Sharkansky, Ira. What Makes Israel Tick: How Domestic Policy-Makers 
Cope With Constraints. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985. 

Sussman, Zvi. Israel's Economy: Performance, Problems, and Policies. 
Tel Aviv: Jacob Levinson Center of the Israel-Diaspora Insti- 
tute, 1986. 

Syrquin, Moshe. "Economic Growth and Structural Change: An 
International Perspective." Pages 42-74 in Yoram Ben-Porath 
(ed.), The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crisis. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986. 

Tamari, Meir. "Equity, Financing, and Gearing in the U.K., 
U.S.A., Japan, and Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 43, June 1976, 29-54. 



377 



Israel: A Country Study 



. ''Monetary Policy and the Individual Firm. An Analysis 

of Company Accounts in Israel, U.K., U.S.A., and Japan," 
Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 45-46, February 1979, 
127-43. 

Tamari, Meir, and Emanuel Gabai. "Some Effects of Differen- 
tial Income Tax Rates on the Behavior of Israel's Industrial Com- 
panies," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 42, January 
1975, 3-14. 

Tarab, Shlomo. "Some Aspects of Efficiency of Investment in 
Mutual Funds Investing in Shares, 1965-72," Bank of Israel Eco- 
nomic Review [Jerusalem], 48-49, May 1980, 103-19. 

Weiss, Zvi. "Allocation and Financing of Motor Transport Infra- 
structure Costs in Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem], 50, February 1981, 5-32. 

Williamson, John. Inflation and Indexation: Argentina, Brazil, and Israel. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985. 

Wolffsohn, Michael. Israel: Polity, Society, and Economy, 1882-1986. 
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 
1987. 

Yitzhai, Shlomo, and Haim Shalit. "Efficient Portfolio Selection: 
Application to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange," Bank of Israel Eco- 
nomic Review [Jerusalem], 58, September 1986, 53-67. 

Zilberfarb, Ben-Zion. "Topics in the Demand for Money in 
Israel," Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusalem], 55, Novem- 
ber 1983, 61-76. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Bank of Israel Economic Review [Jerusa- 
lem]; Bank of Israel Recent Economic Developments [Jerusalem]; Israel 
Economist [Jerusalem]; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics [Jerusalem].) 



Chapter 4 

Abramov, S. Zalman. Perpetual Dilemma: Jewish Religion in the Jew- 
ish State. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- 
sity Press, 1976. 

"Africa- Israel: Improved Relations Hinge on Peace Talks," Africa 
Research Bulletin (Political Series), 25, No. 3, April 15, 1988, 
8824-25. 

Arian, Asher. Politics in Israel: The Second Generation. Chatham, New 
Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1985. 

Arian, Asher (ed.). The Elections in Israel: 1969. Jerusalem: Jerusa- 
lem Academic Press, 1972. 



378 



Bibliography 



. The Elections in Israel: 1973. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 

Transaction Books, 1975. 
. The Elections in Israel: 1977. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic 

Press, 1980. 

. The Elections in Israel: 1981. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 

Transaction Books, 1984. 
Arian, Asher, and Michal Shamir (eds.). The Elections in Israel: 1984. 

New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986. 
Aronoff, Myron J. Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party: A Study 

in Political Anthropology. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1977. 
Aronson, Shlomo. Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli 

Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
Avishai, Bernard. The Tragedy of Zionism: Revolution and Democracy 

in the Land of Israel. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985. 
Ben-Meir, Dov. HaHistadrut. Jerusalem: Carta, 1978. 
Brecher, Michael. Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. Berkeley 

and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980. 
. Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1975. 
The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 
Brooke, James. 'Tn African Diplomacy, Israel Gains a Toehold," 

New York Times, July 27, 1987, A2. 
Brookings Institution. Toward Arab-Israeli Peace: Report of a Study 

Group. Washington: 1988. 
Caspi, Dan, Abraham Diskin, and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.). The 

Roots of Begin 's Success: The 1981 Israeli Elections. New York: St. 

Martin's Press, 1984. 
Cohen, Mitchell. Zion and State: Nation, Class, and the Shaping of 

Modern Israel. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
Elazar, Daniel J., and Alysa M. Dortot (eds.). Understanding the 

Jewish Agency: A Handbook. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public 

Affairs, November 1985. 
Elazar, Daniel J., and Chaim Kalchheim (eds.). Local Government 

in Israel. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1988. 
Elizur, Yuval and Eliahu Salpeter. Who Rules Israel? New York: 

Harper and Row, 1973. 
Frankel, Glenn. "Israel Imposes Sanctions on South Africa," 

Washington Post, September 17, 1987, A46. 
Israel Pledges to Reduce Military Ties to South Africa," 

Washington Post, March 20, 1987, Al, A26. 
Frankel, William. Israel Observed: An Anatomy of the State. New York: 

Thames and Hudson, 1981. 



379 



Israel: A Country Study 



Freedman, Robert O. (ed.). Israel in the Begin Era. New York: 
Praeger, 1982. 

Friedman, Thomas L. "Israel Approves Curbs on Pretoria," New 

York Times, September 17, 1987, A4. 
"Israel Parliament Hears Plan on Pretoria," New York 

Times, March 20, 1987, A3. 
Horowitz, Dan, and Moshe Lissak. Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine 

under the Mandate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
Hurewitz, J.C. Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. New 

York: Octagon Books, 1974. 
Kieval, Gershon R. Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories. 

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
Kifner, John. "Some Dismay on the Road to Morocco," New York 

Times, July 27, 1986, E3. 
Klieman, Aaron S. Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy. 

Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. 
. Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 
Laipson, Ellen B. "Israeli- American Relations," (Library of Con- 
gress Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief IB82008.) 

December 15, 1988. 
Lapidoth, Ruth. "The Taba Controversy," Jerusalem Quarterly 

[Jerusalem], No. 37, 1986, 29-39. 
Little, Tom. "Israel." Pages 452-64 in The Middle East and North 

Africa, 1988. London: Europa Publications, 1987. 
Lukacs, Yehuda, and Abdalla M. Battah (eds.). The Arab-Israeli 

Conflict: Two Decades of Change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1988. 

Lustick, Ian S. For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in 
Israel. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 

Lustick, Ian S. (ed.). Books on Israel. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1988. 

Mahler, Gregory S. Bibliography of Israeli Politics. Boulder, Colo- 
rado: Westview Press, 1985. 

Medding, Peter Y. Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Govern- 
ment in a New Society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1972. 

Melman, Yossi, and Dan Raviv. Shutafut Ivunit: Haksharim Hasodiim 
Bein Yisrael le Yerden (Hostile Partners: The Secret Ties Between 
Israel and Jordan). Tel Aviv: Mitam, 1987. 

Murphy, Richard W. "An American Vision of Peace in the Mid- 
dle East," Department of State Bulletin, 88, No. 2135, June 1988, 
37-38. 



380 



Bibliography 



Oded, Arye. Africa and the Middle East Conflict. Boulder, Colorado: 

Lynne Rienner, 1987. 
Patai, Raphael (ed.). Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel. (2 Vols.) New 

York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 
Penniman, Howard R., (ed.). Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elec- 
tions of 1977. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979. 
Penniman, Howard R., and Daniel J. Elazar (eds.). Israel at the 

Polls, 1981 : A Study of the Knesset Elections. Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 1986. 
Peri, Yoram. Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics. 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Phillips, James A. "America's Security Stake in Israel," Heritage 

Foundation Backgrounder, No. 521, July 7, 1986. 
"Next Step in the Special Relationship: A U.S. -Israel 

Defense Council," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Update, No. 76, 

June 5, 1988. 

Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics . Washing- 
ton: Brookings Institution, 1986. 

Raphael, Gideon. Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign 
Policy. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. 

Raviv, Dan, and Yossi Melman. "Hussein's Covert Israeli Con- 
nection," Washington Post, September 27, 1987, Dl, D4. 

Reich, Bernard. Israel: Land of Tradition and Conflict. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. 

. Quest For Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 
1977. 

The United States and Israel: The Dynamics of Influence. New 

York: Praeger, 1984. 

Reich, Bernard, and Gershon R. Kieval (eds.). Israeli National Secu- 
rity Policy: Political Actors and Perspectives . New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1988. 

Ro'i, Yaacov. "A New Soviet Policy Towards Israel?" Jerusalem 
Quarterly [Jerusalem], No. 44, Fall 1987, 3-17. 

Rubenberg, Cheryl A. Israel and the American National Interest: A Criti- 
cal Examination. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1986. 

Rubenstein, Sondra Miller. The Communist Movement in Palestine and 
Israel, 1919-1984. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. 

Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel, I: From the Rise of Zionism 
to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. 

Sager, Samuel. The Parliamentary System of Israel. Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1985. 



381 



Israel: A Country Study 



Saunders, Harold H. The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab -Israeli 
Peace Process. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 

Schiff, Gary S. Tradition and Politics: The Religious Parties of Israel. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977. 

Schreiber, Jacob. "Does Israel Need a Constitution?" Israel 
Economist [Jerusalem], 43, April 1988, 18-20. 

Segev, Tom. 1949: The First Israelis. New York: Free Press, 1986. 

Shapiro, Yonathan. HaDemokratia Be Yisrael (Democracy in Israel). 
Ramat Gan, Israel: Massada Publishing, 1977. 

Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.). Dynamics of Dependence: U.S. -Israeli Relations. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

Shinar, Dov. "The West Bank Press and Palestinian Nation- 
Building, " Jerusalem Quarterly [Jerusalem], No. 43, Summer 1987, 
37-48. 

Shipler, David K. "For Israel and U.S., a Growing Military Part- 
nership," New York Times, March 15, 1987, Week in Review, 1. 

Sicherman, Harvey. Changing the Balance of Risks : U.S. Policy Toward 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (Policy Papers No. 11). Washington In- 
stitute for Near East Policy, 1988. 

Sinai, Joshua. "A Bibliographical Review of the Modern History 
of Israel," Middle East Review, 10, No. 1, Fall 1977, 66-72. 

Smith, Hanoch. The 1988 Knesset Elections: III. A Victory for the Right 
and Religious Parties . (American Jewish Committee Papers). New 
York: November 1988. 

Spiegel, Steven. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Mid- 
dle East Policy from Truman to Reagan. Chicago: University of Chi- 
cago Press, 1985. 

Tessler, Mark. "Moroccan-Israeli Relations and the Reasons for 
Moroccan Receptivity to Contact with Israel ," Jerusalem Journal 
of International Relations [Jerusalem], 10, No. 2, June 1988, 76-108. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1987. (Report Submitted to the Committee on For- 
eign Affairs, House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate.) Washington: GPO, 
1988. 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Building for Peace: An 
American Strategy for the Middle East. Washington: Washington In- 
stitute for Near East Policy, 1988. 

Weiss, Shevach. HaMahapach: Mai 1977 — November 1978 (The 
Revolution: May 1977-November 1978). Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 
1979. 

Wolffsohn, Michael. Israel: Polity, Society, and Economy, 1882-1986. 
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 
1987. 



382 



Bibliography 



Yanai, Nathan. Party Leadership in Israel: Maintenance and Change. 

Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Publishing, 1981. 
Zisar, Baruch (ed.). The Israeli Political System: Proposals for Change. 

Tel Aviv: Experimental Edition, May 1987. 
Zucker, Norman L. The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public 

Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. 



Chapter 5 

"Air War Over Israel," Defense Update [Hod Hasharon, Israel], 

No. 88, June 1988, 1-57. 
Bar-Natan, Yaacov. "Arabs in the IDF," Spectrum [Tel Aviv], 6, 

No. 1, February 1988, 20-23. 
Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and 

Why. New York: Pantheon, 1987. 
Bensinger, Gad J. "Criminal Justice in Israel: A Research Note," 

Journal of Criminal Justice, 10, 1982, 393-401. 
. "The Israel Police in Transition: An Organizational 

Study," Police Studies [Henley-on-Thames, United Kingdom], 

4, No. 2, Summer 1981, 3-8. 
Benvenisti, Meron. West Bank Data Project, 1986 Report: Demographic, 

Economic, Legal, Social, and Political Developments in the West Bank. 

Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1986. 
Bloom, James J. "The Six-Days-Plus-Ten-Weeks-War: Aspects 

of Israel's Summer Campaign in Lebanon, 1982," Middle East 

Insight, 2, No. 5, January-February 1983, 45-55. 
Brower, Kenneth S. "The Middle East Military Balance: Israel 

Versus the Rest," International Defense Review [Geneva], 19, No. 7, 

1986, 907-13. 

Chen, Oz. "Reflections on Israeli Deterrence ," Jerusalem Quarterly 

[Jerusalem], No. 24, Summer 1982, 26-40. 
Chesnoff, Richard Z., and James Wallace. "The Twilight War," 

U.S. News and World Report, 104, No. 17, May 2, 1988, 30-34. 
Dunn, Michael Collins. "Israel: New Priorities for a New Era," 

Defense and Foreign Affairs, 16, No. 7, July 1988, 8-14. 
Dupuy, Trevor N., and Paul Martell. Flawed Victory: The Arab -Israeli 

Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon. Fairfax, Virginia: Hero 

Books, 1986. 

Engel, Shimon. "The Long Road from Molotov Cocktails to Mis- 
siles, Tanks, and Lasers: A Technological History of the IDF," 
IDF Journal [Jerusalem], No. 15, Summer 1988, 22-31. 

Eshel, David. "The Israeli Armed Forces: Part I: The Israeli 
Army Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, 6, No. 6, 1988, 20-24. 



383 



Israel: A Country Study 



Flume, Wolfgang. "Israeli Defence Industry — Peacetime Link in 
the Economic Chain," Military Technology [Bonn], February 1987, 
93-100. 

Friedman, Thomas L. "Israel's Development of a Major Arms 
Industry," New York Times, December 7, 1986, Section 3, 1. 

. "Living with a Dirty War: Israel's Dilemma," New York 

Times Magazine, January 20, 1985, 32-51. 

Gal, Reuven. A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier. Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1986. 

Gazit, Mordechai. "Israeli Military Procurement from the United 
States." Pages 83-124 in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Dynamics of De- 
pendence: U.S. -Israeli Relations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1987. 

Gold, Dore. "Ground-to-Ground Missiles: The Threat Facing 
Israel," IDF Journal [Jerusalem], 4, No. 3, Fall 1987, 31-34, 
62-63. 

Gunston, Bill. An Illustrated Guide to the Israeli Air Force. Tel Aviv: 

Steinmatzky, 1982. 
Hovav, Meir, and Menachem Amir. "Israel Police: History and 

Analysis," Police Studies [Henley-on-Thames, United Kingdom], 

2, No. 2, Summer 1979, 5-31. 
Hunter, Jane. "Israel and South Africa: Sidestepping Sanctions," 

Middle East International [London], No. 319, February 20, 1988, 

16-17. 

Inbar, Efraim. "Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973," Journal 
of Strategic Studies [London], 6, March 1983, 36-55. 

"Israel." Pages 468-82 in George R. Copley (ed.), Defense and For- 
eign Affairs Handbook. Washington: Perth Corporation, 1987. 

"Israel." Pages 279-82 in Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting 
Ships, 1988-89. London: Jane's, 1988. 

Israel. Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. Military Service. Jerusa- 
lem: Publications Department, Ministry of Immigrant Absorp- 
tion, 1987. 

Israel Prison Service: Annual Report 1986. Jerusalem: Israel Prison Ser- 
vice, 1987. 

Katsiaficas, George. "Behind Bars in Israel," Mideast Monitor, 5, 

No. 1, 1988, 1-4. 
Katzenell, Jack. "Minorities in the IDF," IDF Journal [Jerusalem], 

4, No. 3, Fall 1987, 40-45. 
Keegan,John. "Israel." Pages 301-12 in John Keegan (ed.), World 

Armies. (2d ed.) Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 
King, Barry B. "Crisis Facing Israeli Arms Industry, "Jane's Defence 

Weekly [London], January 9, 1988, 17-18. 



384 



Bibliography 



Kleiman, Aaron S. Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy. 

Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. 
Levin, Marlin, and David Halevy. "Israel." Pages 3-25 in Richard 

A. Gabriel (ed.), Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East. 

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
Levran, Aharon, and Zeev Eytan. The Middle East Military Balance, 

1986. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and Westview Press, 1987. 
Lissak, Moshe (ed.). Israeli Society and its Defense Establishment: The 

Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict. London: 

Frank Cass, 1984. 
Luttwak, Edward, and Dan Horowitz. The Israeli Army. New York: 

Harper and Row, 1975. 
Michelson, Benny. "Born in Battle: A History of the IDF Through 

Four Decades," IDF Journal [Jerusalem], No. 15, Summer 1988, 

8-21. 

Middleton, Drew. "Israel's Defenses: As Good as Ever?" New York 

Times Magazine, May 19, 1985, 60-65, 95-97. 
The Military Balance, 1988-1989. London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 1988. 
Milton, T.R. "Israel's First Line of Defense," Air Force Magazine, 

69, No. 5, May 1986, 62-67. 
Moss, Norman. "Vanunu, Israel's Bombs, and U.S. Aid," Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists, 44, No. 4, May 1988, 7-8. 
Neff, Donald. "Israel Recycles US Arms Technology," Middle East 

International [London], No. 324, April 30, 1988, 18-19. 
O'Brien, William V. "Counterterrorism: Lessons from Israel," 

Strategic Review, 13, No. 4, Fall 1985, 32-44. 
Owan, Clyde. "The Arab-Israeli Naval Imbalance," Proceedings, 

United States Naval Institute, 109, No. 3, March 1983, 101-9. 
Peretz, Don. "Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising," Foreign Af- 
fairs, 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, 964-80. 
Peri, Yoram. Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics. 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Reich, Bernard. The United States and Israel: The Dynamics of Influence. 

New York: Praeger, 1984. 
Reiser, Stewart. "The Israeli Police: Politics and Priorities," Police 

Studies [Henley-on-Thames, United Kingdom], 6, No. 1, Spring 

1983, 27-35. 

Richelson, Jeffrey T. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988. 

Schiff, Zeev. "The Government-Armed Forces Relationship." 
Pages 33-40 in Steven Heydemann (ed.), The Begin Era: Issues 
in Contemporary Israel. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 



385 



Israel: A Country Study 

. A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present. New York: 

Macmillan, 1985. 

Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984. 

Shamir, Yitzhak. "Israel at 40: Looking Back, Looking Ahead," 
Foreign Affairs, 66, No. 3, 1987-1988, 574-90. 

Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.). Dynamics of Dependence: U.S. -Israel Relations. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

United Nations. Center for Disarmament. Study on Israeli Nuclear 
Armament. New York: United Nations, 1982. 

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Mili- 
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987. (Ed., Daniel Gallik.) 
Washington: GPO, 1988. 

United States. Department of Defense. Congressional Presentation for 
Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1989. Washington: Depart- 
ment of Defense, 1988. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1987. (Report Submitted to the Committee on For- 
eign Affairs, House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate.) Washington: GPO, 
1988. 

. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1986. Washington: Department 

of State, 1988. 

Yaniv, Avner. "The Study of Israel's National Security." Pages 
63-82 in Ian S. Lustick (ed.), Books on Israel, I. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988. 

Yishal, Yael. "The Jewish Terror Organization: Past or Future 
Danger?" Conflict, 6, No. 4, 1986, 307-32. 



386 



Glossary 



agora (pi., ago rot) — An Israeli coin. One hundred ago rot equal 
one new Israeli shekel — NIS (q.v.). 

aliyah (pi., aliyot) — Literally, going up. The immigration of Jews 
to Eretz Yisrael, or the Land of Israel. Historians have classi- 
fied five major periods of immigration to Israel, as follows: First 
Aliyah (1882-1903); Second Aliyah (1904-14); Third Aliyah 
(1919-23); Fourth Aliyah (1924-31); and Fifth Aliyah 
(1932-39). 

Asefat Hanivharim (Constituent Assembly) — The Yishuv's 
parliamentary body and the Knesset's predecessor. 

Ashkenazim (sing., Ashkenazi) — Jews of European origin. 

bar — Son of; frequently used in personal names, as Bar-Lev. 

ben — Son of; frequently used in personal names, as Ben-Gurion. 

Bund — A political labor organization of Jewish workers founded 
in Vilna, Lithuania in 1897. The name is an abbreviation in 
Yiddish for The General Union of Jewish Workers in Russia, 
Lithuania, and Poland. The Bund opposed Zionism and viewed 
Yiddish as the only secular Jewish language. 

Conservative Jews — Accept the primacy of halakah (q.v.) but have 
introduced modifications in liturgy and ritual. 

Diaspora — Refers to the Jews living in scattered communities out- 
side Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) during and after the 
Babylonian Captivity (sixth century B.C.) and, especially, after 
the dispersion of the Jews from the region after the destruc- 
tion of the Temple by the Romans in A.D. 70 and the Bar- 
Kokhba War in A.D. 132-35. In modern times the word refers 
to the Jews living outside Palestine or present-day Israel. When 
the word is applied — usually lowercased — to non-Jews, such 
as the Palestinian Arab refugees, the word describes the situa- 
tion of the people of one country dispersed into other countries. 

Druze(s) — Member of a religious community that constitutes a 
minority among Arabic- speaking Palestinians in Israel. Druze 
beliefs contain elements of Shia (q. v. ) Islam, Christianity, and 
paganism. 

fiscal year (FY) — Begins April 1 and ends March 31; FY 1988, 
for example, began April 1, 1988, and ended March 31, 1989. 

Gaza Strip — former Egyptian territory occupied by Israel in the 
June 1967 War. 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 



387 



Israel: A Country Study 



period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the 
result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deduc- 
tions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. 
See also GNP. 

GNP (gross national product) — GDP (q.v.) plus the net income 
or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP 
is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- 
vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, 
which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect 
taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often 
calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsi- 
dies. 

Golan Heights — former Syrian territory occupied by Israel in the 
June 1967 War and formally annexed by Israel in 1981. 

Greater Syria — Term used by historians and others to designate 
the region that includes approximately the present-day states 
of Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria as well as the West Bank. 

Green Line — name given to the 1949 Armistice lines that consti- 
tuted the de facto borders of pre- 1967 Israel. 

Haganah — Literally, defense. Abbreviation for Irgun HaHaganah, 
the Jewish defense organization formed in 1919-20 by volun- 
teers in early Jewish communities as home guards for protec- 
tion against hostile bands. It became the military arm of the 
Jewish Agency (q. v. ) and went underground during the British 
Palestine Mandate period (1922-48) when it was declared ille- 
gal. Along with the Jewish Brigade, which fought with the Al- 
lied forces in World War II, it formed the nucleus of the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) established in 1948. 

HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael (General Fed- 
eration of Laborers in the Land of Israel) — Commonly known 
as Histadrut. Founded in 1920, this national-level organiza- 
tion was also the nation's largest single employer after the 
government. Histadrut performs many economic and welfare 
services in addition to trade union activities; leadership of 
Histadrut has generally been drawn from the Labor Party and 
its predecessors. 

halakah — Either those parts of the Talmud that concern legal mat- 
ters or an accepted decision in rabbinical law. Sometimes trans- 
lated as religious law. 



388 



Glossary 



Hasid (pi., Hasidim) — Member of a religious movement, known 
as Hasidism, founded in the eighteenth century by Israel Ben- 
Eliezer Baal Shem Tov in Eastern Europe. The movement, 
still active in the 1980s, stresses the importance of serving God 
in ecstasy and has strong mystical elements. 

Irgun — An abbreviation for Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military 
Organization). Established in 1937 as an underground Jewish 
extremist organization, also known as Etzel, derived from the 
pronounced initials of its Hebrew name. A more extreme group, 
known as the Stern Gang (q.v.), broke away from it in 1939. 
Both groups were especially active during and after World War 
II against the British authorities in Palestine. Both maintained 
several thousand armed men until all Israeli forces were in- 
tegrated after Israel declared its independence. 

Israeli pound — see new Israeli shekel. 

Jewish Agency — Representing the World Zionist Organization as 
its executive body, the Jewish Agency works in close coopera- 
tion with the government of Israel, encourages and organizes 
immigration of Jews into the country, and assists in their so- 
cial and economic integration. 

Keren HaYesod — Literally, Israel Foundation Fund. The central 
fiscal institution of the World Zionist Organization that finances 
its activities in Israel. 

kibbutz (pi., kibbutzim) — An Israeli collective farm or settlement, 
cooperatively owned and operated by its members and or- 
ganized on a communal basis. 

Knesset — Israel's parliament, a unicameral legislature of 120 mem- 
bers elected by universal suffrage for four-year terms; the Knes- 
set may, through legislative procedures, call for elections before 
the end of the regular term or postpone elections in time of war. 

Ladino — Language based on medieval Castilian but with Hebrew 
suffixes and written in Hebrew alphabet; developed and used 
by Sephardim (q.v.). 

Law of Return — Passed by Knesset in July 1950 stating that "Every 
Jew has the right to come to (Israel) as an olah (new im- 
migrant) . ' ' 

Lehi — Acronym for Lohamei Herut Israel, literally, Fighters for 
Israel's Freedom, a former resistance and political organiza- 
tion, created in 1939 and disbanded under pressure in 1948. 
Commonly known as the Stern Gang. See also Irgun. 

moshav (pi., moshavim) — A cooperative smallholders' settlement 
of individual farms in Israel. Individuals own their farms and 
personal property. Work is organized collectively, equipment 
is used cooperatively, and produce is marketed jointly. There 



389 



Israel: A Country Study 

are several variants including the moshav ovdim, a workers' 
cooperative settlement, and the moshav shitufi, a collective small- 
holders' settlement that combines the economic features of a 
kibbutz (q.v.) with the social features of a moshav. Farming 
is done collectively, and profits are shared equally. 

new Israeli shekel (NIS) — In September 1985, the new Israeli shekel 
(NIS) went into circulation, replacing the Israeli shekel that 
had existed since 1980. (Before 1980 the Israeli currency was 
called the Israeli pound or lira.) The NIS is equivalent to 1,000 
old Israeli shekels and is divided into 100 ago rot. The require- 
ment for the NIS stemmed from the very rapid inflation rate 
of the preceding years, which also resulted in dramatic devalu- 
ation of the old shekel against foreign currencies; for example, 
from 1980 to 1985 the old shekel lost value against the United 
States dollar by 25,000 percent. As of August 1986, the NIS 
was no longer pegged to the United States dollar but rather 
to a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies: 60 percent 
United States dollar, 20 percent West German deutschmark, 
10 percent British pound, 5 percent French franc, and 5 per- 
cent Japanese yen. The currency notes in circulation are 5, 
10, 50, and 100 NIS. The approximate exchange rate for the 
new Israeli shekel and the United States dollar in 1988 was NIS 
1.6 = US$1.00. 

Oriental Jews — See Sephardim. 

Orthodox Jews — Adherents of that branch of Judaism that insists 
on a rigid and strict observance of halakah (q. v. ) and an em- 
phasis on national ritual conformity. 

Pale of Settlement — Area of twenty-five provinces of tsarist Rus- 
sia within which Jews were allowed to live, outside of which 
they could reside only with specific permission. 

Palmach — Abbreviation for Pelugot Mahatz, shock forces. In 
British Palestine and until late 1948, it was a commando sec- 
tion of the Jewish military forces. Organized in 1941 to pro- 
vide the Haganah (q.v.) with a mobile force, it consisted of 
young men mostly from kibbutzim, who took military train- 
ing while working part-time at farming, serving in coopera- 
tion with the British army, without pay or uniforms. 

Reform Jews (sometimes called Progressive or Liberal Jews) — 
Emphasize rationalism and ethical behavior, reject the abso- 
lute authority of halakah, and assert the private religious na- 
ture of Judaism. 

sabra (pi., sabras) — From Hebrew word meaning "a prickly pear," 
but adapted to mean a native-born Israeli Jew. 



390 



Glossary 



Sephardim (sing., Sephardi; adj., Sephardic) — Basically Jews whose 
families were of Spanish or Portuguese origin, wherever resi- 
dent; historically, they tended to speak Ladino (q. v. ) or Arabic. 
The term is often applied to those Jews who are not Ashkena- 
zim. Since the 1960s, Sephardim have often been called Oriental 
Jews. 

Shabbat — Sabbath, observed from Friday sunset to Saturday 
sunset. 

Shia (or Shiite, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of 
the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shias sup- 
ported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to 
the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and 
on this issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.). Shias revere 
Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be hidden from 
view. 

Stern Gang — See Lehi. 

Sunni (from sunna, meaning orthodox) — A member of the larger 
of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the 
traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the 
Umayyad line. On this issue they divided from the Shias (q.v.) 
in the first great schism within Islam. 

Talmud — Literally, teaching. Compendium of discussions on the 
Mishnah (the earliest codification of Jewish religious law, largely 
complete by 200 A.D.), by generations of scholars and jurists 
in many academies over a period of several centuries. The 
Jerusalem (or Palestinian) Talmud mainly contains the discus- 
sion of the Palestinian sages. The Babylonian Talmud incor- 
porates the parallel discussions in the Babylonian academies. 

Torah — The first five books of the Bible: Genesis, Exodus, Leviti- 
cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy; often called the Pentateuch 
or the Law of Moses. In a broader sense, the entire body of 
traditional religious teaching and study. 

ulpan (pi., ulpanim) — center for study, particularly for the study of 
Hebrew by adult immigrants to Israel. 

West Bank — The area of Palestine west of the Jordan River seized 
from Jordan by Israel in the June 1967 War. In 1988 it re- 
mained Israeli-occupied territory and was not recognized by 
the United States government as part of Israel. Israelis refer 
to this area as Judea and Samaria. 

World Zionist Organization (WZO) — Founded in August 1897 at 
the First Zionist Congress called by Theodor Herzl at Basel, 
Switzerland. The movement, named after Mount Zion in 
Jerusalem, was designed to establish in Palestine a national 
home for Jews scattered throughout the world. Since 1948 its 



391 



Israel: A Country Study 



efforts have been devoted primarily to promoting unity of the 
Jewish people and raising funds. In 1929 it established the Jew- 
ish Agency (q.v.). Until 1960 its formal name was Zionist 
Organization, but word World added in new constitution. 

yeshiva (pi., yeshivot) — Traditional rabbinical school for the study 
of Talmud (q.v.). 

Yiddish — A language based on medieval Rhineland German used 
by Jews in eastern, northern, and central Europe and in areas 
to which Jews from these regions migrated. It also contains ele- 
ments of Hebrew, Russian, and Polish, and it is commonly 
written in Hebrew characters. 

Yishuv — The Jewish community in Palestine before statehood. Also 
used in referring to the period between 1900 and 1948. 



392 



Index 



Abbasids, 16 

Abdul Aziz ibn Saud (king of Saudi 

Arabia), 45 
Abdul Hamid (sultan), 30 
Abdullah (king of Transjordan) (see also 

Amir Abdullah), 57, 232, 235 
Abraham, 6, 8, 252 
Abu Musa faction, 278 
Abu Nidal organization, 78, 263, 277, 

278 
Acre, 16 

administrative agencies (see also Chief 
Rabbinical Council), 102 

administrative districts. See districts, ad- 
ministrative 

Aelia Capitolina, 14 

Afghanistan, 78 

African countries, 203, 243, 320 
Agranat Commission, 66, 67, 299 
agreements, xxiv, 33-34, 35, 52, 67-68, 
72, 158, 172, 235, 236, 255-56, 322 
agreements for the preservation of the sta- 
tus quo, 105-6 
agricultural sector, xvii, 161-62 
Agudat Israel, xxvii-xxviii, 96, 99, 
105-6, 212, 220, 355; founding and 
role of, 222-23; Hasidic factions of, 
223; religious schools of, 131 
Ahad HaAm. See Ginsberg, Asher (Ahad 
HaAm) 

Ahdut HaAvodah (Unity of Labor), 40, 

41, 213, 355 
air force. See Air Corps (Hel Avir) 
airline, 167 
airports, xviii, 167 
Al Ahd (The Covenant Society), 32 
Al Aqsa Mosque, 16 
Alexander II (tsar of Russia), 4, 20-21 
Alexander III (tsar of Russia), 21 
Alexander the Great, 11 
Al Fatah (Movement for the Liberation 

of Palestine) (see also Black September 

group), 62, 258, 260, 275, 277-78; 

activity and factions of, 276, 279 
Al Fatat (The Young Arabs), 32 
Algeria: Al Fatah guerrillas in, 278 
Al Haq (Law in the Service of Man), xxxi 
Aliyah: First (1882-1903), 24, 28; Second 



(1904-14), 29, 30, 57, 204; Third 
(1919-23), 37-38; Fourth (1924-31), 
42 

aliyah (aliyot): defined, 89 

Alkalai, Judah (rabbi), 22 

Allenby, Edmund, 35 

Allon, Yigal, 74, 208, 216, 229 

Al Mutawakkil, 16 

Aloni, Shulamit, 217 

Al Qunaytirah, 67 

Altalena affair, 53, 255 

Aman. See Intelligence Branch of general 

staff (Agaf Modiin: Aman) 
Amana, 93, 225-26 
Ames-Yissum, 155 
Amir Abdullah, 32-33, 36, 45 
Amir Faysal, 33, 35, 36 
Amit, Meir, 229 
Amital, Yehuda (rabbi), 224 
Ammon, 10 
Am Oved, 127 
Anglicans, 120 

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 

(1946), 50 
Anglo-French Joint Declaration, 37 
Anti-Lebanon Mountains, 87 
Antiochus IV, 11 

anti-Semitism, 3,17, 20-21; in French so- 
ciety, 25; in Germany, 44, 48-49; of 
Russian tsars, 20-21 

Anzar 2, 335 

Arab Democratic Party, 227, 355 
Arab forces: invade Israel (1948), xxiv, 51 
Arab Higher Committee (AHC), xxiv, 
44, 45; rejects UN resolution for par- 
tition, 51; rejects White Paper provi- 
sions, 47 
Arabian Desert, 7, 15 
Arab independence: geographic area for 

settlement, 33 
Arab-Israeli conflict (see also Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict); United States position 
on, 320; in Yishuv (Palestine), 42-43 
Arab Journalists' Association, 247 
Arab League (League of Arab States): po- 
sition on UN resolution regarding par- 
tition, 50-51 
Arab Legion, xxiv, 52 



393 



Israel: A Country Study 



Arab Revolt. See Palestinian Revolt 
Arabs: attacks on Jewish communities by, 

253-54; opposition to immigration by, 

4 

Arabs in Israel {see also Gaza Strip; oc- 
cupied territories; West Bank), 120-21; 
impact of intifadah on, xxxii; military 
government for and discrimination 
against, 54-57; population distribution 
of, 93; role in political process of, 212, 
226-27 

Arab states: nationalism of, 37; rejection 
of Reagan Plan, 237; relations of Israel 
with, xxix, 5 

Arab Studies Center, xxxiv 

Arab summit meeting, Morocco (1974), 
67 

Arafat, Yasir, 62, 238-39; activity against, 
278; efforts to resolve Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict by, xxxii-xxxiv; as head of 
Palestine Liberation Army, 263; as head 
of PLO, 275; in 1982 Lebanon invasion 
and siege, 264-65 

Arens, Moshe, 180, 219-20, 265 

Argentina, 244 

Arian, Asher, 195 

Arkia Israeli Airlines, 167 

Ark of the Covenant, 10 

Armament Development Authority 
(Rafael), 315-16 

armed forces (see also Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF)); combat units of, xix; composi- 
tion of, xix; legal framework for, 255 

Armenians, 84, 120 

armistice agreement (1949): with Egypt, 
Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria, xxiv, 52, 
255 

armistice agreement (1985): after Leba- 
non invasion, xxix 

Armistice Line (1949). See Green Line 

Armoni, Yitzhak, 226 

Artillery Corps, 310 

Ashdod (port), 166 

Ashkenazim. See Jews, Ashkenazic 

Ashqelon (oil terminal), 167 

Asia Minor Agreement (Sykes-Picot Agree 
ment), 33-34 

Asian states, 244 

Asquith, Herbert, 34 

Assad, Hafiz al, 76, 78, 263 

assassination, 48, 57, 235 

assimilation: of Jews in European society, 
xxiii, 4, 17, 20 



Association for Beduin Rights in Israel, 

228 
Assyria, 10 

Assyrian Empire, 8, 10-11 

Atlee, Clement, 50 

Atomic Energy Commission, 189 

attorney general, 194 

Australia, 159, 244 

autonomy concept, 271-72 

Babylon, 10 
Babylonians, 11 
Bahaism, 120 

Baker, James A., Ill, xxviii, xxxvii 
balance of payments, xvii, 141, 173 
Balfour, Arthur James, 34, 44 
Balfour Declaration (1917), 33-35; Brit- 
ish commitment under, xxiv; declared 
void by Arabs, 36-37; White Paper 
ending British commitment to Jews, 47 
Baltic Sea, 20 
Baniyas River, 87 
Bank HaPoalim, 41, 163, 203 
banking system: bank groups in, 163; ex- 
pansion of, 164, 166; Jewish Agency 
ownership in, 142 
Bank Leumi Le Israel, 163 
Bank of Israel (central bank), 163 
Barak, Ehud, 314 
Bar-Ilan University, 96, 133-34 
Bar-Kochba Rebellion, 14, 15 
Bar-Lev, Haim, 229 
Bar-Lev Line, 64 
Bar-On, Mordechai, 217 
Basic Law: the Knesset (1958), 182, 
190-92 

Basic Law: Israeli Lands (1960), 182 
Basic Law: the Presidency (1964), 182, 
184-85 

Basic Law: the Government (1968), 182 
Basic Law: the State Economy (1975), 
182 

Basic Law: the Army (1976), 182, 280, 
312 

Basic Law: Jerusalem (1980), 182 
Basic Law: the Judiciary (1984), 182 
Basic Law: the Elections (1988), 182, 225 
Basic Law: (proposed) Human Rights, 
xxvii 

Basic Laws (see also constitution; laws to 
legitimize government), xviii, 182-83, 
184 



394 



Index 



Battle of Hattin, 16 
beduins, 120, 121-22; in military service, 
294 

Beersheba (Beersheva), 87 

Beersheba prison, 335 

Begin, Menachem, xxv, 6, 48; actions 
related to Lebanon of, 76; government 
of, 70-75, 180; as leader of Herut, 60, 
207; as leader of Irgun, 53; as leader 
of Likud Bloc, 180, 208; policy for oc- 
cupied territories of, 6; rejection of Rea- 
gan Plan by, 237; in Stern Gang, 254 

Beirut, 16; siege of (1982), xxix, 264 

Bene Akiva, 133, 134 

Bene Yisrael, 109 

Ben-Gurion, David: chief architect of 
IDF, 41,311; founds Ahdut HaAvodah 
(Unity of Labor), 40; founds Poalei 
Tziyyon, 211; guarantees for Judaism 
in State of Israel, 105-6; as head of Jew- 
ish Agency, 47; integrates Palmach into 
IDF, 255; leads Labor Zionists, xxiii, 
4, 29-30, 205; one of founders of State 
of Israel, 3; relationship with Irgun and 
Lehi of, 50; resigns (1953) and is rein- 
stated (1955), 58; supports immigration 
to Palestine, 48 

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 
133-34 

Ben-Meir, Yehuda, 221 

Ben-Natan, Rafael, 222 

Ben-Zakki, Yohanan, 14 

Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak, 205; founds Poalei 
Tziyyon, 211 

Bernadotte, Folke, 52 

Betar, 42-43; 355 

Bet Shean, 9 

Bevin, Ernest, 50 

Bible: Book of Exodus in, 9; Book of 

Judges in, 9 
Biltmore Program, 48 
biotechnology industry, 155-56 
Biqa (Bekaa) Valley, 77 
Bir Zeit University, 75 
Black Panthers, 69, 116, 212 
Black Sea, 20 

Black September group, 276, 328 
Border Police: in Gaza Strip and West 

Bank, 301; responsibilities of, 324 
borders, 7, 85; defenses along, 278-79, 

281, 283 
Borochov, Ber, 29, 211 
Brandt, Willi, 242 



Brecher, Michael, 228 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 66, 70 

Britain (see also British Mandate): ap- 
proves partition (1937), 45: Balfour 
Declaration of, xxiv, 33-37, 47; man- 
date over Palestine of, 36; opposition 
to immigration by, 4; relations with, 
241; role in Middle East of, 32-38; as 
source of coal, 159 

British Mandate (1920-48), 4, 36-38; 
Palestinian Revolt, 44-47; Arab com- 
munity under, 38-40; derivation of 
legal code from, 301, 331, 333; Jewish 
community under, 40-44; policy dur- 
ing prison system set up under legal 
code of, 335; rebellion by Jews against 
authority of, 50; relinquishment of 
(1948), 51 

British Mandate Authority, 55 

budget, government: defense spending in, 
306-9 

buffer zone: occupied territories as, 269 
Bulgaria, 241 
Bund, 21 

Bureau of Scientific Relations (Leshkat 
Kesher Madao: Lekem), 330 

Bureau of the Registration of Inhabitants, 
107, 108 

Burg, Yosef, 221, 222 

Bush, George, xxxiv, xxxvii 

Byzantines, 16 

cabinet (see also Ministerial Comittee for 
Security Affairs), 185, 187-89, 230 

Cairo-Amman Bank, 232 

caliphate, 33 

Cameroon, 243, 320 

Camp David Accords (1978), xix, xxix, 
6, 224, 231, 233, 237, 241, 324; failure 
of, 272; provisions of, 72 

Canaan (the promised land), 6-7, 9 

Cape Carmel, 85 

Carter, Jimmy, 70, 72, 73, 236-37 

Catholics, Greek, 120 

Catholics, Roman, 120 

cease-fire: in Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
(1982), 264; with PLO (1981), 276; in 
War of Attrition, 63, 236; in June 1967 
War, 259; in October 1973 War, 
65-66, 261 

Center for Research and Strategic Plan- 
ning, 327 



395 



Israel: A Country Study 



Central African Republic, 243 
central bank. See Bank of Israel (central 
bank) 

Central Bureau of Statistics, 189 

central hills or highlands, 85, 86 

Central Institute for Intelligence and Spe- 
cial Missions (Mossad Merkazi Le 
Modiin Uletafkidim Meyuhadim: 
Mossad), xx, 327-28 

Central Religious Camp, 224 

chemical industry, 156-57 

Chen. See Women's Army Corps (Chen) 

Chief Rabbinate, 220 

Chief Rabbinical Council, 102, 104, 220 

Children of Israel, 8 

China, People's Republic of, 244; mili- 
tary equipment sales to, 269, 318 

Christianity, 13, 17; official religion of 
Roman Empire, 15 

Christians: in Israel, xxvi, 84, 88; reli- 
gious courts and councils for, 104, 195; 
responsibility for military service, 294 

Churchill, Winston, 36, 47 

Ciskei homeland, 320 

Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM), 212, 
355; ideological position of, 217 

Civil Defense Corps, xx, 310 

Civil Guard, xx, 324-25 

civilian authority, 229 

civil rights: court system to safeguard, 
183-84; groups promoting, 228 

Civil Rights in Israel, 228 

Civil Servants' Union, 190 

civil service {see also Local Authorities' 
Order (Employment Service) (1963)), 
189-90 

Civil Service Board, 190 

Civil Service Law (1959), 189 

climate, 87-88 

clothing industry, 157-58 

coalitions, political: Likud Bloc coalition, 
70; National Unity Government as, 
xix, xxviii; of religious groups, 220-21 

coastal plain, 85 

Cohen, Eli, 328 

Cohen, Geula, 224 

Cohen, Ran, 217 

Combat Engineering Corps, 310 

Command and Staff School, 293 

Committee of Union and Progress, 30 

communications. See telecommunications 

communism, 212, 227 

Communist Party of Palestine, 227 



Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
(1986), United States, 319 

comptroller, state, 192-93, 198 

conferences, 36 

conscription, xxx, 288-90 

Constantine (emperor of Rome), 15 

Constantinople, 15, 16 

constitution {see also Proclamation of In- 
dependence); argument over, xxvii, 53, 
181-84; Basic Laws as representation 
of, xviii, xxvii, 182-83 

construction industry, 158 

cooperatives: affiliated with Histadrut, 
142 

Corfu, Chaim, 233 
Cote d'lvoire, 243 

Council for Peace and Security, xxxii- 
xxxiii 

Council of Settlements in Judea and 
Samaria (Yesha), 226 

Council of Torah Sages, 104, 223, 355 

councils, regional, 199 

Courts Law (1957), 183, 194, 331 

courts-martial, 300, 305 

court system {see also High Court of 
Justice; National Labor Court; Su- 
preme Court); civilian, 193, 331-33; 
Civil Service Disciplinary Court, 190; 
district courts in, 196, 331; Hasidic, 
223; military, 193, 196, 198, 300, 331, 
332; Palestinian, 331; religious, 193, 
194, 195; to safeguard civil rights, 
183-84; specialized courts in, 193-94; 
structure of, 194-98 

Criminal Procedure Law (1965), 331 

Crusaders, 16 

currency, xvii, 163, 173 

customary law, Arab: derivation of legal 
codes from, 194 

Cyrus the Great (emperor of Persia), 11 

Czechoslovakia: arms to Egypt (1955), 
256, 315, 320; Yishuv receives arms 
from (1948), 51 



Damascus, 65 

Damascus (Aram-Damascus), 10, 16 
Dan River, 87 
Dardanelles, 33 
Dari, Arieh (rabbi), 223 
Daroushe, Abdul Wahab, 227 
David (king of Israelites): unification and 
expansion by, 9-10; as warrior, 252 



396 



Index 



Dayan, Moshe, xxx, 58, 60, 64, 66, 208, 
229, 232; role in June 1967 War of, 
259; role in October 1973 War of, 
66-67 

Dayanim Law (1955), 194 

Dayr Yasin, 51 

Dead Sea, xvi, 14, 87, 156 

Dead Sea Bromine, 157 

Dead Sea Works, 157 

debt: domestic, 146, 150, 153-54; exter- 
nal, xxvii, 146, 173 

Declaration of Independence, 55, 104 

Declaration of the Establishment of the 
State of Israel (1948), 3, 181, 184 

Defense (Emergency) Regulations: re- 
striction of movement and land ex- 
propriation under, 56; zone provisions 
of, 55 

defense industries, 314-16 

Defense Service Law, 290 

defense spending. See spending, defense 

Deganya kibbutz, 29, 128 

Degel HaTorah (Torah Flag), 212, 224 

Dekel, Michael, xxxvii 

Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), 275, 279 

Democratic Movement for Change 
(DMC) {see also Shinui (Change)), 208, 
217, 355 

Democratic Zionists, 211 

Department of Military Government, 301 

detention centers, military, 335 

deterrence policy, 268-69 

development towns, 91, 115 

DFLP. See Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 

diamond industry, 156 

Diaspora, 3, 11, 14-15, 83; fund-raising 
in, 200; lack of military tradition in, 
252; loans and grants from, xxvii, 173; 
responsibility of Jews in, 3, 204; as spe- 
cial interest group, 228 

Dimona, 270, 317 

diseases, 136 

districts, administrative (see also govern- 
ment, local; municipalities), xix, 198- 
99 

Dizengoff (shipping company), 167 
Dome of the Rock, 16 
dormant war concept, 267 
Dreyfus, Alfred, xxiii, 25 
Druckman, Chaim (rabbi), 222 
Druze Reconnaissance Unit, 294 



Druze Religious Courts Law (1962), 194 
Druzes: conscription for, 294; in Israel, 

xxvi, 84, 88; religious courts and coun- 
cils for, 104, 194; treatment and activity 
in Israel for, 122, 125 

East Africa, 27 

Eastern Europe. See Europe, Eastern 

East Jerusalem. See Jerusalem, East 

Eban, Abba, xxxiii, 60 

economic assistance: foreign, xxviii, 55; 
for some public services, 151-52; from 
United States, 66, 67, 234, 322 

Economic Stabilization Program (1985), 

xxvii, 146, 150, 154, 173-74, 307 
economy: performance of: 1948-72, 141, 

143-46; performance of: 1973-81, 144- 
46; problems of, xxxv-xxxvi; quasi- 
socialist nature of, xxvi-xxvii; sectors 
of: 1948-72, 141-43 
Edom, 10 

Edot Mizrah. See Jews, Sephardic 
educational system (see also schools), xvi; 
for Arabs, 132, 133; function of IDF 
as part of, 308-10; funding and spend- 
ing for, 151-52; separate, state- 
subsidized, 131; structure and require- 
ments of, 132-33; transformation of 
state religious, 132-33 
EEC. See European Economic Commu- 
nity (EEC) 
Egrof Magen (Defending Shield), 280 
Egypt, 6, 10; actions against Israel 
(1955-56), 256; aircraft destruction 
(1967), 259; armistice agreement with 
(1949), 52, 255; armistice with Israel 
(1948), 52; attack (1970) by Israel of, 
63; boundary with, 85; build-up of mili- 
tary force, 273-74; Canaan boundary 
with, 7; diminished threat of, 272; in- 
vades Israel (1948), 51, 255; Israeli 
troops and planes in, 62, 63; mediator 
in Palestinian-Israeli conflict, xxix; 
migration of Semites to, 8; military al- 
liance with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria 
(1967), 259; ostracized by Jordan, 73; 
perceived as enemy, 267; relations of 
Soviet Union with, 239; relations with, 
231-32; role of Britain in, 32; Sinai 
Peninsula restored to (1982), 73, 78, 
300; as source of oil, 159; Soviet mili- 
tary assistance for, 258; strategy to 



397 



Israel: A Country Study 



recover territory, 63-64; war with 
Yemen, 60; in Yom Kippur attack, 
64-65 

Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agree- 
ment, First. See Israeli-Egyptian Disen- 
gagement Agreement, First 

Eichmann, Adolph, 331-32 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 58 

Eisenstadt, S. N., 83 

Eitan, Rafael, 6, 77, 78, 224, 229; role 
in Begin administration of, 311 

El Al airline, 167 

Elat (port), 87, 167 

Elazar, Daniel, 125 

Elbit, 155 

Elected Assembly (Asefat Hanivharim), 

40, 205, 210 
elections: on local level, 198 
Electoral Alignment (Maarakh), 213, 

216, 357 

electoral system, xxviii; reform for, xviii, 

xxxvii, 228-29 
electronics industry, 155, 316 
Elitzur, Uri, 225 
El Yam (shipping company), 167 
Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of 

Waste Lands) Ordinance, 56 
Emigration: from Israel, 89, 146; of Jews 

from Eastern Europe, 4, 21 
energy industry, 159 
Entebbe raid, 84 

enterprises: private, xx, 154, 315-17; 
state-owned, xix, 315-17; state/private, 
315 

Equatorial Guinea, 243 
Eretz Yisrael, 5, 27 
erosion, 88 

Eshkol, Levi, 59-60, 205, 259; adminis- 
tration of, 61 
Ethiopia, 243 
ethnic groups, 112-16 
Et Taiyiba, 55 
Et Tira, 55 

Etzel. See Irgun Zvai Leumi (National 
Military Organization): Etzel 

Europe, Eastern, 240-41 

Europe, Western {see also European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC)), 241-42 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
158; trade with, 170, 172 

exchange rate system, xvii, 173-74 

executive department, xviii, 184-89 

Exile, 5, 11 



Exodus, 8-9 

exports, xvii, 170; of agricultural prod- 
ucts, 162; of arms and security services, 
xx, 318; to United States under GSP 
and MFN status, 172 

expropriation of land. See land ownership 

extensive threat concept, 267-68 

Ezekiel, 11 

Ezra, 11 

Falashas, 109, 243 

family planning, 91 

Fatimids, 16 

Fay sal. See Amir Faysal 

Faysal-Weizmann agreement, 35 

fedayeen. See guerrillas 

Fibronics, 155 

financial system, 162-66 

First International Bank of Israel, 163 

flooding, 88 

forced labor (corvees), 10 

Ford, Gerald R., 67 

foreign policy: expansion of, xxviii-xxix; 
influences on, xix, 230-44 

France: as arms supplier, 315, 320; man- 
date over Syria of, 36; relations with, 
241 

Frankel, William, 245 

Free Center, 356 

free trade area (FT A), 172 

Gabon, 243 

Gadna. See Youth Corps (Gdudei Noar: 
Gadna) 

Gahal (Freedom-Liberal Bloc), 218, 219, 

356 
Galilee, 15 

Galilee, Israel, 208, 229 

Galilee Area: Arab population in, xxvi, 55 

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 29 

Gaza area, 52 

Gaza Strip (see also intifadah): civilian ad- 
ministration in, 199-200, 301, 303; 
criminal justice in, 333-34; election 
plan for, xxviii, xxxiv; Israeli invasion 
(1967), 259; Israeli reprisal raids in, 
256; Jews in, 300-301; under military 
jurisdiction of Israel, xxx, 300-301, 
303; occupation of (1967), xvi, 5, 85; 
Palestinian Arabs in, 55, 93; prisons in, 
335; problems of population (1967), 73; 



398 



Index 



restrictions and punishments for peo- 
ple in, xxxi; settlements and new set- 
tlements in, xxx vii, 93 
Gaza Valley, 15 

Gemayel, Bashir. See Jumayyil, Bashir 
Gemayel, Pierre. See Jumayyil, Pierre 
General Federation of Laborers in the 

Land of Israel (HaHistadrut HaKlalit 

shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael: Hista- 

drut). See Histadrut 
General Security Service (Sherut Bitahon 

Kelali: Shin Bet or Shabak), xx, 279, 

301, 327, 329-30 
General Service Corps, 310 
General System of Preferences (GSP), 172 
geography, xvi, 85 

Germany, Federal Republic of, 241-42 
Geva, Eli, 312-13 
Ghana, 243 

Ghazi (king of Iraq), 45 
Gibly, Benjamin, 58 
Ginsberg, Asher (Ahad HaAm), 26-27, 
28 

Golan Heights: military positions along, 
271, 283; occupation and annexation 
of (1967), xvi, 85; occupation by Israel 
of, 75; water diversion facility in, 60 

Golani Infantry Brigade, 289 

Gordon, Aaron David, 28-29, 211 

Goren, Shmuel, 303 

government, local (see also districts, ad- 
ministrative; Local Government Cen- 
ter; municipalities; Project Renewal), 
198-99 

government intervention: decline in, 
xxvii, 151; in investment financing, 
164, 166 

Government Names Committee, 189 
Government Press Office, 189 
Government Secretariat, 189 
Granot, Elazar, 216 
Greater Syria, 36-37 
Great Sanhedrin, 13-14 
Greek language, 13 

Greek Orthodox: as minority group, 120; 

religious courts and councils for, 104 
Green Line, 5, 55, 126 
gross domestic product, 144 
gross national product, xvii, 143 
GSP. See General System of Preferences 

(GSP) 
Guard Corps, 310 

guerrilla activity (see also Al Fatah (Move- 



ment for the Liberation of Palestine)): 
Arab (fedayeen), 62, 76; by Egypt 
(1955), 256; by Egypt (1965), 258; lo- 
cation of forces in 1982, 277-78; of New 
Zionist Organization, 218; Palestinian, 
xxix, 62, 63, 276; by Shia groups in Le- 
banon, 265-66; from Syria and Jordan 
(1964), 258 

Gulf of Aqaba, 58, 87, 231-32; Israeli 
fleet in, 284 

Gur, Mordechai, xxxiii, 216 

Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) (see 
also Amana; Herut; Tehiya), 5, 68, 
74-75, 101, 211, 221-22, 224, 356; 
ideology, beliefs, and activity of, 
225-26, 279; as special interest group, 
228 

Gush Emunim Underground (Jewish 
Terror Organization), 279 



Habash, George, 275 

Habib, Philip, 77, 263, 276 

Hadassah Hospital, 62 

Haddad, Saad, 262 

Hadera (coal terminal), 167 

Hadrian (emperor of Rome), 14 

Haetzni, Eliakim, 224 

Haganah (Irgun HaHaganah: Defense 
Organization) (see also Palmach (Pelu- 
got Mahatz: Shock Forces)), 41, 42-43, 
48, 205, 253; as de facto army (1948), 
255, 310; Palmach reserve of, 47, 255, 
310 

HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim 
B'Eretz Yisrael. See Histadrut 

Haifa, 24, 38, 39; fund raising program 
of, 199; port and harbor of, 57, 166 

Haifa Bay, 85 

Haifa University, 133-34 

Hajj Amin al Husayni, 38-39, 44-45, 51 

HaKibbutz HaArtzi (Kibbutz of the 
Land), 128 

HaKibbutz HaDati, 128 

HaKibbutz HaMeuhad (United Kibbutz 
Movement), 128 

halakah (religious law) (see also religi- 
ous courts), xxv-xxvi, 95, 96, 99, 105, 
106, 107, 110; as basis for legal code, 
194 

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), 

xxx-xxxi, 279 
Hammer, Zevulun, 221, 222 



399 



Israel: A Country Study 



HaPoel HaMizrahi (Spiritual Center 

Worker), 221, 356 
HaPoel HaTzair (The Young Worker), 

29, 41, 211, 356 
Harari, Izhar, 182 
Harari decision, 182 
Harel, Israel, 226 
Harkabi, Yehoshafat, xxxiii 
Harun ar Rashid, 16 
Hasbani River, 87 
Hashimite (Hashemite) family, 32 
HaShomer (The Watchmen), 29, 253 
Hasidic Jews, 22 
Hasmonean Dynasty, 13 
Hasmoneans, 5 

Hassan II (king of Morocco), 232-33 

havlaga (self-restraint), 254 

health care system, xvi, 134, 136; fund- 
ing and spending for, 151-52 

Hebrew language, 8, 27, 83; taught as 
part of IDF training, 308-9 

Hebrews, 9 

Hebrew University, 40, 62, 133-34 

Hebron, 38, 42 

Hellenistic period, 13 

Herod the Great (king of Judah), 5, 13 

Herut (Freedom Movement), 53, 60, 134, 
356; Blue- White (Tehelet-Lavan) fac- 
tion of, 218-19; Sephardic Jews support 
for, 206-7 

Herzl, Theodor, xxiii, 25-26, 27, 28, 211 

Herzog, Chaim, xxxvi, xxxvii, 185, 229 

Hess, Moses, 22, 24 

Hevrat HaOvdim (Society of Workers), 
41, 203 

Hibbat Tziyyon (Lovers of Zion), 24, 27, 
83 

High Court of Justice, 195-96 
high technology industry, 315 
Hijaz province, 32 
Hillel, 14 

Hills of Galilee, xvi 

Histadrut (General Federation of Labor- 
ers in the Land of Israel (HaHistadrut 
HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael: 
Histadrut)) (see also Afro- Asian Institute; 
Bank HaPoalim, Hevrat HaOvdim (So- 
ciety of Workers)), 40-41, 69; activities 
of, 127-28; Civil Servants' Union in, 
190; financing of Haganah by, 253; as 
interest group, 228; as national organi- 
zation, 202-3; pension and insurance 
funds of, 136, 137; relation to Mapai 



of, 205; as sector of quasi-socialist econ- 
omy, 142 

Histadrut Conference, 203 

Hitler, Adolf, 44, 48 

Hittite Empire, 7 

Hizballah (Party of God) movement, 

xxx-xxxi, 278 
Holocaust, xxiv, 5, 48-49, 101; effect on 

Zionism of, 5 
Holy Land, 3, 11, 17, 27 
Horam, Yehuda, 240 
House of Omri, 10 
housing, 146 
Hula Basin, 87 

human rights, xxxi, xxxviii, 183-84, 331, 
333 

Hungary, 240-41 
Husayn, Saddam, xxxviii 
Husayni, Faisal, xxxiv 
Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif, xxiv, 32-33 
Husayni (Husseini) family, 38 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence, 33, 
35 

Hussein (king of Jordan), xxix, 60, 63, 
232, 303; denounces Camp David Ac- 
cords, 73; role in Arab-Israeli conflict 
of, 237-39 



immigrants (see also Aliyah): conscription 
for new, 288, 292, 308-10; institutions 
to integrate, 130, 137, 308-10; into 
Palestine, xxiv, 4, 24; from Poland, 42; 
Sephardic Jews as, xxv 

immigration: decreased rate of, 146; ef- 
fect on population age distribution, 88; 
effect on population growth of, 89; into 
Israel (1948-61), 53-54; from Soviet 
Union, xxviii-xxix 

imports, xvii, 170; of coal, 159; of mili- 
tary supplies, 143-44, 153, 314-15; of 
oil, 144, 159, 233 

income distribution, 69 

independence (1948), xxiv, 4, 51 

India, 244; role of Britain in, 32, 49 

Indian Ocean, 317 

Indonesia, 318 

Industrial Development Bank of Israel, 

163 

industrial sector, xvii; arms production 
and defense-related industries in, xxx, 
314-15; biotechnology industries in, 
155-56; chemicals, rubber and plastics 



400 



Index 



industries in, 156-57; clothing and tex- 
tile industries in, 157-58; construction 
industry in, 158; diamond industry in, 
156; domination by government and 
Histadrutof, 142-43, 154-55; electron- 
ics industry in, 155; energy industries 
in, 159; government policy for, 147; 
private ownership in, 154; quality and 
education of labor force in, xxvi; struc- 
ture of, 147-48 

inflation, xxvii, 68, 141, 173-74, 180 

infrastructure, xxvi, 166-69 

Institute for Biological Research, 189 

institutions, national, 200, 205 

Intelligence Branch of general staff (Agaf 
Modiin: Aman), xx, 327, 328-29 

intelligence sector, 320, 327 

interest groups, 227-28 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 317 

intifadah (Palestinian uprising), xxvii, 
xxxviii, 133, 200, 238, 252, 303-6; im- 
pact of, xxxi-xxxvi; participation of 
Palestinian groups in, xxx-xxxi, 279 

invasion: of Lebanon (June 1982), 6 

invasions, 8 

investment, 146-47 

Iran: arms sales to and military coopera- 
tion with, 318-20; Islamic Revolution 
in, 78; relations with, 233-34; support 
in Iran-Iraq War by Syria and Libya, 
78; supports Hizballah movement, 278 

Iran-Iraq War, 78 

Iraq: after Israeli armistice, 52; air force 
performance of, 275; Al Fatah guerril- 
las in, 278; destruction of Osiraq 
nuclear reactor in, 77, 231, 286, 
322-23; Faysal as king of, 36; fear of 
Israel, xxxviii; invades Israel (1948), 
255; military alliance with Egypt, Jor- 
dan, and Syria (1967), 259; as military 
threat, xxxvi, 273; relations with, 234; 
support in Iran-Iraq War by Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, 78; use of surface- 
to-surface missiles (SSMs) by, 269 

Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Or- 
ganization: Etzel) {see also Herut (Free- 
dom Movement)), 43, 48, 53, 218, 254, 
255; connection with Revisionist 
Zionism of, 310-11 

irrigation project. See National Water 
Carrier 

Islam: nationalism of, 37 



Islamic fundamentalist groups, 279 
Islamic Jihad (Holy War) faction, xxx- 
xxxi, 279 

Israel: boycott by Arabs of, 57-58; crea- 
tion of state (1948), xxiv, 3-5, 51, 83; 
invasion by Arab forces (1948), xxiv, 
51 

Israel Aircraft Industries, 143, 316 
Israel Broadcasting Authority (IB A), 189, 
246 

Israel Chemicals Limited (ICL), 143, 157 
Israel Defense Forces (Zvah Haganah 
Le Yisrael: Zahal), xxv, 53; action in 
Lebanon (1982), 229-30; air force 
strength, organization, and responsibil- 
ity, 285-87; attacks on Syria of, 60; 
broadcasting station of, 246; chain of 
command for, 280-81; conditions, pay, 
and benefits in, 294-96; conduct in 
dealing with intifadah, 304-6; delin- 
quents in, 299, 300, 310; Department 
of Military Government in, 301 ; Druze 
Reconnaissance Unit in, 294; as educa- 
tional and socializing factor, 308-10; 
Gadna functional command within, 
287-88; in Gaza Strip and West Bank, 
301; geared for "extensive threat," 
267-68; ground forces strength, loca- 
tion, organization, and responsibility 
in, 281, 283; growth of, 255; military 
law in, 300; military superiority of, 272; 
Minorities Unit in, 294; Nahal func- 
tional command within, 287; navy 
strength, organization, and responsibil- 
ity in, 283-85; rank, insignia, awards, 
and uniforms in, 296-97; reserve sys- 
tem in, 290, 299, 300, 308; role in so- 
ciety of, xxx ; in southern Lebanon 
security zone, 180; strength of, 251; 
Trackers Unit in, 294; training for, 
290-94; Women's Army Corps in, 
289-90 

Israel Diamond Exchange, 156 

Israel Discount Bank, 163 

Israel-EEC Preferential Agreement (1977), 

158, 170, 172 
Israel Foundation Fund (Keren HaYesod), 

202 

Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agree- 
ment, First (1974), 67; Second (1975), 
68 

Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement, 
First (1974), 67; Second (1975), 67 



401 



Israel: A Country Study 



Israel Labor Party. See Labor Party 
Israel Military Industries (IMI), 143, 316 
Israel Police, xx, 189; Border Police as 
subsidiary of, xx, 324; in Gaza Strip 
and West Bank, 301, 323-24; organi- 
zation and law enforcement responsi- 
bilities of, 323-26; reform for, 326-27 
Israel Precious Stones and Diamonds Ex- 
change, 156 
Israel Prison Service, 334-36 
Italy, 47 

Jabotinsky, Vladimir, xxiii, 29-30, 
41-42, 48, 70, 211, 218; establishes 
Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel), 254 

Jacob-Israel (son of Isaac), 8 

Jaffa (Yafo), 37 

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Tel 
Aviv University), xxxiii 

Japan, 244 

Jeremiah, 11 

Jericho missile, 317-18 

Jerusalem: as administrative division, 16; 
as capital, xv; captured from Turks, 35; 
as City of David, 10; Crusaders in, 16; 
division in 1948 of, 52; fund-raising 
program of, 199; Great Sanhedrin in, 
13-14; as Islamic holy city, 16; re- 
named, 14; reunification after June 
1967 War, 5; siege of (A. D. 66), 14 

Jerusalem, East: occupation and annex- 
ation of (1967), xvi, xxxvii, 5, 85, 300; 
uprising among Arabs in, 303-6 

Jew (definition), 106-8 

Jewish Agency (see also Haganah; Israel 
Foundation Fund (Keren HaYesod); 
United Jewish Appeal (UJA); World 
Zionist Organization (WZO)), 36, 37, 
40, 48, 105; financing for Haganah by, 
253; as national institution, 200-202; 
Oriental Jews' interest in, 69; quasi- 
governmental nature of, 142; rejects 
British White Paper provisions, 47; 
work to integrate immigrants of, 130 

Jewish Agency (Status) Law (1952), 201 

Jewish Brigade, 48, 254 

Jewish Legion, 253 

Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet), 

26, 40, 57, 201, 202 
Jewish National Home, 36 
Jewish Settlement Police (Notrim), 253 
Jewish state, 27 



Jewish Terror Organization. See Gush 
Emunim Underground (Jewish Terror 
Organization) 

Jews: Arab attack on, 42; in Eastern 
Europe, 20; emancipation in Western 
Europe for, 17; in Israel, 88; Nazi 
persecution of, 48 

Jews, Ashkenazic, 54, 88-89; differen- 
tiated from Oriental Jews, 84; domi- 
nance in Israeli society, xxv; dominant 
group on kibbutzim, 128-29; as ethnic 
group, 113-14; role in development of 
Zionism, 22, 24 

Jews, Oriental. &*Jews, Sephardic 

Jews, Orthodox (see also Agudat Israel 
Party; Council of Torah Sages; Torah 
Religious Front), 17, 91; arguments 
with secular Jews of, xxv; importance 
of religion in politics for, 220; power 
of, 220-24 

Jews, Sephardic (see also Black Panthers), 
xxv, 22, 54, 89; changing political po- 
sition of, 68-70; decrease in immigra- 
tion of, 146; defection from Labor 
Party of, 69-70; in development towns, 
91; differentiated from Ashkenazic 
Jews, 84, 88-89; dominance in Pales- 
tine of, xxv; education in IDF for, 
308-10; effect of influx of, 5-6; as eth- 
nic group, 113-14; geographic and cul- 
tural orientation of, 206; religious 
beliefs of, 95; representation in military 
support services of, 309-10 

Jews in Ethiopia, 243 

Jews in Iran, 234 

Jews in Morocco, 232 

Jews in South Africa, 243 

Jiryis, Sabri, 56 

Johnson-Lodge Immigration Act, 42 
Johnston Plan, 235 

Joint Economic Development Group 

(United States-Israeli), 235 
Joint Political-Military Group QPMG), 

1983, 234, 321-22 
Joint Security Assistance Group (United 

States-Israeli), 235 
joint ventures, 316 
Jonathan, 9 

Jordan (see also Transjordan), 52; aircraft 
destruction (1967), 259; Al Fatah guer- 
rillas in, 278; arms from Britain and 
United States for, 258; attempt to dis- 
lodge PLO by, 63; border with, 85; 



402 



Index 



build-up of military force, 273-74; cre- 
ation of Hashemite Kingdom of, 57; 
derivation of legal code of, 333; fires on 
Jerusalem, 60; Israeli invasion (1967), 
259; major base of PLO in, 63; mili- 
tary alliance with Iraq, Egypt, and 
Syria (1967), 259; relations with, xix, 
xxix, 232; support of Iraq in Iran-Iraq 
War, 78; weak military threat of, 272; 
West Bank rule by, 73-74 

Jordanian Village Management Law, 303 

Jordan Rift Valley, xvi, 85, 86; military 
position along, 271 

Jordan River, 85, 87; water diversion 
from, 60, 235, 258 

Josephus, 14 

Joshua, 5, 9, 252 

Judah, 9, 10, 14 

Judaism: argument over role in Israel of, 
84; campaign against, 11; intellectual- 
spiritual development of, 15; Ortho- 
dox courts of, 104; reformulation by 
Zionism of, 22; Torah as focal point of, 
11 

Judaism, American: Conservative and 
Reform versions of, 97 

Judaism, Israeli: influence of, 99-101; 
110-11; Orthodox and non-Orthodox, 
95-97; role of traditionalists in 97-98; 
role of Zionists in, 98-99 

Judas (Judah) Maccabaeus, 13 

Judean Hills, xvi, 85, 86 

judges, religious and civil, 194-95 

Judges Law (1953), 183, 194 

judicial system {see also court system; legal 
codes), xviii, 193-98, 331-33; deriva- 
tion of procedures in, 194 

Judiciary Law (1984), 193, 194 

Jumayyil, Bashir, 76, 78, 263 

Jumayyil, Pierre, 262 

June 1967 War. See War of June 1967 

Jurisdiction in Matters of Dissolution of 
Marriages (Special Cases) Law (1969), 
194 

jury system, 194, 333 



Kach (Thus), 211, 212, 222, 224-25; Ter- 
ror Against Terror organization of, 280 
Kahan Commission (1982), 265 
Kahane, Meir (rabbi), 224-25, 280 
Kaissar, Israel, 203 
Kalisher, Zevi Hirsch (rabbi), 22 



Karaites, 109 

kashrut, 106 

Katzir, Ephraim, 270 

Katznelson, Berl, 205 

Katz-Oz, Avraham, 233 

kehilot, 20, 21 

Kenya, 243 

Ketziot detention center, 335 

Khartoum resolution, 62 

Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi 
(ayatollah), 234, 319 

Kibbutz Industries Association, 157 

kibbutz/kibbutzim, 29, 128, 211; agricul- 
tural activity of, 161; federations of, 
128; population of, 91; quality of life 
in, 83; role in regional councils of, 199; 
as special interest group, 228; special 
role of, 204-5 

Kinneret-Negev Conduit. See National 
Water Carrier 

Kissinger, Henry, 65-67, 236 

Kitchener, Horatio H., 32-33 

Knesset, xviii, 53; Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee, 230, 311, 312; or- 
ganization, functions, and responsibil- 
ity of, 190-92 

Knesset Elections Law (1969), 183 

Kollek, Teddy, xxxviii 

Kook, A. I. (rabbi), 98 

Koor Industries, 154 

Kupat Holim (Sick Fund), 127, 136 

Laam (For the Nation), 218, 356 

Labor Alignment, 101 

labor force: education level in, 148, 150; 
employment in defense industries of, 
316; quality and education of, xxvi; 
reduction in agricultural, 162; substi- 
tution for capital of, 147; use of Arabs 
in, xxvi 

Labor Party, xxv, 179, 356; in coalition 
government, 180-81; decline of, 68-70; 
end of dominance by, 70, 216; loss of 
power for, 5-6; retired military in, 229 

Labor Zionism, xxiii, 4, 24, 61, 357; Ben- 
Gurion role in, 40-41; development 
and dominance of, 28-29, 204, 213-14; 
opposition to, 29-30; settlement pol- 
icy of, 5; synthesis of Marxism and 
Zionism in, 28 

Lahat, Shlomo, 229 

Lake Kinneret. See Lake Tiberias 



403 



Israel: A Country Study 



Lake Tiberias, 87 

LaMifneh (To the Turning Point), 222 
Landau, Moshe, 333 
Landau Commission, 333 
Land Day, 126 

Land Development Authority, 57 

Land of Israel Movement, 224 

land ownership: in Israel (after 1948), 
56-57; in Palestine, 39-40 

languages: Arabic in Israel, xvi, 55, 246; 
English, xvi; Hebrew as official, xvi, 
55, 83, 246; Ladino dialect, 113; Yid- 
dish dialect, xvi-xvii, 113 

Laser Industries, 155 

Latin American states, 244 

Lavon, Pinchas, 58 

Lavon affair, 58, 229 

law, religious, 195 

Law and Administrative Ordinance 

(1948), 53 
Law for the Encouragement of Capital In- 
vestment (1967), 147, 164 
Law of Return (1950), 53, 106, 183 
laws to legitimize government, 183 
League of Arab States. See Arab League 

(League of Arab States) 
League of Nations: Council approval of 
British Mandate, 36; Covenant of, 36, 
38 

Lebanon: Al Fatah guerrillas in, 276-78; 
armistice agreement with (1949), 255; 
armistice with Israel (1948), 52; border 
with, 85; Civil War (1975-76), 76, 262; 
invades Israel (1948), 51, 255; Israeli 
activity in, 76-78; Israeli invasion of 
(1982), xxix, 229, 231, 237, 277; Israeli 
retaliation for PLO attacks in, 262; 
militia support from Israel in, 262; 
PLO in, 6; security zone in (1983), 266 

legal codes, 194 

legislative process, 192 

Lehi. See Stern Gang (Lohamei Herut 
Israel: Lehi) 

Lekem. See Bureau of Scientific Relations 
(Leshkat Kesher Madao: Lekem) 

Lesotho, 242 

Levi, David, 220 

Levi, Yitzhak (rabbi), 222 

Levinger, Moshe (rabbi), 5, 68, 225 

Liberia, 243, 320 

Libya: sponsors terrorism, 278; support 

in Iran-Iraq War of Iran, 78 
Lichtenstein, Tovah (rabbi), 224 



Likud (Union) Bloc {see also Free Center; 
Gahal (Freedom-Liberal Bloc); Laam 
(For the Nation); Herut (Freedom 
Movement)), xxv, 179, 211-12; in coa- 
lition government, 70, 180-81; comes 
to power, 5-6, 180, 208; fall of govern- 
ment of (1990), xxxvi; ideological po- 
sition of, 217-20; retired military in, 
229; satellite parties of, 212, 217-18 

Litani River, 76; boundary on, 15 

Little Triangle, 55 

Lloyd George, David, 34 

Local Authorities' Order (Employment 
Services) (1963), 199 

Local Government Center, 199 

Lod airport, 167 

Lotz, Wolfgang, 328 

Lughod, Ibrahim Abu, 238 

Maarakh (Alignment), 213, 357 
MacDonald, Ramsay, 44 
Macedonia, 1 1 

McMahon, Henry, xxiv, 333 

Maki (Communist Party of Israel: Miflaga 
Komunistit Yisraelit), 227, 357 

Malawi, 242 

Malaysia, 318 

mamluks, 16 

mandate system, 35-36 

Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael: 
Mapai) {see also Labor Party), xxvii, 41, 
58, 357; connection with Haganah and 
Palmach of, 310; as party of Ashkena- 
zim, 206-7; role in Israeli life of, 205 

Mapam (Mifleget Poalim Meuchedet: 
United Workers' Party), 134, 212, 213, 
216-17 , 357 

Maritime Fruit Carriers, 167 

Maronite Christian militia, 261-62, 265, 
278 

Maronites, Christian: in Lebanon, 76, 125; 

religious courts and councils for, 104 
Marxism synthesis with Zionism, 28 
maskalim, 21, 24 
Massada, 14 
Mecca, 16, 32 
media, 244-47 
Medina, 16, 32 

Mediterranean Sea: coastline on, xvi, 7, 

15, 85; Israeli fleet in, 284 
Meir, Golda, 62, 64, 91, 109, 116, 205; 

administration of, 208, 216, 218 



404 



Index 



Melman, Yossi, 232 
merkaz klita (absorption agency), 130 
Merneptah (king of Egypt), 8 
Mesopotamia: Canaan boundary with, 7 
Mexico, 159, 244 

MFN. See most favored nation (MFN) 
status 

Middle Eastern states: partition into Brit- 
ish and French zones, 33-34; relations 
with, 231-34 

migration: of Jews to cities, 20; of Jews 
to Egypt, 8 

Miles- Yeda, 155 

military assistance: from United States, 

66, 153, 234, 320-22 
military authority: limits to political ac- 
tivity by, 229 
military budget. See spending, defense 
Military Court of Appeal, 300 
military equipment, xix, 281, 283, 
284-86; purchase of foreign, 316; sales 
of, 318-20; from United States, 320 
military government: for Arabs in Israel 
(after 1948), 54-57; for Arabs in oc- 
cupied territories, 301, 323-24, 333-34 
Military Justice Law (1955), 300, 332 
military sector: role in politics of, xxx, 
310-14 

military supplies: imports of, 143-44 

militias in Palestine, 253 

millet system, 102 

Milson, Menachem, 75 

Ministerial Committee for Security Af- 
fairs, 311 

Ministry of Agriculture, 132 

Ministry of Defense, 55, 56, 58, 193, 
280-81, 300, 301, 316; Defense Sales 
Office of, 319 

Ministry of Education and Culture, 130, 
132, 199, 246, 287 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 230 

Ministry of Health, 136 

Ministry of Housing, 68 

Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 130, 
137 

Ministry of Interior, 221, 303, 323, 

334-35 
Ministry of Justice, 193 
Ministry of Labor, 132 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, 102, 104, 

193, 220, 221 
Ministry of Social Welfare, 136-37 
Minorities Unit, 294 



minority groups, 120-27 

Mirza Husayn Ali (Baha Ullah), 120 

missionary schools, 17 

Mitterrand, Francois, 241 

Mitzna, Amran, xxxv, 314 

Mizrahi (Spiritual Center) (see also Na- 
tional Religious Party), 99, 102, 211, 
221, 358 

Moab, 10 

Moledet (Homeland), 224, 358 
monetary policy, 173-74 
Morasha (Heritage), 222, 358 
Morocco, 232-33, 318 
Mosaic Code, 9 
Moses, 9, 10 

moshav (pi., moshavim): agricultural ac- 
tivity in, 161; federations of, 129; 
founding of, 211; population and activ- 
ity of, 91, 129; quality of life in, 83; role 
in regional councils of, 199; as special 
interest group, 228; special role of, 
204-5 

Mossad. See Central Institute for Intelli- 
gence and Special Missions (Mossad 
Merkazi le Modiin Uletafkidim Meyu- 
hadim: Mossad) 

most favored nation (MFN) status, 172 

mountains and hills, 85 

Mount Gilboa, 9 

Mount Hermon, 87 

Mount Meron, xvi, 85 

Mount Scopus, 62 

Mount Sinai, 9 

Moyne, 48 

Muari, Muhammad, 227 
Mubarak, Husni, xxix 
Multinational Force: in Beirut (1982), 265 
municipalities, 198-99 
Muslim Brotherhood, 78 
Muslim Circassians, 294 
Muslims: in Israel, xxvi, 84, 88; in Leb- 
anon, 76 

Muslims, Sunni: Circassian minority, 
120; religious courts for, 104, 194 

Nabulus, xxxi, 16 
Nafsu, Izat, 330 

Nahal. See Pioneer Fighting Youth (Noar 

Halutzi Lohem: Nahal) 
Nahal HaArava (Wadi al Arabah), 87 
Nahal Soreq, 317 
Napoleon, 16-17 



405 



Israel: A Country Study 



Napoleonic Code, 194 
Nashashibi family, 38-39 
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 58-59, 60, 62; 
orders attack on Israel, 60; War of At- 
trition of, 62-63 
Nathan, Abie, xxxiii 
National Council for Research and De- 
velopment, 189 
National Council (Vaad Leumi), 40, 205 
National Defense College, 293 
National Guidance Committee, 73, 75 
National Insurance Act (1953), 136-37 
nationalism {see also Gush Emunim): anti- 
Semitism factor of, 17, 20; Arab forms 
of, 30, 32, 36-37, 45; of Palestinians, 
6, 75; religious, 61, 74-75; rise of Zi- 
onism from, 3-4; Turkish form of, 30, 
32; varieties of, 37 
nationality: defined, 107, 108-9 
Nationality Law (1952), 106, 183 
National Labor Court, 196 
National Parks Authority, 189 
National Police School, 325 
National Religious Party (NRP) {see also 
Bene Akiva; HaKibbutz HaDati), 102, 
104, 108, 128, 212, 220-21, 358; found- 
ing and development of, 221; LaMifneh 
faction in, 222; Youth Faction of, 221- 
22, 225 

national security: concepts of, xxix-xxx, 
266-72; deterrence as main factor for, 
268; factors necessary for, xxv, 251; as 
rationale for actions against Arabs, 5 

National Unity Government, xix, xxviii, 
xxxiii, 60, 180, 231, 232, 239 

National Water Carrier, 60, 86, 258 

naval air arm, 285 

naval fleet, 284 

Navon, Yitzhak, 185, 216 

navy. See Israel Defense Forces; Sea Corps 
(Hel Yam); underwater commandos 

Nazi war crimes, 331-32 

Nebuchadnezzar, 1 1 

Neeman, Yuval, 224 

Negev Desert, xvi, 56, 85, 86 

Negev Phosphates, 157 

Nesher, 154 

Netanyahu, Benjamin, 220 
Neturei Karta, 95 

newspapers: in Arabic, 246; in Hebrew 

and English, 245, 247 
New Zealand, 244 
Nicholas I (tsar), 20 



Nigeria, 243 
Nile Valley, 8 

NIS. See currency; exchange rate system 
Nixon, Richard M., 63, 66, 321 
Non-Aligned Movement, 244 
non-Jews in Israel {see also Arabs in 

Israel), 84, 88 
Northern Area (Galilee Area), 55 
North Yemen. See Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic (North Yemen) 
NRP. See National Religious Party (NRP) 
nuclear weapons: Israeli capability in, 
270-71; research for, 317 



occupied territories (see also Gaza Strip; 
West Bank): activity of Shin Bet in, 
329-30; Arab and Jewish population 
in, 93, 300-301; criminal justice in, 
333-34; East Jerusalem as, xxxvii, 5, 
85, 300; expansion after 1948 invasion 
into, 255-56; justification for, 5; mili- 
tary government and courts of, 301, 
323-24, 333-34; Palestinian Arab court 
system in, 331, 333-34; settlements and 
new settlements in, xxxvii, 68, 93; of 
June 1967 War, 259, 300-301 

October 1973 War. See War of October 
1973 

Odessa, 20, 21 

offensive strategy: as deterrent, 268 
Office of the Prime Minister, 189 
Office of the State Comptroller {see also 

State Comptroller Law (1958)), xviii, 

192-93 
oil as political weapon, 66 
oil industry, 159 
oil refineries, 143 

ombudsman/ombudswoman. See comp- 
troller, state 
Operation Litani, 76, 276, 323 
Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), xxix, 

6, 78, 263-64 
Organization of African Unity, 242 
Oriental Jews. See Jews, Sephardic 
Orthodox Jews. See Jews, Orthodox 
Osiraq nuclear reactor, 77, 231, 286, 
322-23 

Ottoman Decentralization Party, 32 
Ottoman Empire, 16-17; control of Arab 

lands by, 30; derivation of legal codes 

from, 194, 331, 333 
Ozen, Avner, 225 



406 



Index 



Pale of Settlement, 20, 21, 22, 61 
Palestine (see also Balfour Declaration; 
Britain): Arab population of, 30; under 
British, French, and Russian control 
(1916), 34-35, 38; British Mandate for 
(1923), 36-44; Crusaders in, 16; divi- 
sion of, 16; as geographic unit, 15; Jew- 
ish immigration to, 24, 29, 37-38, 42, 
44, 47-48; Jewish nation-state in, xxiii, 
3; Labor Zionist movement in, 4; 
recommended partition of, 45; remain- 
ing portion after 1948 war, 52; strategic 
importance of, 34; support for settle- 
ment in, 24; UN General Assembly 
Resolution (1947) for partition, 50; UN 
partition plan for (1947), 50-51 
Palestine Center for Human Rights, 
xxxviii 

Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 263, 

275; evacuates Beirut (1982), 265 
Palestine Liberation Force, 51-52 
Palestine Liberation Front, 275 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 
Abu Nidal organization in, 263, 275; 
base in Lebanon of, xxix, 76; cam- 
paign in Lebanon against, 6; effect of 
intifadah on, xxxi-xxxii; efforts to 
resolve Palestinian-Israeli confict, 
xxxiii-xxxiv; establishes major base in 
Jordan, 63; factions of, 275; harass- 
ment of Israeli settlements by, 262; 
military assistance and support from 
Soviet Union to, 239; political support 
for, 227; rejects Reagan Plan, 237; 
represents Palestinian people, 61, 67; 
strength in West Bank of, 75; umbrella 
resistance organization, 62; United 
States willingness to negotiate with, 
239; United States dialogue with, 181 
Palestine National Council, xxxii, 238 
Palestinian Communist Party, 279 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict {see also in- 
tifadah), xix, xxix; efforts to resolve, 
xxxii-xxxvi; Palestinian Revolt (1936- 
39), 44-47 
Palestinian Police, xx 
Palestinian Revolt (1936-39), 33, 39, 
44-47 

Palestinians: under Israeli rule, 73; in 
military detention centers, 335; nation- 
alism of, 6; PLO as sole representative 
of, 67; political parties and popular 
committees of, xxx-xxxi, 227; provi- 



sions in Camp David Accords for, 237; 
refugee camps of, 55, 65, 303-4; sup- 
port of autonomy for, 70; uprising (in- 
tifadah) of, xxx-xv, 133, 200, 238, 279, 
303-6 

Palmach (Pelugot Mahatz: Shock Forces), 
47, 53, 218, 254-55 

pan-Arabism, 267 

Paris Peace Conference, 36 

Passfield White Paper (1930), 43-44 

peacekeeping forces, UN, 59 

Peace Now movement, xxxii, 217, 228 

Peel Commission, 45 

penal system (see also Israel Prison Ser- 
vice), 334-36 

pension system, civil service, 190 

Peres, Shimon, 58, 74, 208, 216, 229, 
231, 232-33; fired (1990), xxxvi; leader 
of Labor Party, 180; as Minister of 
Finance (1988), xxxv; political rivalry 
with Rabin of, 67; support for Reagan 
Plan, 237 

Peretz, Don, 57 

Peretz, Yitzhak (rabbi), 223 

Persian Empire, 11 

PFLP. See Popular Front for the Libera- 
tion of Palestine (PFLP) 

Phalange Party (Lebanon), 76 

Phalangist militiamen, 263, 265 

Pharisees, 13, 14 

Philistia. See Syria Palestina 

Philistines, 9, 10, 15 

Phoenicia, 10 

Pinsker, Leo, 24, 25 

Pioneer Fighting Youth (Noar Halutzi 
Lohem: Nahal), xix, 287, 309 

pipelines, xviii 

Plain of Esdraelon, 9, 85 

Plain of Yizreel (Plain of Jezreel or Plain 
of Esdraelon), 9 

plastics industry, 156 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO) 

Poalei Tziyyon (Workers of Zion), 28, 
211, 227, 358 

pogroms, xxiii, 4, 20, 21, 25, 252-53 

Poland: crisis in, 42; relations with, 
240-41 

Polgat Enterprises, 158 

police force. See Israel Police 

political parties, 210-27; Arab, 212, 
226-27; Knesset representation of 
Arab, 226-27; leftist or socialist labor, 



407 



Israel: A Country Study 



211; Marxist, 211; pivotal role of reli- 
gious, xxxvii, 220; religious, 98-99, 
220-24; right-wing ultranationalist, 
224-25; role of tiny, fringe, xxxvii; 
youth movements associated with, 134; 
Zionist, 211-12; Zionist orientation of, 
213 

political societies, Arab, 32 

political system (see also coalitions, politi- 
cal; National Unity Government): ac- 
commodation to different groups by, 
205-8; characterization of, 179; crisis 
in, 228-29; effect of October 1973 War 
on, 208-9; elite members of, 204, 208-9; 
formation of National Unity Govern- 
ment (1984), 179-80; multiparty nature 
of, xviii-xix, xxviii, 210-28; role of mili- 
tary in, xxx, 310-14; structure and re- 
form of, xviii, 203-10 

Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 235, 330 

Pompey, 13 

Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command, 275, 
278-79 

population, xvi, 88; Arabs as ratio of, xxvi, 
226; concentration of, 91; differences 
in Jewish, 88-89; effect of immigra- 
tion on, 88-89; growth in Palestine of, 
44 

Porat, Hanan, 222, 225 

ports and harbors, xviii, 166, 167 

precipitation, 87-88 

president, xviii; appointment of judges 
by, 194-95; duties and responsibilities 
of, 184-85 

press corps: Arab, 247; Israeli, 244-46 

Press Ordinance of 1933, 247 

Prevention of Infiltration Law, 332 

Prime Minister's Bureau, 189 

prison system (see also Israel Prison Ser- 
vice), 334-36 

Proclamation of Independence, 104 

Progressive National Movement (Pro- 
gressive List for Peace), 227, 358-59 

Project Renewal, 199 

protection, trade, 169-70 

Protestants, 120 

Provisional Council of State, 53 
Ptolemy I, 11 

Public Council for a Constitution for 

Israel, 184 
public service sector: components and 

spending for civilian, 150-52; growth 



in, 147-48 



Qadis Law (1961), 194 
Qalandiyah airport, 167 
Qarmatians, 16 
Qishon stream, 85 
Quran, 194 



rabbi, 15 

rabbinical courts. See religious courts; 
Supreme Rabbinical Court 

Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law 
(1953), 194 

Rabbi of Gur (court), 223 

Rabin, Yitzhak, xxx, 64, 180, 208, 216, 
229, 232; aid to Maronites in Lebanon 
by government of, 76; government of, 
67; perception of Egypt, 268; proposals 
to end Palestinian-Israeli conflict of, 
xxiv 

radio, 245, 246 

Rafael. See Armament Development Au- 
thority (Rafael) 
Rafi (Israel Labor List), 208, 213, 359 
railroad system, xviii, 166, 167 
Rakah (New Communist List), 212, 227, 
359 

Ramadan War. See War of October 1973 
Ram Allah human rights organization, 
xxxi 

Ram Allah prison, 335 

Ramses II (king of Egypt), 8 

Raviv, Dan, 232 

Reagan, Ronald, 77, 234, 237 

Reagan Plan, 237 

Red Sea, 58; Israeli fleet in, 284 

refugee camps for Palestinian Arabs, 55, 

265, 303 
regions, topographic, 85 
Rehoboam, 10 
Reich, Bernard, 84 
Reichman, Uriel, 184 
Reines, I. J. (rabbi), 98-99 
religion, xvii, 13, 15; Islam in Israel, 55; 

Israeli Judaism, 95-1 12; Judaism, 55; 

nationalist element in, 61; new civil, 

100-101; problem of reconciliation with 

nation-state duties, 4-5 
religious courts, 102, 104, 105, 107 
research, joint military, 320 



408 



Index 



reserves in IDF, xxxv, xxxviii, 290, 299, 

300, 308 
Revisionist Party, 218 
Revisionist Zionism, xxiii, 41-42, 70, 

204, 211, 359 
Richter, Yehuda, 225 
Rishon LeZiyyon, 24 
roads, xviii, 166 
Rogers, William, 63, 236 
Rogers Plan, 63, 64, 236 
Roman Empire, 13-15 
Romania, 240-41, 318 
Rothschild, Edmond de, 24, 28 
rubber industry, 156 
Rubenstein, Amnon, 217 
Russian Empire, 20 

Sabra refugee camp, 265 
sabras, 293 

Sadat, Anwar as, xxix, 6; expels Soviet 
advisers, 64; role in strategy for Arab- 
Israeli peace, 70-71, 236-37; role in 
October 1973 War, 66-67; succeeds 
Nasser, 63 

Sadducees, 13 

Sager, Samuel, 230 

Said, Edward, 238 

Salah ad Din (Saladin), 16 

Samarian Hills, 85 

Samaritans, 120 

Samuel, 9 

Samuels, Herbert, 37, 38, 44 
Sanhedrin (see also Great Sanhedrin), 
13-14 

San Remo Conference, 36 
Sapir, Pinchas, 69, 208 
Sarid, Yossi, 217 

satellites, reconnaissance, xxxiii, 323 

Saudi Arabia, 45; acquisition of SSMs by, 
269; defensive posture of, 273; invades 
Israel (1948), 51; support of Iraq in 
Iran-Iraq War, 78; United States mili- 
tary sales to, 321 

Saul (king of Israelites), 9 

saving, 146 

schools: for Arabs (Muslim, Christian, 
and Druze), 121 ; Central School of Ad- 
ministration, 190; for conscripts, 309; 
for Hebrew language (ulpan), 130; of 
kibbutz federations, 131; for military 
training, 292-93; for police training, 
325-26; religious high school system, 



133; religious (yeshivot), 131; state re- 
ligious and secular, 131-32 

Sciaki, Avner, 222 

Scitex, 155 

Sea Corps (Hel Yam), 281 

Sea of Galilee. See Lake Tiberias 

Second Israel (Israel Shniya), 114-16 

security services, 318 

Seleucids, 11 

Selim I (sultan), 16 

Seljuks, 16 

Semitic languages, 8 

Senegal, 243 

Senior Officers' College (Israel Police), 
325 

Sephardic Jews. &tf Jews, Sephardic 
Sephardic Torah Guardians: Shas, xxxvi, 

105, 220, 222, 359; ideological position 

of, 223-24 
service sector, 142 

setdements (see also Council of Setdements 
in Judea and Samaria (Yesha); Gaza 
Strip; West Bank): acceleration follow- 
ing Camp David Accords of, 72-73; built 
between 1948-53, 57; by Gush Emunim, 
225-26; in occupied territories, 68, 74- 
75; opposition to new West Bank and 
Gaza, xxxvii, 237; policy for West Bank 
and Gaza, 125-27, 231; regional coun- 
cils of, 199; at Yamit (1971), 64 

Shabak. See General Security Service 
(Sherut Bitahon Kelali: Shin Bet or 
Shabak) 

Shabbat, 106 

Shafet, Gershon, 224 

Shafir, Herzl, 326 

Shakh, Eliezer (rabbi), 223 

Shale v, Aryeh, xxxiii 

Shalom, Avraham, 330 

Shamir, Shulamit, 241 

Shamir, Yitzhak: fall of government of 
(1990), xxvi; as leader of Likud Bloc, 
219; plan for occupied territory elec- 
tions of, xxviii, xxxiv; proposed peace 
plan of, xxxiv-xxxv; rejects conference 
with PLO, 231; in Stern Gang, 254; 
succeeds Begin, 180 

Shammai, 14 

Sharett, Moshe, 58, 205 

sharia (Islamic law) courts, 102, 104 

Sharon, Ariel, xxx, 6, 65, 75, 77, 78, 220, 
229, 267-68; aggressive stance of, 269; 
resigns as minister of defense, 265 



409 



Israel: A Country Study 



Shas. See Sephardic Torah Guardians: 
Shas 

Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians), 212 
Shatila refugee camp, 265 
Shaw Commission, 43 
Shefaraam, 325 

Shelli (Peace for Israel and Equality for 

Israel), 227, 359 
Shemen, 154 

Shia population (see also Hizballah (Party 

of God) movement); guerrilla activity 

of, 265-66, 278 
Shimron Commission, 326 
Shin Bet. See General Security Service 

(Sherut Bitahon Kelali: Shin Bet or 

Shabak) 

Shinui (Change), 212, 217, 359 
shipping fleet, 167 

Shomrim (Guardsmen) units (see also 

HaShomer (Watchmen)), 253 
Shomron, Dan, xxxiii, 280, 314 
Shultz, George P., 238-39 
Sick Funds. See Kupat Holim (Sick Fund) 
Sidon, 264 
Sierra Leone, 243 
Simon Maccabaeus, 13 
Simpson, John Hope, 43 
Sinai, 8-9 

Sinai Campaign. See War of 1956 (Sinai 

Campaign) 
Sinai Desert, 87 

Sinai Disengagement Agreements. See 
Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agree- 
ment (First), (Second) 

Sinai Peninsula: Israeli attack (October 
1956), 256; Israeli invasion (1967), 259; 
occupation and annexation of (1967), 
5; oil supply in, 159; returned to Egypt 
(1982), xxix, 73, 78, 300; as site for 
Jewish state, 27 

Singapore, 244 

Sisco, Joseph P., 236 

Six-Day War. See War of June 1967 

social structure: class structure in, 116- 
20; forces influencing, 93, 95; influence 
of military on, 312; problems of, xxv- 
xxvi, 83-84 social welfare programs, 
136-37, 144; funding and spending for, 
151-52 

Social Welfare Service Law (1958), 136- 
37 

solar energy, 159 
Soleh Boneh, 41 



Solomon, 5, 10, 252 
Soltam, 316 

Sons of the Village Party, 227 
South Africa, 159, 243-44; arms sales to, 
318-19 

South Lebanon Army (SLA), 265, 266, 
278 

South Yemen. See Yemen, People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of (South Yemen) 

Soviet Jewry Education and Information 
Center, 240 

Soviet Union: military assistance in Oc- 
tober 1973 War, 64; military assistance 
to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq by, 63, 321; 
relations with, xxviii-xxix, 239-40; role 
in Arab-Israeli conflict, 60 

Spain, 242 

spending, defense, xx, xxxviii, 68, 143- 
44, 152-53, 322; impact on economy 
of, 251, 306-8 

Sri Lanka, 244 

SSMs. See surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs) 

State Archives and Library, 189 
State Comptroller Law (1958), 183 
State Education Law (1953), 131, 183 
State Employment Service, 189 
state-owned enterprises, 142-43 
Stern, Avraham, 254 
Stern Gang(Lohamei Herut Israel: Lehi), 

43, 48, 218, 254, 255 
stock market (see also Tel Aviv Stock Ex- 
change (TASE)), 164 
Strait of Tiran: closed by Egypt, 256; 
closed to Israeli shipping, 58; UN clos- 
ing of, 60 
Struma affair, 48 
Sudan, 278 

Suez Canal, 236; British and French sei- 
zure of, 59, 62; closed to Israeli ship- 
ping, 58; Egypt's actions along, 321; 
nationalization of, 256; strategic sig- 
nificance of, 32, 34, 35; war in vicin- 
ity of (1956), xxv 

Supreme Court, 195-96, 331, 333, 334, 
335 

Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), 38 
Supreme Rabbinical Court, 102 
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), 269, 
274 

Swaziland, 242 

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 33-34; 
declared void by Arabs, 36 



410 



Index 



synagogue, 15 

Syria (see also Greater Syria), 15, 34, 35; 
aircraft destruction (1967 and 1982), 259, 
264; Al Fatah guerrillas in, 278; armistice 
agreement with (1949), 255; armistice 
with Israel (1948), 52; border with, 85; 
British withdrawal from, 37; build-up of 
military force, 273-74; Fay sal elected 
king of, 37; French mandate over, 36; 
invades Israel (1948), 51, 255; Israeli 
forces in (1973), 65; Israeli invasion 
(1967), 259; military alliance with Iraq, 
Egypt, and Jordan (1967), 259; military 
threat of, xxxvi, 272-73; in October 1973 
War, 65; relations of Israel with, xxix; 
relations of Soviet Union with, 239; role 
in Lebanon of, 76; Soviet military as- 
sistance for, 258; sponsors anti-Arafat ter- 
rorism, 278; support for Iran in Iran-Iraq 
War, 78; use of surface-to-surface mis- 
siles (SSMs) by, 269; water diversion 
from Jordan River by, 60, 258 

Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agree- 
ments. See Israeli-Syrian Disengage- 
ment Agreements 

Syria Palestina, 13, 14, 15 

Syrkin, Nachman, 28 



Taba, 231 

Tadiran Electronic Industries, 143, 316 

Taiwan (ROC), 244 

Talmud, 14, 101 

Talmud, Babylonian, 15 

Talmud, Palestinian, 15 

TAMA (purchasing tax), 170 

Tami (Traditional Movement of Israel), 
213, 222, 359 

tax system: after 1985 reform, 150; 
revenues of, 145, 153-54 

Technion (Israel Institute of Technology), 
40, 133-34 

Technological and Scientific Information 
Center, 189 

technology transfer agreement, 235 

Tehiya (Renaissance), 222, 224, 359 

Tel Aviv, 14, 24; as capital, xv; develop- 
ment of, 42; fund raising program of, 
199 

Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), 164, 
166 

Tel Aviv University, xxxiii, 133-34 
telecommunications, xviii, 169 



Telem, 208-9 
television, 245, 246 

Temple in Jerusalem (see also Wailing 

Wall), 10, 11, 13, 14-15 
Tenuvah, 41 

Terror Against Terror (TNT), 280 

terrorism (see also Abu Musa faction), 50, 
101, 225; by Arabs, 278; attacks on 
Israeli border defenses, 278; Border 
Police preparation for, 324; of Jews 
against Arabs, 42-43, 279-80; by Libya, 
278; by Palestinians, 67; sea infiltration 
by PLO, 284 

textile industry, 157-58 

Thailand, 244 

Tirosh program (see also Israel Police), 

326-27 
Titus, 14 
Togo, 243 

topography, xvi, 85-87 

Torah, 6-7, 9; as basis for legal code, 194; 
compilation of, 11; study and obser- 
vance of, 15 

Torah Religious Front, 221, 222, 359-60 

tourism, 158-59 

Trackers Unit, 294 

trade, international: barriers to, 169-70; 

GSP and MFN status in, 172; with 

Hungary, 240; with West European 

countries, 241 
trade unions (see also Histadrut), xxvi, 

142, 190 

Transjordan, 45, 52; armistice agreement 
with (1949), 255; armistice with Israel 
(1948), 52; invades Israel (1948), 51; 
separate British mandate for, 36 

transportation system, 166-69; public, 
166 

treaties (see also Camp David Accords), 6, 
72 

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests 

in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 

Under Water (1963), 317 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel 

(1979), xix, xxix, 6, 72, 224, 231, 237, 

268, 300, 321 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons (1968), 317 
truce. See cease-fire 
Truman, Harry S, 49, 51 
Tsomet (Crossroads), 224 
Tunisia: Al Fatah terrorists in, 278; 

bombing of PLO headquarters in, 287 



411 



Israel: A Country Study 



Turkey, 242; armistice with, 37; arms 
sales to, 318; defeat of, 35; nationalism 
of, 30, 32 

Tyre, 10, 264, 266 

Tzaban, Yair. 216 



Uganda Plan, 27, 28 

ulpan (Hebrew language school), 130 

Umar (caliph), 16 

Umar II (caliph), 16 

Umayyads, 16 

underground economy, 68-69 

underwater commandos, 284-85 

UNEF. See United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) 

Unified National Command of the Up- 
rising, xxx, 279 

United Arab Republic (UAR), 60 

United Jewish Appeal (UJA), 202 

United Mizrahi Bank, 163 

United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Force (UNDOF), 67 

United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF), 60. 68 

United Nations Interim Force in Leba- 
non (UNIFIL), 76, 77 

United Nations Partition of Palestine 
Resolution (1947). 239 

United Nations Relief and Works Agen- 
cy (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees, 
xxxi, 73 

United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP), 50 

United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- 
nization-Palestine (UNTSOP), 52 

United Nations (UN): admits Israel to 
membership (1949), 51: buffer zone. 
67; cease-Fire for June 1967 War, 259; 
cease-fire for October 1973 War, 261; 
General Assembly, 50; General Assem- 
bly Resolution (1947), xxiv, 50; peace- 
keeping forces of (1957), 59; Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967). 61. 63. 
65, 68, 236. 239; Security Council 
Resolution 338 (1973), 65, '236, 239; 
Security Council Truce Commission, 
52 

United Religious Front, 220-21. 360 
United States: arms sales to, 320, 322; at- 
tempts to resolve PLO-Israel conflict, 
xxviii; cease-fire imposition under 
auspices of, 264; Department of State 



Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, xxxi; dependence of Yishuv 
(Palestine) on, 48; initiatives in Arab- 
Israeli conflict, 180-81; military and 
economic assistance from, 66; military 
cooperation with, 320-23; position on 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 320; relations 
with, 234-39; sales of military equip- 
ment by, 320-23; as trading partner. 
170, 172 

United States-Israel Free Trade Area 
(FTA) Agreement (1987), 158, 172. 
234-35 

Universal House of Justice (Bahai), 120 
universities, 133-34 
U Thant. 60 

valleys. 85 

Yanunu. Mordechai, 270. 318. 328 
Yespasian, 14 
vigilantism, 280 
Yillage League plan, 75 
Yilner. Meir. 227 

violence: in occupied territories, 6; related 

to UN resolution for partition. 51 
Voice of America, 235 
Yoice of the IDF (Galei Zahal), 246 



Wailing Wall. 14. 42 
Waldman. Eliezer (rabbi), 224 
war: potential triggers for. 269-70 
War of Attrition (1969-70), 62-64, 260; 

United States assistance in settlement 

of, 236 

War of Independence, 51-52, 255, 314 

War of June 1967. xxv. 60. 73. 259-60; 
impact of. 5: impact on Labor Partv of. 
216; importance of. 5: occupied and an- 
nexed territories after, 85; territories oc- 
cupied during. 300; United States 
mediation m. 236 

War of 1956 (Sinai Campaign), 54, 60, 
256. 258-59 

War of October 1973. xxv. 64-68. 260- 
62; assistance from United States for, 
234: failures of. 299; impact of. 5, 262: 
influence on politics and society of. 208. 
216; postwar settlement period of. 
66-67: United States military equip- 
ment in. 320 

wars, xxv, 5. 6. 13 



412 



Index 



Watchmen. See HaShomer (The Watch- 
men) 

Weiss, Daniella, 226 
Weizman, Ezer, xxx, xxxiii, 75, 208, 216, 
229 

Weizmann, Chaim, xxiv, 27, 32, 34, 35, 
48, 51, 53, 211 

Weizmann Institute of Technology, 
133-34, 155 

West Bank {see also intifadah): Arabs in, 93; 
Cairo-Amman Bank in, 232; civilian 
administration in, 199-200, 301, 303; 
criminal justice in, 333-34; election 
plan for, xxviii, xxxiv; election results 
(1976), 74; guerrilla groups in 
(1967-70), 260; Israeli reprisal raids in, 
256; Jordan disclaims involvement in, 
xxix; local government in, 303; under 
military jurisdiction of Israel, xxx, 
300-301, 303; occupation and annex- 
ation of (1967), xvi, 5-6, 52, 85, 300; 
Palestinian Arabs in, 55, 73; prisons in, 
335; restrictions and punishments for 
people in, xxxi; settlements and new 
settlements in, xxxvii, 68 

Western Europe. See Europe, Western 

White Paper (1939), 47, 50 

Wingate, Orde Charles, 253-54 

Wolffsohn, Michael, 241 

women in police force, 325 

Women's Army Corps (Chen), 289 

Woodhead Commission: reversal of Peel 
Commission recommendation, 45 

Workers of Zion. See Poalei Tziyyon 
(Workers of Zion) 

World Peace Council, 240 

World Zionist Organization (WZO) {see 
also Jewish National Fund), 26, 27, 36, 
40, 137, 211; as national institution, 
200-202 



Yadin, Yigal, 208, 229 
Yahad (Together), 208, 360 
Yahweh (God), 6, 9 
Yariv, Aharon, 229 
Yarqon stream, 85 

Yemen: invades Israel (1948), 51; war 

with Egypt, 60 
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 

(South Yemen): Al Fatah guerrillas in, 

278 



Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen): 

Al Fatah guerrillas in, 278 
Yesha. ^Council of Settlements injudea 

and Samaria (Yesha) 
yeshiva (pi., yeshivot), 131, 288 
Yibna Qabneh), 14 
Yiddish, 21 

Yishuv (Palestine), 4, 5, 29, 40-41, 83 

Yizreel (Jezreel) Valley, 85 

Yom Kippur War (1973). See War of Oc- 
tober 1973 

Yoseph, Ovadia (rabbi), 104-5, 223 

Young Worker. See HaPoel HaTzair (The 
Young Worker) 

Youth Corps (Gdudei Noar: Gadna), xix, 
287-88, 309 

Youth Faction (National Religious Party), 
221-22, 225 

youth movements, 134 

Zahal. See Israel Defense Forces: IDF 
(Zvah Haganah Le Yisrael: Zahal) 

Zahlah, 76-77, 263 

Zaire, 243, 320 

Zealots, 14 

Zikhron Yaaqov, 24 

Zim (shipping company), 167 

Zionism {see also Zionist Congress; Jew- 
ish National Fund (Keren Kayemet); 
Labor Zionism; Revisionist Zionism; 
World Zionist Organization (WZO)): 
cultural form of, xxiii, 4, 26-27, 28; de- 
velopment of movement, 3-4, 20-22; 
effect of Holocaust on, 5, 48-49; as na- 
tionalist movement, 83; political form 
of, xxiii, 4, 20, 24-26, 28; precursors 
to, 22, 24; reformulation of Judaism by, 
22 

Zionist Congress: First, 26; Sixth, 27; 
Twentieth (1937) agrees to partition, 
45 

Zionist movement, 38-39; Betar faction 
of, 42-43; impact of Balfour Declara- 
tion on, 35 

Zionists: as potential ally of Britain, 34; 
Orthodox, 96, 212 

Zipori, Mordecai, 229 

Zisar, Baruch, 228 

Zobah (Aram-Zobah), 10 

Zucker, Dudy, 217 

Zucker, Norman, 220 



413 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


OOU-lOJ 


Lrhana 


550-98 


Albania 


550-87 


Greece 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-59 


Angola 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-82 


Guyana 


Doo-ioy 


Australia 


oou-ioi 


Honduras 


550-176 


Austria 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-21 


India 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-o8 


T 

Iran 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-61 


Burma 


550-25 


Israel 


550-37 


Burundi/Rwanda 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


jou— i oy 


i^nau 


Dj\J— 00 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea, North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic/Haiti 


550-76 


Mongolia 


550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-167 


Finland 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-46 


Panama 



415 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-1 R5 


X CI Md.ll V^JUII OLdLCo 




Turkey 


550-42 


Peru 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-72 


P n 1 1 1 r* r* l n ^ q 

X lllllUUlllLo 


550-97 


I r~i 1 rn iqu 
\J 1 lig Lldy 


550-162 


Poland 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-160 


Romania 


550-1 83 


X CIUCHo, x lie 


550-51 


u a u u i ni aula. 


550-99 


Y 1 1 (TO Q 1 7K\J\7K 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 




550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


R^O-184 


Sin orannrp 


550-171 




550-86 


Si o m ^ 1 1 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Sovi<*t TTmnn 






550-179 








550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 






550-53 


Thailand 







416 



PIN: 004192-000 



